IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF MAY 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL PETITION NO.1580 OF 2016 BETWEEN:
1. SRI SRI SRI VIDYA MANOHARA THEERTHARU AGED 30 YEARS PEETADHIPATHIGALU SRI SRI VYASARAJA MUTT, SOSALE T.NARASIPUR TALUK-570014.
2. SRI. PRAMOD AGED 24 YEARS S/O LATE K.RAJAGOPAL ACCOUNTANT, SRI SRI. VYASARAJA MUTT, SOSALE T.NARASIPUR TALUK-570014.
3. SMT. SRIMATHI AGED 54 YEARS W/O SRI. UDDAVACHAR AVAILABLE AT NO.1226, 2ND CROSS, 3RD MAIN, KRISHNAMURTHYPURAM, MYSORE-570014.
... PETITIONERS (BY SRI: C.V.NAGESH SENIOR COUNSEL A/W SRI: RAGHAVENDRA K. ADVOCATE) AND 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY THE STATION HOUSE OFFICER, T.NARASIPUR POLICE STATION, MYSORE DISTRICT-570014.
2. SRI.D.R.NARENDRA AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS S/O LATE. RAMACHANDRA RAO, NO.86, PUTTANNA ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BENGALURU-560004.
... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI: I.S.PRAMOD CHANDRA, SPP-II FOR R1; SRI: C.V.SUDHENDRA, ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIRST INFORMATION REPORT, IN CRIME NO.150/2013 REGISTERED AT T.NARASIPUR POLICE STATION, MYSORE DISTRICT, IN THE COURT OF THE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, T.NARASIPUR FOR OFFENCES WHICH ARE MADE PENAL UNDER SECTIONS 409,420,381 AND 120(B) OF THE I.P.C., TO WHICH CRIME, THE PETITIONERS ARE PRESENTLY LUGGED INTO, INSOFAR AS IT RELATE TO THEM.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 29.01.2019 AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCMENT THIS DAY, JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA. J, MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
O R D E R Respondent No.2 claiming to be a member of Sri. Vyasaraja Mutt, lodged an information with T. Narsipura police, Mysore District alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, conspiracy by Sri. J. Uddhavachar and the present Peetadhipathi of Sri. Vysayaraja Mutt and W/o. Uddhavachar and the manager of the branch Sri. Narasimha Murthy. Based on this information/complaint, FIR was registered in Cr.No.150/2013 under Sections 409, 420, 120-B and 381 Indian Penal Code showing the petitioners as accused Nos. 2, 4 and 3 therein. Petitioners have sought to quash the said FIR and the consequent investigation commenced by respondent No.1/Police.
I have heard learned Senior counsel Sri. C.V. Nagesh appearing for the petitioners and Sri. I.S. Pramod Chandra, learned SPP-II appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. C.V. Sudhindra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
2. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the complainant is a pro bono publico and a member of a self-styled organization which has come into existence during the year 2005 with the sole object of destablizing Sri Sri Vyasaraja Mutt, Sosale and its Peetadhipathi. He is instrumental in instituting various proceedings against Sri. Vyasaraja Mutt and its Peetadhipathi and the present complaint is one of such attempt made by the complainant/respondent No.2 who is a disgruntled and a frustrated person in not getting appointed as Peetadhipathi of Sri Sri Vyasaraja Mutt, Sosole. The allegations made in the complaint are palpably false and baseless and do not constitute the ingredients of any criminal offences, much less, offences punishable under sections 409, 420, 120B and 381 Indian Penal Code. Insofar as petitioner No.1 viz., Sri Sri Sri Vidya Manohara Theertharu is concerned, no allegations are found in the complaint showing his involvement or complicity in the alleged offences. These averments even if accepted on their face value do not make out the offences punishable under sections 409, 420, 120B and 381 Indian Penal Code against petitioner No.1. Even with regard to petitioner Nos.2 and 3, there are no specific allegations that they were entrusted with the properties of the Mutt at any point of time so as render them liable for prosecution for the alleged theft of parts of silver chariot. Placing reliance on the orders passed by Government of Karnataka, learned counsel has emphasized that the Government of Karnataka by its order dated 26.05.2012 had appointed Sri. K. Jayraj, Additional Chief Secretary as the Administrator of Sri Sri Vyasaraja Mutt, Sosale and a committee was constituted to guide the Administrator. Therefore, there was absolutely no basis for the complainant/respondent No.2 to allege that the properties in question were in the actual or constructive possession of the Peetadhipathi of the Mutt. In support of his submission, learned Senior counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in PRATIBHA vs. RAMESHWARI DEVI AND OTHERS reported in (2007) 12 SCC 369. and the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ANAND KUMAR MOHATTA AND ANOTHER vs. STATE (GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI) DEPARTMENT OF HOME AND ANOTHER in Crl.A.No.1395 of 2018 disposed of on November 15th, 2018.
3. Complainant/respondent No.2 has filed a detailed statement of objections denying the contentions raised in the petition. Referring to the averments made in the complaint, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 has highlighted that the allegations made in the complaint prima-facie disclose commission of offences by the petitioners. Petitioner No.1 being the Peetadhipathi of the Mutt was in control, supervision and administration of the Mutt. Appointment of Administrator to manage the properties of the Mutt do not affect the fundamental rights of the Matadhipathi. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision in Sri. Vidya Manohara Teertha Swamigalu vs. The State of Karnataka and others in W.P.No.17370/2012 and has emphasized that Matadhipathi though has some amount of control or supervision over the administration of the Mutt, he does not become owner of the properties of the Mutt and therefore, question of deprivation of the property by merely appointing an Administrator at the request of devotees/denomination does not take away the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution. To buttress his argument, learned counsel has referred to the following decisions:-
1. Vidhya Varuthi Theertha vs. Baluswamy Iyer, AIR 1922 PC 123.
2. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
3. H.H. Sundhundra Thirtha Swamiar vs. Commissioner for Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments, Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 966.
4. A. A. Gopalakrishnan vs. Cochin Devaswom Board and Ors., AIR 2007 SC 3162.
5. Sri. Vidyamanohara Thirtha Swamigalu vs. State of Karnataka in W.P.No.17370/2012.
6. Neelakantrao vs. Vajinath Sway and others – RSA No.7501/2010.
4. The sum and substance of argument of the learned counsel for the second respondent is that accused No.2 was in effective and constructive possession of the Chariot, parts of which were stolen by accused Nos.1, 3 and 4. Said properties were recovered during investigation at the instance of accused Nos.1, 3 and 4. Therefore, there is prima-facie case to proceed with the investigation into the alleged offences. Further, learned counsel submitted that respondent No.2 was not a party to the earlier litigation narrated in the petition, therefore, there is no basis to contend that the complaint is a motivated or an vindictive attempt made by a disgruntled and frustrated person, as contended in the petition. Thus, he has sought to dismiss the petition.
5. Learned SPP-II appearing for respondent No.1-State has argued in support of the impugned action contending that the allegations made in the FIR prima-facie disclose commission of the offences and under the said circumstances, as per the settled legal position, High Court will not normally interfere with the investigation into the case and quash the proceedings at the initial stage. It is the submission of the learned counsel that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR or a complaint, the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made in the complaint or the documents accompanying the same and not on the basis of the contentions or defence set up by the accused and thus seeks to dismiss the petition.
6. I have bestowed my careful thought to the contentions urged by the parties and have carefully scrutinized the material on record.
Material allegations made against the petitioners read as follows:
“J.Uddhavachar along with some Mutt staff went to T.Narasipura branch in his Ambassador car (KA-09- N3667) in the last week of December 2012 and secretly carried away all the containers containing the silver chariot parts except the wheels to his Mysore residence, #1226, Third main, Second cross, Krishnamurthipuram, Mysore- 570004. In this act, the manager of the branch Sri Narasimhamurthy has also connived and actually assisted J.Uddhavachar. this fraud could not have taken place without the prior knowledge of the Peethadhipati, Sri Vidyamanohara Tirtha.”
7. The copy of the pachanama produced along with the petition discloses that during the course of investigation, the alleged stolen parts of the silver chariot were recovered at the instance of accused Nos.1, 3 and 4. In view of this prima facie material, the prayer made by petitioners No.2 and 3 (accused Nos.4 and 3) to quash the proceedings initiated against them for the above offenses cannot be acceded to. However, insofar as petitioner No.1 (accused No.2) is concerned, the only allegation made in the complaint is that the “alleged theft could not have taken place without the prior knowledge of the Peethadhipati Sri Vidyamanohara Tirtha.“ The immediate question that arises for consideration is, whether these averments are sufficient to prima facie constitute the offences alleged against the petitioners entailing their prosecution for the above offences?
8. Learned Senior counsel appearing for petitioner No.1 has attempted to persuade this Court to hold that the above allegations do not constitute the ingredients of any of the offences alleged in the FIR. In order to buttress this point, learned Senior counsel has heavily relied on the order passed by the Government of Karnataka whereby an Administrator was appointed to take over the management and properties, as well as the assets, both movable and immovable, records, accounts, funds of Sri Sri Vyasaraja Mutt, Sosale and its attendant branches and an argument is built up that by virtue of the said order, the management of the affairs of the Mutt and all its assets having been vested with the Administrator, it cannot be said that the properties of the Mutt including the silver chariot were entrusted to petitioner No.1 so as to attract the offences under Section 405/406 of the Indian Penal Code. This argument though at the first blush appears to be attractive, yet, having regard to the rights and obligations flowing from the position of Peetadhipathi of the Mutt, I am unable to accept the argument canvassed by the Senior counsel for the petitioners in this regard for the following reasons, namely;
That there is no dispute with regard to the fact that at the relevant time, petitioner No.1 was the Peetadhipathi of Sosale Mutt. Learned counsel for the petitioners has produced copy of the order passed by this Court in W.P. Nos.17370/2012 and 17391/2012 dated 2.1.2013 wherein appointment of the Administrator for Sri Sri Vyasaraja Mutt, Sosale and constitution of the committee to guide the administrator was challenged by petitioner No.1 before this Court and in the said decision, considering the question as to whether appointing an Administrator to administer movable and immovable properties of the Mutt by the State Government in exercise of powers under the Old Act (Section 26 and 27) or under Article 12 r/w 31-A of the Constitution) would amount to deprivation of property to the Mutt, in paragraph 37 of the Judgment, it is observed as under:
“37. Xxx The matadhipathi at the most occupies the position of a trustee with regard to Mutt, which is a public institution. Undoubtedly, some amount of control or supervision over the due administration of the Mutt and due appropriation of its funds is certainly necessary in the interest of public. An appointment of administrator to manage the properties of Mutts therefore, in my opinion, would not offend any fundamental right of the matadhipathi. In other words the matadhipathi, though has some amount of control or supervision over the due administration of the Mutt, he does not become owner of the properties of Mutts and therefore, the question of deprivation of property by merely appointing an administrator at the request of devotees/denomination does not arise and it would not amount to taking away the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution.”
In paragraph 39 of the said decision, it is further observed that :
“39. Xxxxxx In any case, the Administrator is not a substitute for matadhipathi and his management is only to facilitate better administration of the Mutt. None of the religious rights of the matadhipathi are either touched or taken away by the impugned order. The act of appointing the Administrator does not in any way impair the right of the matadhipathi or the rights guaranteed under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. Xxx”.
9. This view is flowing from the settled proposition of law that Mutadhipathi of a Mutt holds the properties entrusted to him in trust. In this context, it may be useful to refer to the relevant observation made by the Bombay High Court in the case of VIDYA VARUTHI THIRTHA –VS- BALUSAMI AYYAR reported in 1922(24) BOMLR 629:
“11. It is also to be remembered that a “trust” in the sense in which the expression is used in English law, is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple (J.G.Ghose, “Hindu Law” p.276) Hindu piety found expression in gifts to idols and images consecrated and installed in temples, to religious institution of every kind, and for all purposes considered meritorious in the Hindu social and religious system; to brahmans, goswamis, sanyasis, etc. When the gift was to a holy person, it carried with it in terms or by usage and custom certain obligations. Under the Hindu law, the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a “juristic entity,” vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. Religious institutions, known under different names, are regarded as possessing the same “juristic” capacity, and gifts are made to them eo nomine. In many cases in southern India, especially where the diffusion of Aryan Brahmanism was essential for bringing the Dravidian peoples under the religious rule of the Hindu system, colleges and monasteries under the names of math were founded under spiritual teachers of recognized sanctity. These men had and have ample discretion in the application of the funds of the institution, but always subject to certain obligations and duties, equally governed by custom and usage. When the gift is directly to an idol or a temple, the seisin to complete the gift is necessarily effected by human agency. Galled by whatever name, he is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution. In almost every case he is given the right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom. In no case was the property conveyed to or vested in him, nor is ho a ”trustee,” in the English sense of the term, although in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for mal-administration.”
10. A perusal of the material produced by the petitioners as well as by the contesting respondent clearly indicate that the Administrator of the Sri Sri Vyasaraj Mutt, Sosale was appointed by the Government of Karnataka under the Government Order bearing No.RD 67 MUDA PRA 2002, Bengaluru dated 26.5.2012. A committee headed by the former Chief Justice of India and four other members was also constituted to guide the Administrator in the management of the affairs of the Mutt by order of even date. The Administrator appears to have taken charge of the affairs of the Mutt on 26.5.2012. Subsequently, the term of the Administrator was extended for further period of one year by the Government by order dated 25.5.2014.
11. FIR was registered against the petitioners and others on 6.6.2013. There is nothing on record to show that as on that date, possession of the silver chariot in respect of which alleged theft has been committed, was taken over by the Administrator. On the other hand, reading of the panchanama reveals that the Administrator had taken possession of the movables found only in the residential house of petitioner No.1 situated at Mysore and not the movables kept at the other branches of the Mutt. Undisputedly, the parts of the silver chariot are alleged to have been stolen from its T.Narasipura Branch. There is nothing on record to show that the Administrator had taken possession of the said silver chariot from T.Narasipura Branch. Under the said circumstance, by virtue of the office held by petitioner No.1, it has to be held that petitioner No.1 had full dominion and control over the said chariot which was entrusted to him in his capacity as the Muttadhipathi of Sosale Mutt.
12. In the light of the above factual and legal position, the argument canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel that the averments made in the complaint do not attract the ingredients of Sections 405/409 of Indian Penal Code or any other offences alleged in the complaint, is liable to be rejected and is accordingly, rejected.
13. Law is now well settled that if an offence is disclosed in the complaint, court will not normally interfere with the investigation into the case. When a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the Court is, whether uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. Since the allegations made against petitioner No.1 as well as other petitioners prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences, I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the investigation undertaken by the respondents.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petition is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, it is dismissed.
The investigation officer shall proceed with the investigation independently strictly in accordance with law, uninfluenced by the observations made in this order.
Sd/- JUDGE *mn/-