IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 17TH DAY OF JULY 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE WRIT PETITION NO.14362 OF 2019 (LA-UDA) BETWEEN:
SRI. SUNIL KUMAR, S/O. CHENNAI RAI KEVALRAM, AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS, RADHA KUNJ, 1ST MAIN, YADAVAGIRI, MYSURU-570 020. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI.CHANDRANATH ARIGA.K, ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, VIKASA SOUDHA, DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD, BENGALURU-560 001.
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, MYSURU-570 001.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MYSURU DISTRICT, MYSURU-570 001.
4. THE TAHASILDAR, MYSURU TALUK, MYSURU-570 001. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI.E.S.INDIRESH, AGA FOR R1, 3 & 4 SRI T.P.VIVEKANANDA, ADV. FOR R2) THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION DATED 15.07.1997 TO THE EXTENT OF SCHEDULE LAND AT SERIAL NO.226 (ANNEXURE- K) ISSUED BY THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, MUDA AND ETC., THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
O R D E R Mr.Chandranath Ariga, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Mr.E.S.Indiresh, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent Nos.1, 3 & 4.
Mr.T.P.Vivekananda, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3.
2. Writ Petition is admitted for hearing. With consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the same is heard finally.
3. In this petition, petitioner inter alia seeks a writ of certiorari for quashment of preliminary notification dated 15.07.1997 issued by the respondent No.2 insofar as it pertains to the land measuring 21 guntas comprised in Sy.No.92/2, *24 guntas in Sy.No.281, 28 guntas in Sy.No.91/5B, 29 guntas in Sy.No.92/1, 17 guntas in Sy.No.93/1A and 1 acre 10 guntas in Sy.No.93/2 situated at Kergalli Village, Jayapura Hobli, Mysuru Taluk.
4. Facts giving rise to the filing of the petition briefly stated are that the petitioner is the owner of the land measuring 21 guntas comprised in Sy.No.92/2, *24 guntas in Sy.No.281, 28 guntas in Sy.No.91/5B, 29 guntas in Sy.No.92/1, 17 guntas in Sy.No.93/1A and 1 acre 10 guntas in Sy.No.93/2 situated at Kergalli Village, Jayapura Hobli, Mysuru Taluk. The respondents issued a notification under Section 17(1) of the Karnataka Urban Development Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for short) on 15.07.1997. However, despite lapse of 22 years no * Corrected as per Court Order dated 01-09-2022 action was taken to finalise the land acquisition proceedings. Thereupon, the petitioner has approached this Court on the basis of a decision rendered by a Bench of this Court in �c.G.GANGADHAR Vs. MYSORE URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, MYSORE AND ANOTHER' 2013 (4) K.L.J 559.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the rights to hold the land are the constitutional rights which are carried to the petitioner under Article 300A of the Constitution of India and the aforesaid right cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. It is further submitted that the inaction on the part of the respondents for more than 22 years is arbitrary and the controversy involved in this writ petition is squarely covered by a decision rendered by this Court in c.G.GANGADHAR's case, supra.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that no time limit is prescribed under the Act for completion of the land acquisition proceeding and therefore, merely on the ground of delay, a notification issued under Section 17(1) of the Act cannot be quashed. While referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of �BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. Vs. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND & ANR.' dated 03.08.2018 passed in Civil Appeal Nos.7661-63/2018, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 2 submitted that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be incorporated in the provisions of the Act and there is no requirement of passing an award within a period of two years. In this connection, attention of this Court has been invited to paragraph 19 of the aforesaid decision. It is further submitted that no prejudice on account of delay is being caused to the petitioners as the petitioners would get an adequate compensation.
7. I have considered the submissions made by both the sides and have perused the record. It is well settled in law that whether the statute prescribes no time limit for exercise of power, the aforesaid power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. The parties are enjoined by the statute to perform their duties within a reasonable time and are answerable to the Court as to why such dues have not been performed by them within the reasonable time. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of 'RAM cHAND AND OTHERS Vs. UNION OF INDIA' (1994) 1 Scc 44 and c.G.GANGADHAR, supra. In the instant case, undisputedly, the provisions of the Act do not contain any time limit for passing an award. It is also not in dispute that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be read into the provisions of the Act and no time limit with reference to the provisions of the Act can be prescribed for passing the award. However, the fact remains that in the instant case, the notification was issued under Section 17(1) of the Act on 15.07.1997. However, despite lapse of more than 22 years, no explanation has been offered on behalf of the respondents for inordinate delay in conclusion of the proceedings. The inordinate delay for conclusion of the proceedings render the action of respondent No.2 arbitrary, which cannot be sustained in the eye of law. It is pertinent to mention here that in several cases namely, W.P.No.7373-77/2015, W.P.Nos.8013- 16/2015, W.P.No.26550/2014, W.P.No.32192/2014, W.P.No. 62142/2016 and W.P.No.47710/2017, the notifications issued by respondent No.2 have been quashed on the ground of inordinate delay. It is pertinent to mention here that respondent No.2 has accepted the orders passed by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and have not challenged the aforesaid orders. It is also relevant to mention here that in some of the decisions, same notification has been challenged which has been also accepted by respondent No.2. Therefore, at this stage, learned counsel for the respondents cannot be permitted to turn around and take a different stand in case of the petitioner. However, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for respondent No.2 to the decision of the Supreme Court in BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR. supra. I deem it appropriate to refer to paragraph 19 of the aforesaid decision which reads as under:
"19. It is also apparent from the facts and circumstances of the case that there were a large number of irregularities in the course of an inquiry under Section 18(1) of the BDA Act. Government had nothing to do with respect to the release of the land at this stage, as the stage of final notification had not reached but still the landowners in connivance with the influential persons, political or otherwise, managed the directions in respect of 251 acres of the land and Special Land Acquisition Collector also considered exclusion of 498 acres of the land against which the question was raised in the Assembly and eyebrows were raised in public domain. Two inquiries were ordered on 24.11.2012 and 19.1.2013 by the State Government and based upon that inquiry, it was ordered and a public notice was issued on 3rd May, 2014 that the BDA will consider the entire matter afresh. In the aforesaid backdrop of the facts, the writ petitions came to be filed, it would not be termed to be the bona fide litigation, but was initiated having failed in attempt to get the land illegally excluded at the hands of Special Land Acquisition Collector and the State Government and after the inquiries held in the matter and the notice was issued to start the proceedings afresh. At this stage, the writ petitions were filed. In the aforesaid circumstances, it was not at all open to the High Court to quash the preliminary notification issued under Section 17, as the land owners, State Government and BDA were responsible to create a mess in the way of planned development of the Bangalore city."
8. From perusal of paragraph 19, it is evident that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has held that in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 19 of the aforesaid decision, it was not open to the High Court to quash the preliminary notification issued under Section 17 of the Act as the land owners, State Government and Bengaluru Development Authority are responsible to create a mess in the way of planned development of the Bengaluru city. The aforesaid factual situation referred to by the Supreme Court in paragraph 19 of the aforesaid decision does not arise in the obtaining factual matrix of the case. Therefore, on the ground of parity, the petitioners have also been granted similar relief which have been granted to several land owners including similar case C.G.GANGADHAR.
9. In view of the preceding analysis, the impugned notification issued by respondent No.2 dated 15.07.1997 under Section 17(1) of the Act insofar as the petitioner is concerned, is hereby quashed.
Accordingly, writ petition is disposed of.
PKS Sd/- JUDGE