Sri Harish @ Hariprasad vs The State Of Karnataka Vemagal Police Station And Others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF DECEMBER, 2019 BEFORE THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR CRL.P. NO.7884/2019 BETWEEN SRI.HARISH @ HARIPRASAD S/O SADANAND, AGED ABOUT 21 YEARS, R/AT KADAGATTUR VILLAGE, NEW ADDRESS ‘B’ BLOCK, VEMGAL VILLAGE, KOLAR TALUK AND DISTRICT-563101.

...PETITIONER (BY SRI S VISWESWARAIAH, ADV.) AND 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA VEMAGAL POLICE STATION, REP. BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU-560 001.

2. RAVI S/O LATE B.M.NARAYANAPPA AGED ABOUT 19 YEARS, RESIDING AT BYRANDAHALLI VILLAGE, VEMAGAL HOBLI, KOLAR TALUK AND DISTRICT-563101.

…RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. K.P.YASHODHA, HCGP FOR R1, SRI SURENDRA Y.S., ADV. FOR R2.) THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE CHARGE SHEET SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 PENDING ON THE FILE OF HON’BLE II ADDITIONAL DISTRICT, SESSION JUDGE AT KOLAR IN S.C.NO.206/2018 FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 366(A),376(N),342,506,109 OF IPC, SECTION 4,17 OF POCSO ACT AND SECTION 9 OF PROHIBITION OF CHILD MARRIAGE ACT, VIDE ANNEXURE-C BY ALLOWING THIS PETITION.

THIS CRL.P COMING ON FOR ADMISSION THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

ORDER Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the second respondent-De-facto complainant and the learned High Court Govt. Pleader.

2. The counsel for the petitioner and the second respondent have filed into court a joint affidavit of the petitioner who is the first accused, the second respondent and the victim who is the daughter of the second respondent. The joint affidavit reads as under:-

“JOINT AFFIDAVIT We, (1) HARISH @ HARIPRASAD S/o. Sadanand, Aged about 21 years, R/at. Kadagattur Village, New Address: ‘B’ Block, Vemgal Village, Kolar Taluk & District – 563 101 and (2) RAVI N., son of Late B.M. Narayanappa, aged about 41 years, (3) Smt. ARCHANA R., wife of Harish @ Hariprasad, D/o Ravi N., residing at Byrandahalli Village, Vemgal Hobli, Kolar Taluk and District now at Bengaluru, do hereby state on oath as follows:

1. We state that, Petitioner namely Harish has filed the above petition against Respondent No.2 (Complainant) for quashing the proceedings in S.C. No.206/2018 on the file of the Hon’ble 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge, Kolar. We are acquainted with the facts of the case and hence swearing to this affidavit.

2. We state that, Smt. Archana R. (CW.2) is the wife of the Petitioner and daughter of Respondent No.2.

3. We state that, at the intervention of elders and well wishers and family members, we have settled the dispute amicably and reached a settlement out of Court which is culminated in this joint affidavit.

4. We state that, the Petitioner and Smt. Archana R. (CW.2) have got married through a regd. Marriage on 14-10-2019 vide Annexure ‘E’ to the petition and are leading happy married life and that we have no objection for quashing charge sheet filed against the petitioner.

5. We submit that, we have entered into this joint affidavit on our own volition without any influence or coercion and after understanding the contents of this joint affidavit.

Therefore, the parties herein respectfully pray that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to quash the charge sheet filed against the Petitioner in S.C. No.206/2018 on the file of the Hon’ble 2nd Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Kolar, for the offences punishable under Section 366 (A), 376 (N), 342, 506, 109 & Section 4, 17 of POCSO Act, & Section 9 of the prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, in the interest of justice and equity.

We state that these are our signatures and facts stated above are true and correct.”

3. The second respondent along with his wife is present before this court. The second respondent and his wife are arrayed as CW-1 and CW-3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner-accused and the second respondent daughter, were in love and when the parents came to know about it, they eloped and got married in a temple. That the daughter of the second respondent had left the home in the early hours without intimating her parents CW-1 & CW-3. The second respondent agitated by his daughter going missing proceeded to set the criminal law into motion by lodging a complaint which came to be registered as Crime No.132/2018, for the offences punishable under Sections 366(A), 376(N), 342, 506, 109 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 & 17 of The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short ‘POCSO Act’) and Section 9 of The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. The court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Kolar took cognizance and same came to be registered as S.C. No.206/2018.

4. Today it is submitted that the daughter of the De-facto complainant has attained majority and on attaining majority, she expressed a desire to get married to the petitioner and that with the intervention of elders and well-wishers, the marriage of the petitioner i.e. the first accused and the daughter of the second respondent was performed on 14.10.2019 and the marriage has also been registered with the Registrar of Marriages. A copy of the Certificate of Registration of Hindu Marriage is produced as Annexure-E.

5. That the second respondent and his wife and his daughter and the petitioner are present before the court. On a query from this court the victim submit that she is presently residing along with her husband i.e. the first accused-petitioner herein. On a query from this court the second respondent and his wife would submit that there has been no coercion and they have voluntarily got married to their daughter to the first accused. They would also vouch the fact that the petitioner-accused is taking good care of her daughter and they do not intend to pursue the complaint and they have expressed their desire to withdraw the complaint in view of the subsequent development. This court queried the victim as to whether there was any coercion on her to get married, to which, she has replied in the negative. The court also queried the victim, as to whether the petitioner-accused had sexually exploited or had sexual intercourse prior to the date of complaint, to which, she would reply in the negative. The CW-1 the father of the victim would submit that he has made the allegations on a misconception and that the first accused bears good character and antecedents and hence he would request that the petition be allowed and the prosecution be quashed.

6. Per contra, the learned High Court Govt. Pleader would submit that the complaint reflects the commission of heinous offence of rape and hence it is impermissible to compound the same. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of exercise of the power of the High Court to quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in respect of non-compoundable offences has consistently held that the courts ought not to exercise the authority vested in them and quash criminal proceedings and the exercise of inherent jurisdiction in respect of cases of heinous nature and cases which would shock the public conscience. No doubt the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another, reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 after analyzing the various decisions, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in sub-paragraphs 5 & 6 of Paragraph 2 as follows:-

“5. Section 420 IPC, one of the counts on which the petitioner has been convicted, no doubt is a compoundable offence with the permission of the Court in view of Section 320 CrPC but Section 120- B IPC, the other count on which the petitioner has been convicted, is a non-compoundable offence. Section 120-B (criminal conspiracy) is a separate offence and since it is a non-compoundable offence, we cannot permit it to be compounded.

6. The Court cannot amend the statute and must maintain judicial restraint in this connection. The courts should not try to take over the function of Parliament or the executive. It is the legislature alone which can amend Section 320 CrPC.”

7. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Yogendra Yadav & Others Vs. State of Jharkhand & Another, reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653 in paragraphs 4 to 6 has been pleased to observe as follows:-

“4. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 IPC which are non- compoundable? Needless to say that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab). However, in a given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the offences are non- compoundable. In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.

5. In Gian Singh this Court has observed that: (SCC p. 340, para 58) “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor.”

Needless to say that the above observations are applicable to this Court also.

6. The learned counsel for the parties have requested this Court that the impugned order be set aside as the High Court has not noticed the correct position in law in regard to quashing of criminal proceedings when there is a compromise. Affidavit has been filed in this Court by complainant Anil Mandal, who is Respondent 2 herein. In the affidavit he has stated that a compromise petition has been filed in the lower court. It is further stated that he and the appellants are neighbours, that there is harmonious relationship between the two sides and that they are living peacefully. He has further stated that he does not want to contest the present appeal and he has no grievance against the appellants. The learned counsel for the parties have confirmed that the disputes between the parties are settled; that parties are abiding by the compromise deed and living peacefully. They have urged that in the circumstances pending proceedings be quashed. The State of Jharkhand has further filed an affidavit opposing the compromise. The affidavit does not persuade us to reject the prayer made by the appellant and the second respondent for quashing of the proceedings.”

Thereafter the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan & Others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, after taking note of its own pronouncement has been pleased to held at paragraph Nos.11 to 16 as follows:-

“11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this Court in Shiji, the High Court has observed that there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the FIR.

11.1. However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section 320 CrPC. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, the Court's principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions.

11.2. In Gian Singh, in para 61, this Court has observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 342-43) “61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

11.3. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, after considering the decision in Gian Singh, in para 29, this Court summed up as under: (Narinder Singh case, SCC pp. 482-84) “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”

11.4. In Parbatbhai Aahir, again this Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. Considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions: (SCC pp. 653-54, para 16) “16.1. Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

11.5. In Manish, this Court has specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that where the accused are facing trial under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society, the accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.

11.6. In Deepak, this Court has specifically observed that as the offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in Kalyan Singh and Dhruv Gurjar.

12. Now so far as the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh is concerned, this Court in para 29.6 admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, this Court further observed that the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be seen, which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the decision in Narinder Singh shall be of no assistance to the accused in the present case.

13. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Shiji, while quashing the FIR by observing that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong. In Shiji, this Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court observed that: (SCC p. 713, para 19) “19. … that being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations … will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose.”

In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed “that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version”, and to that this Court observed and held that the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 CrPC can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in the said decision, in para 18, it is observed as under: (Shiji case, SCC p. 713) “18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked.”

Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute, etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in Shiji, without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

14. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court in Narinder Singh and Shambhu Kewat, this Court has noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences conferred on a court under Section 320 CrPC and the powers conferred under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 CrPC and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482 CrPC is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent decision in Narinder Singh, the very Bench ultimately concluded in para 29 as under: (SCC pp. 482-84) “29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: