JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner is the landlady and owner of the premises in question which consist of a room, a varandah and an open space. Respondent No. 3 is the tenant in the premises in question. The petitioner moved an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the release of the accommodation in question on the ground that the premises in question was required for the purpose of residence for herself and for her sons who are members of her family. The petitioner alleged that she was presently residing in the house of her brother as a licensee in a single room on the ground floor and that her brother was residing on the first floor, which also consisted of one room. The family of the petitioner's brother comprises of his wife and three sons. The family of the petitioner's brother was growing and he was having difficulty to adjust his family in one room. On the other hand the petitioner alleged that she also has 3 sons, two of them are married and the third son is still studying in college. The petitioner contended that she was finding it difficult to accommodate her family in the present accommodation and if the premises in question is released she could accommodate her family after making necessary constructions.
2. The tenant contested the application for release mainly on the ground that the petitioner is the owner of the single room where she is residing at the present moment and that her brother was not the exclusive owner of the said house. It was alleged that the petitioner was living on the ground floor as owner and not as a licensee.
3. In support of her contention, the petitioner filed the affidavits of her brothers, namely Qadir Ahmad and Sharif Ahmad stating therein that Sharif Ahmad is the owner of the premises in which the petitioner was residing and that the petitioner had relinquished her share in it.
4. The prescribed authority allowed the release application and held that the need of the petitioner was bona fide and genuine and that the need of the petitioner was greater than that of the tenant. The prescribed authority found that the petitioner had relinquished her share in the premises in question and that her brother, Sharif Ahmad was the sole owner of the premises. The prescribed authority further held that the petitioner was residing in that premises as a licensee.
5. Aggrieved by the order of the prescribed authority, the tenant filed an appeal before the District Judge under Section 22 of the Act. The Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and the order of the prescribed authority was set aside, The appellate court found that the petitioner did not relinquish her share in the premises in which she was residing and that she was a co-owner and therefore, the need of the petitioner was not bona fide.
6. Heard Sri Ashish Srivastava, the learned counsel holding the brief of Sri Navin Sinha, Senior Advocate. No one appears on behalf of the respondents.
7. In my view the approach adopted by the appellate court was not correct. The appellate court had presumed that the bona fide need of the petitioner did not exist merely on the ground that she was a co-owner having 1/9th share in the premises in which she was residing. Assuming that the petitioner was a co-owner of the premises in which she was residing, the appellate court ought to have considered whether the premises in which she was residing was sufficient for her need and for her family members. The appellate court should have considered as to whether the petitioner required additional accommodation.
8. Without going into the question as to whether the appellate court was right in holding that the petitioner did not relinquish her share in the premises in which she was residing, this Court is proceeding with the assumption that the petitioner is a co-owner to the extent of 1/9th share in the premises in which she is presently residing.
9. The question that arises is whether 1/9th share in the premises was sufficient for the petitioner's need and for her family members. At the present moment the petitioner and her son are living in one room. Two of her sons are already married and living elsewhere. They need to visit their mother from time to time.
10. The petitioner has contended that if the accommodation is released, she will make additional constructions to meet the need of her family requirement. In my view the need of the petitioner is bona fide and genuine. The petitioner could not be saddled to live in one room of which she is not the full owner. The petitioner has only 1/9th share in an accommodation comprising of two rooms. Therefore, even though she is occupying one room, she is not the full owner of that one room. The petitioner cannot be forced to stay in an accommodation in which she is not the full owner. She is entitled to stay in the premises in which she is admittedly the sole owner of that premises. Thus, the petitioner is entitled to the relief claimed in her release application.
11. On the question of hardship, I find that the petitioner shall suffer greater hardship in the event the release application is rejected. The tenant can always shift to another accommodation. It is not expected that the petitioner being a landlady and owner of the premises in question, herself takes on rent another accommodation in order to meet the need of her growing family.
12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of the appellate court dated 20.10.1983 is quashed and the order of the prescribed authority dated 21.8.1981 is restored. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to cost.