JUDGMENT J. C. Gupta, J.
1. Heard Sri Pramod Kumar Jain counsel appearing for the petitioner. Sri Pankaj Mittal appears for the respondent No. 2 and he has also been heard.
additional accommodation was genuine and bona fide. She also undertook to vacate the premises in question by 31.12.1995 to which the landlord also agreed, it was also provided in the compromise that if the petitioner failed to vacate the house in question by the aforesaid date, the landlord would be entitled to get her evicted in proceedings under Section 23 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority accepted the said compromise and decided the release application of the landlord in terms of the same by the order dated 11.10.91. However, it appears that on account of an accidental error the operative portion of the order mentioned that the application for release was rejected. Thereafter the landlord moved an application purporting to be under Section 151, C. P. C. read with Section 34 of the Act and Rule 22 (f) of the Rules for the correction of the order dated 11.10.91. By the order dated 7.8.92, the Prescribed Authority rectified the said accidental error and accordingly order dated 11.10.91 was corrected and the application for release under Section 21 was allowed with the direction that the tenant would vacate the premises in question and hand over its possession to the landlord on or before 31.12.95 as per the terms of the compromise and in case she failed to do so the landlord was entitled to get the same vacated under Section 23 of the Act at the cost of tenant. It appears that thereafter the petitioner moved an application for recalling the order dated 7.8.92 on the ground that the Prescribed Authority had no power to review its earlier order. The said application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 16.9.98.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued before the Court that there was no provision either under the Act or in the Rules permitting the Prescribed Authority to review the order dated 11.10.91 and therefore, the impugned order dated 7.8.92 was without jurisdiction. This argument of the learned counsel has no substance inasmuch as perusal of the order dated 7.8.92 makes it clear that as a matter of fact, the Prescribed Authority has not reviewed his own earlier order and he has merely corrected a clerical error which had crept in accidentally in the order dated 11.10.91. A bare reading of the order dated 11.10.91 leaves no room of doubt that the Prescribed Authority accepted the compromise entered into between the landlord and the tenant and also accepted the tenant's admission that the need of the landlord was bona fide and genuine and the application for release was to be allowed. However, it appears that instead of using the Hindi word 'Nistarit', inadvertently the word 'Nirast' was typed in the operative portion of the order. This was an accidental error which could be corrected by the Prescribed Authority at any time. It is well-established law that every Court/Tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers has in it inherent power to correct its own mistakes which occur accidentally or by a typing error.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner then argued that the order dated 11.10.91 as corrected by the subsequent order dated 7.8.92 is not enforceable in law as that order was not in accordance with the provisions as contemplated under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. He argued that before an order made under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act can be enforced under Section 23 of the Act, there should be a clear and positive finding about the bona fide need of the landlord. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance on the Head Note (B) of the decision in the case of K. N. Bhargava v. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1984 (2) ARC 588, that the Prescribed Authority must consider the question of bona fide need before acting on the compromise and if order allowing release application in terms of compromise is silent on this aspect, it will be illegal and compromise decree has to be ignored. If we go through the facts of that case and the dictum laid down therein, the said authority is of no help to the petitioner. In that case, a part of the house of the landlord was in occupation of Sri R. S. Tripathi, the then Munsif, Kanpur as a tenant who was transferred to Barabanki and joined there. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for release of that portion on the ground of bona fide requirement for occupation by the members of his family. Some persons made applications for allotment. The application for release as well as application for allotment came up for hearing before the Rent Control Tribunal, Kanpur. By the order dated 27.4.77 the Tribunal rejected the release application of the landlord on the ground that the tenant had vacated the accommodation and, therefore, the release application under Section 21 (1) (a) had become infructuous. The Tribunal then allotted the accommodation to one Sri P. N. Srivastava. The landlord filed appeal before the District Judge against the order of rejection of his release application and also filed a revision against the order of allotment. Before the appellate court, the landlord and Sri Tripathi filed a compromise saying that the accommodation in question be released in favour of the landlord. Learned Additional Judge before whom the appeal and revisions were pending allowed the appeal and remanded the revision for a fresh decision according to law. By the time, this order was passed, the Rent Control Tribunal had been abolished and power to decide the release application under Section 21 of the Act was given to the Prescribed Authority. The release application of the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act came up before the Prescribed Authority who allowed the release application by the order dated September 1, 1979 in view of the compromise which had been verified before the Appellabe Authority and in pursuance thereof the landlord obtained possession. In the proceedings pending before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer for allotment, the landlord filed copy of the order of the Prescribed Authority and also informed him that he has obtained actual possession of the accommodation in pursuance of that order. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer held that the proceedings under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act were of no consequence because they were taken after the tenant Sri Tripathi had vacated the accommodation and after holding that the landlord had no bona fide need, he allotted the accommodation in favour of Smt. Bina Bhargava. The landlord filed revision before the District Judge who held that the compromise relied upon by the landlord was not a lawful compromise and the learned District Judge dismissed the revision. Before this Court, it was contended on behalf of the landlord that the compromise dated 16.3.7.8 and the order of the Prescribed Authority passed on its basis were wrongly ignored by the District Judge and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. This contention was not accepted by this Court for the reason that the District Judge had found as a fact that the compromise entered into between the landlord and Sri Tripathi did not contain even an indication about the bona fide need of the landlord and the compromise was absolutely silent on this important point. The order was passed by the Prescribed Authority In a mechanical manner without application of mind and it could not be said that there was any express or implied admission of the tenant about the bona fide need of the landlord. It was further clear that on the date of entering into compromise Sri Tripathi had no Interest left in the accommodation in question and his entering into compromise with the landlord was nothing more than a compassion or a generous gesture to him. In the aforesaid decision reliance was placed on the case of Alla Bux v. Additional District Judge, 1979 (UP) RCC 509, wherein it was held that the law enjoins upon the authorities under the Act deciding an application under Section 21 of the Act to satisfy themselves about the bona fide requirement of the landlord. In the absence of such adjudication, it is not open to the authorities to allow such an application. If the tenant admits the need of the landlord in a compromise arrived at and, if the circumstances so appear that the compromise is not collusive, then certainly, it would be open to the authorities to take into account this admission made by the tenant.
6. It would thus be seen from the aforesaid decisions that it is only the authority concerned who has to satisfy himself about the bona fide requirement of the landlord and if the tenant admits the need of the landlord in the compromise arrived at and the compromise does not appear to be collusive, it is open to the authority concerned to lake into account the admission made by the tenant and decide the application in terms of that compromise.
7. In the case of Nai Babu v. Lata Ram Narain, AIR 1978 SC 27, a similar controversy arose before the Apex Court as to whether a decree for eviction of tenant could be passed on the basis of compromise between the parties. It was observed that in such a case, the authorities are required to be satisfied whether a statutory ground has been pleaded by the applicant which the tenant has admitted to be correct and where he is satisfied about the statutory requirement then the compromise entered into cannot be said to be illegal. In the case of Suleman Noormohamed v. Umarbhai Janubhai, AIR 1978 SC 952, the Supreme Court held that while recording the compromise under Order XXIII, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not necessary for the Court to say in express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one.
8. In the present case, the landlord-respondent specifically pleaded in his application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act that he needed the accommodation in question as additional accommodation for meeting out his requirement. In the written statement, the tenant denied the claim of the landlord. However, during the pendency of the application, she entered into a compromise with the landlord wherein she specifically admitted that the landlord's need for the accommodation in question was bona fide and pressing. She also agreed to vacate the accommodation in question within a specified period.
The Prescribed Authority while passing the order on 11.10.91 considered the cases of the parties and thereafter accepted the compromise and decided the application in terms of the compromise. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that the Prescribed Authority was not satisfied about the statutory ground of bona fide need of the landlord. That being so, the compromise was lawful and could be accepted by the Prescribed Authority. Section 34 of the Act permits that a proceeding contemplated by Section 21 of the Act could be decided on the basis of compromise and the only requirement is that the compromise which could be accepted in such proceedings is lawful. A thing is said to be lawful, if it is not in contravention of provisions of the Act and the public policy. Thus, it is open for a tenant to accept the claim of the landlord if he feels that the need of the landlord is bona fide and consequently, if he enters into a compromise with him, the compromise cannot be said to be unlawful and the order of release can be based upon such a compromise. In the instant case, it has already been pointed out above that the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act against the petitioner was filed by the landlord on the ground of his personal requirement for additional accommodation and the tenant in the compromise filed before the Prescribed Authority admitted the need of the landlord as genuine. Accordingly, the order passed on the basis of that admission cannot be said to be illegal. When it was binding on the parties it could not be reopened at the instance of the petitioner in the eviction proceedings initiated under Section 23 of the Act especially when it was not the case of the petitioner that the said compromise was the result of some fraud played upon her.
9. In any view of the matter, in the circumstances of the case, the petitioner cannot be allowed to avoid aforesaid compromise and the order dated 11.10.91 passed on the basis of the same especially when she has already availed of the benefits arising out of the said compromise. In the decision in the case of Sri Bakshi Ram v. Sri Brij Lal, JT 1994 (5) SC 422. the Apex Court viewed such unfair stand to be untenable by observing that in equity a person drawing benefit from a transaction is not permitted to escape from disadvantages if any flowing from it. A party cannot be permitted to take the stand "Heads I win, tails you loose" Law has to promote justice. The Courts of equity and justice cannot upheld such an unfair stand.
10. It is also well-established law that in order to seek equitable relief in writ jurisdiction, one must come to Court with clean hands. In the present case, when the petitioner was herself a party to the compromise which is neither alleged to be fraudulent nor collusive, she cannot be permitted to take the stand that the compromise was not lawful after having availed the advantage which she got under the said compromise by continuing to remain in the accommodation in question for a considerable long period. In the case of Har Shankar and others v. Deputy Excise Taxation, AIR 1975 SC 1121, it was observed by the Supreme Court that writ jurisdiction of High Court is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. In the present case, the petitioner voluntarily entered into the compromise and she incurred the obligation of vacating the premises in question by 31.12.95 and therefore, she should in all fairness stick to her promise on the basis of which the other party, i.e., respondent-landlord had permitted her to remain in occupation upto 31.12.95. In the circumstances, the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
11. For the reasons stated above, this writ petition is to be dismissed.
12. At this stage learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is a poor lady and she may be allowed a reasonable time to vacate the house in question. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, opposed this prayer. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is allowed time upto 31.3.1999 for vacating the accommodation in question subject to her filing an undertaking on affidavit before the Prescribed Authority within a period of one month from today to the affect that she shall vacate and hand over possession of the accommodation in question to the landlord peacefully without inducting any third person therein. For a period of one month the operation of the release order shall remain suspended and if the required undertaking is filed the petitioner's dispossession in pursuance of the said order shall remain in abeyance upto 31.3.1999. In the event of no undertaking being filed as aforesaid, it shall be open for the landlord-respondent to get the release order enforced forthwith.
13. With the above concession given to the petitioner for vacating the accommodation in question, this writ petition is dismissed in limine.