IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 05TH DAY OF APRIL 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL PETITION NO.7356/2013 BETWEEN:
SRI N K MOHAN RAM S/O SRI KRISHNA IYENGAR, AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS, RESIDING AT 8, ATRIYA VILLA APARTMENTS, PALACE GUTTAHALLI MAIN ROAD BANGALORE 560003. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI DIWAKARA K, ADV.) AND SRI MAHESH JOSHI S/O LATE H G JOSHI AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS, R/O NO.10, 16TH MAIN ROAD, RADHAKRISHNA HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY III STAGE, PADMANABHANAGAR BANGALORE 560085. ... RESPONDENT (BY SMT M.D.ANURADHA URS FOR SRI C.V.SUDHINDRA, ADV.) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN C.C.NO.15219/11 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE VIII ACMM, BANGALORE AND MAY PASS ANY OTHER SUITABLE ORDER.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
ORDER Petitioner has sought to quash the proceedings initiated against him in C.C.No.15219/2011 for the offences punishable under Sections 499 and 500 of IPC.
2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent. Perused the records.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised threefold contentions.
Firstly, in view of the allegations made in the complaint prior sanction of appointing authority ought to have been produced before the court before taking cognizance of the alleged offences, whereas learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offences without prior sanction as prescribed under section 199 of the Cr.P.C.
Secondly, in order to constitute an offence under Section 499 of IPC, the alleged defamatory statement requires to be published. In the instant case, the averments made in the complaint indicate that it was general communication made by the petitioner to the head of the State, as such, the facts averred in the complaint do not prima-facie made out the ingredients of offences alleged in the complaint.
Thirdly, the order passed by the learned Magistrate is not a speaking order, learned Magistrate has mechanically passed the impugned order without considering the facts of the case. Hence, on these three grounds, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed.
4. Opposing the above submission, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the provisions of Section 199 of Cr.P.C. are not applicable to the facts of the case. The statement made by the petitioner are perse defamatory. There are clear averments in the complaint that the said defamatory statements were circulated by the petitioner to the staff of the Dooradarshana Kendra, Bengaluru including One Ravindra Rao and the same was put on the notice Board of the Canteen so as to circulate the same to the office staff, members and the visitors. Therefore, arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no publication of the alleged defamatory contents are factually incorrect. Further, she would submit that the order of cognizance passed by the learned Magistrate reflects application of mind. Therefore, there is no error whatsoever warranting interference by this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
5. Considered the submissions and perused the records.
6. Coming to the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, I am of the view that reliance placed on Section 199 of Cr.P.C. is totally misplaced.
7. Section 199(2) of Cr.P.C. reads as under:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code, when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed against a person who, at the time of such commission, is the President of India, the Vice-President of India, the Governor of a State, the Administrator of a Union territory or a Minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State in respect of his conduct in the discharge of his public functions a Court of Session may take cognizance of such offence, without the case being committed to it, upon a complaint in writing made by the Public Prosecutor.”
8. A plain reading of the said provisions make it clear that when any offence falling under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code is alleged to have been committed against a person who at the time of such commission, either the President or the Vide-President of India or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, Sessions Court may take cognizance without the case being committed to it upon a complaint made by the public prosecutor. The section does not prescribe any embargo on the public servant to seek for action for defamation committed against him on account of the act of a member of the public. In the instant case, the complainant is public servant who has sought prosecution of the person who has committed an offence against him. Therefore, the provisions of Section 199 of Cr.P.C. are not applicable to the facts of the case. As a result, the first contention is rejected.
9. Coming to the “publication” of the alleged defamatory statement is concerned, it is noticed that clear averments are made in the complaint to the effect that the alleged defamatory statements were circulated by issuing note on 13.08.2008 to all the staff of Dooradarshan Kendra, Bengaluru including one Ravindra Rao. It is stated that the said Ravindra Rao was Film Projectionist of Dooradarshan Kendra who saw the notice in the notice Board during his visit to the Canteen. Therefore, the contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no “publication” of alleged defamatory statement also cannot be accepted.
10. Coming to the order passed by the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the alleged offence is concerned, the said order is self-explanatory. A mere glance of the said order would disclose that the learned Magistrate has considered the averments of the complaint, the facts of the case and has prima-facie arrived at a conclusion that the averments made in the complaint and the sworn statement coupled with the documents produced before the court, made out the ingredients of offence under Section 499 of IPC punishable under Section 500 of IPC. Therefore, no fault could be found with the impugned order. As a result, I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the action initiated against the petitioner.
Consequently, the petition is dismissed.
VM CT-HR Sd/- JUDGE