JUDGMENT Vineet Saran, J.
1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have challenged the order dated 22-10-1977 passed by the Collector, Etawah, issuing the 'parwana amaldaramad' for recording the name of contesting respondent No. 6 Hindu Educational Society, Etawah (hereinafter referred to as the Society) over the plots in dispute in the revenue records; and also the order dated 3-5-1982 passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad dismissing the revision filed by the petitioners.
2. Briefly, the admitted facts of this case are that the Society had on 9-5-1949, applied for acquisition of 15.08 acres of land for construction of a hostel for its College students. Regarding this, a notification for acquisition of land under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued by the State Government on 13-3-1954 followed by a notification under Section 6 on 9-5-1956, after having made the requisite enquiries under Section 5A of the Act. Admittedly, the acquisition notification Included the plots in dispute. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, thereafter, gave an award on 18-5-1957 and all the tenure holders, except three, accepted the award and received the amount of compensation awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. With regard to the three tenure holders who challenged the amount of compensation awarded, the matter went up to the High Court and was finalised on 10.09.1971 after its decision in First Appeals No. 367 and 368 of 1960. The Collector had, under Section 16 of the Act, taken possession of the land acquired and thereafter It transferred the possession to the Society on 19-5-1957. However, it is admitted by the parties that an application for mutation of the name over the land acquired was moved by the Society in the year 1957 and the same remained pending.
3. The other facts relating to the agreement between the State Government and the Society with regard to the purpose of acquisition, may not be relevant for the purpose of the present dispute.
4. From the pleadings of the parties, it appears that in the year 1976 certain ex-tenure holders were trying to encroach on the land acquired for the Society and also to execute sale deeds of certain portions of the said acquired land. Hence a letter was sent by the Joint Secretary of the Society to the District Magistrate, Etawah to see that there was no encroachment on the land acquired for the Society. Thereafter a notice was also got published by the Society on 1-8-1976 in the local newspaper (filed as Annexure 11 to the writ petition) warning the people from having any transaction with the ex-tenure holders, ex-tenants or other persons regarding the land acquired for the Society. However, certain ex-tenure holders who themselves had no right over the plots in dispute, took advantage of the fact that the name of the society had not been mutated in the revenue records (despite the application having been made by the Society in the year 1957), started executing sale deeds. Because of such unauthorized sale deeds having been executed, when it came to the knowledge of the Society that the names of some new persons were being mutated on the plots in dispute, another application was filed by the Society for mutation of the name of the Society on the entire land acquired for them, the possession of which was admittedly given to them in the year 1957. On this application, the impugned order dated 22-10-1977 was passed by the Collector, Etawah issuing 'parwana amaldaramad' in respect of the entire land acquired, which included the plots In dispute. The said order of the Collector was confirmed by the Additional Commissioner in Revision filed by the petitioners.
5. This petition has been filed by twenty six petitioners which are divided in seven sets. The first, second and third sets of petitioners (petitioners Nos. 1 to 13) are those person's who had purchased certain plots from the ex-tenure holder Smt. Chiranji Devi, who had undisputedly accepted the compensation after acquisition proceedings. The fourth set of petitioners (petitioners Nos. 14 to 17) had purchased plots from ex-tenure holder Madan Lal who had also received compensation of his land in the year 1957. The fifth set of petitioners (petitioners Nos. 18 and 19) are those who had subsequently purchased certain plots from the fourth set of petitioners (petitioners Nos. 14 to 17). All such deeds were executed nearly two decades after the acquisition had become final. The sixth set of petitioners (petitioners No. 20 to 22) are the three ex-tenure holders who had not received compensation as awarded by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and had challenged the same which also become final after the judgment of the High Court in the year 1971. The seventh set of petitioners (petitioners Nos. 23 to 26) are also ex-tenure holders who had received compensation after the passing of the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in the year 1957.
6. I have heard Sri S. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri R.B. Trivedi learned counsel for the contesting respondent-Society as well as the learned standing counsel for the State at length.
7. The main contention of Sri S. N. Singh is that all the petitioners had a right over the property as the names of the tenure holders continued in the revenue records over the disputed plots and as such the revenue records could not be altered without any notice or opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not establish from the record as to how the petitioners continued to have or had acquired any valid right over the plots in dispute. With regard to the first set of petitioners, they are those persons who had purchased the land in 1976 from ex-tenure holders, all of whom had already received compensation for their land nearly 20 years back. No person can claim to have a better right, title or interest than the person from whom he is alleged to have purchased. Here in this case the vendors themselves had no right, title or interest over the land in dispute and as such no better right could be transferred by them. In such circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners failed to establish that the first five sets of petitioners had any right or interest over the property in question. The sixth and seventh set of petitioners are those who were tenure holders prior to the acquisition of land and had accepted the compensation for their land acquired either at the initial stage or at subsequent stage after the proceedings were finalised. As such they also cannot be said to have any right or interest left in the property in question.
8. As regards the opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, Sri S. N. Singh has submitted that the impugned order, which has been passed under Rule 399 of the Revenue Court Manual, could not have been passed without notice to the petitioners as under the provisions of Rule 396 of the Manual, any person having right or interest in a property has to be given notice an opportunity of hearing before any amendment or correction is made in the revenue records. In support of his contention, Sri Singh has relied on a decision of this Court in Rajiv Kumar v. Dy. Director of Consolidation (2002 Revenue Journal 65) where the Collector expunged the names from the Khatauni without giving notice, this Court remanded the case for being decided after giving notice and opportunity of hearing to the parties. The petition was decided without calling for a counter-affidavit and on the statement of the Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents that the case may be remanded for fresh decision after giving notice. As such the facts of the case relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are distinct from the present one.
9. It has been contended by Sri Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for the Society that since the petitioners have failed to establish any valid right, title or interest over the plots in question, It was not necessary or obligatory on the part of the State to give them notice before making any amendment or correction in the revenue records. It has been further submitted that in any case if the petitioners had any right or title over the plots in dispute, they could have the same determined in a regular title suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act.
10. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The petitioners have approached this Court in writ jurisdiction. This Court has first to consider that no injustice is caused to a party which has a valid right and title on a property. In the present case the petitioners have not been able to establish from the record that after the land acquisition proceedings had become final, any of the petitioners had at any stage continued to have or had acquired any right, title or interest on the plots in question which were admittedly part of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. The petitioners do not appear to have come to this Court with clean hands. On the contrary, the respondent-Society had come in possession of the entire land acquired in their favour, free from all encumbrances, as back as in the year 1957. Undisputedly, the plots in question were part of the land acquired for the Society. It is further not disputed that the Society had applied for mutation in their favour in the year 1957 itself. Due to some laxity on the part of the revenue authorities the said application remained pending and the name of the Society was not mutated until they filed a fresh application in the year 1977. Such a situation was necessitated because ex-tenure holders started selling plots over which they had no right and hence it was only at this stage when some dispute arose, the respondent-Society found the need of pursuing the application by filing a fresh application for mutation of its name. No person can be permitted to take advantage of inaction on the part of the State to carry out its obligation to maintain proper and up-to-date correct revenue record.
11. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the purpose for which the land was acquired for the Society was not fulfilled, the Society had not complied with the terms of the agreement entered into between them and the State Government; as such the land acquired from them would again vest in the petitioners. Although, the said controversy is not in question in the present writ petition but the argument of the petitioner is misconceived. Even presuming that such be the situation, in any case, the land would not vest back in favour of the petitioners, as they had all either received the compensation or the ex-tenure holders from whom some petitioners are alleged to be claiming their right, had accepted the compensation. In the circumstances, I find that this argument of the petitioner also has no force.
12. In the result, I find no valid ground for interference in the orders passed by the Additional Commissioner, Allahabad and the Collector, Etawah, impugned in this writ petition. The petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.