IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER 2017 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN WRIT PETITION No.41459/2017 (S-R) BETWEEN SRI PHILIP LOBO MAJOR AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS RETIRED DEVELOPMENT OFFICER (MARKETING) EMP NO.50245 NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD CHIKKAMAGALURU BRANCH CHIKKAMAGALURU CITY & DISTRICT-573201.
... PETITIONER (BY SRI R.J.GIREESHA FOR SRI MANJUNATH PRASAD H.N., ADVOCATE) AND 1. NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD HEAD OFFICE 3 MIDDLETON STREET KOLKATA-700071 REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR & MEMORIAL AUTHORITY.
2. THE REGIONAL MANAGER & APPELLATE AUTHORITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD BENGALURU REGIONAL OFFCE SUBHARAM COMPLEX 2ND FLOOR, 144, M.G.ROAD BENGALURU-560 001.
3. THE MANAGER & DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD BENGALURU REGIONAL OFFICE SUBHARAM COMPLEX 2ND FLOOR 144, M.G.ROAD BENGALURU-560 001.
... RESPONDENTS THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUION OF INDIA PRAYING TO SET ASIDE / QUASH THE ORDER DATED 12.12.2015 AT ANNEXURE-E PASSED BY THE R-1; TO DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO REDO THE RETIRAL BENEFITS BY NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE REDUCTION OF BASIC PAY BY TWO STAGES, ETC.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING ORDER The petitioner has challenged the legality of the order dated 12.12.2015, passed by the Chairman and Managing Director, The National Insurance Company Limited, whereby the learned Chairman has reduced the punishment awarded to the petitioner from ‘reduction of pay by five stages’ to ‘reduction of pay by two stages.’ The petitioner has also prayed that the respondents be directed to pay the retirement benefits by not taking into consideration the reduction of basic pay by two stages.
2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on 20.12.1982, the petitioner joined The National Insurance Company Limited, respondent No.1, as a Development Officer (J-I). During the course of his service, on 20.10.2010, he was served with a charge-sheet under Rule 25 of the General Insurance (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975. According to the charge-sheet, on 11.3.2010 he had abused and assaulted one A. Naveena, Development Officer (Administration) inside the office premises. Secondly, on 23.6.2010 he had abused the Branch Manager, Chikkamagalur, using swear words in the office premises, thereby denigrading the office of the Branch Manager. Thirdly, on 6.9.2010, he made unwarranted allegations against one, D. R. Puttaswamy Gowda, the Development Officer (Administration), and attempted to assault him with a chair, inside the office premises. Fourthly, he failed to disclose to the insurance Company that his son, who was residing with him, was acting as the Insurance Agent for the Company, and failed to obtain no-objection certificate from the competent authority for the same.
Subsequently, the insurance company appointed an inquiry officer. After the completion of inquiry proceedings, on 20.4.2014, the inquiry officer submitted his report; he found the petitioner guilty of having committed the alleged misconduct.
A second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. After considering his reply, by order dated 20.5.2014, the disciplinary authority imposed a penalty of “reduction of basic pay by five stages”. Since the petitioner was aggrieved by the said order, he filed a departmental appeal. However, by order dated 9.10.2014, the Appellate Authority dismissed the departmental appeal, and confirmed the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority.
Subsequently, on 2.2.2015 the petitioner submitted a memo to the Chairman and Managing Director. By the order dated 12.12.2015, the Chairman has reduced the punishment as aforementioned. Hence, this petition filed before this court.
3. Mr. H. N. Manjunath Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner, has pleaded that because of the order dated 12.12.2015, the petitioner is being denied his retiral benefits. Therefore, the order deserves to be set aside by this court.
4. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality in the order dated 12.12.2015. In the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS .v.
P. GUNASHEKARAN [(2015) 2 SCC 610], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately discussed the scope of interference by the High Court when punishment is ordered. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
'12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.’ Therefore, the scope of interfering with the punishment order is extremely limited.
6. Since the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any illegality with the order dated 12.12.2015, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the said order.
7. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is devoid of merit; it is accordingly dismissed.
Sd/- JUDGE vgh*.