JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. Heard Sri S.N. Singh, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the petitioners.
2. The petitioners have challenged the judgment dated 16.3.2004 passed by the District Judge, Kushi Nagar. There is a delay of two years and 124 days in approaching the writ Court. The explanation for condoning the delay has been averred in paragraph-18 of the writ petition which stated that the department sought permission for filing the writ petition and, in that regard, the file had to pass from one table to another table and, therefore, that it took some time in granting the permission. The said paragraph further stated that the Court should take a lenient view, while condoning the delay, in the cases filed on behalf of the State Government.
3. The State Government is not above the law and that it cannot be treated differently from that of a common litigant. The law applies equally to all, including the State Government. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State, as a litigant, should be equally treated and that the law should be administered in an even handed manner. The law of limitation is the same for a common litigant as well as for the State Government. A common litigant has to arrange for the requisite expenses and make arrangement for his boarding and lodging. He also has to choose an advocate of his choice. These are time consuming process, but the same has to be done within a' stipulated period. On the other hand, the State Government has all the requisite infrastructure to file a writ petition as early as possible. Merely, because the State Government is an impersonal machinery does not mean that the Government can work at its own pace and leisure.
4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, extends the period of limitation in filing an application or an appeal and gives a power to the Court to admit the appeal or an application after the prescribed period. The only condition is, that the applicant or the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the stipulated period. Though, the Limitation Act is not applicable in a writ jurisdiction, nonetheless, the principles can be applied and the Court can decline to entertain a writ petition, on the ground of laches, if sufficient cause is not shown.
5. What constitutes "sufficient cause" cannot be laid down by any hard and fast principle. The discretion given to the Court cannot be defined or crystallised in a rigid rule of law. The Supreme Court in a number of cases has observed that the expression "sufficient cause" should be construed liberally if it finds that the litigant had acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the matter. If the Court finds that there was lack of bonafide or negligence on the part of the party, the application was liable to be refused.
6. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. the Supreme Court held that even though the Court should adopt a liberal approach in condoning the delay, the law of limitation was required to be administered in an even handed manner and that a litigant, including the State, should be accorded the same treatment, though certain amount of latitude was permissible to be given to the State Government on account of its impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology. Similar view was held by the Supreme Court in the case of The Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:
It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. It would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedantic.
7. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krislmamurthy , the Supreme Court held as under:
It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
8. The reason for such a different stance is thus:
The primary function of a court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.
Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is previous and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, never causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium [It is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation]. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
9. The Supreme Court in State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. the Supreme Court after analysing its earlier judgment held -
After referring to the various judgments reported in New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra , Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram AIR 1917 PC 156, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari , Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi , Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan 1969(2) SCC 770, State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe 1981 Supp. SCC 72, Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath 1982(3) SCC 366, O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh 1984(4) SCC 66, Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji , Prabha v. Ram Prakash Kalra 1987 Supp. SCC 339, G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer , Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India , Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India , Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 487, Ram Kishan v. U.P.S.R.TC. 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 507 and Warlu v. Gangotribai 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 37; this Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. UT held:
It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 percent of the cases filed in this Court be it by private party or the State- are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note- making, file pushing, and passing -on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient case. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision to give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file the appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.
10. To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma .
In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31 years. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy this Court held that the purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for the general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the explanation given does not smack malafides or is not shown to have been put forth as a part of dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In this context it was observed:
It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases, delay of a very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower court.
11. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the State Government being an impersonal machinery and because of its bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing -on-the buck ethos, certain amount of latitude is required provided it shows sufficient cause. In the present case, sufficient cause which has been alleged is that the file had to travel from one table to another and consequently, in the cases relating to the State Government, the Court should take a liberal approach. Necessary details are lacking in this regard. Nothing has been stated or brought on the record as to when the permission was sought from the higher authority for filing a writ petition. No details have been given as to how the delay occurred from one table to another table. Merely by making a bald statement that the delay occurred because of the movement of the file from one table to another does not come within the parameter of the words "sufficient cause" for the court to exercise its discretion and condone the delay. If there had been a delay at the behest of some officer or employee, some responsibility should have been fixed upon that officer or employee concerned, but no such allegation has been made. Further the averment that the court should take a lenient view in matters relating to the State Government is a clear indication that the State Government thinks that it is above the law and that it can get away with anything. In my opinion, these averments are insufficient for the Court to hold that sufficient cause was made out by the petitioner for condoning the delay and for the Court to entertain a petition beyond the stipulated period. In the opinion of the Court, on the basis of a bald averment, sufficient cause has not been explained and therefore, the Court is not inclined to give any kind of latitude to the State Government. Consequently, the Court is not inclined to entertain this writ petition at this belated stage.
12. The writ petition is dismissed on the ground of laches.