IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 911 of 2011 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA Sd/- HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA Sd/-
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========================================================= CHANDULAL J MARVANIYA AND OTHERS Versus STATE OF GUJARAT - THROUGH SECRETARY AND OTHERS ========================================================= Appearance :
MR VIVEK N MAPARA for the petitioners MR RAKESH PATEL, ASST.GOVERNMENT PLEADER for Respondents:1-2 None for Respondent(s) : 3 - 4.
========================================================= CORAM : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D.H.WAGHELA and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA Date : 29/03/2012 CAV JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. ANJARIA) The lands of the petitioners being Survey Nos.135, 138, 139, 141 and 154 at village Kesiya, Taluka Jodiya, district Jamnagar were subjected to acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (‘the Act’ for sake of brevity), for the purpose of UndII Irrigation Scheme. The intention to acquire was declared on 08.07.2005 in form of notification under section 4 of the Act. The notification under section 6 of the Act was issued on 06.09.2005. The Awards under section 11 of the Act in respect of two Land Acquisition Cases No.95 of 2003 and 137 of 2003, covering the lands of the petitioners, was declared on 04.01.2006 and 21.02.2006 respectively.
2. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioners have prayed to quash the notification dated 06.09.2005 issued under section 6 of the Act. It is also prayed to set aside the Awards dated 04.01.2006 and 21.02.2006 passed in the aforementioned two land acquisition cases.
3. According to the petitioners, the total land acquired was 28 mtrs., which was highly excessive compared to the need, as the maximum width required for construction of minor canal for which the acquisition was undertaken, was 6 to 8 mtrs. As a result, the most of the petitioners’ land would remain unused. It was the further case that alternative land being available, that land ought to have been acquired and could have been utilized, and their lands could have been spared.
3.1 The petitioners’ case was that they had submitted objections but the authorities did not consider them and finalized the acquisition without application of mind. By incorporating an amendment in the memorandum of petition, the petitioners pleaded that the acquisition was rendered illegal on account of breach of section 31 of the Act under which it was mandatory for the authorities to deposit the awarded amount in the competent court which was not done.
3.2 Affidavitinreply on behalf respondent No.2 is filed, wherein it is contended that the notification under section 4 of the Act was published on 24.06.2005 in Land Acquisition Case No.95 of 2003 and on 08.07.2005 in Land Acquisition Case No.137 of 2003, pursuant to which the petitioners did not submit objections to the Special Land Acquisition Officer within the prescribed time limit. The notification under section 6 was thereafter issued, and it is contended that under subsection (3) of section 6, it was conclusive evidence of the requirement of land for public purpose. It is further contended that notices were issued to the petitioners under section 9 of the Act giving them due opportunity to submit their case, and the submissions of the petitioners were taken into consideration before passing the Award.
3.3 It was further stated that in respect of those claimants who did not accept the compensation as per the Award, the amount was deposited as Revenue Deposit in the office of Mamaltdar, Jodiya. It was contended that the claimants having not raised any dispute at the time of making of Award before the Collector regarding the compensation, there was no breach of provisions of section 31.
3.4 The petitioners filed affidavitinrejoinder in which they averred in detail regarding their representations made to the authorities in respect of availability of alternative land and the possible utilization of those lands in place of the acquired lands. Affidavitinsurrejoinder is also filed by the respondents in which the case and plea of the petitioners for utilizing the alternative government land is refuted on facts.
4. This Court heard Mr. Vivek N. Mapara, learned advocate for the petitioners and Learned Assistant Govt. Pleader Mr. Rakesh Patel for the respondent State authorities at length.
4.1 It is noticed that the Award under section 11 was declared in 2006 and preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act was issued in 2005. Therefore, the present petition, which is filed in 2011, suffers from delay and laches. The petitioners’ case that they had been making representations all along and that their case that alternative lands were available to be utilized was recommended at one stage by the Executive Engineer, is of no avail for their not approaching the court within a reasonable time to ventilate their grievance. As held in Ravindra Nath Bose Vs. Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 470) and in State of Orisss Vs. Sri Pyarimohan Samantray (AIR 1976 SC 2617) continuous making of representations could not be said to be satisfactory explanation for the delay. Similarly in K.V.Rajalakshmiah Setty Vs. State of Mysore, it was held that merely because superior authority had espoused petitioner’s cause and was writing letters frequently to government to do something for petitioners did not mean that they could rest upon their oars and not approach the court in time. Delay in challenging the acquisition has to be viewed seriously because various procedural stages provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are timebound and has to culminate into finality, without brooking avoidable delay so as to serve the public purpose involved. The present petition could have been rejected on that ground alone.
4.2 Having regard to the undisputed position emerging from uncontroverted averments in reply affidavits that the petitioners did not submit their objections in inquiry under section 5A of the Act, and that they were given opportunity under Section 9 which they had availed, twofold contentions survived for the petitioners, namely the availability of other lands and non compliance of Section 31 of the Act, even as this Court permitted the learned advocate for the petitioners to make elaborate submissions on various points.
4.3 Learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the alternative land which could be utilized was Government waste land alongside a rough road. On that land, there was encroachment which could have been removed and that road could have been shifted. It was submitted that even though powers were available under the Act to acquire, selection of land for the purpose of acquisition should have been with due application of mind and reasonable as it affects livelihood of the owners. It was also submitted that the acquisition was unjustified and amounted to colourable exercise of power, and the lands acquired exceeded the actual need.
4.4 It was next submitted that the provisions of Section 31 of the Act were mandatory, and when the petitioners had not consented to receive the compensation, the Collector was dutybound in law to deposit the amount in the Court. The amount having not been deposited as per the Section , the acquisition was vitiated. It was contended that keeping the amount under the head of Revenue Deposit could not be treated to be compliance of requirement under that Section.
4.5 In support of his submissions, learned advocate relied on the decisions in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Darius Shapur Chenai and others [2005(7) SCC 627], the judgment of the Apex Court in Devsharan and others vs. State of U.P. and others [Special Leave Petition (C.) No.8939 of 2010 decided on 07.03.2011 = AIR 2011 SCW 1778], Ashok Kumar vs. State of Bihar and others [(2008) 8 SCC 445], Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha vs. Union of India and another [(1986) 3 SCC 325], decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Capital Stone Crushers vs. The State of Haryana and another [ in Civil Writ Petition No.12471 of 1989, decided on 05.01.1993] and decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Trilok Singh Mohan Singh vs. State of Haryana and others [Civil Writ Petition No.7678 of 1989, decided on 07.02.1994].
5. Learned Assistant Government Pleader, on the other hand, submitted that the acquisition had attained finality on issuance of Notification under Section 6 of the Act and when it was not the case of the petitioners that the purpose for which the lands were acquired was not public purpose, the petition could not be entertained by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. As regards the contention about the breach of Section 31 of the Act, it was submitted that the plea was technical as the amount of compensation was deposited as Revenue Deposit before the revenue authorities. It was also submitted that the contingencies under section 31(2) would arise when reference under section 18 is made.
5.1 Learned Assistant Government Pleader in support of his contentions placed reliance on the decisions in Govindu Venkata Reddy vs. K. Krishna Rao and another [AIR 1982 Andhra Pradesh 86], Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and another vs. Shah Hyder Beig and others [AIR 2000 SC 671], M/s. Larsen & Tourbo Ltd. vs. State of Gujarat and others [1998 (1) GLH 683].
6. The contention that as the alternative lands were available, the lands of the petitioners could not have been acquired is misconceived both in law as well as on facts. It is not open to an owner of a property to question the acquisition on such ground as held by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. K. Balaji Jaya Rama Rao and Others [(2007) 15 SCC 791] as under:
“19. ..... It is for the Government to decide whether this property is to be acquired or some other property is to be acquired. It is not open to an owner to say that some other property is more suitable. If that were to be permitted then every owner will say that some other property is better and that that property must be acquired instead of his own. So long as the property was required for a public purpose, the mere fact that some other property could have been acquired is not a ground on which the High Court can say that the reasoning for acquisition is not sufficient.”
6.1 The choice of the lands which may be acquired is the domain of the government. The subjective satisfaction of the government would extend to the need for acquisition as well as the determination as to which lands are to be acquired. When the acquisition in the present case is for the construction of canal in an irrigation scheme, the selection of lands on which the canal could pass and could be constructed would also be informed by technical considerations. Therefore, the satisfaction of the government regarding the particular lands to be acquired has to be treated as final. More so in the instant case when the acquired lands are to be utilized with an engineering expertise for the irrigation canal.
6.2 Even on facts, assertion of the petitioners regarding availability of alternative land stood falsified in view of the averments made in reply of the respondents stated:
“ I say and submit that the contentions of the petitioner that land of road (Gada Marg) should be utilized for laying canal can not be sustained because the road is required to be having sufficient length. If say of the petitioner is accepted and land of their is not utilized for canal, but land of road is utilized then the road will have to be shifted towards the opposite survey number, so as maintain width of the road. This, in turn will affect the owner of the other survey number which will result into multiplicity of litigation. Even otherwise also the existing road is to be utilized and that itself is of insufficient width. In that case further reducing width of the road by utilizing of the road in laying canal will not be in any larger public interest.”
6.3 It was denied that government waste land was available and it was further stated that the suggested lands were in use for public road (Gada Marg) which linked villages and where the traffic was increasing day by day. As according to the respondents, no alternative lands as claimed by the petitioners were available, the case of the petitioners on that count involved disputed questions of facts, which could not be gone into by this court in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
7. In order to appreciate the contention regarding non compliance of the provisions of section 31 of the Act, the text of section 31(1) and 31(2) is reproduced hereunder.
“31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in court. (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by someone or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next subsection.
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted.”
7.1 The provision of section 31 has a salutary object of timely and assured payment of compensation to the land owners ensuring that they do not have to run from pillar to post to get their due compensation.
Subsection (1) of section 31 makes it obligatory on the Collector to tender payment of compensation on making of an Award to the persons entitled under the Award. Under subsection (2), the Collector is enjoined to deposit the amount of the compensation in the court to which a reference under section 18 of the Act would be submitted. The words “shall deposit” occurring in subsection (2) signifies mandatory nature of duty of the Collector in this regard.
7.2 Three contingencies are contemplated for Subsection (2) of Section 31 of the Act. The first circumstance in which the Collector shall have to deposit the amount is that where the persons entitled to the compensation “shall not consent to receive it.” The second circumstance is that no person is there competent to alienate the lands, and the third is the existence of dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or apportionment of the amount of compensation.
8. In examining the contention of the petitioners that section 31(2) is breached as they have not consented to receive the compensation and the Collector has not deposited the amount in the competent court, the phrase “if they shall not consent to receive” calls for interpretation. Taking a clue from the future tense used by the legislature, it connotes that it is a subsequent act after the Award for compensation is declared under section 11 of the Act.
8.1 In the facts of the present case the Collector has set apart and deposited the amount of compensation under the head of relevant deposit. There is no clear evidence of that amount being tendered to the petitioners. Similarly, however, the petitioners have not conveyed their reluctance to receive the amounts and kept on agitating their demand for withdrawal of acquisition which cannot be necessarily construed as refusal to receive the amount. In such circumstances, the whole acquisition proceeding cannot be held to be vitiated only on the ground of the amounts of compensation not having been deposited in Court. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, the contention of the petitioners that section 31(2) is contravened is not tenable. Looking it from different angle, depositing of the amount of compensation by the Collector, even as it is not before the competent court, but under the head of Revenue Deposit in the government, is indicative of intention to tender and pay the compensation. If not in letters, in spirit the provisions of section 31 may be treated to have been complied with.
8.2 It is true that the provision of Section 31 is mandatory and non compliance thereof, in given set of facts, would vitiate the acquisition proceedings. A reference to the decision of Division Bench of this Court [(Coram: D. H. Waghela and Bankim N. Mehta, JJ.] in Bhanuben Durlabhbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No.18146 of 2003 with cognate petition decided on 24.09.2010 may be made. In that case, the lands were acquired for GIDC Industrial Estate for which Notification under Section 4 was issued in the year 1988 and Notification under Section 6 was issued in 1989. The award was made on 14.02.1991, even as the possession of the lands in question was not taken from those petitioners. In 1996, the officer on special duty informed the acquiring body that award was declared in 1991. The instruction was given in the year 1992 not to take possession, which, however, was withdrawn by a letter in 1995. After a gap of 14 years, in 2001, the possession was sought to be taken, which could not be taken. For all these years, the amount of compensation was not deposited under Section 31(2) of the Act and as late as on 20.12.2003 notices under Section 12(2) of the Act were issued calling upon the petitioners to remain present to collect the compensation amount. In the backdrop of those facts, the Court set aside the acquisition on the grounds inter alia of noncompliance of Section 31 of the Act, holding that offering compensation in the year 2003 at the rate prevalent in the year 1988 was travesty of justice and amounted to indirectly abrogating the right enshrined under Article 31A of the Constitution. In the facts of the present case, however, contention regarding breach of Section 31 of the Act is totally misplaced.
9. No illegality of procedure required to be followed under the Act could be pointed out by the petitioners. The fact that the construction work of the canal was completed in part and further construction was in progress could also not be disputed by the petitioners. According to the respondents, an amount of Rs.23.97 lakhs was already spent for the construction of canal which was a public purpose. It was also an uncontroverted position on the record that the compensation was awarded to total 19 claimants. Out of 19, possession was taken over in respect of lands covered under Acquisition Case No.95 of 2003 under agreements dated 12.012.2003 and 18.09.2002, whereas the possession of the lands covered under Acquisition Case No.137 of 2003 was taken, as per Rojkam dated 01.03.2006 and Panch Rojkam dated 29.07.2008. The agreements and the Rojkams were annexed with the affidavit. It is seen that out of 19 claimants of both the cases, only 7 petitioners have challenged the acquisition.
10. In view of foregoing discussion and reasons, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.
[D. H. WAGHELA, J.] Amit [N. V. ANJARIA, J.]