Writ petition is filed seeking to quash the orders issued by 2nd respondent by way of endorsement in Ext. P9(a). Petitioners also seek for a direction to the 2nd respondent not to receive the documents submitted by respondents 3 and 4. 2. The facts involved in this writ petition would disclose that the party respondents have approached the District Registrar informing him that a meeting has been held and a new Managing Committee has come into existence. As per the bye-laws of the society, the Managing Committee is elected for a period of 5 years whereas the party respondents, after having issued a requisition for holding a meeting, approached the District Registrar stating that they have held a meeting and requested for making necessary entries in the registry regarding the change of Managing committee members. The complaint is that the party respondents have no right to hold such a meeting, especially when the period of the Managing Committee is 5 years. That apart, the action of the District Registrar in making an endorsement in Ext. P9(a) stating that the details regarding the new Managing Committee is to be entered in the books is absolutely baseless when the period of present Managing Committee was not over.
3. Learned Counsel for the party respondents however points out that the meeting held by them is a validly convened meeting since the Managing Committee of the petitioner-society did not hold the meeting after three years, as specified under the bye- laws. It is their case that the period of the managing committee is only 3 years as stated in the bye-law and the contention that the bye-law was amended is absolutely wrong, which, according to the learned counsel, is clear from the judgment in A.S. No. 615/2000, which is produced as Ext. R3(a).
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon Ext. P11 dated 25.6.2007, wherein paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:
“6. The society submitted the certified copy of the list of governing body elected in the general body meeting held on 17.08.1997 and 17.06.1998, copy of Bye-law amendment approved in the general body meeting held on 17.8.1997. The society had submitted the copy of the minutes book of the general body meetings held on 17.8.1997 and 17.6.1998 to prove the genuineness of election and Bye-law amendment made in general body on 17.8.1997. Hence these records are found relevant.
7. On 29.05.2007 at the time of hearing, the society had produced certified copies of list of governing body elected in the general body on 17.8.1997, 17.06.1998 and certified copy of the Bye Law amendment passed in the general body on 17.08.1997. These certified copies were issued on 08.10.1997 and 26.11.1998 respectively from the District Registrar office, Thiruvananthapuram by the then District Registrar ratifying the elections to governing body by the annual general body meeting held on 17.8.1997 and 16.6.1998.”
It is argued that the amendment to bye-law was accepted by the 2nd respondent. Ext. P2 contains the amendments as well.
5. The subject matter in the appeal, which was decided by this Court in A.S. No. 615/2000, apparently relates to an election conducted for the managing committee in the year 1986. Therefore, the recital in the said judgment by itself may not be evidence enough to contend that there was no amendment to the bye-laws. Counsel for the party respondents further submits that the existence of Ext. P11 has also been taken note of by the learned Judge while disposing of A.S. No. 615/2000. That apart, validity of the 1997 resolutions was also subject matter of the suit, against which A.S. No. 615/2000 came to be filed.
6. Therefore, it is now clear that the validity of the 1997 resolution is yet to be adjudicated and an appeal is pending before the Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioners against the judgment in A.S. No. 615/2000.
7. The fact as to whether the bye-law has been amended stipulating the period of the Managing committee as 5 years, going by the facts of the case, is still a question is to be decided in the suit. In the absence of any such material to indicate that the bye- law has not been amended, it is prima facie to be assumed that on the basis of 1997 resolution of the General Body and Ext. P11 that amendment to bye-law has been accepted by the 2nd respondent. If the party respondents have any complaint to the said amendment, they have to approach the Supreme Court in the pending lis and obtain appropriate orders or to separately challenge the election by a separate suit.
8. Counsel for the petitioners also points out that paragraphs 42 and 44 of A.S. No. 615/2000 have not become final and it had to be decided in the proceedings which was remanded back to trial court and since appeals are pending before the Supreme Court, the same cannot be relied upon for any purpose.
9. The main contention urged by the 3rd respondent is that majority of the members called upon the managing committee to convene a meeting and as they failed for convening the general body meeting even after the expiry of the three year period, the requisionist themselves had convened the meeting and passed the resolutions. Therefore, petitioners having acquiesced in permitting such meeting to be held, cannot now challenge the proceedings of the 2nd respondent.
10. Perusal of Ext. P2 bye-law indicates that an extra ordinary meeting can be held on a request for a meeting by 50% of the members. This clause is amended in the 1997 resolution by making it a requisition meeting from among 3/4th of the total number of members. Further, the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent relied upon Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings to contend that even in the absence of a specific provision permitting the requisitionist to convene a meeting, if there is failure on the part of the Managing Committee to convene the meeting, the requisitionist could do so after issuing notice to the members. The following passage in Shackletoon on the Law and Practice of Meetings, after referring to Isle of Wight Railway Company v. Tahourdin, [1883 Vol. XXV Ch.D 320] reads as under:
“If the practice to convene a meeting to considerer only some of the matters referred to in a requisition, the requisitioist would be within their rights in ignoring it and convening their own meeting.”
In fact, in the present case, the request of the 3rd respondent was to conduct a meeting proceeding on the basis that the period of the Managing Committee expired after three years.
11. Whether the period of the Managing Committee has expired or not, is an issue which is still at large to be decided by the Supreme Court in the present civil appeal or any appropriate proceedings to be initiated by either of the parties. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the respondents have a right to call upon the Managing Committee members to convene a meeting, it cannot be based on the fact that the period of the present Managing Committee has expired.
12. Under these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the party respondents have no right to interfere with the decision of the Managing Committee.
13. The present factual situation indicates that the Managing Committee is elected for a period of 5 years. It is only a prima facie opinion as the finality of the 1997 resolution is yet to be adjudicated in the pending lis. As matters stand now, the Government has rightly relied upon the 1997 resolution in Ext. P11 proceedings. Hence, the 2nd respondent ought not to have have accepted the documents filed by the party respondents.
In the result, the endorsement of the 2nd respondent in Ext. P9(a) is set aside. The party respondents are directed to approach the appropriate forum for resolving the dispute with reference to the validity of the present Managing Committee to hold office.
Sd/- A.M. Shaffique, Judge.
Tds/