JUDGMENT O.N. Khandelwal, J.
1. This revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. has been preferred against the order dated 2.4.2004, passed by District Judge, Lucknow in an execution case whereby revisionists' objection moved under Section 47 of the C.P.C. has been rejected.
2. Relevant facts of the case, are that in pursuance of an agreement between the parties of this revision, with regard to execution of some work in Joshi Math, district Chamoli (now in Uttaranchal), the dispute was referred to the arbitrator by order of the High Court dated 24.3 1998 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
3. Sri G.S. Pandey the then District Judge, Faizabad, was appointed as arbitrator. The claim of the respondent was allowed partly whereby he was held entitled to get Rs. 2,24,111 alongwith interest from the opposite party (i.e., State of U.P. and the Engineer-in-Chief P.W.D., Lucknow).
4. The award dated 12.7.2002 was put to execution against the revisionists. The revisionists in their objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure raised two objections. Firstly, that after coming into force of U.P. Re-organisation Act, 2000, district Chamoli having become part of newly created State of Uttaranchal, it was the State of Uttaranchal, which is liable to satisfy the decree and secondly that since the award was passed after the creation of the State of Uttaranchal, therefore, the Court at Lucknow had no Jurisdiction to proceed with the execution. Both these objections have been rejected by the learned District Judge, Lucknow, against which this revision has been filed.
5. I have heard the learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the revisionist and Sri J.P. Goel appearing on behalf of the respondent-decree holder.
6. It was contended by the respondents that Clause 32(C) of the general conditions of contract which constitutes the arbitration agreement between the parties makes following provisions regarding the Court, which will have jurisdiction to execute the award:
Any suit or application for the enforcement of this arbitration clause shall be filed in competent court at Lucknow, and no other court of any other district of the Pradesh or outside Uttar Pradesh shall have any Jurisdiction in the matter. The award of the Arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding on both parties of the contract.
7. Therefore, the District Judge, Lucknow was competent to entertain the execution application. Hon. Supreme Court also in Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics Put. Ltd. v. Chand Mai Baradia and Ors. 2005 (1) Arb LR 623 (SC), has observed that if the contract contains a clause that dispute under contract shall be decided by a particular court and no other court then only that Court will be competent to hear the dispute.
8. An award becomes enforceable under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, according to which the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court. The execution is dealt with in Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 10 says that "where the holder of a decree desires to execute it, he shall apply to the Court which passed the decree or to the officer (if any) appointed in this behalf." Since the Judgment debtors resided in Lucknow. therefore, naturally the execution application for recovery of the amount under award could have been filed in the Court at Lucknow.
9. It was argued that the word "Court" as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act means "the Principal Civil Court of original Jurisdiction in a district having Jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of the suit...."
10. Even viewed from this point of view only the Court at Lucknow had jurisdiction under this provision because the jurisdiction to decide the question forming the subject-matter of the arbitration had been conferred to Lucknow Court in the agreement executed between the parties. Thus, finding given by the learned District Judge with respect to the maintainability of the execution application at Lucknow is in accordance with law.
11. Now we come to the other objection raised by the revisionist with regard to the execution of the award against the State of U.P. and Engineer-in-Chief, Lucknow. Reference to the provision contained in Section 42(2) of the Arbitration Act was made, which reads as under:
the successor States shall be entitled to receive benefits arising out of the decisions taken by the predecessor State and the Successor States shall be liable to bear the financial liabilities arising out of the decisions taken by the existing State of Uttar Pradesh.
12. Learned standing counsel submitted that the subject-matter in dispute was situated in Joshi Math which now falls in Uttaranchal after the reorganisation of the States w.e.f. 11.11.2000, therefore, the successor State (i.e., Uttaranchal) shall be liable to bear the financial liabilities arising out of the decisions taken by the existing State of U.P. but this provision is not attracted in the present case. The existing State of U.P. had not taken any decision with regard to this financial liability when the Uttaranchal was carved out.
13. Attention was also drawn towards Section 90 of the U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000, according to which, "where immediately before the appointed day, the existing State of Uttar Pradesh is a party to any legal proceedings with respect to any property, rights or liabilities subject to apportionment between the States of Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal under this Act, the State of Uttar Pradesh or Uttaranchal, which succeeds to, or acquires a share in, that property or those rights or liabilities by virtue of any provision of this Act shall be deemed to be substituted for the existing State of Uttar Pradesh or added as a party to those proceedings, and the proceedings may continue accordingly". But such plea was not raised during the arbitration proceedings where it remained pending till July, 2,002 and the judgment debtors participated in that proceedings till the final award was passed. Even any application for correction and interpretation of the award was also not made under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act nor any application for setting aside the arbitral award was made under Section 34 of the said Act. Therefore, arbitral award against the judgment debtor became final and binding under Section 35 of the Arbitration Act.
14. In Krishna Kumar Mundhra v. Narendra Kumar Anchalia 2004 (2) Arb LR 469 (Cal), the Calcutta High Court has held that the provisions contained in Section 34 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act are similar to Section 47 of the C.P.C. and Section 34 restricts the grounds of challenge. Therefore, Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be attracted, despite provisions contained in Section 36 in respect of an award when the same is sought to be executed thereunder. If Section 47 of the C.P.C. is to be attracted then the restrictions provided in Section 34 of the Act would be redundant, that is why the Legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to incorporate the scope similar to Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act in order to bring finality before the decree becomes executable. The object of the Arbitration Act is directed towards speedy hazard free finality with a view to avoid long drawn procedure based on technicalities. Thus, I find that no illegality has been committed by the court below in passing the impugned order. This revision has no merit and is dismissed with costs.