IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 7810 of 1995 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA Sd/-
=========================================================
========================================================= MUFFAZAL MOIZBHAI VAKIL - Petitioner(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT. - Respondent(s) ========================================================= Appearance :
MR MB GANDHI for Petitioner(s) : 1, GOVERNMENT PLEADER for Respondent(s) : 1, NOTICE SERVED for Respondent(s) : 1, ========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA Date : 25/01/2012 CAV JUDGMENT By invoking powers under Article 226 of this Court and asserting rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order to hold and declare that the orders terminating his services as lecturer are illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. A further direction is sought to reinstate him in service with full back wages.
2. [The relevant facts of the case are that the petitioner came to be appointed as lecturer, ClassII, in the subject of Mathematics at Government Polytechnic in the scale of Rs.2,2004,000 vide notification dated 10.02.1992 of Education Department, State of Gujarat, respondent No.1. His appointment was until the post was filled by the Gujarat Public Service Commission or in any other manner or for a period of 11 months, whichever was earlier. It was mentioned in the appointment order that the services were liable to be terminated on availability of candidate from GPSC or on completion of 11 months without any notice and without giving any reason.]
2.1 Respondent No.1 issued notification dated 07.04.1995 terminated the services of the petitioner on the ground that the appointment was ah hoc and in view of workload and the regularly selected candidates from Gujarat Public Service Commission being available for regular appointment. Along with the petitioner, services of two other lecturers also came to be terminated under the same notification. The Principal of A. V. Parekh Technical Institute, Rajkot, where the petitioner was serving, passed consequential order dated 10.04.1995 discharging the petitioner from service. The aforementioned order dated 10.04.1995 (AnnexureA in the petition) and notification dated 07.04.1995 (AnnexureB in the petition) are impugned in present petition.
3. Learned advocate Mr. M. B. Gandhi for the petitioner and Mr. Alkesh N. Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent were heard by this Court at length for their submissions.
3.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner contended that no notice was issued to the petitioner before terminating his services. He submitted that there was noncompliance of Rule 33 of Bombay Civil Services Rules ('BCSR', for short), which rendered the termination illegal.
3.2 It was submitted that the termination was effected eventhough regularly selected candidate from Gujarat Public Service Commission ('GPSC', for short), had not taken charge. He referred to advertisement dated 14.10.1995 (AnnexureB in the petition) published in the news paper to submit that even after dispensing with the services of the petitioner, interviews for recruiting lecturers on ad hoc basis including for the subject of the petitioner were held. It was submitted that it was not permissible to replace an ad hoc employee by another ad hoc person.
3.3 Learned advocate contended that petitioner was continued in service even after expiry of 11 months, therefore, he was treated as a regular employee. It was further submitted that, in any view, the petitioner did not enter the service by way of a backdoor entry and termination of his services by a stroke of pen, was clearly unjust and arbitrary and violated petitioner's rights under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It was also contended that the termination was illintended inasmuch as it was effected during the vacation.
3.4 Learned advocate for the petitioner in support of his submissions relied on the decision in Subdivisional Soil Conservation Officer and Anr. vs. M. M. Saiyed [ 1990 (1) GLH 518 ] to submit that in that case the termination of services of the employee was without requisite notice and without necessary payment of notice period in violation of Rule 33(1) (b) of BCSR, and the Court held the termination to be illegal.
3.5 The decision in Rekha Agrawal vs. State of U.P. [ 1987 JT (4) SC 313] was relied upon to submit that the petitioner in that case was appointed on ad hoc basis, but having worked continuously on the post, she was held entitled to be regularized.
3.6 The decision in Mukundbhai Haribhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat [2000 (1) JCD 348] was next relied upon by learned advocate to submit that in that decision this Court granted relief permitting the petitioners to continue till GPSC finalized selection of the candidates and till the appointments were made.
3.7 The order (in Civil Application No.1014 of 2009 in LPA No.107 of 2009) was relied upon and it was submitted that relief to the applicant therein was granted by the Division Bench of this Court on the principle that the employer cannot replace an ad hoc employee by another ad hoc employee.
4. Learned Assistant Government Pleader made oral submissions and relied upon the conditions in the order/ notification of appointment. He submitted that the petitioner did not have any right to continue in service, as his appointment was purely temporary and his retention in service was conditional and since regularly selected candidates from GPSC were available, termination of petitioner's services was justified.
[5. A plain reading of the notification appointing the petitioner showed that the appointment was conditional and it was provided that it would get terminated on availability of a regular candidate selected by Gujarat Public Service Commission or upon expiry of period of 11 months, whichever was to occur earlier. Thus, the Notification/order of appointment of the petitioner provided two events on the first happening of the either of which, the appointment of the petitioner was to come to an end automatically.] [5.1. The stipulations in the notification appointing the petitioner were in other parlance may be termed as defeasance clause or were in the nature of defeasance clause. The word 'defeasance' is defined to mean annulment or abrogation. It denotes the fact or an instance of bringing an estate or status to an end, especially by conditional limitation. It is a condition upon the fulfillment of which a deed or other instrument is defeated or made void. A contractual provision containing such a condition is termed 'Defeasance Clause'. [Black's Law Dictionary 7th Edition]] [5.2. The term 'defeasance clause' is often used in relation to an instrument or a deed containing certain conditions upon performance of which the force or operation of the deed or the instrument is defeated or voided. In service jurisprudence, when an appointment order incorporates a condition which is in the nature of 'defeasance clause', that is to say on happening of certain event or eventuality, the services of the appointee is made terminable, the appointment is not intended to be treated with absolute or confirmed right from the very beginning. Such appointment remains a stopgap arrangement where the status of the services of appointee remains temporary and contingent. In its logical sequel, it would not confer any right to the post. The appointment of the petitioner was in other words defeasible and created no legal right for the petitioner to continue on the post after expiry of the period contemplated in the instrument of appointment or on happening of the event of availability of GPSC selected candidate. Upon fulfillment of either of the said two conditions, the petitioner's right to continue in services stood defeated. His service were always liable to be terminated in terms of appointment order itself, it having not created any right for the petitioner to the post concerned.]
6. In Subdivisional Soil Conservation Officer (supra) relied on by learned advocate for the petitioner, the services of the respondent was terminated prior to expiry of period of 29 days for which the appointment was given and not by efflux of time. Since the termination was effected before the minimum period contemplated in the appointment letter, the Court held that a notice under Rule 33(1)(b) was required to be given. The facts of the present case are different.
6.1 Indeed, the reliance placed on Subdivisional Soil Conservation Officer (supra) is thoroughly misconceived and the contention about the breach of Rule 33(2)(b) of BCSR deserves to be rejected outright, in view decision in State of Gujarat and Another vs. P. J. Kampavat and others [1993 (1) GLR 848], wherein it is held as under:
“The appointment of the respondents was a pure and simple contractual appointment and that such appointment does not attract and is outside the purview of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959. Since the tenure of the Ministers at whose instance and on whose recommendation they were appointed has come to an end with effect from 10121989, their services also came to an end simultaneously. No order of termination as such was necessary for putting an end to their service, much less a prior notice.” (Para 11) In that case, the nature of appointment was similar and the order of appointment read thus:
“The following persons are appointed as direct recruits on purely temporary basis in the office of the Chief Minister with effect from 671985 (after office hours) on the posts shown against their names. Their services shall be liable to be terminated at any time without giving any notice or assigning any reason. This appointment is for a limited period up to the tenure of Minister's establishment. They will not get any right for absorption in regular cadres of Sachivalaya and they will have to furnish an undertaking to this effect.” (Para 3)
6.2 In Kumari Rekha Agrawal (supra) the relief of regularization was granted on the basis of the provisions of U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 as applied to that petitioner as the appointment was against a substantive vacancy. The ratio of that decision is not applicable in the facts of the present case.
6.3 The decision in Mukundbhai Haribhai Patel (supra) is in no way applicable and indeed runs counter to the case of the petitioner. In that case, the Court, on the contrary, expressed strong disapproval for continuing the ad hoc and temporary appointments for long period holding that such appointment does not confer any right to hold the post permanently and the services can be terminated at any time.
6.4 The order passed in Parmar Rajesh Shivabhai (supra) was an interim order in the context of facts confined to that case, not shown to have resemblance with the facts involved in the present case, and also clarified that no equities would be created by the order. That order, therefore, is not in any way helpful to the petitioner. An interim order, as is well settled, does not confer any right and petitioner cannot claim any right for him on such basis.
7. The law is well settled on the point by decisions of the apex Court as well as of this Court. The Division Bench of this Court in K. D. Vohra vs. Kamleshbhai Gobarbhai Patel [2003 (2) GLR 1343] considered controversy with regard to similar nature of appointments of ad hoc lecturers made de hors the recruitment rules and upheld the judgment of learned Single Judge. It rejected case for regularization negativing the contention that the lecturers appointed on ad hoc basis contrary to the recruitment rules, could claim any such right even when such employees continued for long time pending the availability of regular GPSC recruits, and GPSC did not take steps to fill up the posts.
7.1 In Dr. (Mrs.) Chanchal Goyal vs. State of Rajasthan [AIR 2003 SC 1713], the services of petitioner doctor who was appointed temporarily and continued for long were terminated. In that case also, as in the present case, the condition of appointment was that it would come to an end automatically on becoming available a candidate selected by Service Commission. It was held that there was no scope of regularization unless the appointment was on regular basis. The Court observed that , 'The plea that even for temporary appointment there was a selection. Would be really of no consequence. Further a presumption of the Service Commission's concurrence cannot be drawn. When extensions were granted from time to time, there is no scope for drawing a presumption about such concurrence in terms of R.27(2). After one year, currency of appointment is lost. The extension orders operated only during the period of effectiveness.”
7.2 The appointment of the petitioner could not be faulted being in terms of conditions of appointment order. In Union of India vs. S. K. Bhargawa [(1997) 11 SCC 683] the Supreme Court held that the respondent's termination was in accordance with conditions in letter of appointment and, therefore, it was valid. The respondent in that case was an ad hoc officer who did not avail chance necessary for regularization in a special selection conducted by the UPSC. His letter of appointment stipulated that; “In case your services are continued on ad hoc basis beyond six months due to shortage of candidates duly selected by UPSC, and if you fail to get selected in the selection/competitive examinations conducted by the UPSC on three successive occasions or do not avail of three chances successively, your services shall be terminated.”
8. It is also pertinently noticed from the below quoted order dated 27.11.1995 passed by this Court refusing the interim relief to the petitioner that the petitioner had availed a chance to be selected through GPSC, but he was not selected.
“Rule. In the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner's appointment was on a temporary and ad hoc basis, and that though he has appeared, but could not get himself selected through PSC (Sic.), no interim relief, as prayed for by him, can be granted. Hence, interim relief is refused.”
[9. The termination of petitioner's services was in accordance with the conditions of his appointment. His appointment as lecturer was purely ad hoc and temporary. The conditions in the order of appointment to end the services and to be on the post selfoperative. As there was no right to post for the petitioner, he is not entitled to seek writ of mandamus. The relief of reinstatement in service with full back wages cannot be granted.] 10. The petition is therefore devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.
Amit [N. V. ANJARIA, J.]