1. Present First Appeal has been preferred by the Appellants-Original claimants under Section-23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order dated 03/02/2012 passed in Case No. MX- 0400059 by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ahmedabad on the grounds stated in the memo of Appeal.
2. The original claimant was the passenger who had boarded Ahmedabad-Bhavnagar Intercity Express on 28/04/2002. When the train reached Bhavnagar and when the passengers were getting down including original claimant from the coach, due to sudden jerk he fell down and received serious injuries on both the legs as stated in the appeal memo. The claimant was taken to Divisional Railway Hospital and the operation was performed on both the legs. It is in this circumstance the claim has been made by filing aforesaid application. The claim was filed by the original claimant who ultimately died during the pendency of the case. The claim petition was preferred before the Railway Claims Tribunal for compensation. However, as there was a delay of 1 years and 7 months and 27 days, the Railway Claims Tribunal passed an order impugned refusing to condone the delay. Therefore, the present First Appeal has been preferred by the appellants- original claimants who are heirs and legal representatives of the deceased claimant.
3. Heard learned Advocate Mr. U. M. Shastri for the Appellants-original claimants and learned Advocate Mr. Ravi Karnavat for the Respondent.
4. Learned advocate Mr. U. M. Shastri for the appellant has referred to and relied upon the judgment of Kerala High Court in case of Pushpakaran v. Union of India reported in 2008 ACJ 2469 and submitted that the Railway Claims Tribunal can condone the delay on sufficient reasons applying Section-5 of the Limitation Act. He therefore submitted that the Railway Claims Tribunal while passing the impugned judgment and order has failed to appreciate this aspect, and therefore, the present First Appeal may be allowed.
5. Learned advocate Mr. Ravi Karnavat for the respondent has resisted the appeal contending that it is a Tribunal Establishment General and special statute and therefore limitation act would not apply.
6. In view of this rival submission, it is required to be considered whether the impugned judgment and order passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal can be sustained or not.
7. It is evident that the impugned judgment and order has referred to Section-17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act and refused to condone the delay. However, Railway Claims Tribunal Act has to be read with Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules. The provision of Section-18(3) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act has been referred to by the Kerala High Court also and referring to this very issue relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court and it has been stated that such a Tribunal will have the power and jurisdiction to condone the delay.
8. It is required to be noted that the Railway Claims Tribunal Act has been set up with the objects stated therein, and when such a Tribunal has been set up with the Rules, which refer to the procedure, the Courts or the Tribunals are normally governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, any such application or the procedure has to be considered in light of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which in turn provide for the provisions of the Limitation Act. Therefore, unless there is any specific exclusion, the provisions of the Limitation Act particularly Section-5 of the Limitation Act will come into play. In other words unless there is a specific provision, all such Tribunals or the Courts created and functioning under the statute have their own procedure, which they apply to the Rules of Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore the Limitation Act would also be attracted. If there is a specific provision in the Code of Civil Procedure itself laying down the limitation, then the Limitation Act may not apply or the Code of Civil Procedure may not apply. However, even if there is a special statute providing for the procedure as well as limitation, it has to be considered in light of Section- 29(2) of the Limitation Act which is a central act provided for the aspect of limitation. The provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act provide:
“Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
9. Therefore, unless there is a specific provision, the Limitation Act would be attracted and it will apply to all the proceedings under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. Moreover, the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of P.Sarathy v. State Bank of India, (2000) 5 SCC 355 has interpreted the provisions of Section-5 of the Limitation Act and observed that Section-5 of the Limitation Act would be attracted and the court need not be a civil court, but it will be sufficient if the authority or Tribunal have trappings of court. In other words any such authority or Tribunal having the trappings of the court will be governed by the Limitation Act, and as there is no specific exclusion, the Code of Civil Procedure will apply. Therefore, present First Appeal deserves to be allowed.
10. It is in these circumstances, the present Appeal stands allowed. The impugned order passed by the Railway Claims Tribunal, Ahmedabad refusing to condone the delay is hereby quashed and set aside. The delay in filing the claim petition is condoned.
11. It is further directed that the Railway Claims Tribunal shall decide the application/claim petition on merits in accordance with law within a period of three months.
(RAJESH H.SHUKLA, J.) (ila)