1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
2. It is admitted case of the parties that the appellant Sohanveer had permitted appellant to reside over disputed property. When the respondent gave a notice of eviction to appellant, then appellant had instituted original suit no. 439/ 2006 (Sohanveer v. Chaman Lal Kapoor & Anr.) against the respondent for the relief of permanent injunction restraining him to evict from the disputed property. It is also admitted that the respondents had filed original suit no. 754/2006 (Chaman Lal Kapoor v. Sohanveer) against appellant for his eviction from disputed property. Thereafter the appellant had instituted another original suit number 20/2007 (Sohanveer v. Chaman Lal Kapoor & Anr.) for the relief of specific performance of alleged oral contract allegedly entered between the parties for the sale of disputed property.
3. These three suits no. 439/2006, no. 754/2006 and no. 20/2007 were consolidated, and were decided by a common judgment dated 23.10.2013 of Additional Civil Judge, (Sr. Div.), Court number 6, Meerut. By this judgment original suit number 429/2006 and original suit no. 20/2007 were dismissed, whereas original suit no. 754/2006 (Chaman Lal Kapoor v. Sohanveer) for eviction of appellant was decreed.
4. Against the judgment of trial Court dated 23.10.2013 three appeals were preferred by the appellant. Against the judgment of leading case O.S. no. 439/2006 the Civil Appeal no. 270/2013 was filed, against the judgment of case no. 754/2006 the Civil Appeal no. 271/2013 was filed, and against the judgment of original suit number 20/2007 Civil Appeal no. 272/2013 was filed by present appellant.
5. Above mentioned three Civil Appeals were heard separately by Additional District Judge, Court no.-1, Meerut, and were separately decided on 31.08.2015. This lower appellate Court had afforded opportunity of hearing but the parties and dismissed the three appeals.
6. Against the judgments of lower Court dated 23.10.2013 in three appeals the appellant had preferred three Second Appeals. Against the judgment of Civil Appeal no. 270/2013 the Second Appeal no. 1031/2015 was filed, against the judgment of Civil Appeal no. 271/2013 the Second Appeal no. 1030/ 2015 was filed, and against the judgment of Civil Appeal no. 272/2013 the Second Appeal no. 1029/2015 was filed by present appellant.
7. The pleading of appellant in trial court was that defendant respondent had entered into in an agreement for sale with the plaintiff appellant, under which the defendant respondent had received amount of Rs. 50,600/- cash on 7.02.1985 from plaintiff appellant and handed over the possession of disputed property to plaintiff. At that time it was agreed between the parties that after obtaining permission from a authorities concerned, the defendant will execute registered sale-deed of said property in favour of plaintiff. After that, plaintiff had developed the land in question and the started business of dairy. Defendant had been promising to execute a sale-deed of disputed property in favour of plaintiff, but had never executed the same. On 14.05.2006 the defendant asked the plaintiff to vacate the disputed land and threatened to evict, then plaintiff had filed an suit no. 439/2006 for permanent injunction.
8. After the institution of original suit number 439/2006 (Sohanveer v. Chaman Lal Kapoor & Anr.), the respondent had filed original suit number 754/2006 (Chaman Lal Kapoor v. Sohanveer) for eviction of appellant Sohanveer from disputed property. In the suit it was pleaded that Sohanveer was admitted on disputed property as licensee, but his lisense had been the revoked, therefore he is liable for eviction.
9. After the institution of original suit number 439/2006 and original suit number 754/2006; the appellant Sohanvee had instituted another original suit number 20/2007 for the specific performance of an alleged oral agreement of sale, and prayed that defendant respondent be directed to execute the sale deed of disputed property in favour of plaintiff. In the suit alternative relief of a refund of alleged advance sale consideration of Rs. 50,600/-was sought.
10. The trial Court had admitted written-statements in aforesaid three original suits, framed issues, consolidated them, accepted evidences of the parties and then, after affording opportunity of hearing parties, and decided that the three suits against appellant Sohanveer. In this judgment trial Court had given specific finding that appellant has failed to prove his case of oral agreement of sale in his favour.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that appellant/defendant was admitted in disputed property as licensee and has raised permanent construction over it. Therefore, his license cannot be revoked by licensee plaintiff/respondent. These points were not considered by lower courts who passed erroneous judgment, therefore appeal should be admitted for being allowed.
12. Learned counsel for the respondent refuted the contention of appellant side and submitted that no permanent construction was raised by defendant/appellant and there are concurrent findings of two lower courts on this point. He further submitted that defendant/appellant was admitted in disputed property as licensee, and admittedly his license has been revoked, therefore he is liable to be evicted. He contended that there has been concurrent finding of facts that defendant/appellant cannot restrain plaintiff/respondent from evicting him and both the courts have given correct findings of fact on this point. The judgments of lower courts are not erroneous or perverse; so appeal should be dismissed.
13. A perusal of the record reveals that defendant/appellant had been taking defences about his alleged oral agreement to sell and raising the permanent construction etc. but the same could not be proved by him. From the evidences, it was found that initial constructions present on disputed property were raised by plaintiff/respondent which are at present in form of tin-shed . Only putting tin-shed on the walls constructed by the plaintiff cannot be treated as construction raised by defendant/appellant. It is pertinent to mention that after appreciating the evidences, both the courts had given concurrent finding that no construction of permanent nature was raised by appellant. Even in his pleading he had not taken any specific plea of raising specific constructions. The finding in this regard of two lower courts are based on appreciation of evidences and are correct and acceptable
14. Section 60 of the Indian Easement Act reads as under:-
"60. License when revocable.-- A license may be revoked by the grantor, unless--
(a) it is coupled with a transfer of property and such transfer is in force;
(b) the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution."
15. In present matter, from the adduced evidences, plaintiff could not prove that he he had raised the constructions on disputed property. Apart from it hae had not pleaded that any such alleged construction was with permission of plaintiff or was in accordance with the terms of license or acting upon the license. As discussed in Section 60 (b) that a license may be revoked by the character by the grantor unless the licensee has executed a work of permanent character, acting upon the license. "Acting upon the license" means acting upon right granted to do upon premises of grantor something which would have been unlawful in absence of such right. The construction of permanent works itself would not render a license irrevocable unless such construction had been made by the licensee in pursuance of the license granted to him. Construction of building on land, when the license was not granted for building purposes, would not attract the provisions of Section 60 and render license irrevocable.
16. The only dispute in this matter is as to whether the defendant/appellant being licensee is liable for eviction of disputed property or not ,and this point has been rightly decided by the two lower courts that defendant/appellant cannot get relief of injunction restraining his eviction and plaintiff/respondent cannot get relief of injunction restraining his eviction and plaintiff/respondent having revoked his license, is entitled for relief of eviction of defendant. The other point to be determined in this matter was relating to alleged permanent construction raised by defendant/appellant. This was not a question of law but was a question of fact that could be decided on the basis of evidences as has been done by the lower courts. Although, it has been mentioned in written-statement that defendant/appellant had filled some pit but there is no specific pleading that constructions present over disputed property were raised or constructed by appellant, and that too acting upon the license or with permission of the grantor of the license. Therefore, status of defendant/appellant is that of trespasser, who was earlier a licensee but whose license had been revoked, so he is liable for eviction. There appears no error or infirmity in judgment of both the lower courts.
17. On examination of the reasoning recorded by the trial court, which are affirmed by the learned first appellate court in first appeal, I am of the view that the judgments of the trial court as well as the first appellate court are well reasoned, based upon proper appreciation of the entire evidence on record. No question of law, much less a substantial question of law was involved in the case before the High Court. No perversity or infirmity is found in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court that has been affirmed by the first appellate court to warrant interference in this appeal. None of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant- plaintiffs can be sustained.
18. In view of the above, this Court finds that no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. The second appeal is dismissed.
Order Date: 18.05.2016 Sanjeev.