Between
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY SECOND APPEAL No. 737 OF 2014
Dated:31-10-2014
M/s. Southend Partnership Firm rep., by its Partner Sri K. Raj Kumar, S/o. Late L. Kantilal Jain, aged 49 years, M/s. Southend, 1-7-361 to 377/92, Chenoy Trade Centre, Park Lane, Secunderabad and another AND Anand Kumar Gupta and two others ... APPELLANTS .. RESPONDENTS THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY
SECOND APPEAL No. 737 OF 2014
JUDGMENT:
The appellants have established a fairly large textile showroom at Park Lane, Hyderabad. It is stated that they own six mulgies and one of the neighbouring mulgies owned by the 1st respondent-plaintiff was also taken on lease for the same purpose in the year 2000. The 1st respondent got issued a notice dated 11-08-2006 under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (for short, ‘the Act’) and requested the appellants to vacate the premises. That was followed by filing of O.S No.1198 of 2006 in the Court of I Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. It was pleaded that the lease itself was for a limited period and even after receiving the notice under Section 106 of the Act, the appellants did not vacate the premises. The appellants filed a written statement opposing the suit. According to them, there was an oral understanding to the effect that the lease would be in force for 20 years and on that basis, huge investment was made to bring a textile showroom covering the suit premises also. The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment dated 25-11-2010. Thereupon, the appellants filed A.S No. 7 of 2011 in the Court of I Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. The appeal was dismissed on 21-08-2014. Hence, the second appeal.
Heard Ms. Manjiri S. Ganu, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri R.A. Atchutanand, learned counsel for the 1st respondent-plaintiff.
There is no dispute that the 1st respondent is the owner of the premises. Controversy was only as to the nature of lease, particularly in relation to the period. On the basis of the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration:
“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for recovery of possession as prayed for?
2. Whether the termination notice is valid?
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for past mesne profits as prayed for? for?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for future mesne profits as prayed
5. To what relief?”
The 1st respondent deposed as PW 1 and he filed Exs.A-1 to A-8. On behalf of the appellants, DWs 1 to 4 were examined and no documentary evidence was adduced. The suit was decreed and in the appeal preferred by the appellants herein, the lower appellate Court framed one point for consideration, namely, “whether the appellants have established substantial grounds to set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court in O.S No.1198/06 dated 25-11-2010”. The appeal was ultimately dismissed.
This is a typical case in which the appellants have brought into existence a big showroom which comprised of substantial extent of premises owned by them and part of the premises owned by the 1st respondent. The lease commenced in the year 2000, but a formal document in that behalf appears to have been executed in the year 2006. Though it was urged that there was an oral understanding at the commencement of the lease that it will be in force for 20 years, it is not substantiated by referring to any recitals of any document. The duration of a lease happens to be an important aspect of the transaction. Though an attempt was made to establish through oral evidence that the lease was for 20 years, the trial Court and the lower appellate Court were not satisfied about it. No serious defect was pointed out in the notice marked as Ex.A-1 nor the title of the 1st respondent was disputed. The inevitable consequence was that the suit filed for eviction was to be decreed. The learned counsel for the appellants is not able to point out any question of law much less substantial question of law in the second appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
Learned counsel for the appellants prayed for grant of time to vacate the premises. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent opposed the same. However, taking into account, the fact that the business of the appellants was being undertaken in the suit schedule premises for the last several years, time is granted to the appellants till the end of June, 2015 to vacate the premises subject to their filing an undertaking before the trial court within four weeks from today to the effect that they will put the 1st respondent in vacant possession of the suit schedule property on or before 30-06-2015 and subject to their payment of rents regularly.
The miscellaneous petitions filed in this appeal shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J 31-10-2014 ks