IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1264 of 2007 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA AND HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA ========================================== ===============
========================================== =============== PUNAJI DHANAJI BARIYA Versus STATE OF GUJARAT ========================================== =============== Appearance :
MR. MRUDUL M BAROT for Appellant.
MR KP RAWAL, ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for respondent.
========================================== =============== Date : 25/07/2012 CAV JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA)
1. This appeal is at the instance of a convict for the offences punishable under sections 302, 323 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and is directed against an order of conviction and sentence dated 27th June 2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.3, Ahmedabad [Rural], at Ahmedabad in Sessions Case No. 33 of 2006. By the aforesaid order, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under sections 302, 323 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and consequently, sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5000/- for the offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. In default of payment of fine, the appellant was directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. So far as the offence punishable under section 498A of the IPC was concerned, the appellant was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.500/-. In default of payment of fine, he was directed to undergo a further rigorous imprisonment for 3 months. Similarly, as regards the offence punishable under section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and was imposed with a fine of Rs.250/-, with a further stipulation that in case of default of payment of fine, he would undergo further rigorous imprisonment for 2 months.
2. The case made out by the prosecution may be summarized thus:
2.1 The accused sold paddy from his house at 18-30 hours on 30th October 2005 at village Dhamatvan, and therefore, the complainant, his wife, scolded him. The accused got exited and started beating and torturing the complainant. In view of such act on the part of the accused, the complainant was very much shocked and frustrated and poured Kerosene over her body. The accused, at that time, ignited a matchstick on her, which caused her severe burn injuries and resulted in death.
2.2 On 31st October 2005, one Maganbhai Sanjaji Kotwal, PSI was in charge PSO of Kanbha Police Station. At that time, a complaint was received through Police Constable Ramanbhai. Subsequently, the complaint was made by Kamalaben, wife of Punamji, the victim, before the 2nd PSI J.B. Pandit along with an index-slip [suchipatra] on the basis of which he had registered a complaint being CR. No. I-149 of 2005 for offences punishable under sections 307, 498A and 323 of the IPC in Station Diary of Kanbha Police Station. The said complaint was forwarded for investigation to Senior Police Inspector V.R. Patel.
2.3 Prior thereto, ASI Dipusinh Ishwarsinh Vaghela was in charge of PSO Kanbha Police Station from 2.00 PM on 30th October 2005 to 08.00 AM on 31st October 2005. He had received a vardhi from the police constable, Natwarlal Brahmbhatt, of the police table of the Civil Hospital at 2.30 PM on 31st October 2005 in which he had stated that a woman, namely, Kamalaben Punamji Bariya, age 37 years, residing at Dhamatvan, Taluka Daskroi, Dist. Ahmedabad had a quarrel with her husband and her husband told her to die. She, therefore, poured Kerosene upon her own body and her husband ignited a matchstick and the women had thus been brought to the hospital with burn injuries and had been referred to 'G' Ward for treatment. Entry was accordingly made in the information register. ASI, one Ramanbhai Babhai Bhatiya, was on duty at Kanbha Police Station, and primary investigation was handed over to him. Taking the vardhi, he had gone to the Civil Hospital and looking at the condition of the injured, he felt proper to take a Dying Declaration. He, therefore, prepared a yadi requesting the Executive Magistrate, Ahmedabad, for taking Dying Declaration, and after preparing the yadi, he contacted the Doctor who was treating the patient to enquire about the condition of the patient. The Doctor had put an endorsement on the yadi that the patient was conscious. With two copies of the yadi, he went to the house of the Executive Magistrate at 11-00 hours and he had given the yadi to the Executive Magistrate for taking Dying Declaration and the said Executive Magistrate had put the signature for acknowledging the receipt of the same.
2.4 At that time, one Jigar Bharatbhai Pandit was performing duty as 2nd PSI in Kanbha Police Station. He came to know by telephone through PSO that as a quarrel took place between Kamlaben and her husband at village Dhamatvan, that she poured kerosene upon her body as her husband told her to die, and that her husband ignited the matchstick and Kamlaben had thus received burn injuries and was brought for treatment at Civil Hospital. He, therefore, went to the Civil Hospital and on asking the victim personally, she declared the fact of the complaint and, therefore, he had written down the complaint before her. The complaint was written as dictated by her and the same was sent to Kanbha Police Station for registration.
2.5 Further investigation in the matter was entrusted to Vishnukumar Ranchhodbhai Patel, PSI, State Branch, Gandhinagar and he started further investigation in the matter. Perusing panchnama of the place of incident, the copy of the yadi made to Executive Magistrate for taking Dying Declaration and with the copy of the Dying Declaration, a yadi was written to the FSL Officer to visit the site. Accordingly, H.T. Modi, FSL Officer, visited the site, made inspection and gave a report. Two persons were called as panchas and panchnama of the scene of offence was recorded. Statements of witnesses were also taken.
2.6 The accused was found out, and was, therefore, detained and was sent to judicial custody.
2.7 Meanwhile, the victim died. A yadi was therefore sent to the Executive Magistrate to make inquest panchnama. Inquest panchnama was made in the presence of two panchas. Thereafter, filling up the Dying Declaration form, the same was sent to RMO, Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad, for post mortem.
2.8 As the victim had died, later on, a yadi was written to add the offence punishable under section 302, IPC.
2.9 On completion of the investigation, charge sheet was made against the accused. As the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the learned 7th Additional Senior Civil Judge, JMFC, Ahmedabad [Rural] committed the case to the Sessions Court under section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2.10 The Sessions Court framed charge against the accused, Exh.3, and statement of the accused was also recorded. The accused did not admit the offence and claimed to be tried.
2.11 The prosecution adduced the following oral evidence in support of its case.
3.12 The following pieces of documentary evidence were adduced by the prosecution.
3.13 After completion of oral as well as documentary evidence of the prosecution, the statement of the accused under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was recorded in which the accused stated that the complaint was a false one and that the victim, his wife, got burn injuries as her clothes caught fire from the flames of the lamp. He had further stated that his married life with the victim was for twenty years and in the said wedlock he had two children. He further stated that no quarrel with his wife had taken place at any time.
3.14 At the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge convicted the accused for offences punishable under sections 302, 498A and 323 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him as stated hereinbefore.
4. Being dissatisfied, the accused has come up with the present appeal.
5. Mr. Barot, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, laboriously contended before us that the learned Sessions Judge committed substantial error in holding the appellant guilty by relying upon the Dying Declaration of the deceased. Mr. Barot submits that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have taken note of the fact that the victim had suffered severe burn injuries and as such, was not in a position to give the Dying Declaration. Apart from the aforesaid fact, Mr. Barot tried to impress upon us that it did not appear from the Dying Declaration that the formalities required for recording such Dying Declaration were complied with. By referring to the evidence given by the Executive Magistrate and the Doctor, Mr. Barot tried to convince us that those were conflicting and thus, the benefit of doubt should be given to his client.
5.1 Mr. Barot further contended that it appeared from the Dying Declaration itself that the deceased herself poured the kerosene over her body and thus, there was no justification of levelling the charge of murder against the appellant.
5.2 Mr. Barot contends that the story made out by the prosecution that the victim herself poured kerosene and the appellant ignited the fire, is unbelievable. Mr. Barot further contends that it is very risky to uphold the conviction on the basis of the Dying Declaration when the patient was in a critical condition.
5.3 Mr. Barot, therefore, prays for setting aside the order of conviction and sentence.
6. Mr. K.P. Raval, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State-respondent, on the other hand, supported the order of conviction and contended that there was no justification to disbelieve both the Doctors and the Executive Magistrate on the question of the then physical condition of the deceased at the time of recording Dying Declaration. Mr. Raval further contended that even after giving the Dying Declaration, the victim survived for next four days and therefore, there was no element of doubt about the condition of the victim at the time of recording Dying Declaration. Mr. Raval, therefore, prays for dismissal of the appeal.
7. The question that arises, therefore, for determination in this appeal is whether in the facts of the present case, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in holding that the appellant had ignited the matchstick on the body of the victim when she admitted to have poured Kerosene on her body after being harassed by the conduct of the appellant.
8. First of all, we propose to consider the Dying Declaration given by the deceased on 31st October 2005, which started at 13-20 hours. According to the said Dying Declaration, the deceased and the accused were sitting in their house where the accused brought paddy doing labour work and sold 2 maunds from such paddy. She asked him not to sell the said paddy and scolded him for such sale, as a result, there was a quarrel and the accused started beating the deceased as he had already consumed liquor. The deceased stood up and got hold of the container of kerosene and poured the same on her own body. At that stage, her husband said, “either you will not survive or I will not survive”. Saying so, he ignited a matchstick on her body and ran away. Her husband's elder brother came to save her and thereafter, her father and others brought her for treatment in the hospital. She has further stated that there was very much harassment caused by her husband and she had been tolerating for so many years, and now she cannot tolerate any more and accordingly, she poured kerosene on her body.
9. PW.2, Sheelaben A Patel, is the Executive Magistrate who had recorded the Dying Declaration. She has in detail described how she got the requisition for recording the Dying Declaration and that she had complied with the same after complying with the formalities required under the law. She further stated that the patient was conscious at the time of taking such declaration.
10. PW.20, Dr. Manish S Jain, is the Doctor who made endorsement on the Dying Declaration after the same was recorded, stating that the patient was conscious.
11. We have found that both, the Executive Magistrate and the Doctor, were consistent in their cross-examination and we do not find any reason to disbelieve their version.
12. It further appears from the records that the facts stated in the Dying Declaration has also been mentioned in the telephone vardhi, Exh.39, taken by the police constable at the time when the deceased was admitted in the hospital. Similarly, the selfsame facts have also been stated by the deceased at the time when case history, Exh.48/49 was taken by PW. 17 Dr. Rinaben Chokshi. Even in the complaint, Exh. 43, the deceased has stated the same facts as stated before the Executive Magistrate.
13. Although the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant tried to impress upon us that the burn injuries of the deceased being 65%, she was not in a position to make statement, we are not impressed by such submission in view of her consistent case made from the very beginning. It further appears that she died 4 days after making the Dying Declaration.
14. No material has been placed before the Court to indicate that at the relevant point of time when she made the Dying Declaration she was unconscious or not capable of understanding what she has stated.
15. From the aforesaid evidence on record, we find that the learned Sessions Judge was quite justified in concluding that although the deceased herself has poured kerosene on her body after quarrelling with the accused, it was the accused who had thrown the lighted matchstick on the body of the deceased.
16. It appears from the statement made under section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the accused tried to make out a case that the deceased wife was burnt by flame of a lamp by accident. However, the case of accident is not even borne out by any materials on record.
17. On consideration of the entire materials on record, we thus find that the learned Sessions Judge rightly found the appellant guilty under Sections 302, 323 and 498A of the IPC, and thus, there is no justification for interfering with the order impugned.
18. The appeal is, thus, devoid of any substance and is, accordingly, dismissed.
[BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, C.J.] mathew [J.B.PARDIWALA. J.]