IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR W.P.NO.40234/2018 (L-KSRTC) BETWEEN SRI. RAMESHA GURUNAGOWDERA S/O CHENNABASAVARAJ, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS DRIVER OF BMTC, NORTH DIVISION, BENGALURU-22, R/O HOUSE NO.125, AT "BASAVA NILAYA"
NISRGA LAYOUT, MUDDINAPALYA, BENGALURU-91.
(BY SRI S B HALLI, ADV.) AND DIVISIONAL CONTROLLER BMTC, NORTH DIVISION, YASHAVANTHAPURA, BENGALURU-22.
(BY SMT. H R RENUKA, ADV.) ... PETITIONER ... RESPONDENT THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED TRIAL COURT/LEARNED JUDGE OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL IN SL.A.NO.1169/2013 (IN ID NO.148/2005) DTD 17.10.2016 VIDE ANNX-D ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING IN ‘B’ GROUP THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent.
2. The case of the petitioner is that he was employed as a driver by the respondent-Corporation and that Articles of Charges came to be issued on 13.04.2012 for having unauthorizedly remained absent from duty between 04.10.2011 to 16.04.2012. Pursuant to the charge sheet, the Corporation has conducted an inquiry and a report came to be submitted. Show cause notice came to be issued to the petitioner and not finding the reply satisfactory, the punishment of dismissal has been passed on 31.10.2013. On the same date, the application for approval under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been made seeking approval. The Tribunal by order dated 17.10.2016 has been pleased to accord approval to the punishment imposed on the petitioner. The instant writ petition is canvassed on a very short ground that the order being violative of the provisions of Section 33(5) of the Act, which reads as under:
“33(5) Where an employer makes an application to a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section (2) for approval of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application and pass, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of such application, such order in relation thereto as it deems fit:
Provided that where any such authority considers it necessary or expedient so to do, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as it may think fit:
Provided further that no proceedings before any such authority shall lapse merely on the ground that any period specified in this sub-section had expired without such proceedings being completed.”
3. The answer to the point canvassed lies in the second proviso, whereby the Statute mandates that no proceeding shall lapse merely on the ground that the period specified in sub-section had expired without such proceeding being completed. That being the mandate of law, the instant writ petition is misconceived. The contention canvassed being contrary to the provision itself, has no legs to stand and accordingly the writ petition being bereft of merits, stands dismissed.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the ruling rendered by His Lordship R.M.Lodha, as he then was. On perusal of the said ruling, it is apparent that the Court was dealing with the factum of non-compliance of the rigour of the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). The said ruling is inapplicable to the facts of the present case. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would pray liberty to lay challenge to the dismissal order. If the petitioner is so aggrieved by the order of dismissal, it is open for the petitioner to do so in accordance with law.
Sd/- JUDGE KK CT-HR