IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2017 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN WRIT PETITION No.55377/2017 (S-RES) BETWEEN :
SRI R. RAGHAVENDRA REDDY S/O. LATE SRI C. RAMA REDDY, AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS, EARLIER WORKING AS LECTURER IN SOCIOLOGY AT CHAMARAJAPET INDEPENDENT PRE-UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, BENGALURU-560018 AND R/AT NO.47/10/01, 6TH CROSS, 10TH MAIN, BANASHANKARI 3RD STAGE, BENGALURU-560085. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI G. PAPI REDDY, ADV.) AND:
1. CHAMARAJAPETE EDUCATION SOCIETY (REGD.) HAVING ITS OFFICE AT NO.2/3, SECOND MAIN ROAD, 8TH CROSS, CHAMARAJAPET, BENGALURU-560018, BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. THE PRESIDENT CHAMARAJAPET EDUCATION SOCIETY(REGD.), NO.2/3, SECOND MAIN ROAD, 8TH CROSS, CHAMARAJAPET, BENGALURU-560018.
3. THE COMMISSIONER DEPARTMENT OF PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN KARNATAKA, PALACE ROAD, BENGALURU-560001. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI V. B. SHIVAKUMAR, ADV. FOR C/R-1) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 23.11.2017 PASSED BY THE EDUCATION APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE III ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL JUDGE AT BANGALORE IN M.A.(EAT) NO.22/2017 VIDE ANNEXURE-J AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING :
O R D E R The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 23.11.2017, passed by the III Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, functioning as the Educational Appellate Tribunal, whereby the learned Tribunal has kept its order dated 18.11.2017 in abeyance for a period of four weeks in order to permit the respondent to file an appeal against the said order before this Court.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner was working as a Lecturer in Sociology in the Pre-University College, run and managed by the Chamarajpet Education Society (R), the respondent No.1. During the course of his service, he was not only charge-sheeted by the respondent No.1, but was also subjected to a departmental enquiry. By order dated 25.08.2007, the respondent No.1 removed the petitioner from his service. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the removal order dated 25.08.2007, he filed an appeal before the Educational Appellate Tribunal. After hearing both the parties, by order dated 18.11.2017, the learned Tribunal set aside the removal order and directed the respondent No.1 to reinstate the petitioner, but without payment of back wages and continuity of service. Since the respondent was aggrieved by the order dated 18.11.2017, since it was contemplated filing of an appeal before this Court, it filed an application under Order XLI, Rule 5 (2) of CPC, and requested the learned Tribunal to keep its order in abeyance till the statutory period to file an appeal expires. The petitioner filed his objections to the said application. However, by order dated 23.11.2017, the learned Tribunal has kept its order dated 18.11.2017 in abeyance for a period of four weeks. Hence, this petition before this Court.
3. Mr. G. Papi Reddy, the learned counsel for petitioner, pleads that ever since 2007, the petitioner has been fighting a legal battle hoping that justice would be done to his cause. By order dated 18.11.2017, justice was finally done by the learned Tribunal. But instead of petitioner being reinstated immediately, the learned Tribunal has kept its order dated 18.11.2017 in abeyance. Thus, the petitioner is being denied justice.
Secondly, since the Tribunal has not directed payment of back wages, since the respondent would be required to pay merely salary to the petitioner, the salary which would be payable by the Government, the respondent would not suffer any loss by reinstating the petitioner. Therefore, the learned Tribunal was not justified in keeping its order in abeyance for a period of four weeks.
Lastly, the petitioner is due to retire on 18.01.2018. In case, the order dated 18.11.2017 is not implemented immediately, the order of reinstating would merely become a formality. Therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
4. On the other hand, Mr. V. B. Shivakumar, the learned counsel for respondent No.1, submits that the respondent No.1 has a right to access justice. Therefore, it has a right to file an appeal before this Court. Moreover, the Order XL1 Rule 5 CPC, clearly empowers the Court passing the decree to stay its own executable order, or decree. Since the respondent is contemplating to file a an appeal, it was well within its right to file an application under Order XL1 Rule 5 (2) CPC. Merely because the petitioner is likely to retire, merely because the respondent may not suffer any loss, merely because the petitioner has been fighting a legal batter for a decade, cannot deprive the respondent of its right to file an application under Order XL1 Rule 5 CPC. It is in order to protect the right of the respondent, in the interest of justice, that the learned Tribunal has passed a valid order. Therefore, the learned counsel has supported the impugned order.
5. Heard the learned counsel for parties, and perused the impugned order.
6. Undoubtedly, a party does have the right to access justice by filing a review petition, or appeal. Unless the filing of such revision petition, or appeal is barred by law, such right to access justice cannot be denied to the party on the ground that the other party is likely to suffer further injustice. Just because the petitioner is about to retire shortly, just because the learned Tribunal has directed the respondent to reinstate the petitioner, the right of the respondent to access justice cannot be denied to them. It is precisely to give an opportunity to the judgment-debtor to challenge the order by which he/she may be aggrieved by it, that Order XL1 Rule 5 (2) CPC bestows sufficient power on the Court passing a decree to stay the operation of its own decree Consequently, Order XL1 Rule 5 (2) CPC, bestows a right upon the judgment-debtor to move an application under the said provision and to seek stay of the decree passed by the Court.
7. In the present case, the judgment-debtor, the respondent No.1 has exercised its right and the learned Tribunal has legally exercised its power. Therefore, the impugned order is neither illegal, nor perverse.
8. For the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any merit in the present writ petition. It is, hereby, dismissed. No order as to cost.
Sd/- JUDGE Np/-