JUDGMENT S.U. Khan, J.
1. Original petitioner Smt. Rameshwari Devi (since deceased and survived by legal representative) was the owner of the house in dispute. She sold it to one Brij Kishore on 16.5.1960. Simultaneously Brij Kishore permitted petitioner and her husband to continue to live in the house in dispute on payment of rent of Rs. 15 per month. The allegation in para 2 of the writ petition that petitioner was not owner of the house in dispute when she sold it in the year 1960 cannot be accepted as petitioner is estopped from denying her own title after executing the sale deed. Similarly allegation in paragraph 4 of the writ petition that petitioner sold the house against a conditional sale deed to Brij Kishore also cannot be accepted for the reason that it has not been shown that either in the said sale deed there was a clause of re-purchase or any agreement for re-conveyance was executed by Brij Kishore.
2. According to para 5 of the writ petition after becoming the tenant of the house in dispute petitioner and her husband sub-let a portion of the house to Har Sewak original respondent No. 3 (since deceased and survived by legal representative). Afterwards Har Sewak purchased the entire house in dispute from Brij Kishore and filed suit for eviction against petitioner claiming therein that he had become the landlord and petitioner his tenant. The suit was registered as (S.C.C.) Suit No. 266 of 80, Har Sewak v. Smt. Rameshwari Devi, on the file of J.S.C.C./Munsif I. Jhansi. The suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent was decreed by trial court on 1.9.1984. Against the said judgment and decree petitioner filed revision which was allowed on 19.2.1985 by District Judge, Jhansi, copy of the said judgment is Annexure-1 which does not contain number of revision. Through the said order matter was remanded to J.S.C.C. After remand the suit was again decreed on 25.3.1986. The petitioner filed S.C.C. Revision No. 107 of 86. District Judge, Jhansi through judgment and order dated 28.10.1986, dismissed the revision hence this writ petition.
3. The first point argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that Brij Kishore after purchasing the house in dispute from the original petitioner let out the same to Mithu Lal husband of the petitioner and after his death his wife, i.e., the petitioner and his three sons and one daughter inherited the tenancy and suit for ejectment was bad in law for nonjoinder of the three sons and one daughter of Mithu Lal husband of the petitioner.
4. The Supreme Court in Harish Tandon v. A.D.M. , has held that after the death of the tenant all his heirs inherit the tenancy as joint tenants. Service of notice of termination of tenancy on one joint tenant is sufficient to terminate the tenancy of all the joint tenants and similarly decree, for eviction passed against one joint tenant is binding upon other joint tenants. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in A.C. Juker v. K.P. Mantri , also. Accordingly even if it is held that building was let out by Brij Kishore to Mithu Lal or Mithu Lal and Rameshwari Devi the original petitioner, it was not necessary to implead the sons and daughter of Mithu Lal in the suit. There was absolutely no clash of interest in between the petitioner and her children. The petitioner did not collude with the landlord. She contested the proceeding tooth and nail.
5. The second and main point argued by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent No. 3 Har Sewak was sub-tenant of petitioner Rameshwari Devi hence even after purchasing the property from landlord Brij Kishore he could not file suit for eviction against Rameshwari Devi. The Supreme Court in N. Sainuddin v. K. Sulaiman , held that a sub-tenant after purchasing the entire property becomes landlord/owner of the entire property and can file suit for eviction of the chief tenant from whom he had taken sub-tenancy. The said judgment has been approved by the three Judges judgment of the Supreme Court in P.K. Jaiswal v. P.H. Bano 2005 AIR SCW 3240 : 2005 (6) ALR 173. The point is squarely covered by these two authorities of the Supreme Court.
6. Accordingly there is no merit in this writ petition hence it is dismissed.