Court No. - 41
Case :- GOVERNMENT APPEAL No. - 410 of 2018 Appellant :- State Of U.P.
Respondent :- Hriday Narayan Rai And Others Counsel for Appellant :- Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Rajesh Dayal Khare,J. Hon'ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi,J.
This government appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. alongwith an application for grant of leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated 25.3.2011 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge (S.C./S.T.) (Prevention) Act, Ghazipur in S.T. No.280/1995 (State Vs. Hriday Narayan Rai and others), whereby the respondents have been acquitted of the charges under Sections 147, 452, 436/ 149, 323/149, 302/149 of I.P.C. and Section 3 (1) (X) and Section 3 (2) (3) (4) and (5) of The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.
Heard learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State-appellant on the application seeking leave to appeal. Perused the impugned judgment.
Challenging the legality and correctness of the impugned judgement, the learned A.G.A. has contended that the incident has taken place during a public meeting of Bahujan Samaj Party held on 15.9.1990, in which about 200 people had gathered. The accused respondents are alleged to have badly beaten some Harijans resulting in stampede. Four persons have died in the stampede, and their dead bodies were thrown into the river and the same have been recovered. The accused-respondents also set on fire the huts of Harijan due to which the articles were badly burnt. However, the learned trial court, without a proper appreciation of evidence, acquitted all the accused by the impugned judgment which is liable to be set-aside.
A perusal of the evidence available on the record shows that the statements of witnesses do not find corroboration with each other. Most of the witnesses have failed to identify any of the accused respondents. There is evidence that due to stampede, the people were running helter skelter. They have stated that brick batting started among the public gathered there due to which several persons sustained injury. Although some persons were initially named in the F.I.R., but subsequently in the statement recorded by the Investing Officer under Sections 161 Cr.P.C., the names of the accused-respondents along with their parentage were also included and they were put to trial. The postmortem of the dead bodies were conducted two times, however, the first postmortem report was suppressed by the prosecution. It is noteworthy that in a public meeting where 200 people have assembled and the incident has taken place, it is not possible for any person to recognise as to who assaulted whom, therefore, naming the accused-respondents along with their parentage as has been done in the present case is highly improbable. Moreso, there may be some passive onlookers who join the mob out of curiosity, having no common intention or common object and it is very difficult to distinguish them. Under these circumstances, liability cannot be fixed on any accused.
The impugned judgment shows that the learned trial court after a detailed discussion of evidence, has acquitted the accused respondents.
The view taken by learned trial court is a possible view and the golden thread which runs through the administration of criminal justice while hearing the appeal against the acquittal is that even if two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing towards the guilt of the accused and other towards their innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be accepted and the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed by the appellate court. The reason is that while passing the order of acquittal, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is re-inforced In Ramesh Babulal Doshi Vs. State of Gujrat; 1996 (9) SCC 225, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under : -
"...in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocence unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of innocence is, re-enforced and strengthened by the trial court "
In Mahadeo Laxman Sarane vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 12 SCC 705, the Apex Court has observed that : -
"It is true, that the settled legal position is that in an appeal against acquittal the High Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal if on the basis of the same evidence two views are reasonably possible-one in favour of the accused and the other against him. In such a case if the trial court takes a view in favour of the accused, the High Court ought not to interfere with the order of acquittal."
In C. Antony Vs. K.G. Raghavan Nair, (2003) 1 SCC 1, the Apex Court has laid down the law as follows:-
"Unless the findings of trial court are perverse or contrary to the material on record, High Court cannot, in appeal, substitute its finding merely because another contrary opinion was possible on the basis of the material on record."
In Sirajuddin Vs. State of Karnataka, (1980) 4 SCC 375, the Apex Court has reiterated the same principle in the following words:-
"Where trial Court's order of acquittal is based on a reasonably possible view, High Court should not, as a rule of prudence, disturb the acquittal."
Considering the facts and circumstances in wake of the above cited legal position, we do not consider it to be a fit case for grant of leave to appeal to the applicant.
The application seeking leave to appeal is rejected and consequently the appeal is dismissed.
Order Date:-30.4.2018-SB