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Sri Sudeep A K

High Court Of Karnataka|28 August, 2019
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JUDGMENT / ORDER

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2019 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA AND THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK G. NIJAGANNAVAR Miscellaneous First Appeal No.2527 of 2016 (MV - I) BETWEEN:
SRI.SUDEEP.A.K, S/O B.A. KOTRESHAPPA, AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, R/O D.NO.1890/77, S.S.LAYOUT, DAVANAGERE-577 002. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI HANUMANTHAPPA A., ADVOCATE) AND:
1. THE GENERAL MANAGER, KSRTC, SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE – 560 027.
2. THE INTERNAL SECURITY FUND, KSRTC, DIVISIONAL OFFICE, SHANTHINAGAR, BANGALORE – 560 027.
3. THE DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER, NWKSRTC, BELGAUM DIVISION, BELGAUM – 590 001. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI F.S.DABALI, ADVOCATE FOR R-1 TO R-3) THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED:21.11.2015 PASSED IN MVC NO.1109/2009 ON THE FILE OF THE C/c.II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, MACT-6, DAVANAGERE, PARTLY ALLOWING THE CLAIM PETITION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION.
THIS M.F.A. COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT Though this appeal is listed for admission, with the consent of learned counsel on both sides, it is heard finally.
2. The injured-claimant has filed this appeal seeking enhancement of compensation, not being satisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Court of II Additional Senior Civil Judge and VI Additional Motor Vehicles Accident Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’ for the sake of brevity) at Davanagere in MVC No.1109/2009 dated 21.11.2015.
3. Briefly stated the facts are that the appellant – claimant filed the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against the respondents seeking compensation of `50,00,000/- with costs and interest on account of the serious injuries sustained by him in a road traffic accident. According to the appellant, on 08.08.2009 at about 5.30 am., he was traveling in a bus belonging to the respondents (KSRTC) bearing registration No.KA-22/F- 1710 from Bengaluru to Davanagere. The driver of the bus drove the said bus in a rash and negligent manner and dashed to a lorry bearing No.KA-16/A-6837 which was proceeding ahead; as a result of collision between the two vehicles, the claimant sustained grievous injuries. He was shifted to C.G.Hospital, Davanagere and thereafter to Fortis Hospital, Bengaluru, wherein on account of the crush injuries, the left leg was amputated above the knee. According to the claimant, he spent `8,00,000/- towards medical expenses. He further contended that he was hale and healthy prior to the accident, being an MBA graduate; he was brilliant and extraordinary student and was selected in the Campus to Cambridge Solution Company, Bengaluru in the year 2008 and was getting `18,000/- per month as salary. That the company had proposed to send him to United Kingdom. But, on account of the accident resulting in amputation of his left lower limb, he lost a golden opportunity and a bright future. He contended that he is the only son to his parents and as a result of the said accident, they are suffering from untold mental agony.
Therefore, claimant sought for compensation under various heads.
4. In response to the claim petition, the respondents appeared and denied the averments made in the claim petition and contended that the driver of the bus was proceeding slowly by following the traffic Rules and that there was no negligence on the part of the driver. Contending that the amount of compensation claimed is exorbitant, excessive and without any legal basis, respondents sought for dismissal of the same.
5. On the basis of the above pleadings, the Tribunal framed the following issues for its consideration.
“1) Whether the petitioner proves that on 8/8/2009 at about 5.30 pm (sic ! am) when petitioner was traveling in the KSRTC bus bearing Reg.No.KA-22/F-1710 from Bangalore to Davanagere, the respondent No.1 being the driver of the said bus drove it in a high speed with rash and negligent manner and dashed the lorry and thereby caused grievous injuries?
2) Whether the respondents prove that they are not liable to pay any compensation to the petitioner?
3) Whether the petitioner is entitle for compensation, if so to what extent, what rate of interest and from whom it is recoverable?
4) What relief or award?”
6. In order to substantiate his case, the claimant examined himself as PW1 and Dr.Avinash as PW2. He produced 112 documents which were marked as Exs.P1 to P112. The respondents examined the driver of the bus as RW1. The Tribunal awarded compensation of `21,54,250/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum by judgment and award dated 09.05.2011. Contending that the award of compensation was exorbitant, the respondents preferred MFA No.7347/2011, while the appellant herein has preferred MFA Crob.90/2012 for enhancement of compensation. This Court by judgment dated 11.11.2013 remanded the appeal to the Tribunal for re-determination of compensation. Subsequent to the remand, the respondents examined RWs.2 to 5 and produced 7 documents namely Exs.R1 to R7. The claimant did not let in any evidence subsequent to remand. On the basis of the evidence on record, Tribunal awarded `8,27,000/- only with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till realization. Being aggrieved by the meager compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the claimant has preferred this appeal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent – Corporation and perused the materials on record.
8. Appellant’s counsel contended that the award of compensation on all the heads namely, medical expenses; conveyance charges; loss of income during laid up period and rest; injury, pain and suffering; incidental charges; disfiguration; loss of amenities of life and future medical expenses are on the lower side. He further contended that the Tribunal has not awarded any compensation towards ‘loss of future earning capacity’. He invited our attention to the relevant documentary evidence to contend that on account of the serious injuries sustained to the left lower limb, the same has to be amputated above the knee. On account of amputation, the appellant has lost his earning capacity totally. The Tribunal has failed to appreciate the fact that there was 100% loss of earning capacity and has not awarded any compensation on the said head. He contended that this Court may determine the loss of earning capacity on account of the physical disability and amputation at 100% and award compensation on the said head while enhancing the compensation on all other heads. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellant pointed out to the relevant documentary as well as oral evidence on record.
9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents – KSRTC supported the judgment and award of the Tribunal. He contends that on the earlier occasion, Tribunal awarded an exorbitant compensation of `21,54,250/-. The same was challenged before this Court. This Court rightly remanded the matter to the Tribunal for the purpose of re-assessment of compensation. Subsequently, RWs.2 to 5 have been examined by the KSRTC and documents Exs.R1 to R7 have been produced. That, even after the amputation of the left leg, the appellant continued in his job for a period up to 07.09.2012. Thus, there is no loss of future earning capacity. The Tribunal has rightly not awarded any compensation on the said head. He further submitted that the award of compensation on all other heads is just and proper which would not call for any interference in this appeal. He also brought to our notice the fact that the additional evidence has been let in to the effect that the appellant is now fit with the artificial limb, as a result of which, he has a virtual limb and he is able to carry out his day-to-day activities and also engaged in his avocation or employment to earn his livelihood. Therefore, this Court cannot award any compensation on the head of ‘loss of future earning capacity’ and that the Tribunal has rightly not awarded any compensation on the said head.
10. Learned counsel for KSRTC also contended that the functional disability cannot be 100%, as even according to Workmen’s Compensation Act, in the event of amputation of lower limb above the knee, it is only 60% to 70% disability. He therefore, submitted that there is no merit in this appeal and the same may be dismissed.
11. By way of reply, learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the fact that the doctor – PW2 has deposed to the effect that there is 80% permanent disability to the left lower limb. The same has resulted in 100% functional disability and therefore, this Court may consider the loss of functional disability at 100% and award compensation on the head of ‘loss of future earning capacity’ and also towards the cost of change of the lower limb which has to be made after a few years. Hence, compensation on the head, ‘future medical expenses’ may be enhanced. He also submitted that the Tribunal is not right in deducting a sum of `2,64,617/- towards the medical expenses which was paid by the employer of the appellant and thereby reduce the compensation on the said head.
12. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the material on record as well as the original records, the following points would arise for our consideration:
(1) Whether the appellant is entitled to additional compensation?
(2) If so, what order?
13. The fact that the appellant sustained grievous injuries in a road traffic accident which occurred on 08.08.2009 at about 5.30 am., when he was traveling in a bus belonging to the respondents – KSRTC bearing No.KA- 22/F-1710 from Bengaluru to Davanagere, when the driver of the bus drove it in a rash and negligent manner and dashed it against the lorry bearing No.KA-16/A-6837 which was proceeding ahead, has been established by the appellant-claimant. The appellant has also established the fact that on account of serious injuries sustained to the left lower limb, he had to undergo amputation of the same above the knee. The controversy, however, is with regard to percentage of disability sustained by the appellant and as to whether he has lost his future earning capacity and the quantum of compensation that he is entitled to. The Tribunal awarded compensation of `8,27,000/- subsequent to the remand of the matter by this Court on various heads, which is extracted as under:
1) Medical expenses `5,00,000/-
7) Loss of Amenities of life `1,00,000/-
8) Future Medical Expenses   ` 40,000/-_ TOTAL `8,27,000/-
14. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents –KSRTC need not be reiterated. PW2-Doctor who treated the appellant has deposed that the appellant has sustained 80% permanent disability. However, controversy is as to whether on account of the amputation of left lower limb above the knee, there is 100% disability.
15. The Tribunal has rightly deducted `2,64,617/- from `7,43,780/- and awarded `5,00,000/- towards ‘medical expenses’.
16. In this regard, before going into the evidence on record, it would be useful to extract the following paragraphs from the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court authored by His Lordship, Hon’ble Raveendran J., in the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar and another reported in (2011) 1 SCC 343:
“General principles relating to compensation in injury cases 5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act”, for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, which means that compensation should, to the extend possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. (See C.K.Subramania Iyer v. T.Kunhikuttan Nair, R.D.Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. and Baker v. Willoughby.) 6. The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Non-Pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).
In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specific medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life.
7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and under Item (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses-Item (iii)-depends upon specific medical evidence regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary damages-Items (iv), (v) and (vi) – involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decisions of this Court and the High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses some difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability-Item (ii)(a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case.
Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanent disability 8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability to perform an activity in the manner considered normal for a human being. Permanent disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, found existing at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation, after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use of some part of the body on account of the injury, which will cease to exist at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers to a person’s inability to perform all the duties and bodily functions that he could perform before the accident, though he is able to perform some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity. Total permanent disability refers to a person’s inability to perform any avocation or employment related activates as a result of the accident. The permanent disabilities that may arise from motor accident injuries, are of a much wider range when compared to the physical disabilities which are enumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (“the Disabilities Act”, for short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in Section 2 (i) of the Disabilities Act are the result of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming compensation.
9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more often than not, with reference to a particular limb. When a disability certificate states that the injured has suffered permanent disability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not the same as 45% permanent disability with reference to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb (or part of the body) expressed in terms of a percentage of the total functions of that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent of disability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanent disability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability of left leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus 60%). If different parts of the body have suffered different percentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed in terms of the permanent disability with reference to the whole body cannot obviously exceed 100%.
10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability as a result of injuries, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of such permanent disability on his earning capacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply the percentage of permanent disability as the percentage of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of loss of earning capacity, arising from a permanent disability will be different from the percentage of permanent disability. Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, a particular extent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in a corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, if the evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss of earning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanent disability will result in award of either too low or too high a compensation.
11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the standard multiplier method used to determine loss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases, on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as a result of the permanent disability, is approximately the same as the percentage of permanent disability in which case, of course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determination of compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.) 12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of such permanent disability. This means that the Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to the evidence:
(i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary;
(ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is permanent total disablement or permanent partial disablement;
(iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such disablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body, that is, the permanent disability suffered by the person.
If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disability then there is no question of proceedings further and determining the loss of future earning capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such permanent disability has affected or will affect his earning capacity.
13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability on the actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent disability and what he could not do as a result of the permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenities of life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation, profession and nature of work before the accident, as also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on the activities and functions, which he was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or restricted from discharging his previous activities and functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale of activities and functions so that he continues to earn or can continue to earn his livelihood.
14. For example, if the left hand of a claimant is amputated, the permanent physical or functional disablement may be assessed around 60%. If the claimant was a driver or a carpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtually be hundred per cent, if he is neither able to drive or do carpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk, in government service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need to award any compensation under the head of “loss of future earnings”, if the claimant continues in government service, though he may be awarded compensation under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his hand. Sometimes the injures claimant may be continued in service, but may not be found suitable for discharging the duties attached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, on account of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to some other suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in which case there should be a limited award under the head of loss of future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earning capacity.
15. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded by treating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or even anything more than 50%), the need to award compensation separately under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life may disappear and as a result, only a token or nominal amount may have to be awarded under the head of loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwise there may be a duplication in the award of compensation. Be that as it may.
16. The Tribunal should not be a silent spectator when medical evidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect, in particular, the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168 and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does not function as a neutral umpire as in a civil suit, but as an active explorer and seeker of truth who is required to “hold an enquiry into the claim” for determining the “just compensation”. The Tribunal should therefore take an active role to ascertain the true and correct position so that it can assess the “just compensation”. While dealing with personal injury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself with a medical dictionary and a handbook for evaluation of permanent physical impairment (for example, Manual for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for Orthopaedic Surgeons, prepared by American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorized texts) for understanding the medical evidence and assessing the physical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keep in view the First Schedule to the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent of permanent disability in different types of injuries, in the case of workmen.
17. If a doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms, the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simple non- medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. If a doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanent disability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whether such percentage of disability is the functional disability with reference to the whole body or whether it is only with reference to a limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is stated with reference to a limb, the Tribunal will have to seek the doctor’s opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce the corresponding functional permanent disability with reference to the whole body and, if so, the percentage.
18. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposed to accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat the injured but who give “ready to use” disability certificates, without proper medical assessment. There are several instances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating the injured, readily give liberal disability certificates to help the claimants. But where the disability certificates are given by duly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subject to evidence regarding the genuiness of such certificates. The Tribunal may invariably make it a point to require the evidence of the doctor who treated the injured or who assessed the permanent disability. Mere production of a disability certificate or discharge certificate will not be proof of the extent of disability stated therein unless the doctor who treated the claimant or who medically examined and assessed the extent of disability of the claimant, is tendered for cross-examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by the claimant, it can constitute a Medical Board (from a panel maintained by it in consultation with reputed local hospitals/medical colleges) and refer the claimant to such Medical Board for assessment of the disability.
19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:
(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising from injuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.
(ii) The percentage of permanent disability with reference to the whole body of a person, cannot be assumed to be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put it differently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is not the same as the percentage of permanent disability (except) in a few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence, concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity is the same as the percentage of permanent disability).
(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or who examined him subsequently to assess the extent of his permanent disability can give evidence only in regard to the extent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacity is something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunal with reference to the evidence in entirety.
(iv) The same permanent disability may result in different percentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons, depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job, age, education and other factors.”
17. Bearing in mind the above guidelines, we have perused the evidence on record. It has come in the evidence that though the accident occurred on 08.08.2009, the appellant continued to discharge his duties in the Company till 07.09.2012 and thereafter, he was relieved or resigned from the Company. According to appellant’s counsel, he has not since then been employed on account of amputation of his left lower limb. The contention is that on account of the said amputation, the appellant continued in the Company in which he was working on account of sympathetic reason. Although he was promoted from the post of Senior Associate to Advance Associate, there was not much increase in his salary and in order to seek better prospects, he resigned. But, he has not found any other employment as such on account of his permanent disability. Therefore, the contention is that the loss of future earning capacity must be 100% which contention is objected to by learned counsel for the respondents – KSRTC. But, PW2-the doctor has stated that the permanent disability is 80%. We also find that he was able to attend to his office for some time after the accident. It may be due to sympathetic reasons that he was continued by his employer but the fact remains that ultimately, he resigned his job and according to the appellant, he has not found any other avocation or employment. In the circumstances, it cannot be held that there is 100% loss of functional disability. This is because he did attend his office for some time after the amputation of his lower limb. Since, the medical evidence states that there is 80% permanent disability, we accept the medical evidence and hold that there is 80% loss of functional disability also.
18. Further, as per Ex.P92, which is the salary certificate, it is noted that the salary of the appellant was `15,280/- which we round off to `15,000/-. The appellant was aged about 24 years at the time of accident. Hence, the appropriate multiplier is ‘18’.
19. In light of the above facts, the compensation on various heads is as under:
Towards ‘pain and sufferings’ `1,00,000/-, towards ‘medical expenses’ `5,00,000/-, towards ‘incidental charges’ `50,000/-, towards ‘loss of future earning capacity’ at 80% disability `25,92,000/-, towards ‘loss of amenities’ `2,00,000/-. No compensation can be awarded towards loss of income during the laid up period as he had continued to work for some period after the accident. By considering the cost of artificial limb being `3,46,000/- which is rounded off to `3,50,000/- and for at least two such limbs which are required during the life time of the appellant, therefore, the same being `7,00,000/-, the compensation towards ‘Future medical expenses’ is `7,00,000/- and ‘loss of marriage prospectus’ `50,000/-, is awarded. Thus, the total compensation is `40,92,000/-. The same shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of claim petition till realization, except for an amount of `7,00,000/-, which has been paid towards future medical expenses.
20. In the result, the re-assessed compensation is as under:
earning capacity at 80% disability (`15,000x12x18x80%) 25,92,000 5 towards loss of amenities 2,00,000 6 towards Future medical expenses (`3,50,000x2) 7 towards loss of marriage prospectus 7,00,000 50,000 TOTAL 41,92,000 21. The appeal filed by the appellant is allowed in part. The appellant – claimant is entitled to a total compensation of `41,92,000/- with interest as stated above except for Rs.7,00,000/- being future medical expenses instead of Rs.8,27,000/- ordered by the Tribunal. 75% of the aforesaid re-assessed compensation, after excluding the amount which has already been paid to the appellant, shall be deposited in any Post Office or Nationalised Bank or Scheduled Bank for an initial period of ten years. He shall be entitled to draw periodical interest on the said deposit. The balance compensation shall be released to the appellant after due identification.
22. The respondent – KSRTC shall deposit the balance compensation with up-to-date interest within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of certified copy of the judgment.
The parties to bear their respective costs.
In view of disposal of the appeal, pending application stands disposed of.
Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE GH
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Title

Sri Sudeep A K

Court

High Court Of Karnataka

JudgmentDate
28 August, 2019
Judges
  • B V Nagarathna
  • Ashok G Nijagannavar