JUDGMENT R.K. Agrawal, J.
1. Special Appeal No. 110 of 2000, has been filed by the State-respondents against the judgment and order dated 5.11.1999 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38530 of 1999. Following the judgment and order given in the connected Writ Petition No. 13710 of 1999, Mahendra Nath Tiwari v. State of U. P. and Ors., the writ petition was allowed and the termination order dated 5.6.1973 was quashed-
2. Special Appeal No. 112 of 2000 has been filed by the State-respondents against the judgment and order dated 5.11.1999, passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38534 of 1999, wherein the learned single Judge had followed the decision of this Court in the case of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46061 of 1993, decided on 26.9.1997 Vijay Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors., and allowed the writ petition by quashing the termination order dated 20.11.1975.
3. Special Appeal No. 113 of 2000, has been filed by the State respondents against the judgment and order dated 5.11.1999, passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38533 of 1999, preferred by Girja Shanker Mishra, wherein the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition by following his order of date passed in connected Writ Petition No. 13710 of 1999, Mahendra Nath Tiwari v. State of U. P. and Ors., and had allowed the writ petition by quashing the termination order dated 26.7,1973.
4. Special Appeal No. 229 of 2000, has been filed by the, State-respondents against the judgment and order dated 8.9.1999, passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44581 of 1999 preferred by Ram Bishal Maurya by following the decision of this Court dated 26.9.1997 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 46061 of 1993, Vijay Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. and Ors.. The writ petition has been allowed and the petitioner has been directed to be reinstated on his original post of constable in P.A.C.
5. Special Appeal No. 386 of 2001, has been filed by the State-respondents against the judgment and order dated 8.9.1999, passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44592 of 1998, preferred by Tej Narain Singh wherein the learned single Judge had finally disposed of the writ petition with a direction that, in case the petitioner has not been convicted on any criminal charge and no departmental proceeding is pending against him, he shall be reinstated to his original post of constable to P.A.C.
6. Since all these special appeals raise a common question of law, they have been taken together and are being decided by a common Judgment,
7. The respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 110 of 2000, Gajadhar Pandey, was appointed as a constable in P.A.C. against substantive vacancy on 16.10.1970. After successful completion of probation period and training he was posted as a permanent constable in 26th Battalion, Gorakhpur. In May, 1973 a revolt in P.A.C. took place. The State Government lodged a F.I.R. against the person involved in the revolt. However, those persons were acquitted by the Sessions Court, which order was affirmed by this Court in appeal. Even though, Gajadhar Pandey was not named in the F.l.R. his service was terminated on 5.6.1973 by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof on the ground that his services is no longer required by treating him to be a temporary constable. It appears that the State Government took a decision to reinstate all such P.A.C. constables whose services have been terminated on account of P.A.C. revolt and who have been acquitted in the criminal charges. This decisions was taken in the year 1996-97. Gajadhar Pandey approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 13967 of 1997, which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 11.9.1997 with a direction that he may make a representation raising all his grievances before the appropriate authority, who shall decide the same in accordance with law within a specified period. The representation was rejected by the Commandant 26th Battalion P.A.C. vide order dated 26/27.11.1997. The order dated 26/27.11.1997 was once again challenged by Gajadhar Pandey by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2242 of 1998, which was disposed of by this Court on 22.1.1998 with a direction for making a fresh representation to be decided by the authorities. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction a fresh representation was made, which has also been rejected uide order dated 16.3.1998. Gajadhar Pandey challenged the aforesaid order by filing Writ Petition No. 38530 of 1999, which has been allowed by the learned single Judge uide order dated 5.11.1999.
8. Harl Narain Trlpathi, the respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 112 of 2000 was appointed as constable in P.A.C. against substantive vacancy on 10.11.1970. After successful completion of probation period and training he was posted as a permanent constable in 26th Battalion, Gorakhpur, in May, 1973, a revolt in P.A.C. took place. His services was terminated on 5.6.1973 by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof on the ground that his services are no longer required treating him to be a temporary constable. Hari Narain Trlpathi approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 14058 of 1997, which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 11.9.1997, with a direction that he may make a representation raising all his grievances before the appropriate authority, who shall decide the same in accordance with law within a specified period. The representation was rejected by the Commandant vide order dated 26.11.1997, which was again challenged before this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1804 of 1998, which was disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated 19.1.1998 directing the petitioner to make a fresh representation. The representation was rejected by the Commandant 26th Battalion P.A.C. uide order dated 17.3.1998. The order dated 17.3.1998, was once again challenged by Hari Narain Tripathl by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38534 of 1999 which has been allowed by the leaned single Judge uide order dated 5.11.1999, following the decision of this Court dated 26.9.1997, passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Wo. 46061 of 1993, Vijay Bahadur Singh v. State of U. P. arid others,
9. The respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 113 of 2000, Girja Shanker Mishra, was appointed as a constable in P.A.C. against substantive vacancy on 20.10.1964. After successful completion of probation period and training he was posted as a permanent constable in 26th Battalion, Gorakhpur. His services were terminated on 5.6.1973 by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof on the ground that his services are no longer required. Girja Shanker Mishra approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 43582 of 1997, which was disposed of uide judgment and order dated 5.11.1998 with as direction that he may make a representation raising all his grievances before the appropriate authority, who shall decide the same in accordance with law within a specified period. The representation was rejected by the Commandant 26th Battalion P.A.C. uide order dated 27.1.1998. The order dated 27.1.1998 was once again challenged by Girja Shanker Mishra by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5192 of 1998, which was disposed of by the Court on 18.2.1998 with a direction for making a fresh representation to be decided by the authorities. Pursuant to the aforesaid direction a fresh representation was made, which has also been rejected uide order dated 5.7.1998. Girja Shanker Mishra challenged the aforesaid order by filing Writ Petition No. 38533 of 1999, which has been altowed by the learned single Judge uide order dated 5.11.1999.
10. The respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 229 of 2000, Ram Bishal Maurya was appointed as a constables in P.A.C. against substantive vacancy on 1.10.1965. After successful completion of probation period and training he was posted as a .Head Constable in 26th Battalion, Gorakhpur. After his service was terminated on 30.5.1973, he was given an award for gallantly and courage by the S.S.P., Allahabad, on 22.8.1973. His services were terminated on 30.5.1973 by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof on the ground that his services are no longer required. Ram Bishal Maurya approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 17036 of 1998, which was disposed of vide judgment and order dated 18.12.1997 with a direction that he may make a representation raising all his grievances before the appropriate authority, who shall decide the same in accordance with law within a specified period. The representation was rejected by the Commandant vide order dated 23.3.1998. The order dated 28.3.1998, was once again challenged by Ram Bishal Maurya by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 44581 of 1998, which was disposed of by this Court on 8.9.1999 with a direction that in case the petitioner has not been convicted on any criminal charge and no departmental proceeding is pending against him, he shall be reinstated to his original post of Constable in P.A.C.
11. The respondent-writ petitioner in Special Appeal No. 386 of 2001, Tej Narain Singh was appointed as constable in P.A.C. against substantive vacancy on 22.3.1967. After successful completion of probation period and training he was posted as a constable in 26th Battalion, Gorakhpur. His services were terminated on 30.5.1973 by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof on the ground that his services are no longer required. Tej Narain Singh approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No. 44592 of 1998, which was disposed of finally vide judgment and order dated 8.9.1999 with a direction that in case the petitioner has not been convicted on any criminal charge and no departmental proceeding is pending against him, he shall be reinstated to his original post of constable in P.A.C.
12. We have heard Sri Sabhajit Yadav, learned standing counsel for the appellants and Sri R.N. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner in all the special appeals.
13. The learned standing counsel submitted that so far as Gajadhar Pandey, Hari Narain Tripathi, Girja Shanker Mishra and Tej Narain Singh are concerned, they were all temporary police constables and their services had been terminated by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. It does not cause any stigma nor can be said to be punitive in nature. Thus, the learned single Judge was not justified in directing their reinstatement. In respect of Ram Bishal Maurya, the learned standing counsel submitted that he was a temporary Head Constable and, therefore, his services had rightly been terminated by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. It was further submitted that in all these cases, the order of termination was passed in the year 1973 and they had approached this Court fori the first time in the year 1997, i.e., after more than 24 years. Thus, they are not entitled for reinstatement in service. He submitted that the respondent-writ petitioners are guilty of laches and the writ petitions ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone. In support thereof, he relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1992 SC 141, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows :
"Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because other similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result, of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner's contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Article 14 of the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant of the relief to the petitioners, in the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory, as asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioners."
14. Sri R.N. Tripathi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioners, however, submitted that those P.A.C. constables, who were terminated on account of being involved in P.A.C. revolt and were named in the F.I.R. the Government took a decision to reinstate them in the year 1996-97 and only thereafter a cause of action had arisen to the respondent-writ petitioners. Thus, the petitioners cannot be said to be guilty of laches, as they had approached this Court in the year 1997 Itself. He further submitted that all the respondents-writ petitioners were appointed against the substantive vacancy and they were put on probation. The rules did not provide for extension of probation period on completion. The respondent-writ petitioners automatically got confirmed to that post. He relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Maurya v. V.P. Cooperative Sugar Factory Federation and Ors., 1986 (53) FLR 281. He further relied upon another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 and State of Gujarat v. Akhilesh Singh Bhargava and Ors., 1987 (4) SCC 482. Sri Tripathl further submitted that even though, the services have been terminated by giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof, but the fact of the matter is that the services have been terminated on account of P.A.C, revolt, which would be further established from the certificate given by the Commandant 26th Battalion, Gorakhpur, to Gajadhar Pandey to the effect that his services were terminated during the P.A.C. revolt and merely because a specific entry has not been made in the character roll to that effect will not change the situation. Girja Shanker Mishra was also given good entries in the character roll and he was working since 6.7.1965 on various posts. He relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 5.1.1988 passed in Civil Appeal No. 2366-67 of 1986, Shesh Narain Awasthi v. State of U. P, and Ors., wherein the discharge order dated 27.5.1973 of a temporary police constable without holding any enquiry on account of the alleged active part taken in the activity of unrecognised police Karmchari Parishad. though innocuous was held to be violative of Article 311 of the Constitution. He further submitted that this Court in Writ Petition No. 2208 of 1981 (SIB) Naroottam Singh Tomar v. U. P. Public Service Tribunal and Ors., decided on 22.8.2000. had directed for reinstatement in service of the petitioner therein, even though the order of termination on the face of it was a simpliciter order of discharge. The Court relied upon the decision of Chhavinath Singh v. U. P. Public Service Tribunal 1997 (3) AWC 1604, against which the special leave petition has also been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30.7.2001 being petition for special leave to Appeal No, 4391 of 2001. Thus, he submitted that the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge does not call for interference.
15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we find that the services of the respondent-writ petitioners were terminated in the year 1973 by giving one month's pay in lieu of notice. They had approached this Court for the first time in the year 1997. All those police constables whose names were mentioned in the F.I.R. and whose services were terminated on account of taking part in the P.A.C. revolt after their acquittal were reinstated in service on account of the decision taken by the Government in the year 1996-97. These respondent-writ petitioners immediately thereafter approached this Court. In the first instance, this Court directed the respondent-writ petitioners to make a representation before the concerned authorities. The representations were rejected and thereafter they had approached this Court by filing writ petitions giving rise to the present special appeals. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent-writ petitioners are guilty of laches. It is to be remembered that our State is a welfare State. If the services of those constables, who took part in P.A.C, revolt and indulged in criminal activities can be reinstated by the State Government without their termination order having been set aside on account of a policy decision, the cases of the respondent-writ petitioners, who did not indulge in any criminal activity and whose services were terminated by giving one month's pay in lieu of notice stood in a better footing. The State ought to have reinstated such persons also. Thus, we are of the view that the State has acted arbitrary in not reinstating them while reinstating other set of persons whose services were terminated in specific charge, the cause being common, i.e., P.A.C. revolt, and they had to approach this Court. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent-writ petitioners were guilty of laches. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as relied upon by the learned standing counsel would not be applicable in the peculiar facts of this case, as the Hon'ble Supreme Court had dismissed the special leave petition in respect of similarly situate employees, namely, Chhavi Nath Singh and Narottam Singh Tomar, who had filed the claim petition before the U. P. Public Service Tribunal where the order of discharge was simplicitor like the present one.
16. In the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U. P. State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Anr., 1998 (4) AWC 201 (SC) : AIR 1999 SC 609 : Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U. P. and Ors., 2000 (3) AWC 1848 (SC) ; AIR 20OO SC 1706 and in the case of Pawanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences and Anr., 2002 (1) AWC 42 (SC) : AIR 2002 SC 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the principles where an order of discharge simplicitor can be considered to be punitive or stigmatic. There is no dispute that the services of all the respondent-writ petitioners were terminated on account of P.A.C. revolt, even though their order of discharge did not mention anything about it. The intention being clear and all such P.A.C. constables, who stood in a position worse than the present respondent- writ petitioners, as they were named in the F.I.R. and their services were terminated on that account have been reinstated discriminating the respondents-writ petitioners. Thus, there is no justification for not reinstating them. In these background, the order of discharge has to be held to be punitive.
17. So far as the question of discharging the respondent-writ petitioners without holding any inquiry is concerned, we find that their services have been terminated during the P.A.C. revolt. Girja Shanker Mishra and Ram Bishal Maurya had been promoted on the post of Head Constable and had also been awarded good entries, even though, the order of discharge is simplicitor in nature, but in the background of the development that had taken place at the relevant time, it can be said that their termination order on account of P.A.C. revolt, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shesh Narain Awasthi (supra), is violatlve of Article 311 of the Constitution, as no enquiry whatsoever was held in the matter. Further all such persons, who are involved in the P.A.C. revolt and were named in the F.I.R. after their acquittal, have been reinstated in service. The State Government cannot give a different treatment to other constables, may be even if their services are temporary in nature.
18. In the case of Chandra Prakash Shahi (supra), the Apex Court has, while considering para 541 of the U. P. Police Regulations which provided for two years period of probation, held that as the Regulation is silent as to the maximum period beyond which the period of probation cannot be extended, the period of probation shall be treated to have been extended as a permanent status can be equated only by means of a specific order of confirmation. The learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioners have not brought any material on record to show that any specific order of confirmation has been passed. Thus, the plea that all the respondents-writ petitioners have acquired a permanent status cannot be accepted in view of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, which related to U. P. Police Regulations, which are applicable in the present case.
19. In view of the foregoing discussions, the judgments and orders passed by the learned single Judge do not suffer from any legal infirmity. All the special appeals fail and are dismissed.