JUDGMENT M. Katju, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the parties.
2. This special appeal has been filed against the impugned interim order of the learned Single Judge dated 16.7.2004 in Writ Petition No. 26317 of 2004.
3. It appears that the respondents were employees of the U.P. State Handloom Corporation and they had been sent on deputation to the State Urban Development Agency They were retrenched from their parent department, that is U.P. State Handloom Corporation. As a consequence, their services were also terminated in the State Urban Development Agency where they had been sent on deputation.
4. By the impugned interim order the order dated 21.5.2004 passed by the State Urban Development Agency terminating the services on deputation of these employees have been stayed and the learned Single Judge has further directed the authorities to allow the petitioners to continue in service in State Urban Development Agency and District Urban Development Agency.
5. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties in detail we are of the opinion that the impugned, order cannot be sustained. Firstly by the said interim order final relief has been granted which cannot be done as held by this Court in State of U.P. and Ors. v. Smt. Meera Sankhwar and Ors., 2004 (4) AWC 3162 Special Appeal No. 555 of 2004, decided on 12.7.2004. The entire case law on the point has been considered in the aforesaid Division Bench decision and hence we are not repeating the same.
6. The consequence of the interim order dated 16,7.2004 would be that the writ petitioners would continue in the service of State Urban Development Agency and the District Urban Development Agency. In our opinion, this amounts to giving final relief.
7. In State of Haryana v. Suman Dutta, (2000) 10 SCC 311, the Supreme Court held that a termination order should not be stayed by the High Court by means of an interim order. The Supreme Court in that decision observed:
"We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court erred in law in staying the order of termination as interim measure in the pending writ petition, By such interim order if an employee is allowed to continue in service and then ultimately the writ petition is dismissed then it would tantamount to usurpation of public office without any right to the same."
8. The ratio of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the present case.
9. Apart from the above we may also mention that the parent department of the writ petitioners was the U.P. State handloom Corporation and they had only been sent on deputation to the State Urban Development Agency and the District Urban Development Agency. When their services in the parent department was terminated (whether by way retrenchment, dismissal or otherwise) their services in the deputationist department automatically comes to an end. This is because a person has his lien only in the parent department and not in the deputationist department. If his service in the parent department is terminated than he loses his lien in the parent department, and since he has no lien in the deputationist department obviously he cannot continue in the later department.
10. Moreover, the writ petitioners had an alternative remedy of challenging the retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act/U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and hence in our opinion the writ petition itself should not have been entertained, vide U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. v. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam Karmchari Sangh, (2004) 4 SCC 268.
11. The definition of industry in the Industrial Disputes Act has been very widely interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 969, and in our opinion, the U.P. State Handloom Corporation as well as State Urban Development Agency and District Development Agency are industries. Hence if the writ petitioners wanted to challenge their retrenchment they should have raised an industrial dispute and requested the Government to make a reference to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. The High Court should not ordinarily interfere when there is an alternative remedy before the Labour Court/Tribunal.
12. For the reasons given above this appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside.
13. With the consent of both the learned Counsel for the parties in this appeal we are also disposing of the Writ Petition No. 26317 of 2004 in terms of the above order.