Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
Facts in brief of the present case appeal are that M/S Suchi Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as a firm) is a proprietorship firm, engaged in the business for supply of materials to the Government Department and other private sectors having its registered office at 4/284 Parvati Bagla Road, Flat No.504 Navsheel Sadan Kanpur Nagar (herein after referred to as the Factory). Firm is also registered with the Ordinance Equuipment Factory Kanpur, allotted the Code No.S-01010000 in the year 1985-86. Since then, giving the supply of the items against the tender issued by the factory.
On 9.4.2009, Ordinance Equipment Factory, Kanpur had not issued the tender to the plaintiff/appellant whereas issued to the other firms for supply of the materials/items. In this regard, the grievance has been raised, but no heed paid, so the plaintiff/appellant for redressal of his grievances, filed Original Suit No.405 of 2010.
After exchanged of the pleadings between the parties as well as documentary/oral evidence, the trial court, dismissed the suit by judgement and decree dated 26.3.2012. Thereafter, Civil Appeal No.68 of 2012 , filed by the firm also dismissed by judgment and decree dated 11.07.2014 by appellate court/Additional District and Sessions Judge, Court No.24, Kanpur Nagar Accordingly, the present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-appellant, pressed on the following substantial question of law :-
"Whether the department/organization can debar/restrain its bonafide registered supplier from the placing of an order on the ground that the registered bonafide supplier is having a business relation with a firm/organization who have been allegedly black listed by the department/organization concerned ?"
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the firm is registered with Ordinance Equuipment Factory Kanpur and supplying the material as per the tender issued. However, without any justification or reason w.e.f. 9.4.2009, the factory has stopped issuing of tender to the plaintiff. As per direction issued by the Factory Board, Kolkata, the tender has not been issued to the appellant because firm is having business relation with M/S Anurag Trading Company who has been black listed, the said action is wholly illegal and arbitrary in nature, categorically brought before the courts below, but without taking into consideration the said facts, the courts below have passed the judgments and decrees against the plaintiff/appellant, so liable to be set aside.
I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.
In order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, I feel appropriate to through the provisions as provided under Section 14 as well as Section 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act relevant portion quoted herein below :-
"Section 14 - (1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely :-
(a) a contract for the non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief;
(b) a contract which runs into such minute or numerous details or which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties, or othewise from its nature is such, that the Court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms;
(c) a contract which is in its nature determinable;
(d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the Court cannot supervise.
Section 41 (e) - to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced."
As per the said provisions, the grant of specific performance of a contract is not a matter of absolute right in the parties demanding. It is said to be a matter of grace and application for such relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The right to specific performance depends on the mutuality of obligations and of remedy.
A decree for specific performance of contract will not be granted if it would be or could be made, nugatory and useless or if it would be ineffectual or not beneficial to the plaintiff. Generally equity will not decree the specific performance of contract which may be terminated or abandoned by either of the parties at any time. Similarly, where the performance of the contract is impossible and the decree of specific performance cannot be enforced, the court will deny the remedy.
In "Restatement of the Law", Second Series, Contract 2d., vol.3, it has been mentioned that a promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude of the performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate to the advantage to be gained from enforcement. Similarly, a promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.
Accordingly, a court does not deem it expedient to make a decree for specific performance of a contract which runs into minute or numerous details, and leaves a party to seek his remedy in damages. In such cases, the court refuses to interfere, not because the court cannot formulate a decree which shall order everything necessary for a complete performance or which shall not be absolutely incapable of compulsory execution but because the enforcement of the decree would unreasonably tax the time, attention and resources of the court, and thereby interfere too much with its public duties to other suitors, and in the general administration of justice. Upon the same principle, a court often abstains from enforcing in specie a contract to execute works which the court cannot superintend. This clause does not supply any test whereby the limit of the court's capacity for superintendence may be determined. It is vague. The court may also sometimes find it not in the public interest to decree specific performance in a particular case.
Now reverting to the facts and circumstances of the case, from the perusal of the judgments and decree passed by the courts below while dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff, the trial court has given the following finding :-
"इस प्रकार से उपरोक्त समग्र विश्लेषण से स्पष्ट है कि किसी फर्म या व्यक्ति को टेंडर जारी करना या न करना नियमानुसार नीतियों के अधीन रहते हुए प्रतिवादी पक्ष का अपना विवेकीय अधिकार है । वादी इस तथ्य को वर्णित आधारो पर यहाँ साबित करने में विफल रहा है कि शाश्वत रूप से अन्नतकाल तक याचित अनुतोष के परिप्रेक्ष्य में स्थाई निषेधाज्ञा प्राप्त करने का वह अधिकारी है । अतः वादबिंदु स. १ वादी के विरुद्ध नकारात्मक रूप से निर्णीत किया जाता है तथा उपरोक्त समग्र विश्लेषण व विवेचना के प्रकाश में वादबिंदु स.2 तदनुसार निस्तारित किया जाता है |"
Further, the appellate court had confirmed the finding given by the trial court while deciding the appeal as well as given a finding relevant portion quoted herein below :-
"प्रतिवादी द्वारा उसे टेंडर दिया जाता रहा है और वादपत्र में अंकित तिथियों से वादी को टेंडर देना बंद किया गया, यधपि प्रतिवादिपक्ष की ओर से यह त्रुटि की गयी है कि टेंडर न दिए जाने का कोई कारण वादी को उसके पत्रो के उत्तर में नहीं बताया गया, किन्तु विचारण के स्तर पर जब प्रतिवादी द्वारा इस तथ्य का खुलासा कर दिया गया कि काली सूचि में डाली गयी मेसर्स अनुराग ट्रेडिंग कंपनी का वादी की फर्म से सम्बन्ध है, तब वादी के लिए यह आवश्यक था कि यह साक्ष्य से यह सिद्ध करता कि मेसर्स अनुराग ट्रेडिंग कंपनी से उसका कोई सम्बन्ध नहीं है और प्रतिवादिपक्ष द्वारा जो रिपोर्ट प्रस्तुत की गयी है, वह गलत है किन्तु उस रिपोर्ट को खंडित करने के सम्बन्ध में कोई अन्य साक्ष्य वादी द्वारा प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया है । दूसरा बिंदु यह है कि प्रतिवादी स.2 को आर्डिनेंस फैक्ट्री बोर्ड, कलकत्ता के द्वारा निर्देश दिया गया कि अनुराग ट्रेडिंग कंपनी से सम्बन्ध रखने वाली किसी भी फर्म को टेंडर न दिया जाए , किन्तु वादी ने स्वयं आर्डिनेंस फैक्ट्री बोर्ड, कलकत्ता के विरुद्ध कोई भी अनुतोष याचित नहीं किया है । यह सही है की वादी को व्यवसाय करने का विधिक अधिकार प्राप्त है, किन्तु यदि यह व्यवसाय दूसरे पक्ष के साथ किन्ही शर्तो के उल्लंघन के कारण अथवा शर्तों को पूर्ण न करने के कारण बाधित होता है अथवा विच्छेदित होता है तो वादी बिना उन शर्तो को पूरा किये अथवा विसंगतियों को दूर किये दूसरे पक्ष को व्यवसाय के लिए बाध्य नहीं कर सकता है और जैसा की विशिष्ट अनुतोष अधिनियम की धरा-४१ (आई) में कहा गया है की निषेधाज्ञा का व्यादेश उन मामलों में प्रदान नहीं किया जायेगा, जहाँ वादी का आचरण अथवा उसके अगेंटो का आचरण ऐसा है, जो उन्हें न्यायालय से सहायता प्राप्त करने के लिए अयोग्य ठहराता है। वर्तमान मामले में वादी का आचरण इस प्रकार का है कि उसने प्रतिवादी द्वारा प्रस्तुत साक्ष्य जैसे तथ्यों को छिपाकर अथवा उन्हें प्रकट होने पर उनका कोई खंडन न कर स्वच्छ हाथों से न्यायालय के समक्ष नहीं आया है और वर्तमान मामले में अवर न्यायालय द्वारा निषेधाज्ञा का आदेश पारित न करके कोई भी विधिक त्रुटि नहीं की गयी है। चूकिं प्रतिवादी स.-२ ने अपने साक्ष्य में उल्लेखित तथ्य, जो कि सम्यक आधार है, के अनुसार वादी को टेंडर जारी नहीं किया है और ऐसे मामले में वादी को शाश्वत व्यादेश का अनुतोष प्रदान नहीं किया जा सकता । परिणामतः यह सिविल अपील सव्यय ख़ारिज किये जाने योग्य है | Keeping in view the concurrent finding given by the courts below as well as the provisions as provided under Section 14 and Section 41 (e) of the Specific Relief Act, the appellant/plaintiff registered with the Ordinance Equuipment Factory Kanpur, allotted the Code No.S-01010000 in the year 1985-86, cannot claim to get a tender for supply of the material as a matter of right. So, the judgments passed by the courts below are perfectly valid rather in accordance with law as laid down by this Court in the case of Union Construction Co. v. Chief Engineer, E.C., AIR 1960 All 72, wherein this Court interpreted the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act and relevant portion quoted as under :-
"A building of engineering contract requires technical knowledge and long experience in the line for executing the works covered by the contract. It is thus a contract which is dependent on the personal qualifications and volition of the parties and is also of such a nature that the court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms."
The said view has been further reiterated by this Court in the case of Nagar Mahapalika Kanpur vs. Punjab Association 1980 ALL LJ 869.
In view of the above said facts, findings recorded by the Courts below cannot be set aside on flimsy arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and without there being any question of law. In the instant case, arguments of the counsel for the appellants are factual in nature and by no stretch of imagination can constitute substantial questions of law. Re-appraisal of evidence is not permissible. Interference of the facts from recital or content of the document or after shifting oral evidence does not leave any scope of re-appraisal in exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 C.P.C.
It is well settled by a long series of decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and of this Court, that a High Court, in second appeal, cannot go into questions of fact, however, erroneous the findings of fact recorded by the courts of fact may be, the learned counsel for the appellant did not and could not contend that the High Court was competent to go behind the findings of fact concurrently recorded by the two courts of fact. (See Mustafa Vs. Vakil @ Iqbal and another 2008 (105) RD 392).
The Apex Court depreciated the liberal construction and generous application of provisions of section 100 C.P.C. Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that only because there is another view possible on appreciation of evidence that can not be sufficient for interference under section 100 C.P.C. For ready reference, extract of paragraph No.7, of the vase of Veerayee Ammal V. Seeni Ammal reported in 2002 (1) SCC 134=2001(45) ALR 691 (SC) is quoted below:
"7......We have noticed with distress that despite amendment, the provisions of section 100 of the Code have been liberally construed and generously applied by some judges of the High Courts with the result that objective intended to be achieved by the amendment of section 100 appears to have been frustrated. Even before the amendment of section 100 of the Code, the concurrent finding of facts could not be disturbed in the second appeal."
In the case of Santosh Hazari V. Purshottam Tiwari reported in 2001 (92) RD 336 (SC) had held that a point of law which admits of no two opinions may be preposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be 'substantial' a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. If will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of the each case whether a question of law is substantial one and involved in the case or not. The same view has been expressed again by the Apex Court in the case of Govinda Raju Vs. Marriamman 2005 (98) RD 731.
For the fore-going reasons, no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. The judgement and decree under challenged in the present case is perfectly valid and needs no interference.
In the result, the second appeal lacks merit and is dismissed.
Order Date :- 27.8.2014 Mahesh