JUDGMENT S.P. Mehrotra, J.
1. This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed, inter alia, challenging the order dated 16.12.1985 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Prescribed Authority (respondent No. 1).
2. The dispute relates to a house situated in Mohalla Qureshi, Amroha, district Moradabad, detailed in the release application mentioned hereinafter. The said house has hereinafter been referred to as "the house in question".
3. It appears that a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short "the Act") was filed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 as landlords in respect of the house in question agatnst Smt. Matina Khatoon, the tenant. The said release application was rejected by the learned Prescribed Authority by the order dated 17.11.1981.
4. Against the said order of the learned Prescribed Authority, Moradabad, dated 17.11.1981, respondent Nos. 2 to 10 filed an appeal under Section 22 of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The said appeal was registered as Rent Control Appeal No. 32 of 1981.
5. By the judgment and order dated 1.2.1985, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Moradabad (Appellate Authority) allowed the said Rent Control Appeal No. 32 of 1981. The operative portion of the said judgment and order dated 1.2.1985 passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Moradabad, is quoted below :
"Appeal is allowed. Respondent is directed to be evicted from portion of land shown by letters A B C D in the map paper No. 18C. She is at liberty to deliver possession of this portion out of the Court also to be petitioner-appellants. After getting delivery of possession petitioner-appellants shall make constructions over the land A B C D according to the approved site plan paper No. 18C within a period of one year from today and thereafter shall deliver possession of the constructed portion to the respondent. Till respondent gets possession over the newly constructed portion she shall pay the existing rent. After receiving delivery of the possession of the newly constructed portion she will pay rent at the rate of Rs. 25 per month. After the petitioner-appellant's delivery the possession of the newly constructed portion shown by letters A B C D in map paper No. 18C they shall be entitled to get delivery of possession of the remaining portion of the house from the respondent. In case respondent refuses to deliver possession of the remaining portion petitioner-appellants shall be entitled to get eviction of the respondent in two stages as detailed above. Costs of this appeal shall be on the parties. Map paper No. 18C shall form part of the order."
A perusal of paragraph 8 of the said judgment and order dated 1.2.1985 shows that the aforesaid order was passed with the consent of both the sides.
6. Against the said judgment and order dated 1.2.1985, the aforesaid Smt. Matina Khatoon, tenant filed a writ petition which was dismissed by the order dated 13.2.1985. Relevant portion of the said order dated 13.2.1985 passed by this Court is quoted below :
"In my opinion, the apprehension expressed by the petitioner has no basis. Reading the entire operative portion of the judgment under challenge, it is apparent that the petitioner shall be required to deliver possession over the constructed portion of the tenancy in question only after the landlord has completed the new construction over the vacant portion and delivered possession thereof to the petitioner in terms of the Judgment. With these observations, the petition is dismissed summarily."
7. Thereafter, respondent Nos. 2 to 10 filed an execution application on 4.4.1985, which was numbered as Execution P.A. No. 8 of 1985.
8. On 1st of October, 1985, it appears that possession over the land shown by the letters A B C D in the map annexed to the aforesaid judgment and order of the Appellate Authority was delivered by the aforesaid Smt. Matina Khatoon to respondent Nos. 2 to 10. An assertion to this effect has been made in paragraph 13 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 10 in this writ petition. In paragraph 12 of the rejoinder-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner in this writ petition, this fact regarding delivery of possession on 1st of October, 198E), is not specifically denied.
9. Therefore, an application dated 14th October, 1985 (Annexure-C.A. 1 to the counter-affidavit filed in this writ petition) was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 10 in the said Execution P.A. No, 8 of 1985. It was, infer alia, prayed in the said application dated 14.10.1985 that some other date be fixed in the said Execution P.A. No. 8 of 1985 so that the respondent Nos, 2 to 10 could construct room, etc. which were required to be given to the said Smt. Matina Khatoon. By the order dated 14.10.1985, the said application dated 14.10.1985 was allowed, and 2.12.1985, was fixed for disposal.
10. An application dated 16.12.1985 (Annexure-C.A. 2 to the counter-affidavit) (No. 19Ga) was thereafter, filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 in the said Execution P.A. No. 8 of 1985. It was, inter alia, stated in the said application dated 16.12.1985, that the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 had constructed new accommodation tin shed which consisted two rooms facing north, verandah, kitchen, latrine, bath-room and sahan, and the main door was towards north. It was, inter alia, prayed that the said Smt. Matina Khatoon be directed to vacate the old tenanted accommodation in her possession and to shift to the newly constructed accommodation.
11. The said Smt, Matina Khatoon filed an application No. 20Ga dated 16.12,1985, inter alia, praying that Commission be issued to Amin to report on the points mentioned in the said application. The said application dated 16.12.1985, filed on behalf of Smt. Matina Khatoon has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition.
12. By the order dated 16.12.1985, respondent No. 1 allowed the said application No. 19 Ga dated 16.12.1985 (Annexure-C.A. 2 to the counter-affidavit in this writ petition) filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 10, and rejected the said application No. 20 Ga dated 16.12.1985 filed on behalf of Smt. Matina Khatoon.
13. Thereafter, the said Smt. Matina Khatoon filed the present writ petition.
14. During the pendency of this writ petition, Smt. Matina Khatoon expired and her heirs and legal representatives have been brought on record as petitioner Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 pursuant to the order of this Court dated 20.3.1996.
15. I have heard Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri P.S. Baghel, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 10.
16. Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 1.2.1985 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) was conditional order, and unless the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 fulfilled their part contemplated in the said order, namely, to make construction over the land A B C D, the petitioners could not be compelled to vacate the old tenanted accommodation in their possession, Sri Qadeer contends that it was incumbent on the Prescribed Authority to get inspection of the newly constructed accommodation done through Amin, and then only the learned Prescribed Authority could direct the petitioners to vacate the old tenanted accommodation in their possession. The learned Prescribed Authority passed the impugned order, the contention proceeds, illegally without appreciating the said aspect of the matter.
17. In reply, Sri P.S. Baghel, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 submits that the construction as per the direction of the Appellate Authority in the order dated 1.2.1985 having been completed by the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 at an expenditure of about Rs. 75,000, the petitioners were bound to hand over the vacant possession of the old tenanted accommodation in their possession as directed in the said order of the Appellate Authority dated 1.2.1985. Sri Baghel further submits that the application dated 16.12.1985 filed on behalf of the said Smt. Matina Khatoon, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner Nos. 1/1 to 1/3 was not accompanied by an affidavit, and the respondent No. 1 rightly passed the impugned order rejecting the said application filed on behalf of the aforesaid Smt. Matina Khatoon, Sri Baghel further submits that no relief could be granted to the petitioners in exercise of equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the conduct of the aforesaid Smt. Matina Khatoon as is evident from the facts of the case.
18. Sri Baghel also points out that a perusal of paragraph 9 of the judgment and order dated 1.2.1985, shows that the arrangement contemplated in the said judgment and order was to last for a period of 10 years.
19. In rejoinder, Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned counsel for the petitioners reiterates his aforesaid submissions. He further points out that the observation made in paragraph 9 of the judgment and order dated 1.2,1985 that the arrangement was to continue for a period of 10 years, was only with regard to the rate of rent which was fixed at Rs. 25 per month. No such period was fixed in paragraph 8 of the said judgment and order or in the operative portion of the said judgment and order.
20. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Before proceeding to deal with other submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to consider the submission of Sri Baghel that the arrangement contemplated in the said judgment and order dated 1.2.1985 was to last for a period of 10 years. Having considered the said submission of Sri Baghel, I find myself unable to accept the same. A perusal of the judgment and order dated 1.2.1985, shows that the said observation made in paragraph 9 of the said judgment and order regarding arrangement being for a period of 10 years, was only with regard to the rate of rent which was fixed at Rs. 25 per month. The said observation regarding arrangement being for 10 years was not intended to cover other terms and conditions of the arrangement mentioned in the said judgment and order dated 1.2.1985. The contention of Sri Qadeer, learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard, in my opinion, is correct.
21. Coming now to other submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The facts narrated above show that the order dated 1.2.1985, was passed by the Appellate Authority allowing the said Rent Control Appeal No. 32 of 1981 with the consent of the parties. Thereafter, instead of complying with the terms and conditions contained in the said judgment/order dated 1.2.1985, Smt. Matina Khatoon filed a writ petition before this Court which was dismissed on 13.2.1985. Even thereafter, the possession of the land A B C D as required in the said judgment and order dated 1.2.1985, was not delivered to the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 for a long time, and the possession was delivered only on 1st October, 1985. On 14th October, 1985, respondent Nos. 2 to 10 filed an application dated 14.10.1985 (Annexure-C.A. 1 to the counter-affidavit in this writ petition) praying for fixation of some other date in the execution case so that the construction could be done in accordance with the direction contained in the Judgment and order dated 1.2.1985. After the construction was made, the aforesaid application No. 19Ga dated 16.12.1985, was filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 wherein, prayer was made that the said Smt. Matina Khatoon be directed to vacate the old tenanted accommodation and shift to the newly constructed accommodation.
22. Instead of complying with the direction contained in the judgment and order dated 1.2.1985, the application No. 20Ga dated 16.12.1985, was filed on behalf of the said Smt. Matina Khatoon, inter alia, praying for issuance of commission to the Amin to report on various points mentioned in the said application. Only general and vague allegations were made in the said application, inter alia, alleging that the new construction which was made, would fall within one year. No affidavit was filed in support of the allegations made in this application.
23. The learned Prescribed Authority on the same day (i.e., 16.12.1985) considered both the aforesaid applications, namely, application No. 19Ga filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 and the application No. 20Ga filed on behalf of the said Smt. Matina Khatoon, and passed the impugned order dated 16.12.1985.
24. A perusal of the said order dated 16.12.1985, shows that the respondent No. 1 has given cogent reasons for passing the same. It has, inter alia, been pointed out by the respondent No. 1 that only general and vague allegations have been made by the said Smt. Matina Khatoon in the said application No. 20Ga, and no affidavit has been filed in support of the said allegation. It has also been, inter alia, pointed out that the said application No. 20Ga has been moved in order to delay the execution of the order passed under Section 21 of the Act. There is no illegality or perversity in the impugned order dated 16.12.1985.
25. Certain further facts are also relevant to show the conduct of the said Smt. Matina Khatoon. After the impugned order was passed on 16.12.1985, an application dated 18.12.1985, was filed on behalf of Smt. Matina Khatoon. In this application, it was, infer alia, stated that the said Smt. Matina Khatoon was seriously 111, on account of which she was unable to shift to the newly constructed accommodation. Prayer was made that eight days' time be granted to the said Smt. Matina Khatoon for shifting to the newly constructed accommodation. The said application is Annexure-C.A. 3 to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 to 10 in this writ petition.
26. The said application dated 18.12.1985 filed on behalf of Smt. Matina Khatoon was supported by an affidavit of Tamkeen Ahmad son of Smt, Matina Khatoon sworn on 18.12.1985, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure-C.A. 4 to the counter-affidavit in this writ petition. On the said application dated 18.12.1985, filed on behalf of Smt. Matina Khatoon (Annexure-C.A. 3 to the counter-affidavit), the learned Prescribed Authority passed an order dated 18.12,1985 (Annexure-C.A. 5 to the counter-affidavit filed in this writ petition) inter alia, granting time upto 23rd December, 1985 for vacating the old tenanted accommodation in possession of the said Smt, Matina Khatoon.
27. Instead of vacating the accommodation within the time granted by the said order dated 18.12.1985 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority, the said Smt. Matina Khatoon filed the present writ petition before this Court wherein an interim order was passed on 19.12.1985. The facts regarding the said application dated 18.12.1985 and the order dated 18.12.1985 passed thereon were not disclosed in the writ petition.
28. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is evident that the said Smt. Matina Khatoon the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners 1/1 to 1/3 did not come before this Court with clean hands. Writ jurisdiction is equitable jurisdiction. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion that this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
29. Certain judicial decisions may be referred to in this regard.
30. In the State of Haryana and Ors. v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. and Anr. AIR 1977 SC 781 (paragraphs 9 and 19 of the said AIR), their Lordships of the Apex Court set aside the order of the High Court granting stay of dispossession passed in a writ petition, on the ground that the petitioner in filing the writ petition misled the High Court and started proceedings for oblique and ulterior motive.
31. In Banarsidass Musadilal v. State of U. P. and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 408 (paragraph 8 of the said AIR), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, applied equitable considerations in granting relief.
32. In Chancellor and Anr. v. Dr. Bijayananda Kar and Ors, AIR 1994 SC 579 (paragraphs 7 and 10 of the said AIR), the petitioner in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India did not disclose material facts regarding two letters. Their Lordships of the Apex Court held that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed, as the petitioner did not come to Court with clean hands.
33. In Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and Anr. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr, AIR 1996 SC 2410, their Lordships of the Apex Court laid down as follows (paragraph 11 of the said AIR) :
"11. It is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This Jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priory, before invoking the Jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief....."
34. In Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram and Ors., AIR 1951 All 746 (FB), a Full Bench of this Court laid down as follows (paragraph 51 of the said AIR) :
"51. In our opinion, the salutary principle laid down in the cases quoted above should appropriately be applied by Courts in our country when parties seek the aid of the extraordinary powers granted to the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. A person obtaining an ex parte order or a rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands, must not suppress any relevant facts from the Court, must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that person invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts. Applying this principle to the present case, we feel that, in this cases, the petitioner company has disentitled itself to ask for a writ of prohibition by material suppressions, misrepresentations and misleading statements which have been found by us above....."
35. In Goa Dock Labour Union and Anr. v. Government of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1969 Goa, Daman and Diu 16, it was laid down as under (paragraph 5 of the said AIR) :
"5. ..... The petitioners seeking extraordinary relief are expected to disclose material facts. They may be against them, but that is no reason to keep them back from the Court....."
36. In N. Bommon Behram and Anr. v. Government of Mysore and Ors., AIR 1970 Mys 89, a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court held as follows (paragraph 19 of the said AIR) :
"19. ..... It is an elementary principle that persons seeking the assistance of the Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction must come with clean hands. They should not suppress facts or state false facts or withhold material facts from the Court....."
37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the writ petition lacks merit and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, on the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.