JUDGMENT Amar Saran, J.
1. This application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been filed by the applicant Smt. Usha Sahrawat, who is the principal of Kanya Kalyan Gurukul Shiksha Sansthan Inter College, Bhainswal, Muzaffarnagar, ( hereinafter called the institution ) against the order dated 20.5.2002 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar, whereby the learned Magistrate has summoned the applicant in criminal case No. 1700/9 of 2002 on the basis of the complaint filed by Yashpal Singh, the ex-Manager of the institution.
2. The allegations in the complaint dated 19.3.2002 were that one teacher Km. Shimla had filed a writ petition No. 11463 of 1992 before the Hon'ble High Court, which was decided in her favour on 29.9.1994 on the footing that Km. Shimla was working without any break since 2.3.1988 as an L.T. grade teacher. In that case the complainant claimed that he was also made a party and he had filed a counter affidavit on the basis of true facts and the documents shown by the Principal, i.e. the applicant. The applicant is said to have written a letter on 9.1.2002 to the Account and Finance Officer, Muzaffarnagar wherein she has maliciously stated with the object of defaming the complainant that in the counter-affidavit of the complainant in the writ petition of Km. Shim la, incorrect facts, which were against the record, had been mentioned for personal gain in a dishonest and collusive manner, which amounted to a criminal act and in this manner she had defamed the complainant and his reputation in society had fallen as a result thereof.
3. After examining the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and his witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C, the learned Magistrate has summoned the applicant as aforesaid.
4. I have heard Shri Indra Raj Singh, learned counsel for the applicant, Shri V.K. Singh, learned counsel appearing for opposite party No. 1 and learned Additional Government Advocate representing the State.
5. It is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that writ petition No. 11463 of 1992 has indeed been decided in favour of Km. Shimla on the basis of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the committee of management (of which the complainant was the Manager) on the footing that Km. Shimla was discharging her duties as L.T grade teacher since 2.3.1988 in a continuous manner without any break.
6. It has been mentioned by the applicant in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in support of this application that Km. Shimla had resigned from service on 25.8.1988. It is further mentioned in paragraph 5 of the affidavit that after the institution was brought under the Payment of Salaries Act, 1971, an advertisement for the post of assistant teacher was made and Km. Shimla applied for the same and on the basis of the resolution of the selection committee dated 10.2.1991, she was appointed on the post of assistant teacher. Paragraph 5 further mentions that the resolution dated 10.2.1991 is also annexed as Annexure 4 to the application. This annexure shows that Km. Shimla after resigning from her post in August, 1988, had left the job and she started working on the post from 1.1.1990 as an assistant teacher before she was finally selected in the interview held on 1.2.1991 as an assistant teacher.
7. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit, it is mentioned that the complainant also wrote a letter dated 18.2.1991, (Annexure 5) to the Deputy Director of Education for grant of approval to the appointment of Km. Shimla. The said letter also mentioned that the post from which Km. Shimla had resigned had become vacant, but in the interview held on 20.1.1990, Km. Shimla was selected by the management as assistant teacher, so approval was being sought.
8. Whilst the reply of O.P. No. 1 to paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed by the applicant was that that after Km. Shimla's resignation from the institution on 25.8.1988, the same was not accepted by the committee of management and she continued to work in the college, but so far as the reply of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the affidavit is concerned, contents of which have been mentioned above, it is stated that they need no comment, being matters of record. Therefore, it is argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the averments contained in the management's resolution dated 10.2.1991 (Annexure 4) and letter written by the complainant dated 18.2.19991 (Annexure 5) have been conceded to be correct. In this view of the matter the complainant was guilty of filing a wrong affidavit in the High Court on the basis of which a favourable decision had been given in favour of Km. Shimla.
9. The contention of the learned counsel for the applicant was that essentially the letter written by the applicant to the Account and Finance Officer dated 9.1.2002, which forms the basis of the complaint contained substantially correct facts and the applicant had written the letter in protection of her self interest to a person in authority in good faith and it was also in public good as it was for the purpose of preventing public money being wasted on Km. Shimla for the period when she was not working in the institution and the Prabandh Sanchalak of the institution had also furnished the reply, which was to the same effect. In this connection, learned counsel for the applicant drew my attention to exception nine to Section 499 IPC, which reads as follows:
"Ninth Exception:- Imputation made in good faith by person by protection of his or other's interests.- It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.
10. Learned counsel has also referred to the fifth exception to Section 499 IPC, according to which it is not defamation to express in good faith any opinion respecting the merit of any case or the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent or respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct, if it is made in good faith.
11. It is also contended that the applicant could be entitled to the protection of exception eight of Section 499, which protects accusation made in good faith against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-mater of accusation. It is argued that the Account and Finance Officer was a person, who stood in position of lawful authority to the appellant and the accusation had been preferred to him.
12. In the case of Rajendra Kumar Sita Ram Pande v. Uttam and Anr. 1999 SCC (Cri) 393, where the charge against the accused persons was that they had made a false complaint to the Treasury Officer that the complainant had come to the office in drunken state and abused the Treasury Officer, the Apex Court has held that such an accusation to a person who has lawful authority does not constitute defamation and is protected by exception eight to Section 499 IPC. In this connection the Apex Court has observed in paragraph 7 as under:
Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation. The report of the Treasury Officer clearly indicates that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental enquiry had been initiated and the complainant was found to be guilty. Under such circumstances the fact that the accused persons had made a report to the superior officer of the complainant alleging that he had abused the Treasury Officer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the present complaint and nothing more, would becovered by Exception 8 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code.
13. In this view of the matter the Court had quashed the order issuing process and the criminal proceedings.
14. In my opinion, the applicant is also entitled to the aforesaid protection conferred by the above exceptions and there is substance in the above noted arguments raised by the learned counsel for the applicants.
15. Learned counsel for the complainant, however, relied upon the decision of Ajay Mehra and Anr. v. Durgesh Babu and Ors. 2992 (9)n 709 for the proposition that at the stage of cognizance, other materials cannot be considered by the Magistrate.
16. The view that I have taken is essentially based on the pleadings on the parties and not on other materials on record.
17. Moreover, on the facts and circumstances of the case, it does appear that this prosecution has been initiated for a collateral purpose inasmuch as there appears to be a dispute between the parties over running of the institution and it is for this reason that a mountain appears to have been made of a mole hill and averments, which would not said to be significantly damaging or defamatory and which could only cause slight harm, if at all and which may have been substantially true for the reasons stated above, have been picked up for the purpose of launching this malicious prosecution.
18. Law it may be noted is not meant for the protection of the hyper sensitive. In this context Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code, describes acts, which cause only slight harm andenunciates the principle of "deminimis non curat lex" may be alluded to. Section 95 IPC may be usefully extracted here:
"Act causing slight harm.- Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.
19. In this view of the matter, in my view, permitting prosecution of the applicant to continue in the present case would amount to abuse of the process of court. Accordingly the order dated 20.5.2002 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarnagar summoning the applicant under Section 500 IPC is hereby set aside and the criminal prosecution of the applicant as aforesaid is quashed.
20. This application is allowed.