JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. Heard petitioner's counsel and learned standing counsel.
2. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 30.5.1998 passed by the Prescribed Authority rejecting petitioner's application moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of delay in moving the restoration application.
3. The facts giving rise to this writ petition may be stated in short. An application for release of shop in question was moved under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 by respondent No. 2, since deceased. In the said application, legal heirs of the deceased-tenant were impleaded as opposite parties. The said application was contested by all the opposite parties excepting the petitioner. The said application after contest was allowed. The appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed and so also the writ petition filed before this Court. On the request made on behalf of the petitioner-tenants, this Court allowed one year's time to them for vacating the shop in question, subject to filing of an undertaking on affidavit before the prescribed authority.
It further appears that the required undertaking was also filed before the executive court and for that reason, the execution of the release order was postponed. It further appears that when lime to vacate the shop in question as per the order of this Court approached, the petitioner moved an application before the prescribed authority for setting aside the order of release on the ground that she had no knowledge of the proceedings. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was also moved along with the restoration application for condonation of delay, which has been rejected by the impugned order.
4. From the above facts it is, thus, clear that the petitioner was also impleaded as a party in the release application along with other joint tenants, who contested the claim of the landlord upto this Court and lost from every corner. The law is now well-settled that after the death of original tenant, his heirs/legal representatives become only joint tenants and not tenants-in-common. In this connection, reference may be had to the case of Harish Tandon v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1995 (1) ARC 220, wherein it was held by the Apex Court that after the death of the tenant, his heirs/legal representatives become only joint tenants and they do not inherit the tenancy rights as tenants-in-common. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs and there is no division of the premises or of the rent payable. The heirs/legal representatives, therefore, succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. The result is that any action of any of the joint tenants binds the others.
5. In the case of Mohd. Parvez and others v. VIIth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate/Prescribed Authority, Kanpur and others, 1996 (I) ARC 439, it was held that there is a presumption that a joint tenant represents the interest of all other joint tenants. In Smt. Anju Sharma v. Suresh Chand Jain and others, 1993 (1) ARC 291, after the death of original tenant, suit for ejectment was filed against some of his heirs without impleading all the heirs. The decree for eviction was challenged by those who were not impleaded. Still in the circumstances, it was held that the decree passed was binding on all the joint tenants including those who were not impleaded. In the case of Sunil Kumar v. Special Judge, Jaunpur and others, 1994 (II) ARC 194, it was held that a person is not entitled for impleadment and contest the matter in appeal, if the matter was fully represented by the some of the other joint-tenants before the trial court,
6. In view of the above settled position of law and specially having regard to the fact that the other joint tenants who were impleaded along with the petitioner in the release application had contested the matter upto this Court and lost from every Court and also obtained an order from this Court for time to vacate the premises in question on their filing an undertaking, the present application for restoration appears to have been moved mala fide simply with a view to deny the landlord of his right to obtain possession of the premises in question, which incidently happens to be a shop. There is no allegation that other joint tenants who had contested the matter, had colluded with the landlord. The present application for restoration per se appears to be an abuse of process of Court.
7. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order of the prescribed authority is upheld and in the circumstances, proceedings pending before the prescribed authority on the restoration application moved by the petitioner are quashed. This Court further is of the opinion that for bringing such a frivolous litigation on baseless grounds, much of the time of this Court as well as of the Courts below was wasted, therefore, the petitioner should be settled with costs which in the circumstances are quantified at Rs. 2,000 which shall be deposited by the petitioner with the Registrar of the Court within one month, failing which the order shall be sent to the district court for execution thereof in accordance with law.