THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. SUNIL CHOWDARY CRIMINAL PETITION No.11239 OF 2010 21.11.2014 Between:
Somarapu Satyanarayana ...Petitioner Vs.
Smt. Vijaya Lakshmi & another.
…Respondents < GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
!Counsel for Petitioner : Sri Bhooma Goud ^Counsel for 1st Respondent:
^Counsel for 2nd Respondent: Public Prosecutor ? Cases referred
[1]
2011 (4) ALD 96
2 (2007) 6 SCC 555
3 (2010) 10 SCC 469
4 2014 (1) ALD (Crl.) 662 (SC)
5 AIR 1992 SC 604
6 AIR 1960 SC 866
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.SUNIL CHOWDARY CRIMINAL PETITION No.11239 of 2010 ORDER:
1 This petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against the petitioner in DVC No.149 of 2010 on the file of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad.
2 The facts enumerated for filing of the present petition, succinctly, are as follows:
3 The first respondent herein filed a complaint under Section 12 of The Protection of Women From Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short ‘the Act’) on the file of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad against the petitioner claiming reliefs under Sections 14, 16 to 20 and 22 of the Act. The trial Court, after taking the case on file, issued summons to the petitioner.
4 As per the allegations made in the complaint, the petitioner and first respondent lived together in house bearing D.No.21-4-82 14th Industrial Area, Gowthami Nagar, Ramagundam for two or three years. The first respondent used to stay in the house of the petitioner as and when his wife went to her parents’ house for a period of two or three months. The gist of the complaint is that first respondent is an aggrieved person; therefore, she is entitled to claim reliefs under sections 18 to 22 of the Act from the petitioner.
5 There is no representation on behalf of the first respondent. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that non-claiming of notice by the first respondent would amount to service of notice.
6 A perusal of the record reveals that on 12.11.2010, the learned counsel for the petitioner was permitted to take out personal notice to the first respondent and file proof of service. In pursuance of the said direction, the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken out personal notice to the address of the first respondent by registered post with
acknowledgement due, but the same was returned with an endorsement ‘not claimed.’ The learned counsel for the petitioner filed a memo along with return postal cover in the registry to that effect. For better understanding, the address furnished by the first respondent in her complaint and the address to which the petitioner sent notice are furnished in the following table:
7 From the above table, it is clear that notice was sent to the correct address of the first respondent, as mentioned in the complaint.
8 As per the principle enunciated in K.Sajjan Raj v Gopi Setty
[1]
Chandra Mouli when a notice has been sent to the correct address of the party and when the same has been returned as “not claimed”, the same amounts to service of notice.
[2]
9 I n C.C.Alavi Haji v Palapetty Muhammed the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
Section 27 of General Clauses Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by a registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement “refused” or “not available in the house” or “house locked” or “shop closed” or “addressee not in station”, due service has to be presumed.
10 The facts of the case on hand are almost similar to the facts of the case cited supra. In the light of the settled legal position and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that notice is duly served on the first respondent. Since the first respondent is not inclined to appear, even after duly served with notice in this petition, the matter can be decided on merits.
11 The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the first respondent is not an aggrieved person; therefore, the DVC filed by her is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that even if the allegations made in the complaint are ex facie taken to be true and correct, prima facie, no case has been made out so as to attract the provisions of the Act.
12 The Parliament, with a laudable object i.e. in order to provide for more effective protection of the rights of women, guaranteed under the Constitution, who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected there with or incidental thereto, enacted the DVC Act, 2005.
13 Before adverting to the factual aspects of the case, it is profitable to extract the relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 2 (a) of the Act defines ‘aggrieved person’ which reads as under:
“Aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a
domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent.
Section 2 (f) of the Act defines ‘domestic relationship’ which reads as under:
“Domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons
who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family.
Section 2 (q) of the Act defines ‘respondent’ which reads as under:
“respondent” means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:
PROVIDED THAT an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship
in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner.
Section 2 (s) of the Act defines ‘shared household’ which reads as under:
(s) “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household."
Section 26 of the DVC Act, 2005 reads as under:
26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings:-
(1) Any relief available under Secs. 18, 19 20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before a Civil Court, Family Court or a Criminal Court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondent whether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.
(2) Any relief referred to ion sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceeding before a Civil or Criminal Court.
(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedings other than a proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate of the grant of such relief.
14 A perusal of Section 26 of the Act at a glimpse connotes that DVC Act is only a supplementary but not a substitute to the existing enactments. The reliefs provided under the Act are not alternative but in addition to and along with any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in a suit or other legal proceeding. This itself indicates that the very object of the Act is to provide remedial measures.
15 A fascicular reading of Section 2 (a) and proviso to Section 2 (q) of the Act clearly demonstrates that not only a legally wedded wife but also a female, who prima facie establishes her relation with the respondent is in the nature of marriage, can knock the doors of the Court seeking reliefs provided under the Act. The word ‘aggrieved person’ encompasses in it legally wedded wife as well as a female who satisfies the basic ingredients of the Act. It appears that the intention of the legislature is to wipe off the tears of a woman, who is victim of domestic violence and who parenthetically has not undergone the requisite ceremonies of a valid marriage of personal laws. From a conjoint reading of various definitions, as enumerated in Section 2 of the Act, it is clearly manifest that this Act recognized the de-facto marriage to rescue the victims of domestic violence by providing various reliefs. Establishment of a relationship in the nature of marriage is sine qua non for granting reliefs under the Act. A combined reading of clauses (f) and (s) of Section 2 of the Act postulates that mere staying in a shared house by itself would not entitle a female to press into service the provisions of the Act, without satisfying the other relevant aspects. The word ‘domestic relation’ as used in clauses (a), (f) and (s) of Section 2 of the Act means a relation between two individuals of heterogeneous sex, which is invariably in the nature of marriage only. A reading of one of the definitions referred supra, in isolation of the other, would lead to misinterpretation of the provisions of the Act. In order to understand the basic concept and underlying object of the Act, one has to read all these definitions together. Section 3 of the Act defines multi facets of domestic violence. Sections 18 to 22 of the Act provide remedial reliefs to the victims of domestic violence. Violation of the orders passed by the Court would attract penal provisions as contemplated under Section 31 of the Act.
16 During the Vedic period, the institution of marriage was recognized as a sacrament but not as a contract so far as Hindus are concerned. The very purpose of marriage among Hindus is to perpetuate their family name by procreating children and also leading the life by meticulously following the religious customs. The concept of marriage is union of two hearts as one, but not union of two individuals of opposite sex. ‘Let mutual fidelity continue until death’ is the bedrock for institution of the marriage. Belief and faith in the above said philosophy made the institution of marriage intact for centuries so far as India is concerned. Polygamy was recognized and accepted among Hindus up to 1955 so far as man is concerned. The Hindu Marriage Act 1955 introduced monogamy among Hindus. The changes that have taken place in the society are being reflected in the laws made by the legislature having competency. Taking note of the contemporary socio economic conditions of the society, the laws made by the legislature may be remedial as well as preventive in nature. Parliament enacted the Domestic Violence Act with dual object of remedial as well as preventive.
17 Hindu Marriage Act does not define marriage. However, Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act deals with conditions for a valid Hindu marriage, which reads as under:
A marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus, if the
following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—
(i) Neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage;
(ii) At the time of the marriage, neither party—
(a) is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness of mind; or
(b) Though capable of giving a valid consent, has been suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to such an extent as
to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or
(c) Has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity,
(iii) The bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one years and the bride, the age of eighteen years at the time of the
marriage;
(iv) The parties are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of
them permits of a marriage between the two;
(v) The parties are not sapindas of each other, unless the custom or usage governing each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
18 Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act postulates the ceremonies to be observed during the performance of the marriage. A conjoint reading of Section 5 and 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 clearly indicates what constitutes a valid Marriage under Hindu Law.
19 It appears that the words ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ might have been used in the Domestic Violence Act keeping in mind the scope of Section 5 of Hindu Marriage Act as well as other personal laws.
20 The crucial question that falls for consideration, at this juncture, is whether the first respondent herein has satisfied the basic ingredients of the Act so as to maintain the case in the backdrop of the various provisions referred supra.
21 Reverting to the facts of the case on hand, the marriage of the first respondent was performed with one T. Chandramouli in the year 1980, who is an employee in Singareni Collieries, through whom she was blessed with two daughters. As per the allegations made in the complaint, first respondent developed acquaintance with the petitioner in the year 1988 during the elections to Ramagundam Municipal Corporation. The acquaintance between the petitioner and the first respondent has transmogrified into intimacy during the course of time. The intimacy between the petitioner and the first respondent culminated into live in relationship. Resultantly, the live in relationship between them led to taking of customary divorce by the first respondent from her husband on 24.5.2002. There is no doubt that in the State of Andhra Pradesh and State of Telangana customary divorce has been in vogue in certain communities. Prevailing of customary divorce in the caste to which first respondent belongs and the same was recognized by Court of law is conspicuously silent in the complaint. A perusal of the record reveals that the first respondent filed O.P.No.4 of 2009 against her husband under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Peddapalli seeking to dissolve the marriage between them by granting divorce. It is an admitted fact that the said O.P. was allowed by granting divorce and the marriage of the first respondent with her husband was dissolved with effect from 10.11.2009. In view of the judgment and decree in O.P.No.4 of 2009, the oral plea of the first respondent that she had taken customary divorce from her husband in the year 2002 is not sustainable either on facts or on law.
22 As per the allegations made in the complaint, the first respondent and the petitioner lived together in a house bearing D.No.21-4-82, 14th Industrial Area, Gowtham Nagar, Ramagundam, Karimanagar District for a period of two to three years after she obtained alleged customary divorce from her husband. It is further alleged that the petitioner married the first respondent on 25.11.2008 at Hyderabad. It is further alleged that the first respondent and the petitioner used to attend functions and social gatherings like wife and husband. But there is no specific averment from which date to which date they lived together continuously for a period of two years. It is also not specifically mentioned about the time and exact place where the petitioner married the first respondent. Even assuming but not conceding that the petitioner and the first respondent lived together under the same roof, does it automatically entitle the first respondent to knock the doors of the Court by invoking the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act is a crucial point to be addressed by the Court. Even assuming but not conceding that the petitioner and the first respondent stayed for two or three years under the same roof that would not confer any right on the first respondent to invoke the provisions of the Act without establishing the relationship between them is in the nature of marriage.
23 It is not in dispute that the petitioner and the first respondent are Hindus by birth and are governed by Hindu law. For better appreciation of the contentions of the first respondent, it is not out of place to extract hereunder the relevant portion of the complaint, which reads as under:
“The wife of the respondent namely Smt. Bharathi used to go to
take care of her parents for a period of 2 to 3 months and during those timings the petitioner aggrieved person used to live with the respondent. It is submitted even in the presence of Smt. Bharathi the petitioner aggrieved person used to stay in the shared house in the above house.”
24 It is the admitted case of the first respondent that one Smt. Bharathi is legally wedded wife of the petitioner herein. The contents of the complaint would clearly go to show that the first respondent is very much aware that the petitioner was a married person. The first respondent is entitled to contact second marriage after 10.11.2009 only in view of judgment and decree passed in O.P.No.4 of 2009. In order to constitute a valid marriage under Hindu law, the parties to the marriage have to satisfy the conditions stipulated under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act. A married woman marrying another married man during the subsistence of their marital tie with their respective spouses is not valid one. Like wise, a divorced woman is not entitled to marry a man whose marital tie is in subsistence. Whether the words ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ as contemplated under Section 2(f) and proviso to Section 2(q) of the Act encompasses in it all sorts of live in relationship or not? The various provisions of the Act expressly or by necessary implication exclude each and every live in relationship from the purview of the Act. At this point of time the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the ratio laid down in
[3]
D.Velusamy Vs. D.Patchaiammal wherein the Hon’ble apex Court held as under:
31. In our opinion a `relationship in the nature of marriage' is akin to a common law marriage. Common law marriages require that although not being formally married:-
(a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
(b) They must be of legal age to marry.
(c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried. (underlining mine)
(d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being akin to spouses for a significant period of time. (see `Common Law Marriage' in Wikipedia on Google) In our opinion a `relationship in the nature of marriage' under the 2005 Act must also fulfill the above requirements, and in addition the parties must have lived together in a `shared household' as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act. Merely spending weekends together or a one night stand would not make it a `domestic relationship'.
32. In our opinion not all live in relationships will amount to a relationship in the nature of marriag8e to get the benefit of the Act of 2005. To get such benefit the conditions mentioned by us above must be satisfied, and this has to be proved by evidence. If a man has a `keep' whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purpose and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of marriage'
33. No doubt the view we are taking would exclude many women who have had a live in relationship from the benefit of the 2005 Act, but then it is not for this Court to legislate or amend the law. Parliament has used the expression
`relationship in the nature of marriage' and not `live in relationship'. The Court in the grab of interpretation cannot change the language of the statute.
25 As per the principle enunciated in the case cited supra, in order to constitute relationship in the nature of marriage, both parties must be qualified to enter into a legal marriage. In the instant case, with effect from 10.11.2009, the first respondent is entitled to marry another person or maintain relationship in the nature of marriage provided the other person is also qualified to enter into a legal marriage. However, even if the first respondent married the petitioner, their relationship will not fall within the ambit of ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ as defined under Section 2 (f) of the Act. In order to resolve the issue, this Court is also placing reliance on the ratio laid down in Indra Sarma Vs. V.K.V. Sarma[4] wherein the Hon’ble apex Court after considering various provisions of the Domestic Violence Act with reference to the laws prevailing in other countries, held as under:
37. Reference to certain situations, in which the relationship between an aggrieved person referred to in Section 2(a) and the respondent referred to in Section 2(q) of the DV Act, would or would not amount to a relationship in the nature of marriage, would be apposite. Following are some of the categories of cases which are only illustrative:
a) Domestic relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Relationship between an unmarried adult woman and an unmarried adult male who lived or, at any point of time lived together in a shared household, will fall under the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and in case, there is any domestic violence, the same will fall under Section 3 of the DV Act and the aggrieved person can always seek reliefs provided under Chapter IV of the DV Act.
b) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman and a married adult male: Situations may arise when an unmarried adult women knowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male. The question is whether such a relationship is a relationship in the nature of marriage so as to fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act.
c) Domestic relationship between a married adult woman and an unmarried adult male: Situations may also arise where an adult married woman, knowingly enters into a relationship with an unmarried adult male, the question is whether such a relationship would fall within the expression relationship in the nature of marriage.
d) Domestic relationship between an unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male: An unmarried woman unknowingly enters into a relationship with a married adult male, may, in a given situation, fall within the definition of Section 2(f) of the DV Act and such a relationship may be a relationship in the nature of marriage, so far as the aggrieved person is concerned.
e) Domestic relationship between same sex partners (Gay and Lesbians): DV Act does not recognize such a relationship and that relationship cannot be termed as a relationship in the nature of marriage under the Act. Legislatures in some countries, like the Interpretation Act, 1984 (Western Australia), the Interpretation Act, 1999 (New Zealand), the Domestic Violence Act, 1998 (South Africa), the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, 2004 (U.K.), have recognized the relationship between the same sex couples and have brought these relationships into the definition of Domestic relationship.
63. We may now consider whether the tests, we have laid down, have been satisfied in the instant case. We have found that the appellant was not ignorant of the fact that the respondent was a married person with wife and two children, hence, was party to an adulterous and bigamous relationship. Admittedly, the relationship between the appellant and respondent was opposed by the wife of the respondent, so also by the parents of the appellant and her brother and sister and they knew that they could not have entered into a legal marriage or maintained a relationship in the nature of marriage. Parties never entertained any intention to rear children and on three occasions the pregnancy was terminated. Having children is a strong circumstance to indicate a relationship in the nature of marriage. No evidence has been adduced to show that the parties gave each other mutual support and companionship. No material has been produced to show that the parties have ever projected or conducted themselves as husband and wife and treated by friends, relatives and others, as if they are a married couple. On the other hand, it is the specific case of the appellant that the respondent had never held out to the public that she was his wife. No evidence of socialization in public has been produced. There is nothing to show that there was pooling of resources or financial arrangements between them. On the other hand, it is the specific case of the appellant that the respondent had never opened any joint account or executed any document in the joint name. Further, it was also submitted that the respondent never permitted to suffix his name after the name of the appellant. No evidence is forthcoming, in this case, to show that the respondent had caused any harm or injuries or endangered the health, safely, life, limb or well- being, or caused any physical or sexual abuse on the appellant, except that he did not maintain her or continued with the relationship.
ALIENATION OF AFFECTION
64. Appellant had entered into this relationship knowing well that the respondent was a married person and encouraged bigamous relationship. By entering into such a relationship, the appellant has committed an intentional tort, i.e. interference in the marital relationship with intentionally alienating respondent from his family, i.e. his wife and children. If the case set up by the appellant is accepted, we have to conclude that there has been an attempt on the part of the appellant to alienate respondent from his family, resulting in loss of marital relationship, companionship, assistance, loss of consortium etc., so far as the legally wedded wife and children of the respondent are concerned, who resisted the relationship from the very inception. Marriage and family are social institutions of vital importance. Alienation of affection, in that context, is an intentional tort, as held by this Court in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal case (supra), which gives a cause of action to the wife and children of the respondent to sue the appellant for alienating the husband/father from the company of his wife/children, knowing fully well they are legally wedded wife/children of the respondent..
65. We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant, having been fully aware of the fact that the respondent was a married person, could not have entered into a live-in relationship in the nature of marriage. All live-in- relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage. Appellant’s and the respondent’s relationship is, therefore, not a relationship in the nature of marriage because it has no inherent or essential characteristic of a marriage, but a relationship other than in the nature of marriage and the appellant’s status is lower than the status of a wife and that relationship would not fall within the definition of domestic relationship under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. If we hold that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is a relationship in the nature of a marriage, we will be doing an injustice to the legally wedded wife and children who opposed that relationship. Consequently, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent in connection with that type of relationship, would not amount to domestic violence under Section 3 of the DV Act.
26 Even as per the observations of the Hon’ble apex Court made above, the relationship between the petitioner and the first respondent will not come within the purview of ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ as defined under Section 2 (f) of the DVC Act. In the absence of domestic relationship between the petitioner and the first respondent, the first respondent will not be recognized as an ‘aggrieved person’ as defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act. The facts of the case on hand are identical to the facts of the case cited supra.
27 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and also the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, I have no hesitation to hold that the first respondent is not an aggrieved person to claim any relief under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act against the petitioner.
28 The next question that falls for consideration is whether this Court can quash the proceedings in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
29 The various remedies provided under the DVC Act are purely civil in nature. There is no element of criminality in the reliefs sought by the aggrieved person under the Domestic Violence Act. As per Section 27 of the Act, the Judicial Magistrate of I Class or Metropolitan Magistrate concerned is competent to pass appropriate orders under the Act. Section 28 of the Act mandates that the Judicial Magistrate of I Class has to follow the procedure contemplated under Cr.P.C. while granting the reliefs. The various reliefs provided under the Act are remedial in nature.
30 In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[5], the Hon’ble apex Court held as under:
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and
the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
31 The Hon’ble apex Court in R.P.Kapoor v State of Punjab held as hereunder:
"Cases may also arise where the allegations in the F.I.R. or the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. In such cases, no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In this case it would be legitimate to the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person."
[6]
,
32 As per the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, the Court can quash the proceedings if the allegations made in the complaint are inherently improbable and if continuation of proceedings would amount to abuse of process of Court. In the instant case, the allegations made in the complaint are bereft of the basic ingredients of clauses (a), (f) and (s) of Section 2 of the Act.
33 For the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that continuation of proceedings against the petitioner is nothing but abuse of process of law and hence liable to be quashed.
34 In the result, the Criminal petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner in DVC No.149 of 2010 on the file of IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad are hereby quashed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending in this Criminal Petition, if any, shall stand closed.
Date: 21st November, 2014.
T.SUNIL CHOWDARY, J.
L.R. Copy be marked B/o Kvsn
[1] 2011 (4) ALD 96
[2] (2007) 6 SCC 555
[3] (2010) 10 SCC 469
[4] 2014 (1) ALD (Crl.) 662 (SC)
[5] AIR 1992 SC 604
[6] AIR 1960 SC 866