1. Heard Sri Sushil Kumar Mehrotra, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Vinay Kumar Khare, Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Sarvesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. The present appeal has been filed with a delay of 9 days, which has been duly explained by means of affidavit in support of the delay condonation application. Cause shown is sufficient. Delay is condoned. Delay condonation application is allowed.
3. On merits, it has been submitted that the objections filed by the appellants-State under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) have been wrongly rejected as not maintainable.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the objections that were filed in the month of October, 2017 (to the award of the arbitration dated 31.12.2016), were duly supported by an application seeking condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 34(3) and Section 43 of the Act. Therefore, the learned District Judge has completely erred in rejecting those applications seeking condonation of delay as not maintainable.
5. On the other hand, it has been submitted on behalf of the claimant-respondent that the normal period of limitation to file the objections under Section 34 of the Act is only three months. Since the signed copy of the award has been received by the appellants on 18.01.2017, that period expired on 17.04.2017. However, delay in filing the objections could only be condoned in terms of proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act i.e. for a further period of one month which ended on 16.05.2017.
6. Insofar as it is admitted to the appellants that the objections were filed, much later in October, 2017, though the actual date of filing of the objections has not been disclosed even in the appeal, the said application for condonation of delay was not clearly maintainable. In the first place, the principle of law is very clear that in the event of specific provision being made in the special act providing for period of limitation and its condonation, the general principle contained in the Limitation Act would not apply with respect to condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as laid down by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise Vs. Hongo India (Pvt.) Ltd. & Anr., (2009) 5 SCC 791 and Union of India Vs. M/s Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470.
7. Insofar as further reliance has been placed by learned Standing Counsel on a decision of the Supreme Court in Transparent Packers Vs. Arbitrator-cum-Managing Director & Anr., 2000 (3) AWC 2500 (SC), the same has no application inasmuch as in that case, though as a fact, the application seeking condonation of delay supported by an affidavit had been dismissed as not maintainable by the learned District Judge, that order was reversed by the Supreme Court on the reasoning that there was no requirement for the objector to enter the witness box to testify before the Court. That is not the case here. In the present case, since the application seeking condonation of delay was filed beyond the statutory period of thirty days stipulated under proviso to Section 34(3) of the Act, clearly the said application was not maintainable. Therefore, there is no error in the order passed by the learned District Judge.
8. It has been further submitted that the State is willing comply with the award but some relaxation may be made in the interest awarded @ 18%. Insofar as the present proceedings arise from objections, which have been rejected as not maintainable, the present appeal does not warrant any interference in exercise of its jurisdiction of first appeal from order.
9. The present appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
Order Date :- 26.8.2019 Abhilash