JUDGMENT M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. We have heard the learned Addl. S.P.P. on merits because there is an I.A. for condonation of delay and in principle, unless this Court is satisfied that there exists a good case on appeal, we do not share the view that notice be issued to the respondents and they be asked to appear before this Court even on the LA. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the I.A.A. is allowed and the delay is condoned.
2. As far as the merits of the case are concerned, the prosecution had alleged that pursuant to a quarrel between the parties, that an assault had taken place with a stone and some relatively minor injuries had resulted. Undoubtedly, there was some doubt as to whether a fracture had occurred and therefore Section 326, IPC has been invoked. The case was referred to the Lok Adalat because the parties had virtually settled their grievances and since, the law does not permit compounding, very correctly, the trial Court has recorded a conviction and has imposed a sentence of one day till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 50/- in default, ten days' simple imprisonment. Amazingly enough, the State of Karnataka has come up in appeal on the technical ground that under Section 326, IPC, compounding is not permissible but more importantly that the punishment awarded is inadequate.
3. As far as the first place is concerned, we need to observe that even the Supreme Court recently in the decision reported in 1999 AIR SCW 566 : 1999 Cri LJ 1342 had occasion to observe that in a case under Section 326, IPC where the offence is not (sic)impoundable under Section 320, Cr. P.C., (sic) at it is still permissible for the Court if the (sic) parties have virtually patched up, to impose (sic) lenient sentence in that case, the Court imposed a very lenient sentence and as the accused had been in custody for six months the Court held that the sentence be reduced to the period already undergone. It is the application of this principle that has guided us into holding that in appropriate cases the interest of justice would be served if the Court were to impose a punishment that is in consonance with the spirit of the compromise but more importantly the status of the parties, the type of injury and other relevant circumstances.
4. As regards the submission that merely because the case was referred to the Lok Adalat, that the trial Court ought not to have passed the order in question. We need to observe that the purpose of making such references is in order to reduce or lower down the load on the Courts and in order to bring about a degree of good feeling, compromise and atonement and that where such a reference is made with the full consent of both the parties and the approval of the Court, that unless it is demonstrated that the order is palpably wrong or that it has resulted in a gross miscarriage of justice or that it has set a wrong precedent, this Court would normally not interfere with the order. We need to note that there is another principle of importance that emerges in this class of cases namely that having regard to the nature of the incident, the aggrieved party is the one who has sustained injuries and tlie one who has complained and if that party is satisfied with the decision and the terms and conditions on which the Court has disposed of the case, there can be no question of the State being aggrieved by this decision and consequently, there is hardly any justification for the State to come up in appeal on the ground that the State is the aggeived party. We need to therefore clarify that we are of the view that having regard particularly to the abnornal work-load on the trial Courts, that it is highly desirable that cases of this category and those which qualify for such disposal should be referred to the Lok Adalats and disposed of. We make it clear however that our observations are confined to the facts of this case and will not debar other aggrieved parties or for that matter the State if it is demonstrated that the order passed is palpably wrong in some other case.
5. In particular, the learned Add. SPP drew our specific attention to Sub-section (5) of Section 19 of Chapter 6 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. The relevant provision reads as follows:
(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of;
(i) any case pending before; or
(ii) any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of and is not brought before, any Court for which the Lok Adalat is organised:
Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compound-able under any law.
6. The submission canvassed is that the order passed in this case is inherently wrong or without jurisdiction insofar as the Lok Adalat could not have exercised jurisdiction at all since it pertains to a non-compound-able offence i.e. Section 326, IPC. We do not at all have any quarrel with the proposition as laid down in the Section nor can it be so but what we need to reiterate is that this is not a compromise of compounding order that has been passed by a Lok Adalat because had any such order resulted, then the barwould have been applicable. Even though the parties had resolved the dispute, the Court realising that the traditional order of compounding was not permissible has recorded a conviction and imposed a sentence and fine. We have also analysed as to whether the reference itself in the first instance can be found fault with. The learned Add. SPP is right when he points out that if it is a serious offence or a non-compoundable offence such as Section 302, IPC, that no reference would be competent to a Lok Adalat even if for whatever reason the disputing parties had sunk their differences. However, we have made it clear in this instance that even the initial reference as far as this particular case is concerned would not be bad because the invocation of Section 326, IPC itself was not justified in so far as the injuries were very minor and would not justify a charge under Section 326, IPC. We clarify this position in order to remove any ambiguity that may arise in so far as the law itself provides for reference to the Lok Adalat only of criminal cases where the offence is compoundable. It is very necessary for us to lay down an important clarification from the point of view of giving full and complete effect to the legislative intent behind this particular enactment. As has happened in this case, we need to clarify that merely because the police may invoke a particular Section which may appear to be non-compoundable, that ipso facto the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat will not be barred provided the following factors are prevalent. Firstly, if on an examination of the material i.e. the evidence and in particular the injuries it. clearly emerges that had a Court even come to the conclusion that the accused was guilty, that the conviction would only be under a lesser offence and we quote an instance where the chargesheet may invoke Section 326 IPC but the statements and the medical certificates only make out a charge under Section 323 IPC or Section 324 IPC; the reference to the Lok Adalat would not be bad in such a, situation. This is an important clarification because we have cbme across many instances where there is suspicion that the1 injury is more serious, than it actually was, such as to where there is suspicion that a fracture has occurred and Section 326 IPC or Section 307 IPC is originally invoked, which on a subsequent examination of the material before the Court is wholly unjustified. What we are repeatedly emphasising is that the Legislature has intended through this enactment to put an end to a large number of disputes wherein cases are pending before the Courts and where, in the general and social interest a compromise is far more desirable. If the authority is satisfied that the parties have willingly compromised the dispute, the enactment provides for a closure of the proceedings and that laudable objective should not be frustrated merely on technical grounds that the chargesheet may mention a section that is not compoundable. We also need to clarify that a careful examination of the record must be undertaken and as has happened in the present case, the order must clearly specify that the charge could only be under a section that is compoundable, but we need to sound a note of caution that this does not mean that if the material discloses a non-compoundable offence, that the Authority would still be entitled to entertain the dispute.
7. With these observations, the appeal which fails on merits to stand dismissed.