JUDGMENT B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. This writ petition is yet another woeful tale of a hapless old lady of 90 years of age who, by virtue of her old age and infirm condition otherwise was unable to protect herself from the brazen act of lawlessness of the respondent No. 5, who forcibly grabbed her house which is the premises described in the writ petition and where after having found no shelter at the hands of the administration, had to or rather was compelled to seek shelter of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the protection of her rights and property.
2. This incident of house grabbing is stated to have taken place on 6-7.3.2004. It is undisputed that the petitioner is alone and does not have any male member to support her. This Court taking cognizance of this petition, issued notice to the district administration as well as to the respondent No. 5 and in spite of several orders, appropriate response in the matter was not given as a result whereof, this Court repeatedly made queries which, in essence, were three fold.
(1) Under what circumstances the respondent No. 5 could muster the courage to take forcible possession of the house of a helpless old aged woman;
(2) What action the District Administration has taken against the respondent No. 5; and (3) Whether the respondent No. 5 is liable to compensate the petitioner by making payment of damages.
3. The district administration came with a stand that the matter had been rendered infructuous, as the respondent No. 5 had vacated the house in question. The same stood now returned back in possession of the petitioner having been vacated by the respondent No. 5 on 31.1.2005. In response to our queries, a counter affidavit sworn on 5.2.2005 was filed by one Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla, deposing himself as a Deputy Superintendent of Police. In the said affidavit, it has been admitted that the respondent No. 5, Dabbu Yadav had illegally occupied the house in question bearing premises No. D-40/48, Laxmanpura, Police Station Dashashwamedh, Varanasi. However, the affidavit reiterated the stand taken by the administration, which was to the following effect:
However, at present the said house has been vacated on 31.1.2005 and the same is in possession of the petitioner. As the house in question has been vacated by the respondent No. 5, no action is required at this stage in view of the changed circumstances and the petition should be dismissed as having become infructuous.
4. The affidavit further disclosed that action against respondent No. 5 had been taken under Section 107/116 of Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, nothing left for the administration to do further.
5. Since this Court had not found the aforesaid deponent to have answered the queries made by the Court, an order was passed on 14.9.2005, calling upon said Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla, Deputy Superintendent of Police to remain present. In Court to explain and answer the queries made by the Court, indicated hereinabove. Shri Shukla attended the Court but failed to satisfy us on any of the, queries raised by us. In our opinion, the affidavit filed by him was clearly evasive and to a certain extent misleading as neither any specific answer had been given to our queries nor there was any indication of taking any action against the respondent No. 5 in accordance with law. During the course of the hearing of the matter, we enquired from Shri Shukla as to what would be the appropriate provision under the criminal law that may be attracted in a case of a criminal trespass as involved in the present controversy. The Court was shocked to notice that the officer expressed his total inability to point out any provision under the Indian Penal Code, which may be applicable in the given fact and situation of this case. There was also no evidence of any prosecution having been launched against the respondent No. 5 so as to make him answerable to the stated commission of an offence as was evident on the broad facts that have emerged from the pleadings in the case.
6. This pathetic situation where the administration had almost abdicated its duty to discharge its solemn obligations by protecting the life and property of a citizen of this country, clearly called upon this Court to intervene in the matter and not sit as a silent spectator where the petitioner had clearly established the violation of her natural rights, basic human rights, legal rights and fundamental rights as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. We were also of the opinion that the demeanour of the officer, coupled with the averments contained in the affidavit and his absolute incapacity to even refer to the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, left no room for doubt that the deponent Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla had tried to mislead this Court and was in effect colluding with the respondent No. 5 to somehow or the other help him out of the clutches of the Court.
7. Such being the position in this case, we were constrained to observe that such incidents deserve to be nipped at the earliest yet in order to let the respondents know the law of the land, we may remind everybody concerned that this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court has come down heavily in matters of house grabbing by not only passing simply strictures but also issuing appropriate lawful measures taken for preventing any such incidents in future. To further the case, the Court has not only restored back possession of such properties but has also awarded adequate heavy compensation and has also taken appropriate action against erring officials and such unscrupulous persons like respondent No. 5 who was indulged in unlawful activities.
8. What is surprising is that inspite of the order of this Court dated 7.4.2004, the respondent No. 5 continued to occupy the premises till 31.1.2005. Neither the administration nor the police authorities took any care to remedy the situation appropriately in accordance with law and rather tried to protect the respondent No. 5 by taking up stand before this Court that the matter deserves to be rendered infructuous. This unfortunate situation has our total disapproval and we deprecate the attitude of the respondents.
9. Having recorded our views, we further liked to caution the respondents that this was, a clear-cut case of criminal house trespass about which the provisions of the Indian Penal Code take care of in Sections 441, 442 and 445 as well as the other related provisions. We were not only surprised but shocked that the police officer who was deputed to file the affidavit either was totally incapable of understanding the law which he was supposed to follow or to protect life and property of citizens or he deliberately conducted himself in a manner so as to mislead the Court. We failed to understand as to why the matter was left by the authorities by simply initiating the proceedings under Section 107/116, Cr. P.C. In spite of the orders of this Court dated 7.4.2004, the respondent No. 5, in defiance of law, continued to occupy the premises in question. The administration sat silent with no compensation to the petitioner. Fundamental rights of the petitioner as well as her legal rights and basic human rights were allowed to be openly violated for more than 10 months.
10. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, on 18.10.2005, we directed the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi, to file his personal affidavit answering all our queries clearly indicating as to under what circumstances this incident took place and why the district administration including the police authorities did not register an appropriate criminal proceedings against the respondent No. 5. We further directed the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasl, to ensure presence of respondent No. 5 in this Court on 10.11.2005 by Issuing a bailable warrant against him, as in spite of service of notice on him, he failed to appear before us. The respondent No. 5 was also directed to file reply as to under what circumstances, he forcibly and unlawfully occupied the part of the premises in question and he was also to answer as to why he should not pay exemplary cost and damages to the petitioner for unlawful retention of the premises.
11. We further put Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla to notice as to why proceedings be not drawn against him for having attempted to mislead this Court by filing a misconceived affidavit and making irresponsible statements before this Court.
12. The matter was heard on 10.11.2005 and Shri Shukla filed his reply to our notice. Respondent No. 5 was also produced before us in police custody and we were informed that he was brought from the Jail as he had been detained there being an accused in a case under Section 302, I.P.C. His counsel Mr. Srivastava sought time to file reply, which was granted till 24.11.2005. However, no reply was filed by him. The last opportunity was given to Mr. Sanjay Srivastava to file the reply upto 1.12.2005.
13. Shri Sanjay Srivastava, filed a counter-affidavit today denying all the averments made in the petition submitting that the respondent No. 5 had falsely been impleaded in this case. He never occupied the part of the premises and, therefore, the question of vacating the same could not arise. He had been supplying the milk and milk products to the family of the petitioner and wanted to recover the arrears of the milk and milk products which were not paid by her, hence she has lodged a complaint against him and subsequently when the Court adopted the strict view, the police authorities, to save their skin, have Implicated him falsely in many criminal cases. In paragraph 21 of the counter-affidavit, it has specifically been mentioned that he had been threatened by the police authorities and was forced to admit that he had occupied, the part of the premises but vacated it. This improvement had been made by the respondent No. 5 to wriggle out from the admission made before this Court on 10.11.2005, wherein the order sheet read as under:
Mr. Srivatava, learned Counsel in presence of his client respondent No. 5 has submitted that without having the knowledge of the any order of this Court or pendency of the writ petition, respondent No. 5 had vacated the premises on 31.1.2005. It is therefore admitted by the respondent No. 5 that he has been in possession of the premises in dispute and as such the respondent No. 5 is directed to explain under what circumstances he has taken possession of part of the said house.
14. The respondent No. 5 was produced before this Court in police custody and his counsel Shrl Sanjay Srivastava made the aforesaid statements after taking instructions from him. It is difficult to believe that he made that statement under the threat of the police. There was no question for the police to save its skin if the respondent No. 5 had not made any encroachment. It could have been easier for the said authorities to submit that the averments made in this petition are factually incorrect and false. Respondent No. 5 did not commit any offence or they could have investigated the matter and filed a final report. No attempt had ever been made by respondent No. 5 to submit any complaint before any authority alleging that the Police Authorities had threatened him and forced him to make such admission. The statement made by the counsel in presence of respondent No. 5 cannot be said to have been made under the police threat.
15. It is settled proposition of law that admission is the best evidence unless the party who has admitted it proves It to have been admitted under a wrong Impression or it could not have been otherwise factually correct.
In Narayan Bhagwantrao Gosavi Balajiwale v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi and Ors. , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon and though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous.
16. The same view had been reiterated in K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India and Ors. ; Basant Singh v. Janki Singh ; Prem Ex-Serviceman Co-operative Tenant Farming Society Ltd. v. State of Haryana AIR 1974 SC 112 and Avadh Kishore Dass v. Ram Gopal and Ors. .
17. In Nagubai Ammal and Ors.v. Shama Rao and Ors. , the Apex Court had taken the same view holding that the statements admitting the factual position must be given full effect and while deciding the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance on the decision in Slatterie v. Pooley (1840) 6 M and W 664, wherein the Court had observed that "what a party must admit to be true, may reasonably presumed to be so.
18. In view of the above, we have no reason to ignore the admissions made by respondent No. 5 before us that he had occupied the part of the premises and vacated it on 31.1.2005. All the averments made in the counter-affidavit are in a nature of an afterthought. An affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent Shri Ashok Kumar Shukla, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police of the area who has stated that he had gone to spot and evicted the respondent No. 5 on 31.1.2005 from the premises. There is no reply by respondent No. 5 to the said affidavit dated 10.11.2005, nor we have any reason to believe that the facts mentioned therein are not factually correct.
19. A Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 954 of 1995, Waqf Alalaulad v. Sunderdas Daulatram and Sons, decided on March 13, 1996, has held that if a person has been unlawfully dispossessed from his property without any recourse to law by a private person, writ is to be issued to restore its possession to the person who has been dispossessed from it and it cannot be said that only remedy in such a case is the civil suit. This Court further held that grabbing the property by brazen act of lawlessness is not a simple case of dispossessing a person from his property and in such a case; the State has to come to the rescue of the victims. The relevant extract from the said judgment of this Court is reproduced below:
But dispossessing a person from his property otherwise than in due course of law is different from grabbing the property by terrorizing the person in possession. To capture the property forcibly by creating terror by applying brute force is not a simple case of dispossessing a person from property. In a country governed by rule of law, no person can be deprived of his life, liberty and property by third degree methods, such as terrorizing and mal-handling the person concerned. In such a case, not only the person who has been dispossessed of his property but the Society itself is taken to ransom by brute force. Such an act creates terror in the minds of the people and has the effect of shaking the social fabrics of the society. These facts also hit and damage the authority of the Government with the result that the public order, peace and tranquillity of the society are disturbed. In such cases it is the duty of the Government to come to the rescue of the persons who are threatened or have been dispossessed from their property by brazen act of lawlessness.
20. This Court relying on Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India , also held that the Government has the sovereign power of guardianship over the persons under disability and it is its duty to protect them. In this connection, it was held as under:
The position of the Government being that of parent, it has to act, intervene and protect lives, liberty and property of the people when threatened or invaded. Its duty is much greater in the case of a person under disability. A person is under disability not only when he suffers from physical or legal infirmities, but also when he is unable to stand up and protect his right and property from invasion by or with the help of anti-social elements, Mafias and terrorists. In such a case, it is not only duty of the Government to protect a person in distress and restore the possession of his property to him, but it is also the duty of this Court, when approached, to pass appropriate orders and issue necessary directions to the Government to protect his life, liberty and property and, when found necessary, to restore him the possession of his property.
21. This Court also relied upon the decision in National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Anr. , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as under:
We are a country governed by the Rule of Law, our Constitution confers certain rights on citizens. Every person is entitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. So also, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. Thus, the State is bound to protect the life and liberty of every human-being, be he a citizen or otherwise, and it cannot permit any body or group of persons e.g. the AAPSU to threaten the Chakmas to leave the State failing which they would be forced to do so. No State Government worth the name can tolerate such threats by one group of persons to another group of persons, it is duty bound to protect the threatened group from such assaults and if it fails to do so, it will fail to perform its constitutional as well as statutory obligations. Those giving such threats would be liable to be dealt with in accordance with law. The State Government must act impartially and carry out its legal obligations to safeguard the life, health and well-being of Chakmas residing in the State without being inhibited by local politics.
22. This Court accordingly in the case of Waqf Alalaulad (supra) laid down that a writ petition for protecting a person's property and liberty and even for restoration of possession of the property to the person who has been dispossessed by anti-social elements by brute force, is maintainable. In this connection, this Court has observed as under:
When a person, who has been dispossessed from his property by brazen acts of lawlessness by or with the help of anti-social elements, approaches this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does not exercise its power to enforce the contractual and legal obligations of the parties. It only directs the Government to enforce the Rule of Law and to protect the lives, liberty and the properties of the people and, if found necessary, to restore the possession of the property to the person who has been dispossessed therefrom, leaving it open to the parties to get their rights adjudicated through civil court. To tell a person whose property has been forcibly captured and seized by or with the help of anti-social elements, to file a suit for its recovery and be on the streets till the suit is decided by the last Court, is nothing but slapping a person in distress.
23. This Court has taken a serious note of the fact that sometimes the authorities, under the Rent Control Act and also with certain influential person, make the allotment of a house without following the procedure prescribed in law. Such allotment has also been held to be in the category of house grabbing by the Court and it directed vacating the said premises and compensating the landlord while entertaining the writ petitions as is evident from the judgments in Uma Shanker v. Xth A.D.J., Kanpur and Ors. 2003 (4) AWC 2895 ; Smt. Leelawati and Ors. v. Ram Swarup and Ors. 2003 (6) AWC 5184 ; Ram Sumer v. 1st A.D.J., Kanpur and Ors. 2003 (6) AWC 5208 ; Ratan Lal Poddar v. Vth A.D.J., Gorakhpur and Ors. 2004 (1) AWC 779 ; Chandra Kant Nagarkar v. Vth A.D.J., Gorakhpur 2004 (4) AWC 2856 : (2004) 1 ARC 349 and Smt. Kusum Lata Yadav v. A.D.J., Court No. 14, Moradabad and Ors. 2005 (1) AWC 349.
24. In. Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal and Anr. , the Supreme Court observed that where a Government activity involves public element, the "citizen has a right to claim equal treatment", and when "the State acts to the prejudice of a person, it has to be supported by legality." Functioning of a "democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination.
25. Similarly, in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and Ors. , the Apex Court observed as under:
Every action of the executive Government must be in form of reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of rule of law and its bare minimum requirement.
26. Thus, a decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation and the plea of legitimate expectation relates to procedural fairness in decision making and forms, a part of the rule of non-arbitrariness, as denial of administrative fairness is Constitutional anathema. (Vide E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu ; Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. ; Km. Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P. and Ors. and Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Delhi Auto and General Finance Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. ).
27. The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and command the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should not only be fair, legitimate and above-board but should be without any affection or aversion. It should neither be suggestive of discrimination nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. (Vide Haji T. M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala Financial Corporation ).
28. In the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Nalla Raja Reddy and Ors. , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed as under:
Official arbitrariness is more subversive of doctrine of equality than the statutory discrimination. In spite of statutory discrimination, one knows where he stands but the wand of official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately.
29. Similarly, in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India and Ors. , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court observed as under:
In the context it is important to emphasize that absence of arbitrary power is the first essence of the rule of law, upon which our whole Constitutional System is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon Executive Authorities, must be confined within the clearly defined limits. Rule of law, from this point of view, means that the decision should be made by the application of known principle and rules and in general such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is, if a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.
30. In a case where as a result of a decision taken by the Government the other party is likely to be adversely affected, the State authorities have to exercise their powers bona fidely and not arbitrarily. (Vide Amamath Ashram Trust Society v. Governor of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 477).
31. There is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the Government are bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass the test of reasonableness and whenever action taken is found to be lacking bona fide and made in colourable exercise of the power, the Court should not hesitate to strike down such unfair and unjust proceedings. (Vide Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. and HansraJ H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. ).
32. In essence, the action/order of the State or State instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. The Rule of Law is the foundation of a democratic society.
33. Courts being custodians of law have a solemn duty to uphold the rule of law under all circumstances by directing the authorities concerned to act in accordance with law. If the rule of law is not enforced, it will surely become a casualty in the process, a costly consequence to be zealously averted by all, and at any rate, by the Court. (Vide Salkia Businessmen's Association and Ors. v. Howrah Municipal Corporation and Ors. ).
34. Wherever arbitrariness or unreasonableness is found, there is a denial of Rule of Law. The Rule of Law means absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the State or its instrumentality. (Vide State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. v. Thakur Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170). A decision taken by the authority under the Statute has to be made by the application of principles of rules, and, in general, such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he stands. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis to a decision taken in the rule of law. The term Rule of Law connotes the undisputed supremacy of law and envisage a state of things in which everyone respects the law and where law has to be followed by everyone collectively and individually by the citizens as well as by the State. The Rule of Law permeates the entire fabric of the Constitution and indeed forms one of its basic features. (Vide Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab ).
35. The right to personal liberty guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution is of the widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights and also means "life free from encroachments unsustainable in law and such rights flow from Article 21 of the Constitution". (Vide Maneka Gandhi (supra) ; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. and District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad and Anr. v. Canara Bank and Ors. ).
36. Law and legal framework constitutes the foundation of civilized existence and ordered progress of the society. Therefore, maintenance of law and order is a prerequisite for bringing about development in any society. Good governance derives its strength from Rule of Law. A person has a legitimate expectation that whenever any offence is committed, the police, meant to help him will render all possible assistance to him.
37. In the instant case, the said hopes have been belied blatantly and without any justified excuse. The police in spite of having full information, did not rise to the occasion and sacrificed promptness in favour of laxity, presumably to leniently deal with the matter and unduly protect the respondent No, 5. Delay in justice is denial of the same and is a negation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. That, which was supposed to be jealously guarded, was left open for wanton violation and destruction. The constitutional rights of the petitioner under Article 300A have been violated on account of absence of timely intervention by the pplice. To put it precisely, the police failed to take action and waited till this Court wielded its authority by issuing orders. The Court has been compelled to issue prerogative Writs on account of a total failure on the part of the authorities particularly the police who failed to restore the rule of law. The failure was both ways, firstly by not taking immediate action against the respondent No. 5 by launching appropriate criminal proceedings and allowing him to forcefully occupy the premises and secondly by not timely setting its own house in order. This sort of a situation destroys the faith of the public in the system which brings the rule of law under threat of extinction.
38. The fact that the petitioner was deprived of her property without authority of law is established and there had been unlawful invasion on her right of privacy. The respondent No. 5 executed his uncouth wishes undeterred by any factor and was allowed to have his way is also clear from the pleadings. The extent of damage assessed by the authorities as indicated in their affidavit before this Court is explained. Thus, the damage has been quantified and assessed by the respondents themselves.
39. On the last occasion, Shri A. K. Shukla, Deputy Superintendent of Police could not answer any of the queries put to him in the Court and could not throw any light as which of the statutory provisions could be applicable in a case of house grabbing. The Court had directed him to file his affidavit as under what circumstances, he could not launch the criminal prosecution against the respondent No. 5. In response to the same, he has filed the affidavit dated 10.11.2005, wherein the relevant facts have been stated as under:
5. That even after posting of the deponent as Circle Officer, Dashashwamedh with effect from 14.12.2004, the said incident was not reported to the deponent by anybody...
8. That the deponent/ applicant immediately evicted the opposite party No. 5 on 3,1.2005 itself and peaceful possession was handed over to the petitioner in presence of the deponent. At this place, it is much pertinent to mention that at the time of restoration of possession to the petitioner, the opposite party No. 5 did not raise any objection whatsoever and on the other hand the petitioner, who is an old and infirm lady, herself was avoiding for any further action being taken against the opposite party No. 5...
10....the deponent is yet not disowning his liability in the matter, inasmuch as he was posted for some time as Circle Officer, Dashashwamedh but this fact that the aforesaid incident never came to the notice of the deponent/applicant earlier as has been already detailed in the preceding paragraphs.
15... The deponent could not meet the queries earlier made by the Hon'ble Court in detail but at same time, the deponent/ applicant respectfully submits that there was no element at all to mislead the Hon'ble Court playing hide and seek on the part of the deponent/applicant...
40. The aforesaid contents of the affidavit filed by Shri Shukla clearly reveal that the deponent himself evicted the respondent No. 5 in pursuance of the order of this Court and the infirm old lady was not willing to initiate any proceedings against the respondent No. 5. We fail to understand once the F.I.R. had been lodged by the petitioner, under what circumstances the consent of the petitioner for proceeding against respondent No. 5 was required and what was the occasion to ask the petitioner as to whether she was willing to prosecute the accused. More so, after lodging the F.I.R., if she had already ran from pillar to post for getting the premises evicted, eviction might have been a substantial relief for her but the deponent failed to furnish any explanation as in such circumstances why criminal prosecution could not be launched against the respondent No. 5. After facing humiliation for such a long period, the 90 year old infirm woman could not dare speaking against the respondent No. 5. It does not certainly mean that she could not be willing taking action against him as for seeking the relief against him, she left no stone unturned. More so, as the deponent himself admitted that he was not acquainted with any statutory provision which may be attracted in an offence of house grabbing, what the Court can expect from him to do against any accused. His conduct has been reprehensible and thus cannot be approved.
41. We do not find any force in the submissions made by Shri C. L Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for Shri Shukla that the deponent was an innocent police officer and acted throughout bona fidely. This has seriously been opposed by Shri Rupak Chaubey, learned Counsel for the petitioner. The fact-situation itself reveal that the officer has not acted with complete sincerity. However, it is submitted that the enquiry has been set up against him by the higher authorities and we hope that it shall be concluded expeditiously in accordance with law.
42. In view of the affidavit filed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi dated 23.11.2005, we are not inclined to issue any direction in respect of other police officers. However, we expect that the assurance given by the authority concerned in the affidavit would not end in empty hopes and the erring police officers shall be taken to the task in accordance with law.
43. Respondent No. 5 is directed to make the payment of rent at the rate mentioned in the affidavit dated 23.11.2005, i.e., Rs. 489.25 per month and the double amount of the same as damages and further cost to the tune of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees Fifty thousand only). The said amount shall be recovered from him by the District Collector, Varanasi and paid to the petitioner within a period of four weeks and for that purpose, we direct the learned standing counsel to send a copy of the judgment and order to the District Collector, Varanasi, for compliance.
44. The question is, whether police authorities also deserve to be penalised for this situation. The facts as brought on record leave no room for doubt that there was a gross failure on the part of the police authorities to protect the petitioner resulting in serious damage to her property. The liability against them is clearly discernible for the callous, negligent and deliberate passive attitude of the police officers. In such a situation, it would be appropriate that the State is made liable to pay exemplary costs and damages to the petitioner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we assess the same at Rs. 10,000 to be paid by respondent No. 1 to the petitioner within the same period. It shall be open to State to recover this amount from the erring officials.
45. With these directions, the writ petition stands disposed of.