JUDGMENT M. Katju and R. S. Tripathi, JJ.
1. This appeal has been filed after a delay of 385 days against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Bulandshahr dated 27.10.1995 in Land Acquisition Reference No. 266 of 1992.
2. It has been stated in para 3 of the affidavit in support of the delay condonation application that certified copy of the judgment and decree dated 27.10.1995 was applied on 19.1.1996, and thereafter opinion from the D.G.C. (Civil) was sought vide letter dated 19.1.1996 (vide Annexure-1 to the affidavit).
3. Opinion of the D.G.C. (Civil), Bulandshahr was received on 14.2.1996. After receipt of the opinion of the D.G.C. (Civil) the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bulandshahr wrote a letter on 14.2.1996 to the Executive Engineer Temporary Division, P.W.D. Department, Bulandshahr to file an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 27.10.1995 (vide Annexure-2 to the affidavit).
4. It is alleged in para 6 of the affidavit in support of the delay condonation application that on 23.2.1996 the Executive Engineer Construction Division II, P.W.D. Bulandshahr wrote a letter to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bulandshahr to file an appeal (vide Annexure-3 to the affidavit).
5. It is alleged in para 7 of the affidavit that thereafter a check list was prepared and after preparation of the check list the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr by his letter dated 14.8.1996 sent a letter to the Joint Secretary, U.P. Government to obtain the permission from the Legal Remembrancer, U.P. Government to file the appeal (vide Annexure-4 to the affidavit).
6. It is alleged in para 8 that again on 21.8.1996 the Special Land Acquisition Officer wrote a letter to the Executive Engineer, Construction Division II, P.W.D. for paying the Court fee of Rs. 1,75,465. A photocopy of the said letter is Annexure-5 to the affidavit.
7. It is alleged in para 9 of the affidavit that on 25.9.1996 the Law Department, U.P. Government granted permission to file the appeal along with a delay condonation application. Permission granted by the Law Department on 25.9.1996 was received in the office of the District Magistrate on 27.9.1996 and on 3.10.1996 in the office of the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the draft regarding court fee was prepared on 4.1.1997.
8. It is alleged in para 11 of the affidavit that on 8.1.1997 the official came to Allahabad to file the present appeal, and the appeal was prepared and file on 11.3.1997.
9. The aforesaid facts disclose the cavalier manner in which the State Government treats such matters. The D.G.C. (Civil) by his letter dated 14.2.1996 advised the State Government to file an appeal, but as stated in para 7 of the affidavit in support of delay condonation application nothing appears to have been done for about six months from February to August, 1996, as is evident from paras 6 and 7 to the affidavit. No explanation for this delay between February and August, 1996 has been given, and it is not mentioned in the affidavit what was done during this period. It was only in August, 1996 that the District Magistrate, Bulandshahr by his letter dated 14.8.1996 wrote to the Joint Secretary, U.P. Government for obtaining permission to file the appeal.
10. As stated in para 9 of the affidavit, on 25.9.1996 the Law Department, U.P. Government granted permission to file the appeal, and the draft for filing the appeal was prepared on 4.1.1997 and on 8.1.1997 the official came to Allahabad to file the present appeal. However, the appeal was filed after another interval of two months on 11.3.1997, and there is no explanation in the affidavit for this further delay of two months caused between 8.1.1997 and 11.3.1997.
11. Thus, there are a series of delays in filing of this appeal, and it seems that the officials of the State Government treat such matters leisurely and in a casual and cavalier manner. No indulgence can be shown by the Court for this.
12. Learned standing counsel has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, AIR 1996 SC 1623, where the Supreme Court observed :
"When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officer/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay--intentional or otherwise--is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible."
13. We are of the opinion that no doubt greater latitude has to be shown by the Court to the State Government while considering whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned or not, but the above observation of the Supreme Court cannot be interpreted to mean that the State Government is at liberty to file an appeal whenever it so chooses. In above decision of the Supreme Court the delay was of 109 days in filing the appeal whereas in the present case the delay is of 385 days, i.e., almost 13 months.
14. In State of West Bengal v. Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Supreme Court observed (vide paragraph 27) :
"Mr. D. Mukherji, learned counsel for the first respondent, is certainly well-founded, in his contention that the expression "sufficient cause" cannot be construed too liberally, merely because the party in default is the Government. It is no doubt true that whether it is a Government or a private party, the provisions of law applicable are the same, unless the statute itself makes any distinction. But it cannot also be gainsaid that the same consideration that will be shown by Courts to a private party when he claims the protection of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should also be available to the State."
15. Similarly, in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, the Supreme Court refused to condone the delay of 264 days in filing the S.L.P. In that decision the. Supreme Court observed :
"For quite some time in the past, this Court has been making observations as to the grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of limitation. Such observations have been made for over a few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is filed in November, 1993. The explanation for the delay, had better been set out in petitioner's own words :
"(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate and sent the same for approval to the Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case file.
(h) The Board returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on September 20, 1993 requesting that draft S.L.P. was not approved by the Board. The Board after approving the draft S.L.P. sent this file to C.A.S. on October 1, 1993."
This explanation is incapable of furnishing a judicially acceptable ground for condonation of delay. After the earlier observations of this Court made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the matters might improve. There seems to be no visible support for this optimism. There is a point beyond which even the Courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant is the Government which is itself under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that Government should riot be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interest. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.
The application for condonation of delay is, accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time."
16. In the present case for the reasons already stated above, we are not inclined to condone the delay in filing this appeal.
17. In our opinion, no sufficient cause has been shown for the delay in filing the appeal. Hence this delay condonation application is rejected. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed.