IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 931 of 2006 For Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR.BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA ====================================== =============== 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as
4 to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ?
5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
================================================== =================== JANGLIYABHAI RANGLABHAI DHANUK CONVICT NO.79236 - Appellant(s) Versus STATE OF GUJARAT - Opponent(s) ====================================== ============== Appearance :
MR GAJENDRA P BAGHEL for Appellant(s) : 1, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for Opponent(s) : 1, ====================================== =============== HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE CORAM :
MR.BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA and HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA Date :26/09/2012 CAV JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA)
1. The present appeal is at the instance of a convict accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and is directed against an order of conviction and sentence dated 5th May, 2006, passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-II, Chhota Udepur, Dist: Vadodara in Sessions Case No.70 of 2004. By the aforesaid order, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable U/s.302 of the Indian Penal Code and consequently sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.100/-. In default of payment of fine, the appellant was directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one month. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge also declined to give benefit of set off of the period of detention undergone by the accused U/s.428 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. Case of the Prosecution :
2.1 The deceased Naranbhai Jandubhai was residing at Village Moti Sadhli situated in Ta: Chhota Udepur, Dist: Vadodara with his wife and children. On 28th May, 2004, there was a religious function at the house of one Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai Rathva resident of village Moti Sadhli. As per the custom and ritual, small children of the village are fed food.
Accordingly, on 28th May, 2004, Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai Rathva had invited children of the village at his house to have food. Food was being served from morning till evening. People came with their respective children and after having food left the house of Chhitubhai. It is the case of the prosecution that on that day when food was being served at the house of Chhitubhai, the accused had also came at the house of Chhitubhai with an iron Paliya in his hand and sat down amongst small children to have food. The deceased being a villager of the same village, was helping Chhitubhai in serving food. The deceased served rice to the accused and at that point of time the accused felt that the deceased had served less quantity of rice. The accused felt bad and therefore, asked the deceased as to why the deceased served less rice to the accused. According to the case of the prosecution, so saying, the accused all of a sudden inflicted injury on the neck of the deceased with an iron paliya causing instantaneous death of the deceased.
The aforesaid is the sum and substance of the case of the prosecution. It is also the case of the prosecution that on the date of the incident, the wife of the deceased had also come at the house of Chhitubhai with her children and was present at the time when the incident occurred.
2.2 The wife of the deceased PW.2 Ghugariben lodged a First Information Report about the incident at 20.40 hours on the same date with Rangpur Police Station. On the strength of the first information report – Exh.46, investigation commenced. Inquest Panchnama – Exh.25 of the dead body of the deceased was drawn in presence of the panch witnesses. The deadbody of the deceased was sent for Postmortem examination. The postmortem examination revealed that the deceased had sustained a sharp cutting wound 9cm x 5 cm on the neck and all vessels were found cut. The cause of death assigned was cardio respiratory arrest due to injury and loss of blood. Thereafter scene of offence Panchnama was drawn in presence of two panch witnesses. On 29th May, 2004, the accused surrendered himself before Rangpur Police Station and on his own free will and volition produced the iron Paliya with which injuries were inflicted on the deceased. The panchnama of the person of the accused was drawn at Exh.31 in the presence of two panch witnesses. The clothes of the accused were also collected and thereafter, were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis. The panchnama of the clothes of the deceased Exh.34 was drawn. A map of the scene of offence Exh.38 was prepared. The statements of the witnesses were recorded and on completion of the investigation, finally the Investigating Officer filed charge-sheet in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chhota Udepur.
3. As the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court, the JMFC, Chhota-Udepur committed the case to the Sessions Court U/s.209 of the Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court framed charge against the accused Exh.14 and statement of the accused was recorded. The accused did not admit the charge and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution adduced the following oral evidence in support of its case.
PW.1 Dr. Mohammad Shahid Jiyauddin, Exh.17- Medical Officer who performed the Postmortem.
PW.2 Ghugariben Natabhai Jandubhai , Exh.21 - Original complainant and wife of the deceased.
PW.3 Bhadubhai Nayakabhai, Exh.22 - Eye-witness to the incident.
PW.4 Ghughariyabhai Anudiyabhai, Exh.23 - Eye-witness to the incident PW.5 Remlabhai Sekadiyabhai, Exh.24 - Panch witness of the Inquest Panchnama.
PW.6 Ramlabhai Undhaliyabhai Rathva, Exh.26 - Panch witness of the scene of Offence Panchnama.
PW.7 Virsingbhai Bajubhai Exh.29 - Panch witness of the arrest Panchnama of the accused.
PW.8 Karamshi Chhotubhai Raghva, Exh.32 - Panch witness of the panchnama of the clothes of the deceased.
PW.9 Kanubhai Malabhai Rathva, Exh.35 - Circle Inspector who prepared map of the scene of offence.
PW.10 Mahendrabhai Bahadursinh Solanki, Exh.40 - Investigating Officer.
PW.11 Vikramsinh Narendrasinh Solanki, Exh.45 - The First Investigating Officer.
5. The following pieces of documentary evidences were adduced by the prosecution.
6. After completion of oral as well as documentary evidence of the prosecution, the statement of the accused U/s.313 of Criminal Procedure Code was recorded, in which the accused stated that the complaint was a false one and he was innocent. The defence of the accused was one of alibi. According to the accused on the date of the incident he was not present at village Moti Sadhli.
7. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Judge convicted the accused for the offence U/s.302 of IPC and sentenced him as stated hereinbefore.
8. Being dissatisfied, the accused-appellant has come-up with the present Appeal.
9. Oral Evidence on record :
i) The prosecution examined PW.1 Dr. Mohammad Shahid Jiyauddin, Exh.17 to prove the Postmortem report. The PW.1 deposed that the postmortem examination of the deadbody of the deceased revealed the following injuries.-
(1) 9cm x 5cm x 5cm sharp cut on left side extended backward to forward upto mandible.
(2) Muscles and all vessels cut.
(3) Skin cut 2cm left mandible region away from left angle of mouth.
Internal examination revealed the following injuries –
(1) 3rd and 4th cervical bone cut and all vessels corresponding to the injury were found cut.
The cause of death assigned was cardio respiratory arrest due to injury No.16 and due to massive loss of blood. The PW.1 also deposed that there was no chance worth the name for the deceased to survive taking into consideration the nature of the injuries sustained. The PW.1 further deposed that injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by a sharp cutting and heavy object. The weapon of offence iron paliya was shown to PW.1 and on examination of the iron paliya, the PW.1 deposed that the injuries were possible by such an iron paliya. The PW.1 proved the Postmortem report Exh.19.
ii) The prosecution also examined PW.2 Ghugariben one of the eyewitnesses to the incident and the wife of the deceased. The PW.2 Ghugariben in her evidence has deposed that the incident occurred at around 5'O clock in the evening. Her husband, the deceased died at the house of Chhitubhai. The PW.2 has further deposed that there was a function at the house of Chhitubhai, where, according to the ritual, small children are invited to have food. The PW.2 has further deposed that the accused also sat in the line along with other children to have food and her husband, the deceased was serving food. The PW.2 has further deposed that at that point of time the accused told the deceased as to why the deceased had served very less quantity of rice and so saying all of a sudden the accused inflicted injuries on the neck of the deceased with an iron Paliya. According to the PW.2, the accused knocked down the deceased in one blow. The accused ran away from the place of the occurrence. The PW.2 also identified the iron paliya as the same iron paliya which was used by the accused in inflicting injuries on the deceased. The PW.2 has further deposed that thereafter she went to Rangpur Police Station to lodge the first information report. The PW.2 reached Rangpur Police Station at around 8 O’clock where her first information report was recorded. In her cross-examination she deposed that she is the second wife of the deceased. The deceased had first wife and children. The PW.2 also deposed that the first wife of the deceased and her children and she herself and her children all are residing together. The PW.2 further deposed that on the date of the incident she had gone to the house of Chhitubhai with her three children. According to the PW.2, it takes around 10 minutes from her house to reach the house of Chhitubhai. The PW.2 has further deposed in her cross-examination that the function was at around 4' O clock in the evening. The people who came late from work had food late in the evening. According to her when she sat for food with her children, other people of the village were also having food. The PW.2 has further deposed that after having food she left the house of Chhitubhai alongwith her children and the other people who were having food also left the house of Chhitubhai. The PW.2 deposed that after having food at the house of Chhitubhai, she returned home and was doing her household work. According to the PW.2 all of a sudden she heard commotion and therefore, came out of her house and learnt that her husband, the deceased had died. The PW.2 further deposed that when she reached the place of occurrence she found that her husband was lying down and was dead. According to the PW.2 she learnt from the talks of the people of the village that it was the accused who had killed her husband, the deceased.
iii) The prosecution examined PW.3 Bhadubhai Nayakabhai – Exh.22 as one of the eyewitnesses to the incident. The PW.3 Bhadubhai in his evidence has deposed that on the date of the incident there was a function at the house of Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai. According to the PW.3 on that day he himself, the deceased and Ghugariyabhai were present at the house of Chhitubhai. The rice and dal were being served to small children at the house of Chhitubhai. The PW.3 Bhadubhai has deposed that at that time the accused came at the house of Chhitubhai and sat down in the line with other small children to have food. According to the PW.3, the accused told as to why less quantity of rice was being served to him and saying so all of a sudden inflicted injuries on the neck of the deceased with an iron paliya. According to PW.3 the deceased fell down and died immediately. According to the PW.3 nothing transpired between the accused and the deceased at the time when injuries were inflicted on the neck of the deceased with an iron paliya by the accused. According to the PW.3, the accused had brought iron paliya along with him when he came at the house of Chhitubhai to have food. The PW.3 has deposed that when the incident occurred he was at the house of Chhitubhai and witnessed the actual assault on the deceased by the accused. The iron paliya i.e. the muddamal was shown to the PW.3 and on being shown the PW.3 identified the iron paliya to be the same object with which injuries were inflicted by the accused on the deceased. The PW.3 further deposed that thereafter wife of the deceased Gugariben went to Rangpur Police Station to lodge the FIR. According to the PW.3 when the incident occurred Gugariben, the wife of the deceased was at the house of Chhitubhai. The PW.3 in his cross-examination deposed that an exorcist is called to perform rituals and one such exorcist had come at 8 O’clock in the morning at the house of Chhitubhai to perform the rituals. The PW.3 denied the suggestion that immediately on completion of the ritual small children are being served food. According to the PW.3 the ritual would last for around one hour. In such type of ritual small children are to be fed food and not elder children.
According to the PW.3 his statement was recorded by the police at around 8 o’clock in the evening at the house of Chhitubhai where the incident had occurred. The PW.3 further deposed that on that day he had food at the house of Chhitubhai. The PW.3 had dal and rice. The PW.3 on his own volition deposed that he himself, the deceased and Ghugariyabhai sat back at the house of Chhitubhai and at that point of time wife of the deceased Gugariben was also at the house of Chhitubhai. According to the PW.3 as children came, they kept on serving food and around 50 children were served food on that particular day. According to the PW.3, the children kept on coming at the house of Chhitubhai upto 5 o’clock in the evening. According to the PW.3 he was also one of the persons along with the deceased who was serving food.
iv) Prosecution has also examined PW.4 Ghugariyabhai Anudiyabhai, Exh.23. PW.4 Ghugariyabhai in his evidence has deposed that on the date of the incident, there was a function at the house of Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai. Accordingly, the PW.4, the deceased and the wife of the deceased were present at the house of Chhitubhai. According to the PW.4 at that point of time, food was being served to the children of the village. Dal, rice and chapattis were being served to the small children. The PW.4 has deposed that at that point of time the accused also came at the house of Chhitubhai and sat in the line along with other children to have food. According to the PW.4, at that point of time the accused told the deceased as to why less quantity of rice was served to him and saying so the accused inflicted injuries on the neck of the deceased with an iron paliya. According to the PW.4 nothing untoward transpired between the accused and the deceased at the time when the accused inflicted injuries on the deceased. According to the PW.4, the accused came at the house of Chhitubhai alongwith an iron paliya. According to the PW.4 in such type of functions some people do come with weapon in their hands and others may not bring such weapons along with them. According to the PW.4, the deceased had not brought any weapon along with him on that particular day. The PW.4 Ghughariyabhai identified the iron paliya to be the same weapon with which the injuries were inflicted by the accused on the deceased. The PW.4 has further deposed that Chhitubhai was his natural brother and they all were residing together in one house. According to PW.4, there were 8 family members at the house of Chhitubhai whereas there were 7 family members in the family of the PW.4. The PW.4 further deposed that to perform some rituals an exorcist has been called from village Rangpur and the said exorcist started performing the rituals at around 8 o’clock in the morning and completed at 9 o’clock in the morning. The food was being served after 9 o’clock in the morning. In the cross-examination of PW.4, contradiction in the form of omission was brought on record wherein the PW.4 deposed that it was not true that in his police statement he had stated that there was a function at the house of the PW.4’s younger brother Chhitubhai and all the guests including the deceased, the wife of the deceased and other people after having food left for their respective houses. The PW.4 has further deposed that the statement of the wife of the deceased was recorded by the police at around 8 o’clock in the night standing next to the deadbody of the deceased. The PW.4 has further deposed that as they were all serving food they could not save the deceased.
v) The prosecution has also examined PW.5 Remlabhai Sekadiyabhai. The PW.5 is one of the panch witnesses of the inquest panchnama. The PW.5 proved the contents of the inquest panchnama Exh.25.
vi) The prosecution thereafter examined PW.6 Ranglabhai Rathva Exh.26. PW.26 is one of the panch witnesses of the scene of offence Panchnama. This witness proved contents of scene of offence Panchnama Exh.28.
vii) The prosecution thereafter examined PW.7 Virsingbhai Bajubhai Exh.29. The PW.7 is one of the panch witnesses of the arrest panchnama of the accused. The PW.7 in his evidence has deposed that on 29th May, 2004, the PW.7 was called at Rangpur Police Station at around 4 O’clock in the evening. On that day one another person named Meghjibhai Dhuliyabhai was also present as one of the panchwitnesses. The PW.7 has deposed that the accused on his own free will and volition produced an iron paliya and handed-over the same to the police. The PW.7 was shown the iron paliya and he identified the same to be the same iron paliya which was produced and handed over by the accused at the police station. The PW.7 in his cross-examination has deposed that he being an illiterate person is unable to remember the exact date on which the Panchnama was drawn. The PW.7 emphatically denied the suggestion that he had put his thumb impression on a prepared Panchnama. According to the PW.7 the procedure of drawing of the Panchnama lasted for around 2 hours. The PW.7 denied the suggestion that no weapon or any other object was handed-over or produced by the accused in his presence at the police station.
viii) The prosecution examined PW.8 Karamsing Rathva – Exh.32. The PW.8 is one of the panch witnesses of the panchnama of the clothes of the deceased. The PW.8 proved the contents of the Panchnama –Exh.34.
ix) The prosecution also examined PW.9 Kanubhai Rathva Exh.35. PW.9 is the Circle Inspector serving with Taluka Panchayat of Chhota Udepur. The PW.9 was asked by the investigating agency to prepare a map of the scene of offence. Accordingly PW.9 prepared a map of the scene of offence Exh.36.
x) The prosecution thereafter examined PW.10 Mahendrasinh Bahadursinh Solanki Exh.40. The PW.10 is one of the Investigating Officers. The PW.10 had taken over the investigation from PW.11 Vikramsinh Narendrasinh Solanki, the first Investigating Officer. The PW.10 in his evidence has deposed that his predecessor in Office had handed-over the papers of investigation of the present case and on the strength of the same the PW.10 had prepared a charge-sheet and the said charge-sheet was filed by him in the Court of JMFC, Chhota Udepur.
xi) The last witness to be examined by the Prosecution was PW.11 Vikramsinh Narendrasinh Solanki, Exh.45. The PW.11 in his evidence has deposed that on 28th May, 2004 he was serving as a PSI of Rangpur Police Station. According to the PW.11, the wife of the deceased Gugariben had come to the Police Station to lodge her complaint and accordingly the complaint of the incident was recorded and registered. The PW.11 has further deposed that after recording of the FIR Exh.46 he proceeded with the investigation. Inquest Panchnama of the deadbody of the deceased was drawn, scene of offence Panchnama was drawn, the Panchnama of the clothes of the deceased was drawn, the deadbody of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. The PW.11 has deposed that on 29th May, 2004, the accused on his own free will and volition surrendered at Rangpur Police Station. The PW.11 has further deposed that on the accused surrendering before Rangpur Police Station, two panchwitnesses were called for drawing the arrest Panchnama i.e. the Panchnama of the person of the accused. The PW.11 has further deposed that at the time of drawing of the arrest Panchnama the accused on his own free will and volition also handed-over and produced an iron paliya which was used in the commission of the offence. In his cross-examination the PW.11 has deposed that he learnt about the incident at around 9 O’clock in the night on 28th May, 2004. The PW.11 has further deposed that by the time he learnt about the incident, the FIR was already registered. The PW.11 has further deposed that it was true that the wife of the deceased had not lodged her FIR at Rangpur Police Station in his presence.
10. Submissions on behalf of the accused-appellant:
10.1 Mr. Baghel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-accused vehemently submitted that the learned trial Judge committed serious error in holding the accused guilty of the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. According to Mr. Baghel, the evidence of none of the eyewitnesses could be termed as wholly reliable and inspiring confidence. Mr. Baghel also submitted that the trial Court committed an error in believing the version of the PW-2 Ghugariben, the wife of the deceased. According to Mr. Baghel, the PW-2 Ghugariben could not be termed as an eyewitness in the light of her evidence to the effect that the PW-2, Ghugariben learnt about the incident only upon hearing the commotion when the PW-2 was at her house.
10.2 According to Mr. Baghel, the very genisis of the prosecution case could be said to be doubtful and the prosecution has tried to suppress the true origin of the occurrence. Mr. Baghel also submitted that there was no reason for the accused to sit alongwith other children to have food, more particularly when the occasion was one in which food was to be served only to small children as per the custom and ritual.
10.3 Mr. Baghel vehemently submitted that the trial Court failed to consider the plea of alibi as raised by the accused during the course of trial. According to Mr. Baghel, the accused was not at village Moti Sadhli when the incident in question occurred.
10.4 Mr. Baghel also submitted that the trial Court committed an error in not giving the benefit of set-off available to the accused under Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
10.5 Mr. Baghel lastly submitted that even if the entire case of the prosecution is believed to be true, then under such circumstances the trial Court could not have convicted the accused for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC, but the conviction ought to have been under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Baghel, therefore, urged to allow the appeal fully or in the alternative to alter the conviction from Section 302 to one under Section 304 IPC.
11. Submissions on behalf of the State:
Mr. K.P. Raval, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent State vehemently submitted that the trial Court rightly convicted the accused for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. Mr. Raval further submitted that the evidence of the eyewitnesses could be termed as reliable, cogent and convincing. Mr. Raval further submitted that the plea of alibi as raised by the accused is without any foundation or any evidence on record. According to Mr. Raval, the burden would be on the accused to prove his alibi and in the present case, the accused could not discharge the said burden even on preponderance of probability. On the question of set-off, Mr. Raval submitted that it would be a matter of discretion which the trial Court may exercise in the facts and circumstances of each case. According to Mr. Raval, set-off under Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code is not a matter of right. Mr. Raval therefore, urged to dismiss this appeal there being no merit in the same.
12. Thus, the picture that emerges from a cumulative reading and the assessment of material on record is thus :
12.1 On the date of incident i.e. on 28th May, 2004, there was a function at the house of one Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai Rathva at village Moti Sadhli. According to the custom and the ritual, small children of the village are invited and are served food. So far as this part of the prosecution case is concerned, it has been proved by cogent evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It also appears from the oral evidence on record that when the food was being served at the house of Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai, the accused all of a sudden came and sat in the line alongwith other small children to have food. It also appears that the deceased and few others were helping Chhitubhai on that day to serve food to the children. It might be that Chhitubhai Anudiyabhai, the host, and the others may not have thought fit to tell the accused not to sit for food as the function was only for small children. However, it appears that the deceased who was serving food also served rice to the accused and the accused felt annoyed due to less quantity of rice being served to the accused. On this trivial issue, the accused asked the deceased as to why less quantity of rice was served to him and saying so inflicted injuries on the neck of the deceased with an iron Paliya which he was carrying when the accused came at the house of Chhitubhai. We have found the evidence of all the eye-witnesses absolutely consistent so far as the genesis of the occurrence is concerned.
13. Mr. Gajendra Baghel, learned Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant submitted that the PW.2 Gugariben, the wife of the deceased could not be termed as an eyewitness as in her cross-examination the PW.2 Gugariben has deposed in clear words that after having food at the house of Chhitubhai, she alongwith her children returned home. According to Mr.Baghel the PW.2 has further deposed that she was doing her house-hold work at her home and at that point of time the PW.2 heard commotion and learnt through others that her husband – the deceased had been killed by the accused. According to Mr. Baghel under such circumstances, the PW.2 Gugariben could not be said to be an eyewitness to the incident.
14. We appreciate the submission of Mr. Baghel, learned Counsel appearing for the accused that the PW.2 Gugariben might not have witnessed the incident because according to the PW.2 she had gone with her three children at the house of Chhitubhai and after having food at the house of Chhitubhai the PW.2 returned home with her children and was doing her house-hold work and thereafter the PW.2 learnt about the incident. Therefore, Mr. Baghel, to a certain extent is justified in submitting that the evidence of the PW.2 could not be said to be one of an eyewitness. However, we cannot overlook the fact that the PW.2 in her evidence has deposed that when she came out of her house on hearing the commotion, one and all started talking about the injuries inflicted by the accused on the neck of the deceased.
15. Even if we hold that the PW-2 Gugariben, the wife of the deceased is not an eyewitness to the incident, that would not help the accused in any manner. We find that the evidence of the PW.3 Badubhai Nayakabhai and the evidence of the PW.4 Ghugariyabhai Anudiyabhai is absolutely consistent, cogent, clear and convincing and it could be said that the prosecution has been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of the evidence of the two eye-witnesses –the PW.3 and the PW.4. Nothing could be elicited by the defence through the cross-examination of the PW.3 and the PW.4 so as to render the evidence of the PW.3 and the PW.4 doubtful or unreliable in any manner.
16. The prosecution has also been able to prove the Panchnama - Exh.31 i.e. the arrest Panchnama of the accused drawn on 29th May, 2004 at 16.00 hours. The arrest panchnama Exh.31 has been duly proved by the evidence of the PW.7 Virsingbhai, Exh.29. According to the PW.7, on 29th May, 2004 he was called at Rangpur Police Station and at that point of time the accused produced on his own free will and volition an iron Paliya said to have been used in the commission of the offence. The said iron Paliya was seized by the Police in presence of the panch-witnesses i.e. the PW.7 and other panch witness and thereafter, was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis. This fact stands further corroborated by the report of the FSL which indicates that blood was found on the iron paliya matching with the blood group of the deceased i.e. ‘B’.
17. We have also noticed from the evidence of the PW.11, the Investigating Officer that the accused on his own surrendered before the Police at the Police Station and this is evident from the evidence of the PW.11. Most importantly the fact that the accused surrendered before Rangpur Police Station on 29th May, 2004 has not been challenged by the defence. No suggestion was made to the PW.11 i.e. the Investigating officer that it was false to say that the accused had surrendered on his own before the Police Station.
18. The aforesaid conduct of the accused would be a relevant fact admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The Supreme Court in A.N. Venkatesh V. State of Karnataka (2005) 7 SCC 714, made the following observations as regards the conduct of the accused relevant by virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act.
"By virtue of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, the conduct of the accused person is relevant, if such conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact. The evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter, that the accused pointed out to the police officer, the place where the deadbody of the kidnapped boy was found and on their pointing out the body was exhumed, would be admissible as conduct under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused contemporaneously with or antecedent to such conduct falls within the purview of Section 27 or not as held by this Court in Prakash Chand V. State (Delhi Admn.) [1979] 3 SCC 90]. Even if we hold that the disclosure statement made by the accused-appellants (Exts. P-15 and P-16) is not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, still it is relevant under Section 8."
19. The plea of alibi is based on Section 11 of the Evidence Act, which provides, inter alia, that a fact, which is, otherwise, not relevant, will become relevant if such a fact is inconsistent with the fact in issue. Thus in a given case, when the incident took place at a place, 'X' and the accused claims that he was, at the relevant point of time, at a place, 'Y', in order to show that it was not possible for him (i.e., the accused) to be present at the place 'X', at the relevant point of time, the implication is that the accused seeks to prove a fact, which is inconsistent with the fact in issue, namely, that the accused was present at the place of occurrence. When a person wants to establish a fact, which will contradict a fact in issue or a relevant fact, such a fact is relevant and must be allowed to be proved. The burden to prove such a fact is, however, on the accused under Section 103 of the Evidence Act inasmuch as Section 103 lays down that the burden of proof, as to any particular fact, lies on that person, who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall be on any particular person.
20. Thus, in the light of Section 103, if the accused wishes the Court to believe in existence of the fact that he was at a place other than the place where he is alleged to have been, the burden to prove that he (the accused) was elsewhere, rests on the accused. It is based on this principle that the illustration, appended to Section 103, states, inter alia, that when an accused wishes a Court to believe that, at the time, in question, he was elsewhere, it is the accused, who must prove it. We must hasten to point out and reiterate that the burden of proof of the plea of alibi, which the accused takes, rests on the provisions of Section 103 and not on Section 106.
21. We may also point out that before a Court examines the correctness of the plea of alibi taken by an accused, the evidence on record must, otherwise, be sufficient to bring home the charge against the accused. If the evidence adduced by the prosecution is insufficient to uphold the charge brought against the accused, the plea of alibi taken by the accused may not be necessary to be examined. When the prosecution succeeds in proving its case, the Court has, if the accused has taken the plea of alibi, obligation to determine whether the plea of alibi is or is not true. Moreover, when the plea of alibi taken by an accused is found to be false, it becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances, which may appear against the accused. In other words, it is only when the prosecution succeeds in discharging its burden of proving its case against an accused that the evidence given by the accused as regards his plea of alibi can be examined in order to ascertain as to whether the accused has been able to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place and time of the alleged occurrence.
22. Coupled with the above, we may point out that when the burden to prove plea of alibi shifts to an accused, the accused must prove his plea of alibi with certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place and time of occurrence. If the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the Court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the place and time of occurrence, the Court would evaluate the prosecution evidence to see if the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution leaves any room available to fit therein the defence of alibi. The burden of the accused is, undoubtedly, heavy. This flows from the language of Section 103 of the Evidence Act. However, while weighing the prosecution case and the defence case, pitted against each other, if the balance tilts in favour of the accused, the prosecution would fail and the accused would be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt, which would emerge in the mind of the Court. The defence of the accused all through-out was that on the date of the incident he was not present at village Moti Sadhli and therefore, there was no question of going at the house of Chhitubhai. Thus, it could be seen that the defence of the accused was one of alibi.
23. We may, now, look into the evidence which the defence has adduced. We have noticed that the accused was unable to lead an iota of evidence to show that on the date of the incident he was not present at village Moti Sadhli. The accused raised this defence of alibi in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The plea of alibi cannot be proved by merely raising a plea or defence during the course of recording of statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that there is no substance or any merit in the defence of the accused that he was not present at the village Moti Sadhli on the date of the incident, but on the contrary this false plea of alibi is an additional incriminating circumstance in the chain of circumstances, appearing against the accused.
24. We shall now deal with the alternative submission of Mr. Baghel as regards applicability of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC. The sine quo non for the application of an Exception to Section 300 always is that it is a case of murder but the accused claims the benefit of the Exception to bring it out of that Section and to make it a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. We must, therefore, assume that this would be a case of murder and it is for the accused to show the applicability of the Exception. Exception 4 reads as under:-
"Exception 4.- Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner."
A perusal of the provision would reveal that four conditions must be satisfied to bring the matter within Exception 4 :
(i) it was a sudden fight;
(ii) there was no premeditation;
(iii) the act was done in the heat of passion; and; that
(iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
On a plain reading of Exception 4, it appears that the help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found.
25. It would be profitable for us to quote the following observations of the Supreme Court explaining the scope and ambit of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, made in the case of Vishal Singh V. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2009 Criminal Law Journal 2243. A three Judge Bench observed in paragraph 7 as under:-
"7. The Fourth Exception of Section 300, IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the First Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for, in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reasons and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A 'sudden fight' implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the 'fight' occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300, IPC is not defined in the IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression 'undue advantage' as used in the provision means 'unfair advantage'. These aspects have been highlighted in Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujrat (2003 (5) Supreme 223]; Parkash Chand v. State of H.P. (2004 (11) SCC 381); Byvarapu Raju v. State of A.P. and Anr. (2007 (11) SCC 218) and Hawa Singh and Anr. v. State of Haryana (SLP (Crl.) No.1515/ 2008, disposed of on 15.1.2009)."
Applying the aforesaid principles as explained by the Supreme Court in the facts of the present case, more particularly considering the evidence on record, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the present case is not one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but the same is a case of murder. It is very difficult for us to accept the submission of Mr. Baghel that the case would fall within Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC and such benefit be extended to the accused.
26. We shall now deal with the last submission of Mr. Baghel as regards the benefit of set-off under Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
It is now a settled legal position that a sentence of imprisonment for life is not a sentence which would expire automatically after the expiry of 14 years including remissions. The sentence would ensure till the life time of the prisoner as it is not possible to fix the period of his remaining natural life. A sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be automatically treated as one for a definite period in absence of any provision to that effect in the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act. There is no rule conferring an indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life to an unconditional release on the expiry of a particular term including remissions. The Rules under the Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a sentence of imprisonment for life. Whatever be their releases on furlough or parole, the life convicts still have to undergo imprisonment for the remainder of their life. The Supreme Court affirmed the ratio of Gopal Godse Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1961 SC 600), in Maru Ram Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1980 SC 2147, holding that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath and whatever the length of remission earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by the Government. In Ashok Kumar's case, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1792, the Supreme Court after referring to the ratio of Godse's case (supra) and Maru Ram's case (supra) held that where a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for life, the remissions earned by him during his internment in prison under the relevant remission rules have a limited scope and do not acquire significance until the sentence is remitted under Sec., 432 of the Code, in which case the remission would be subject to limitation of Sec. 433A of the Code, unless of course power is exercised under Art. 72 or 161 of the Constitution. The State Government has, however, a discretion under Sec. 432 of the Code to remit the remaining part of the sentence and order release of the convicted prisoner, subject to the embargo on its right imposed under Sec. 433A of the Code.
27. Mr. Baghel, learned counsel appearing for the accused submitted that the accused was arrested on 29th of May, 2004 and stood convicted for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 of IPC on 5th May, 2006. According to Mr. Baghel, in view of the order passed by the learned trial Judge refusing to give benefit of set-off, the period of detention as an undertrial prisoner between 29th May, 2004 and 5th May, 2006 would not be considered for the purpose of set-off. Section 428 reads as under:-
Section 428 : Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment – Where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, not being imprisonment in default of payment of fine, the period of detention, if any, undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment, on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him.
Provided that in cases referred to section 433A, such period of detention shall be set off against the period of fourteen years referred in that section”.
28. Whether imprisonment “for life” is imprisonment “for a term” under the aforesaid Section 428 was an issue that was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirath Vs. Delhi Administration, reported in (1985) 2 Supreme Court Cases 580, wherein it is held by the Supreme Court that the person who is sentenced 'for life imprisonment' is a person sentenced to imprisonment 'for a term', as contemplated by the provisions of section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
29. It is pertinent to note that the aforesaid proviso to section 428 Cr.P.C. was not there when the Supreme Court delivered the aforesaid judgment in the case of Bhagirath (supra). This proviso came to be added by an amendment Act 25, 2005, with effect from 23rd June, 2006. The Bill that introduced, this amendment states that -
“5.7 Clause 39: This clause adds a proviso to section 428 providing for a set off of the period of detention during investigation and trial against period of 14 years of actual imprisonment. This amendment is necessary so that the convicted accused can get a benefit of the period suffered by him as detention during the trial and investigation being set off against period of 14 years mentioned in section 433A”
The Section 433-A of the Code reads thus:
“ Section 433A : - Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases – Notwithstanding anything contained in section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishment, provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment.”
Thus, the question that falls for our consideration is as to whether the proviso to Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 operate retrospectively and whether the benefit of the proviso to Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure added by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 could be given to the convicts who are already undergoing life imprisonment in implementation of conviction awarded prior to the coming into force of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005.
30. In our opinion, the accused herein, who was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life prior to the Amendment Act of 2005 will also be entitled to the benefit of said proviso. It is clear that the proviso to Section 428 is ex-post facto law with retrospective effect in the sense that benefit of this proviso will be available to a person, who was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life prior to this amendment and was actually undergoing the sentence on the date when this amendment came into force.
31. We thus, hold that the accused who is sentenced for life imprisonment is an accused sentenced to "imprisonment for a term" as contemplated under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and therefore, the accused herein is entitled to claim that the period of detention undergone by him during the investigation, enquiry or trial before the date of conviction shall be set off against the life imprisonment imposed upon him on conviction. Thus, we hold that though the accused herein was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment prior to 23rd June, 2006, the accused is entitled to claim benefit of proviso to Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
32. Even otherwise the power to commute a sentence, as also to grant set-off while calculating the total period of sentence is an executive power and not a judicial power as such. This power vests exclusively with the executive Government and not with the judiciary. In other words, it is not open for the judiciary either to grant or not to grant the set-off as also either to commute or not to commute a sentence.
33. We are fortified in our view from a Supreme Court judgement delivered in the case of Ashok Kumar Vs. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 498, para 11, the relevant portion of which reads thus:-
"11. The law governing suspension, remission and commutation of sentence is both statutory and constitutional. The stage for the exercise of this power generally speaking is post-judicial, i.e., after the judicial process has come to an end. The duty to judge and to award the appropriate punishment to the guilty is a judicial function which culminates in a judgment pronounced in accordance with law. After the judicial function thus ends the executive function of giving effect to the judicial verdict commences."
34. Another way of looking at the issue under consideration is that an occasion to try, entertain and decide the claim of a convict for set-off under section 428 of the Code will arise only when the imprisonment for life awarded to such a convict is to be commuted. Such an occasion obviously cannot arise when such a convict is being convicted and sentenced either by Sessions Judge or when sustainability of such conviction and sentence is being examined by the High Court in an appeal. In other words, an occasion to operate provisions of section 428 r/w section 433-A of the Code arises only after the convict is convicted and not at the time when the convict is being convicted or being sentenced by a Court.
35. We may draw support in this regard from the observations made in paragraph 11 of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirath (supra), which reads thus:-
11 The question of setting off the period of detention undergone by an accused as an undertrial prisoner against the sentence of life imprisonment can arise only if an order is passed by the appropriate authority under Section 432 or Section 433 of the Code. In the absence of such order, passed generally or specially, and apart from the provisions, if any, of the relevant Jail Manual, imprisonment for life would mean, according to the rule in Gopal Vinayak Godse3, imprisonment for the remainder of life.”
36. Therefore, we hold that the statutory benefit to be granted to the accused under Section 428, read with Section 433-A of the Code, cannot be taken away simply because it was so ordered by the learned trial Judge.
37. In overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the Trial Court committed no error in recording a finding of guilt of the accused for the offence of murder punishable U/s.302 IPC and rightly convicted the accused. We do not find any merit in this Appeal and is accordingly dismissed. The order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court is hereby confirmed.
38. We however, modify the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to the extent that the accused-appellant herein shall be entitled to the benefit of set-off of the period of detention undergone by him under the provisions of Section 428 read with Section 433-A of the Criminal Procedure Code.
(Bhaskar Bhattacharya, C.J.) (J.B. Pardiwala, J.) */Mohandas