JUDGMENT S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Petition has been filed by Smt. Urmila Devi daughter-in-law of deceased Kishun Lal, who died in-harness on 21.4.1999. The deceased Kishun Lal was employed and discharging his duties as Painter in the Electricity Transmission Division-11, U.P. Power Corporation, Allahabad at the time of his death. The necessary facts which bear on the controversy involved in the present petition are that Anil Kumar husband of the petitioner predeceased his father late Sri Kishun Lal and he was survived by the petitioner and two children, i.e., one son and one daughter. In the wake of the death of Anil Kumar, his family consisting of wife and two children was sustaining on the earning of late Kishun Lal. Consequent upon the death of Kishun Lal, the petitioner who happened to be his daughter-in-law, applied for compassionate appointment which according to the petitioner was declined by means of order dated 22.4.2002 passed by the respondent No. 2 on the premises that she did not fall within the definition of family as envisaged in the provisions of U.P. State Electricity Board Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975.
2. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Nripendra Misra for the respondents.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner canvassed the correctness of the impeached order on the ground that the father-in-law of the petitioner had breathed his last during the lifetime of her husband and therefore, the petitioner fell back upon her father-in-law for sustenance and by this reckoning, the petitioner should be deemed to be the member of the 'family' of the deceased Government servant for the purposes of the aforesaid rules. The learned standing counsel, on the other hand, did not countenance the submission stating that the daughter-in-law is not included in the definition of the word 'family' as defined in the relevant Dying-in-Harness Rules which is applicable to recruitment of dependents of the deceased Government servants. The relevant rule being germane to the controversy is abstracted below for ready reference :
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4. In view of the above submissions canvassed across the bar, the question that begs consideration is whether the petitioner could be taken to be the family member of the deceased in the fact-situation of the case. From a perusal of the aforestated rule, it transpires that the word "family" has been interpreted to signify and include wife or husband, son, unmarried daughter and widowed daughter. The word 'include' has been interpreted in various decisions and the distillate of what has been observed in various decisions by the Apex Court is that the use of word "include", would enlarge the scope of the definition, (see Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 1991 Supp (2) SCC 18). In another decision the word "include", it has been observed, is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute ; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include, (see Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works, (1991) 3 SCC 617, 620). In C.I.T. v. Taj Mahal Hotel. (1971) 3 SCC 550, the Apex Court expressed the view that the word "includes" is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used, those words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. The word "include" is also susceptible of other constructions. In South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers' Association v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601, the Apex Court signifies that it is true that "includes" is generally used as a word of extension, but the meaning of a word or phrase is extended when it is said to include things that would not properly fall within Its ordinary connotation. It was also laid down that there could not be any Inflexible rule that the word "include" should be read always as a word of extension without reference to the context.
5. In Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldanha and sons and Anr. (supra), the question for consideration was whether the respondents' factories in view of the amendment to the definition of 'seasonal factory' have lost the benefit of exclusion from the Act, In connection with the question, the three Judge Bench observed that the word 'include' in the statutory definition is generally used to enlarge the meaning of the preceding words and it is by way of extension and not with restriction. The word 'include' is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute ; and when it is so used, these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural Import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall Include. In the case under reference, the factory was seasonal factory within the meaning of Section 1(4) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 which was excluded from the operation of the Act.
6. Subsequently Amending Act 44 of 1966 came into force and definition of seasonal factory was amended. After the amendment, the Employees' State Insurance Corporation called upon the respondents to pay the contributions payable under the Act. The matter was taken to Karnataka High Court, which held that the purpose of the amendment was to enlarge and not to restrict the statutory concept of "seasonal factory" and the position of respondent's establishments as seasonal factories under and for the purpose of the Act remained unaltered even after the amendment. The Apex Court upheld the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in the terms aforestated.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed credence on a decision of this Court in Rajendra Kumar v. State of U.P., 1999 (2) AWC 1373 and in this case, learned single Judge dealing with similar controversy observed that "it bears no repudiation that the Legislature has power to define the word even artificially and so the definition of a word in the definition clause of a statute may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of the same. Normally when a word is defined it means such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and extension whereas where the word defined is declare to include such and such the definition is prima facie extensive. The learned single Judge also relied upon the "Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 6th Edn. by Justice G.P. Singh in which the word "include" has been expounded as under :
"The word 'includes' is often used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. When it is so used these words and phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such thing as they signify according to their nature and import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include."
In the ultimate analysis learned single Judge observed that "regard being had to the inclusive definition of the term 'family' as defined in, and object sought served by the Rules, I am persuaded to the view that in the fact-situation of the present case, the petitioner ought to be treated as a member of the 'family' of the deceased Government employee, and, therefore, the petitioner should be held to be entitled to claim compassionate appointment under the aforesaid rules." In this case grandson had claimed compassionate appointment inasmuch as father of the petitioner had predeceased the grandfather.
8. Reverting to the Rules, 1975, it is noticeable that the rules were framed in exercise of powers under Section 79(c) of the Electricity Act, 1948. In framing scheme for compassionate appointment, the underlying policy and object does appear to me to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread earner which has left the family in penurious condition and without any means of livelihood. The learned counsel for the petitioner has produced before the Court the succession certificate granted by the civil courts in which the petitioner and her children have been declared as legal heirs and successor of the deceased Kishun Lal in consonance with the provisions of Hindu Succession Act. It is noticeable from the record that the petitioner applied for succession certificate which was awarded by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Allahabad vide certificate annexed as Annexure-2 to the petition in favour of the petitioner and her two children, namely, Satya Prakash aged 7 years and Km. Puja aged five years holding the survivors to be the heirs of the deceased Kishun Lal under Section 3/2 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 regarding the estate of propositus Kishun Lal. It is in this perspective that the case of the petitioner has to be taken into reckoning for appropriate relief. It has not been disputed that petitioner and her children in the wake of death of Sri Anil Kumar, were being looked after and sustained on the earning of late Kishun Lal and after the only bread earner, the petitioner and her children have been left high and dry without any means and resources to fall back upon and at this stage, to decline appointment on punctilious reading of the definition of family in the Rules, 1975, would be too preposterous for the family and may land them stranded and would mock at the scheme and its underlying object inasmuch as the object underlying the compassionate appointment being to mitigate the hardship, the denial on the fallacy that her appointment was not permissible within the definition of 'family' contemplated in the Rules, 1975 would be in antagonism of the constitutional provisions enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the Legislature must be deemed to have intended to include daughter-in-law in the 'family' regard being had to the inclusive definition of the term 'family' in the instant case.
9. As a result of foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the word 'family' in the provisions must be construed liberally having due regard to the inclusive definition of the term 'family' as defined in and object sought to be served by the rules. The petitioner in the instant case being heir of the predeceased son and being dependent for sustenance on the deceased employee Kishun Lal, is entitled to be construed as one of the family members of the deceased in view of the inclusive definition of the word 'family and is thus entitled to be considered for appointment under Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1975 aforestated.
10. In the ultimate analysis, the petition succeeds and is allowed and the order dated 22.4.2002 impeached herein thereby rejecting the claim of the petitioner is quashed accordingly and in consequence, it is directed that the respondents shall issue appropriate orders giving suitable appointment to the petitioner under the provisions of the rules aforestated within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before the appropriate authority.