IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 26TH DAY OF AUGUST, 2019 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA CRIMINAL PETITION No. 7788 OF 2016 BETWEEN:
1. SRI. H S NAGABHUSHANA S/O SRI H.R. NAGARAJ AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, PANCHAYAT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER HIRENAHALLI GRAM PANCHAYAT TUMKUR TALUK & DISTRICT R/AT NO.35, 8TH CROSS S.S. PURAM TUMKUR-572 103.
2. SMT. H.K. MANJAMMA W/O SRI. LHANUMANTHARAYAPPA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS FORMER CHAIRMAN HIRENAHALLI GRAM PANCHAYAT TUMKUR TALUK & DISTRICT R/O CHIKKANAHALLI VILALGE OORDIGERE CROSS HIREHALI LPOST TUMKUR TLAUK & DISTRICT PIN: 572 104.
(By Sri. C.R.GOPALASWAMY, ADV.) AND 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY LOKAYUKTA POLICE M.S. BUILDING, BANGALORE-560 001 BY ITS REGISTRAR ... PETITIONERS 2. DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE OFFICE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA TUMKUR DISTRICT TUMKUR-572 101.
3. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA TUMKUR DISTRICT TUMKUR-572 101.
(By Sri. VENKATESH S. ARBATTI, SPL.PP ) ... RESPONDENTS THIS CRL.PETITION IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE REGISTRATION OF FIR VIDE CR. NO.21/2014 OF THIRD RESPONDENT POLICE, CONSEQUENTLY QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.NO.169/2016 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 13(1)(c) R/W SEC.13(2) OF PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988, PENDING ON THE FILE OF II ADDL. DIST. AND S.J., TUMKUR.
THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, THE COURT PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
ORDER Petitioners are accused Nos.1 and 2 in Crime No.21/2014 registered under Sections 13(1)(c) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘Act’ for short). Based on the investigation, charge sheet has been laid against the petitioners for the above offences and matter is pending on the file of the II Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur in Spl.Case No.169/2016.
2. The petitioners have sought to quash the impugned proceedings mainly on three grounds. Firstly, FIR in the instant case was registered and the investigation was conducted by the very same officer contrary to the settled canon of justice which has caused grave injustice to the accused. Secondly, the Inspector of Police, who conducted the investigation and submitted the charge sheet was not authorized under Section 17 of the Act. Hence, the entire proceedings are vitiated. Thirdly, the allegations made in the charge sheet do not prima facie make out the ingredients of the offence under Section 13(1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the Act. In support of his submissions, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Megha Singh –v- State of Haryana reported in AIR 1995 SC 2339 and the decision of this Court in the case of Sri C Murthyunjayaswamy –v- State by Karnataka Lokayukta police reported in 2017(1) AKR 83.
3. Repelling the above submissions, learned standing counsel appearing for respondents has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar –v- State of Punjab reported in AIR 2015 SC 1206 and the notification issued by the Government of Karnataka authorizing all the Inspectors of Police, office of the Karnataka Lokayukta for the purpose of proviso to Section 17 of the Act.
4. I have considered the rival submissions and carefully scrutinised the material on record.
5. The undisputed facts are that, on receipt of credible information that large scale illegalities were being committed in the panchayat office by collecting illegal gratification from the general public for mutating the documents and creating fake and forged bills, the Inspector of police, Karnataka Lokayukta suo motu lodged a complaint and registered the FIR in crime No.21/2014 under Section 13(1)(c) r/w 13(2) of the Act and forwarded the information to higher superiors and made a requisition to the Magistrate and obtained a search warrant and conducted a search in the Panchayat office, Hirehalli Grama Panchayat, Tumkur taluk and commenced investigation. After investigation, the very same Officer laid charge sheet against the petitioners for the above offences.
6. The above facts clearly indicate that investigation is conducted by the very same officer, who had lodged the information and registered the FIR. The question whether the course adopted by the Police officer vitiated the proceedings has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod’s case (supra). In the said case, PW-8 viz., Investigating officer in his official capacity gave information, registered the case as part of his official duty and later investigated the case and filed the charge sheet. In the light of the above facts, considering the authorities on the subject including the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Megha Singh’s case (supra), in paragraph 28 of the said Judgment has held as under:
“ In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the raiding party had sent the report to the police station and thereafter carried the formal investigation. In fact, nothing has been put to him to elicit that he was anyway personally interested to get the appellant convicted. In our considered view, the decision in S.Jeevanatham (AIR 2004 SC 4608) (supra) would be squarely applicable to the present case and, accordingly, without any reservation we repel the submission so assiduously urged by Mr.Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant.”
7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also considered the earlier decision on the subject, especially the case of State –vs- V.Jayapaul reported in (2004) 5 SCC 223 wherein the Court posed a question whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground that the police officer, who had lodged/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected commission of cognizable offence by the respondent should not have investigated the case ? After referring to Section 154 of Cr.P.C., in paragraph 26 of the Judgment reiterated the following ratio:
“26. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court proceeded to state thus:
“Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who “lodged” the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent Police Officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a Police officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and therefore made up is mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack.”
Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (AIR 1964 SC 221) (supra) and Megha Singh (supra).”
8. The ratio laid down in the above decision, in my view, squarely applies to the facts of the case. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that law has not been correctly laid down in Vinod’s case (supra), for not considering the law laid down in Megha Singh’s case (supra), but a reading of the decision in Vinod’s case, it is seen that even Megha Singh’s case has been considered. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard. Consequently, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is rejected.
9. Coming to the authorization under Section 17 of the Act is concerned, the said provision empowers the authorized officers to investigate the case either pursuant to the general authorization or special authorization. The notification produced by the learned standing counsel for the respondents reads thus:
“ In exercise of the powers conferred by the first Proviso to Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988) and in suppression of Notification No.HD 175 PEG 86(1) dated 26th May, 1986 the Government of Karnataka hereby authorizes all the Inspectors of Police, Office of the Karnataka Lokayukta for the purpose of the said proviso.”
The Investigating officer having been duly authorized under Section 17 of the Act, even this contention is liable to be rejected.
10. Coming to the third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, on perusal of the material on record, I find that the allegations made in the charge sheet and the material produced in support thereof, prima facie attract the ingredients of the offence under Section 13(1)(c) and 13(2) of the Act. There are clear allegations that the alleged illegalities have been committed by the petitioners in the course of discharge of their duties by misusing the official position. As such, I do not find any justifiable reason to quash the proceedings on the purported contentions urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners.
11. Insofar the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in C.Mruthyunjayaswamy’s case (supra) is concerned, learned standing counsel for the respondents has pointed out that the said decision is overruled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State –vs- H.Srinivas reported in 2018 SCC OnLine SC 576.
Consequently, the petition being devoid of merit, the - same is dismissed.
Liberty is reserved to the petitioners to seek discharge on such grounds available under law. In such an event, any observations made in this order shall not come in the way of the trial court considering the said prayer.
Sd/- JUDGE ln.