JUDGMENT Vinod Prasad, J.
1. The applicant through the present application has applied for bail in crime No. 23 of 2005, under Sections 307/302 I.P.C. & 3(2)(5) S.C./S.T. Act, P.S. Bishungarh, district Kannauj.
2. The bail prayer of the applicant has been rejected by the learned Sessions Judge on 21.9.2005 vide bail application No. 488 of 2005 vide annexure No. 15 of the affidavit appended along with this bail application.
3. The prosecution allegations against the applicant as is perceptable from the F.I.R. (annexure No. l) are that Sher Singh, the brother of informant Shyam Babu was in jail in some case. The informant Shyam Babu accompanied by his bahanoi Anant Ram and Rameshwar, Kaleshwar, Lallu and Shyam Babu had gone to see him in jail at Kannauj on 24.3.2005. While returning after the said visit in a private Jeep to Bishungarh, they had co-passengers Man Singh Yadav @ Neta, Subash (present applicant), Nayab Singh and Girver in the same Jeep. When their Jeep reached near Babu Singh Inter College in Village Mahamood Pur Khas proceedings towards Nadanpur culvert at 5.00 P.M. then the aforesaid four co-passengers Man Singh Yadav @ Neta, Subash (present applicant), Nayab Singh and Raj Kumar got the Jeep forcibly stopped and dragged out Anant Ram and Rameshwar, the two persons accompanying the informant and shot dead Anant Ram and caused firearm injuries to Rameshwar and also to one Tabeej Nath, who was also a co-traveller in the same Jeep. The police meanwhile arrived and sent the injured persons to the Government Hospital, Chibbramau for treatment. The accused after the incident escaped towards Shankerfurki. The informant Shyam Babu got the F.I.R. scribed through Ram Singh regarding the said incident and lodged it at police station Bishungarh as crime No. 23 of 2005 under Sections 307, 302 I.P.C. on that date itself at 6.35 P.M. covering a distance of six and a half kilometers south of the place of incident. Subsequently, another injured Rameshwar also lost his life because of the injury sustained by him in the said incident. The postmortem reports of the deceased persons Anant Ram and Rameshwar are annexed as annexure No. 5 and 6 respectively to this bail application which indicates that they had sustained firearm gunshot wound of injuries and the cause of their death was antimortem firearm injuries. The injury report of injured Tabeej Nath (annexure No. 2) indicates that he too sustained firearm injuries. On the aforesaid factual matrix the present applicant Subash has applied for his bail.
4. I have heard Sri Prem Prakash Yadav, learned Counsel for the applicant in support of this bail application and the learned A.G.A. in opposition.
5. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the applicant that in this case initially, in the F.I.R. the role of shooting was assigned to all the four accused persons but subsequently the prosecution developed its case and assigned the role of shooting to Nayab Singh and Raj Kumar and anointed the applicants Subash and co-accused Man Singh with the role of catching hold. He further contended that the co-accused Man Singh, who has been assigned the role of catching hold had already been granted bail by this Court on 29.5.2006 vide Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 10470 of 2006. He had filed the said bail granting order of the co-accused Man Singh on an affidavit as annexure No. Nil appended along with the listing application filed by him on 6.6.2006. He contended that on the same reasoning on which co-accused Man Singh has been granted bail by this Court the applicant is also entitled to be released on bail. Learned Counsel for the applicant also contended that there is no evidence of tempering and the sessions Judge has wrongly considered that the applicant is trying to temper with evidence.
6. Learned A.G.A. on the other hand contended that it is a day light incident in which two persons have lost their lives and one person has sustained one gunshot injury. He submitted that the F.I.R. was lodged promptly and the applicant should not be granted bail as he and his associates have tried to tamper with prosecution evidences and therefore, the fair trial is not possible.
7. From the arguments stated above harangued by the rival sides it is clear that the applicant is seeking bail in a dare devil day light incident where two persons have been shot dead after being dragged out from the jeep in which they were travelling and one person has received gun shot injuries. The main ground is that the co accused similarly situated had already been released on bail and therefore the applicant is also entitled to the same treatment. This leads to a question as to whether the applicant's case is identical to that of the co-accused or there is some distinction between the two and can this be accepted as a rule of law that only on the ground of parity where the co- accused had been granted bail the other co-accused in the subsequent bail application is also entitled to be released? This question no longer remains re Integra. It had been raised time and again before this Court. The said question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court reported in 1983 AWC 148, Sunder Lal v. State of U.P. This Court was pleased to observe thus:
The learned Counsel only pointed out that by reason of fact that other co- accused had been admitted to bail the applicant should also be granted bail. This argument alone would not be sufficient for admitting the applicant to bail who is involved in a triple murder case.
8. In an another division bench judgement of this Court reported in 1993 ACC 281 Nanha v. State of UP(DB). the said question came up for consideration again. The Division Bench went into a detailed discussion on the said question and Hon'ble G.D. Dubey J. was pleased to observe in para 22 thereof thus:
From the cases discussed above, we find that parity alone had not been considered as a around for release on bail. A full bench of this Court as well as Supreme Court had refused to release an applicant on bail simply because the other co- accused had been released on bail. In the case of Capt. Jagjit Singh and Sunder Lal, Supreme Court and High Court examined the case of each applicant on it's own footing, even though co- accused had been released on bail.
(Emphasis mine).
His Lordship was further pleased to observe that "On the examination of cases cited before us I am of opinion that the case of an accused has to be examined individually."
Giving the answer to the question referred Hon'ble G.D. Dubey J. in the aforesaid judgement Nanha (Supra) was further pleased to hold that:
... parity can not be the sole around for granting bail even at the stage of second or third or subsequent bail application when the bail application of the co accused whose bail applications had been earlier rejected are allowed and co- accused is released on bail. Even then the court has to satisfy itself that,...there are sufficient grounds for releasing the applicant on bail.
(Emphasis mine).
9. Hon'ble Virendra Saran J. though delivered a separate judgement in the aforesaid case but was pleased to observe thus:
All the accused of a case always do not stand on the same footing.... Even if role assigned to various accused is same vet they may stand on different footing.
His Lordship was further pleased to observe in the afore said judgement that:
None the less the principle of grant of bail on parity can not be allowed to be carried to an absurd or illogical conclusion so as to out a Judge in a tight and strait Jacket to grant bail automatically. There may be cases which may require exception : where a judge may not simply take a different view from the Judge who granted bail earlier to a co- accused but where the conscious of the Judge revolts in granting bail. In such situation the Judge may choose to depart from the rule recording his reasons.
10. The above quoted portion of full Bench judgment has also been quoted with approval by both the Hon'ble Judges in the case of Nanha (Supra).
In the case of Chander alias Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 1997 (34) ACC 311 Hon'ble Markandey Katju J. as His Lordship then was also observed thus:
No doubt the view of a brother Judge deserves great respect, and ordinarily it should be followed, but there may be cases where the Judge can not agree with his brother Judge who granted bail to the co- accused for instance a case of day light murder where the accused persons are named in the first information report and assigned a specific role which resulted in the death, and the medical and other evidence are corroborative of the prosecution version. In such a case if one Judge has granted bail of a co- accused must the other Judge also grant bail even if he feels that by no stretch of imagination could bail have been granted in such a case. In my humble opinion the answer has to be in the negative.
11. This case Chander @ Chandra was subject to a reference by Hon'ble Markandey Katju, 1 and while deciding the said reference in a Division Bench reported in 1998 CRI.LJ. 2374 Chander @ Chandra v. State of U.P. Hon'ble G.P. Mathur, J. was pleased to hold that:
A judge is not bound to grant bail to an accused on the around of parity even where the order granting bail to an identically placed co-accused contains reasons, if the same has been passed in flagrant violation of well settled principle and ignores to take into consideration the relevant factors essential for granting bail.
12. Grant of bail on the question of parity also came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of State v. Capt. Jaqiit Singh 1962 SC 253. While deciding the said argument it was laid down by the apex court that:
It is true that the two of the persons who were prosecuted along with the respondents were released on bail prior to the commitment order; but the case of the respondent is obviously distinguishable from their case in as much as the prosecution case is that it is the respondent who is in touch with the foreign agency and not other two persons prosecuted along with him.
13. In Sol. Leave Petition No. 4059 of 2000 Rakesh Kumar Pandey v. Munni Singh @ Mata Bux Singh and Anr. decided on 12.3.2001, the Apex Court strongly denounced the order of the High Court granting bail to the co-accused on the ground of parity in a heinous offence and while cancelling the bail granted by the High Court it observed that:
The High Court on being moved, has considered the application for bail and without bearing in mind the relevant materials on record as well as the gravity of offence re/eased the accused respondents on bail, since the co-accused, who had been ascribed similar role, had been granted bail earlier.
14. The Apex Court in the aforesaid law report has further observed:
Suffice it to say that for a serious charge where three murders have been committed in broad day light, the High Court has not applied its mind to the relevant materials, and merely because some of the co-accused, whom similar role has been ascribed, have been released on bail earlier, have granted bail to the present accused respondents. It is true that State normally should have moved this Court against the order in question, but at the same time the power of this Court cannot be fettered merely because the State has not moved, particularly in a case like this, where our conscience is totally shocked to see the manner in which the High Court has exercised its power for release on bail of the accused respondents. We are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter, as it may prejudice the accused in trial. But we have no doubt in our mind that the impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from gross illegality and is an order on total non-application of mind and the judgment of this Court referred to earlier analysing the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 439 cannot be of any use as we are not exercising power under Sub-section (2) of Section 439 Cr.P.C.
15. Thus from the discussions made above it is clear that bail, can be granted on the ground of parity only when all aspects relevant and germane to the grant of bail were considered by the earlier Judge on the fact and circumstances of a particular case and no distinction can be said to be deciphered between the case of the accused who is seeking bail vis-a-vis the other accused who had already been granted bail. Parity means similarly situated based on relevant considerations. If any relevant consideration had escaped the notice of the Judge on the earlier occasion while granting bail to the co- accused the said consideration can be a valid around to refuse bail to the co- accused even though the role assigned to the two of them may be similar in the incident. The around of parity is not the rule of law but it is the rule of judicial discipline and proprietary carved out by the Judges themselves since no two persons similarly situated should be treated differently in consonance with Article 14 of The Constitution Of India. But it is not the law that different persons should be treated alike or that a mistake or none consideration of a relevant fact on an earlier occasion must yield to same result at a later occasion because of principle of parity and alike treatment. It is to be born in mind that it lies on the person claiming parity to satisfy the court that all relevant aspects of the matter were considered by the Judge on the earlier occasion while exercising descrition favourable to the accused and nothing relevant and germane to the point in issue had escaped it's notice and that the case of another accused claiming parity is not distinguishable at all from such an accused. Let me remind here that bail in non-bailable offences is not a matter of right but is a judicial descrition exercised Judicially. It is not an arbitrary exercise but is a well-considered and well-analysed Judicial description based on peculiar facts of each case in consonance with judicial discipline.
16. The second rung of argument for consideration which arises automatically is as to what are the relevant factors to be considered at the time of granting bail by the courts in cases where the bail is not a matter of right but is a judicial discretion. This point should not vex the mind much as the Supreme Court time and again has dealt with this aspect in many a binding judicial pronouncements. Some of which are quoted herein after.
17. In Gurcharan Singh v. State A.I.R. 1978 SC 179 : 1978 Cri LJ 129 it was held as follows in para 24 of the reports:
The overriding considerations in granting bail to which we adverted to earlier and which are common both in the case of S. 437(1) and 5. 439(1). Cr.P.C. of the new Code are the nature and gravity of the circumstances in which the offence is committed; the position and the status of the accused with reference to the victim and the witnesses; the likelihood of the accused fleeing from Justice; are repeating the offence; of ieopadising his own life being faced with a grim prospect of possible conviction in the case of tempering with witnesses: the history of the case as well as of its investigation and other relevant grounds which, in view of so many variable factors, cannot be exhaustively set out.
18. In Babu Singh v. State of U.P. it was held as follows in para 16 of the reports:
Thus the legal principle and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals it is part of the criminoloaical history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of the society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant is, therefore, not an exercise in irrelevance.
19. On such exposition of law to be released on bail on the ground of parity, I have considered the contentions raised by both sides. From the perusal of the record of this bail application it transpires that it is a day light incident, which was executed in a dare devil manner by getting the Jeep stopped, catching hold of two deceased persons and shooting them down and causing injury to another person. It further transpires that in the F.I.R. general role of shooting has been assigned to all the accused persons but subsequently the role of catching hold has been given to the applicant along with the co-accused Man Singh. It further transpires that the co-accused. Man Singh has been granted bail by this Court as has been mentioned above. However, it also transpires that the applicant has been tempering with the prosecution evidences. Along with the bail applications the applicant has filed the affidavits of the eyewitnesses present on the spot as annexure Nos. 13 and 14 to this bail application. A perusal of the said annexure Nos. 13 and 14 clearly indicates that even the injured person Tabeej Nath had filed an affidavit before S.P. Kannauj along with the affidavits of Sanju Kumar and Ramanand. In the aforesaid affidavits they had denied only the fact of identifying of the accused persons but so far as factum of incident is concerned the same has been accepted to be corrected. Sanju Kumar was the driver of the Jeep and he had stated that at the gun-point he was forcibly made to stop the Jeep and the four persons have committed the crime. Thus, in this view of the matter it is perceptibly clear that the applicant or his associates have been trying to temper with the prosecution witnesses. The aforesaid fact of tempering with the prosecution witnesses which was relevant and germane to the consideration of bail was not considered at all by this Court (Hon'ble Shiva Shanker, J.) while granting bail to the co-accused Man Singh. A perusal of the bail granting order indicates that the aforesaid fact of tempering was never brought in the knowledge of this Court or at least it escaped its notice. One of the paramount considerations while exercising discretionary power under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is that the accused will not abscond and will co-operate with the trial and that he will not temper with the prosecution witnesses. These two criteria are relevant and germane as has been reiterated time and again by the Apex Court as well as by this Court.
20. In a recent judgment rendered by the Supreme Court 2005 (4) Crimes 58 (SC) State through CB.C.I.D v. Amarmani Tripathi it has been held that:
While a vague allegation that accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert Justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused.
The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence.
Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant.
21. It has also been observed by the Apex Court in 1978 ACC 86 Gurcharan Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration).
We may repeat the two paramount considerations viz the accused fleeing from justice and his tampering with prosecution evidence relate to ensuring a fair trial of the case in a court of justice . It is essential that due weight should be bestowed on these two factors apart from others....
(Emphasis supplied on underlined portions)
22. It has also been observed in the case of Gudicanti Narasimhulu and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh 1978 Cr.L.J. 502 by Hon'ble V.R. Krishna Iyer J. that:
It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to winch the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed also bears upon the issue.
Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the court to be freed for the time being.
(Emphasis Supplied)
23. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid guidelines laid down by the Apex Court that the paramount consideration while considering bail of an accused is as to whether the applicant will thwart the course of justice by tempering with evidences against him or not. In the present case this Court while granting bail to the co-accused has not at all dwell on this most important aspect of the matter, which has probably escaped its notice or it seems that the said fact was not brought before the Hon'ble Judge. In this context it is important to note that bail of the co-accused Man Singh was rejected by Sessions Judge on a different date in a different bail application than the present applicant. While rejecting the bail of the present applicant learned Sessions Judge has also taken into consideration the fact that the applicant is trying to temper with the prosecution witnesses.
24. Thus, in my view, the contentions of learned Counsel for the applicant that it is a case of parity cannot be accepted at all. The seventy of the incident and dare devil manner in which it was executed as well as coupled with the fact that the accused endeavoured to temper with the prosecution witnesses the case of the present applicant on that ground is distinguishable from the case of the co-accused Man Singh, who has been granted bail by this Court. I am not inclined to accept the contentions of parity raised by learned Counsel for the applicant for the aforesaid reasons.
25. On the discussion made above, I am of the view that the applicant is not entitled to be released on bail. His bail prayer is declined and this bail application is rejected.