JUDGMENT Y.R. Tripathi, J.
1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking a direction in the nature of mandamus against the opposite party No. 2 for not proceeding in any way and staying further proceeding of complaint case bearing No. 2842 of 2002, Smt. Sunita Devi v. Sudhir Singh and Ors., as contained in Annexure-17 to the petition, pending before him as also for quashing the summoning order dated 14.2.2003 (Annexure-18) and the complaint.
2. The factual matrix necessitating the filing of this petition is that the opposite party No. 1 was married to the petitioner No. 2 in the year 1996. The petitioner No. 1 is the mother of petitioner No. 2 and mother-in-law of opposite party No. 1. The remaining two petitioners No. 3 and 4 are real elder brothers of petitioner No. 2. The opposite party No. 1, after her marriage, came along with her husband petitioner No. 2 to reside with him at Lucknow of which the petitioner No. 2 is a resident of. According to the opposite party No. 1, as is borne out from the complaint filed by her in the Court of opposite party No. 2 Judicial Magistrate, Auraiya, the petitioners made certain dowry demands including a colour T.V. and Hero Honda motorcycle and brought pressure on opposite party No. 1 to get their said demand fulfilled. The complaint further reveals that the petitioners started ill-treating the opposite party No. 1 by passing sarcastic remarks and inflicting physical tortures of different types. In the meantime, the opposite party No. 1 visited her parental house and informed her parents about the dowry demand made by the petitioners as well as ill-treatment meted out to her by them, whereupon her father made all possible efforts to resolve the controversy by peaceful negotiations but all in vain and the situation reached to an unresolvable state. The things did not stop here and as is borne out from the complaint, on 15.12.2002 around 8 a.m., the petitioners beat the opposite party No. 1 and made an attempt to set her on fire but any how she managed to escape from her matrimonial home and reach her parents in Auraiya, where she informed the senior police officers of the incident through applications sent by registered post and when no action was taken in the matter, she took shelter of the Court and filed the complaint, on which the Court taking cognizance summoned the petitioners.
3. During the course of hearing on the point of admission, a serious objection was raised by the A.G.A. about the maintainability of this petition. The learned A.G.A., contended that since the petitioners seek to challenge the summoning order passed by the Magistrate at Auraiya, the cause of action for which has arisen outside the areas in Oudh, this Bench has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioners, relying on the law laid down in the cases of Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1976 SC 331 ; Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 and Full Bench decision of this Court in Nitya Nand Tewari v. State of U. P. and Ors., 1994 (2) LCD 1181, urged that since a part of cause of action has taken place within the area in Oudh, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this petition. The main thrust of his argument was that according to the own saying of opposite party No. 2, cruelty, harassment and torture was meted out to her in Lucknow falling in Oudh, hence the petitioners have the right to present this petition before the Lucknow Bench. The learned counsel for the petitioners invited the attention of this Court to the provisions of Articles 7 and 14 of the United Provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order, 1948 which have been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin's case (supra). The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nitya Nand Tiwari (supra), has observed that the law pronounced by the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin still holds good. In Nasiruddin's case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has concluded in paragraph 37 that "the expression 'cause of action' with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench or at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad."
4. So far as the legal proposition on the point of jurisdiction is concerned, it was conceded that the law pronounced by the Apex Court in the case of Nasiruddin (supra) is final. Thus, the only question that remains to be seen in this case is that whether any part of cause of action for presenting this petition has arisen within the area in Oudh or not. As already pointed out, the petitioners have sought three reliefs, first, a direction in the nature of mandamus to opposite party No. 2 not to proceed in any way in the complaint case No. 2842 of 2002, second, that further proceedings in the aforesaid complaint be stayed and the third, that the summoning order and the complaint be quashed. It would be found that the criminal proceeding in which direction to the opposite party No. 2 is sought for not proceeding with it and for staying the same, is pending before the Magistrate at Auraiya, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Then the summoning order too has been passed by the same Magistrate. So far as the quashing of the complaint is concerned, a perusal of Section 2(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure will show that the word 'complaint' mean any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. In view of the said definition, the allegations with regard to commission of crime in itself do not constitute a 'complaint' unless made to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code and since in this case, the allegations about the commission of the offence were made before the Judicial Magistrate at Auraiya who entertained the complaint and proceeded with it, the cause of action in respect of complaint is also found to have arisen outside the limits of Oudh. The cruel treatment alleged to have been meted out to the opposite party No. 1 at Lucknow is the cause of action for the complaint case filed by the opposite party No. 1 but certainly it is not the cause of action for the present petition seeking reliefs as aforesaid. In this view of the matter, I do not find that any part of cause of action for filing the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has arisen within the territorial limits of Oudh, which can confer jurisdiction on this Bench. This being the position, I am of the considered view that the present petition is not maintainable at Lucknow Bench and hold accordingly.
5. The petition shall, therefore, be returned to the petitioners, as per rules, for presentation before Allahabad Bench.