JUDGMENT Khem Karan, J.
1. An important question of law is involved in this writ petition and the same is as to whether or not delay in filing revision under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C of Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (for short the Act of 1947), can be condoned under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1963).
2. Brief facts giving rise to this writ petition are as under :
"In an election held in June, 2000, to the office of Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Mubarakpur, district Shrawasti, Tej Narain (opposite party No. 2) was declared elected. Smt. Krishna Kanti (the petitioner), who was also in the fray, filed an election petition under Section 12C (1) of the Act of 1947. before the prescribed authority (Sub-Divisional Officer), who vide his order .dated 5.3.2001, decided for recounting of the votes and fixed 12.3.2001 for the purpose. Tej Narain, challenged the same by filing a Writ Petition No. 659 (M/S) of 2001, wherein this Court vide its interim order dated 12.3.2001. stayed the operation of order dated 5.3.2001 but by the time same could be brought to the notice of the prescribed authority, recounting had already taken place and the election petition allowed, vide order dated 12.3.2001. On the basis of the result of recounting, the present petitioner (Smt. Krishna Kanti) was declared elected. This gave rise to another Writ Petition No. 915 (M/S) of 2001. Both the aforesaid writ petitions, filed by Tej Narain were finally disposed of, by common order dated 24.4.2001 of this Court. The Writ Petition No. 659 (M/S) of 2001, against order dated 5.3.2001 of the prescribed authority was dismissed as infructuous, whereas the Writ Petition No. 915 (M/S) of 2001, against the order dated 12.3.2001 of the prescribed authority was also dismissed, but on the ground that the petitioner had alternative remedy of revision, under subsection (6) of Section 12C of the Act of 1947. The Court further provided in its order dated 24.4.2001, that the period consumed in prosecuting the Writ Petition No. 915 (M/S) of 2001, shall be excluded, for counting the period mentioned in subsection (6) of Section 12C of the Act of 1947."
3. Special leave petition, filed before the Apex Court, was dismissed on 27.7.2001. The opposite party No. 2, says that information of this dismissal came to him on 9.8.2001 and certified copy of order dated 27.7.2001, was received on 17.8.2001. On 18.8.2001 the revision under Section 12C (6) of the Act of 1947, was filed before the District Judge, Shrawasti, along with application for condonation of delay. After hearing the contesting parties, the learned District Judge condoned the delay, vide order dated 22.9.2001, which is being Impugned in this writ petition.
Further proceedings, pursuant to the impugned order dated 22.9.2001, stand stayed by this Court, in view of interim order dated 14.3.2002.
4. Sri U. K. Srivastava, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued that like, Representation of the Peoples Act. 1951. Act of 1947, is also a self-contained Code and the provisions of the Act of 1963, cannot be made applicable to the proceedings thereunder, except to the extent the Act of 1947 or the rules framed thereunder make the same applicable. He submits that Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act of 1963 is not attracted to the proceedings under Section 12C (1) or (6) of the Act of 1947. To support his arguments. Sri Srivastava has referred to Sakru v. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279, Anwari Baswaraj Patil and Ors. v. Seddaramaiah and Ors., AIR 1994 SC 512 and Ansar Ahmad v. Sub-Divisional Officer. Kairana and Ors., 1998 (3) AWC 18O7 : 1998 RD 500. His second contention is that even if it is accepted for a moment that the period, consumed in prosecuting the Writ Petition No. 915 of 2001 was to be excluded, in view of the concession granted by this Court in its order of 24.4.2001 the revision filed on 18.8.2001 was highly time-barred and the delay, caused after 24.4.2001 could not have been condoned under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. His third submission is that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the provisions contained under Sections 4 to 24 of the Act of 1963, were applicable, by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act of 1963 to the filing of application under Section 12C (6), there were, no sufficient grounds to condone the delay, because the opposite party No. 2, was not diligent and prompt in prosecuting one remedy or the other. According to him, the order dated 22.9.2001 by which the learned District Judge has condoned the delay, being contrary to law and totally unjustified one deserves to be quashed.
5. On the other hand. Sri D.R. Shukla, the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 2. submits that the decisions referred to and relied on by Sri U.K. Srivastava, are not relevant in the context of the question, as to whether provisions contained under Sections 5 and 14 of the Act of 1963, are applicable to the filing of revision under Section 12C (6) of the Act of 1947. According to him, the law on the point of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act of 1963, in filing election petition, either under the Act of 1951 or U. P. Act of 1947. cannot be pressed into service, in the context of the question, involved here. His second submission is that in absence of express or implied exclusionary provision in the Act of 1947 or the rules framed thereunder, the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Act of 1963. would apply, by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the said Act, to the filing of application under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C of the Act of 1947. He has tried to support his arguments, by referring to Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel and Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1099, Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1976) 1 SCC 392. State of West Bengal v. Nuruddin Malick. (1998) 8 SCC 143 and Azizul Haq Kausar Naqbi v. State. AIR 1980 All 149 (FB). Sri Shukla has also argued, that after dismissal of special leave petition against order dated 24.4.2001 of this Court, it is now not open to the other side to contend that the period consumed in prosecuting the Writ Petition No. 915 (M/S) of 2001, cannot be excluded from the period mentioned in subsection (6) of Section 12C. According to him. the delay in filing the revision was properly explained and in any case, this Court should be slow enough, in interfering with the exercise of such discretion, in favour of condoning the delay.
6. There appears to be force in the contention of Sri Shukla, that the cases, cited by Sri Srivastava are not the authority, on the point involved in this writ petition. While in Sukru's case (supra), the point involved was as to whether delay in filing appeal before the Collector, under Section 93 of Andhra Pradesh (Telengana) Area Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, could be condoned under Section 5 of Limitation Act. 1908 (hereinafter referred to as Act of 1908). The Apex Court said that the provision of the Act of 1908 applied to the proceedings before the "Courts" and since Collector was not a Court and so condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act of 1908 was not permissible, in absence of any provision, making that section applicable, to the filing of appeal under Section 93. In this way, this authority cannot support Sri Srivastava, as here application under Section 12C (6) of the Act of 1947 lies to the District Judge, a recognized civil court by all means.
7. In Anwari Basvaraj Patil's case (supra), the question involved was as to whether delay in filing "recrimination" referred to and equated with an election petition, under Section 97 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, could be condoned under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 ; Their Lordships ruled :
"If Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the filing of an election petition, it does not equally apply to the filing of recrimination notice as the Act equates recrimination notice to an election petition."
8. What is remarkable is that their lordships distinguished, five judges decision in Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel. AIR 1964 SC 1099. by saying that the same dealt with the applicability of Section 12 (2) of the Act of 1908, to an appeal preferred under Section 116A and not with the filing of election petition. For saying so. their lordships relied on the following observation of the Apex Court in H.N. Yadav v. L.N. Misra, (1974) 3 SCR 31 : AIR 1974 SC 480:
"Vidyacharan Shukla's case (supra) is one which dealt with the appeal under the Act while what we have considered it whether the Limitation Act is at all applicable to the election petition under the Act. Thirdly. Section 29(2) of the new Limitation Act does not now give scope of this controversy. No doubt, Section 5 would now apply where Section 29(2) is applicable but even applications and petitions unless they are expressly excluded. Even assuming that the Limitation Act applies to election petitions under the Act, what has to be seen whether it excluded from application to such petitions."
So, this case is also not directly on the point, involved in this writ petition. The ratio of this case is that since the Act of 1951, is a self contained Code, so the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not govern the filing of election petitions and their trial.
9. Jyoti Basil's case is on the point, whether the provisions contained under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, can be invoked to implead some one as party to the election petition. It was answered in negative with the observation that Act of 1951 was self-contained one. It was again a case, totally on a different point.
10. Ansar Ahmad's case (supra). on which Sri Srivastava has placed great reliance, is also on the point whether, provisions of Limitation Act. 1963, will be applicable, by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of that Act. to the filing of an election petition under Section 12C (1) of the Act of 1947. After referring to numerous decisions, including. H.N. Yadav's case, and to the provisions contained in the Act of 1947 and the rules framed thereunder, this Court said that the provisions contained therein, were self-contained and application of Section 5 of the Act of 1963, was excluded by implication. Applicability of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act of 1963 or Sections 4 to 24 of that Act. to the filing of revision under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C, was neither involved nor considered and decided.
11. The Court feels persuaded to accept the contention of Sri Shukla, that whatever has been said and held. in the context of the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1963. to the filing of election petitions either under the Act of 1951 or Section 12C of the Act of 1947, may not necessarily be relevant or decisive, in the context of the filing of application under Section 12C of the Act of 1947.
12. Let us turn to the cases cited by Sri Shukla. In V.C. Shukla's case, Section 12 (2) of the Act of 1908 was applied to an appeal under Section 116A of the Act of 1951. In Mangu Ram's case (supra), the Apex Court ruled :
"There is an important departure made by the Limitation Act, 1963, in so far as the provisions contained in Section 29, Sub-section (2) is concerned. Under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, Sub-section (2), clause (b) provided that for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the application of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms excluded. But under Section 29(2) of Act of 1963 the provisions of Section 5 shall apply in case of special or local law to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. So since under the Limitation Act. 1963, Section 5 is specifically made applicable by Section 29, Sub-section (2), it is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Section 5 that it would stand displaced. There is nothing in Section 417 (4), Cr. P.C. 1898, which excludes the application of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963."
To the same effect was the view of a Full Bench of this Court in Azizul Haq's case (supra), where this Court said :
"Section 29(2) of Limitation Act of 1963 now lays down that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply even in the case of a special or local law unless their application is expressly excluded by such special or local law. The result, therefore, is that while under the Limitation Act of 1908 the High Court would have been incapable of extending the period of limitation by having recourse to the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, position now is totally different and period of limitation prescribed under Section 96(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can now be extended by the High Court in an appropriate case."
So none of these cases, relied on by Sri Shukla. is directly on the point, Involved but these can be helpful, in the discussion, to follow.
13. Let us have a took at the provision contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act of 1963. It reads :
"(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
14. It may be useful to reproduce Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the old Act of 1908. The same was as under :
"Section 29 (2) where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor, by the first Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law :
(a) the provision contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18, and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law ; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act' shall not apply."
15. As observed by this Court in Azizul Hag's case (supra) and by the Apex Court in Mangu Ram's case (supra), there is substantial departure from the old provision, in the sense that under the old law. Section 5 was not applicable, even if, the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 29 were attracted to a case, because Clause (b) excluded the applicability of the provisions (except those mentioned in Clause (a) of that Act of 1908, Here the position in the present Section 29 (2) is totally different.
16. It is not disputed that the Act of 1947 is a special law. While an election petition under Sub-section (1) of Section 12C lies to the prescribed authority (not a recognized court), the revision against its orders, lies to the District Judge (by all means an established Principal Civil Court). Although Sub-section (8) of Section 12C says that the revisioning authority 'shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed', but none of the learned counsels, has brought to the notice of the Court, any such procedure, that might have been prescribed by the rules, framed under the Act. Neither the rules, namely, U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules, 1947, (as amended from time to time) framed under Section 110 of the Act of 1947 nor U. P. Panchayat Raj (Settlement of Election Disputes) Rules, 1994, framed under Section 110 read with Sections 12C and 12D of the Act of 1947, prescribe any such procedure, as referred to in Sub-section (8) of Section 12C of above mentioned Rules of 1994. Rule 4 of the Rules of 1994 is important, as it also provides for dismissal of election petition, which has not been filed in time or where Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3, has not been compiled with. Powers of review have also been conferred by proviso (vii) to Rule 4 but none of these rules, deals with the filing or hearing of revisions, under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C of the Act of 1947.
17. It appears to be well-settled (see Collector, Varanasi v. Gauri Shankar Misra, AIR 1968 SC 384 and Shambhu Nath v. Awadhesh Kumar Sadhu Khan, 1981 Cr LJ 1102), that when a statute provides lor appeal/suit/application, to a Court already existing, without providing a particular procedure, for trial or hearing of such suit/appeal/ application, the practice and procedure, which regulate the proceedings before such Court, will also regulate the hearing and disposal of such suit/appeal/application. In absence of any other procedure, for regulating the filing and hearing of application under Section 12C (6), the procedure that applies to the filing of revision under Section 115 of C.P.C., will govern the same.
18. The law of limitation falls in the realm of procedural law (See Vidyacharan Shukla's case (supra) and in absence of any provision to the contrary, the provisions of the Act of 1963, will be attracted to the proceedings before the District Judge, under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C of the Act of 1947. Besides the above, even under the old Act of 1908, Section 12(2) was applied to an appeal under Section 116A of the Act of 1951, by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 29.
19. A plain reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act, makes it clear that, for the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), following main conditions must be satisfied :
(i) That the special or local law must have prescribed period of limitation for such suit/ appeal/application.
(ii) That such period must be different to the period prescribed in the First Schedule of the Act of 1963.
(iii) That such special or local law must not have excluded the applicability of Sections 4 to 24 or any of them, to such suit/appeal/application.
20. It is clear Section 12C (6) prescribes a period of limitation for filing application before District Judge. Technically speaking, none of the articles of the First Schedule, prescribes any period of limitation, for filing such application, against orders of the prescribed authority/Sub-Divisional Officer. But one may refer to Article 131 or 137 of that Schedule, for saying that the different period, will be treated to have been prescribed. Even if, recourse is not had to Article 131 or 137, situation remains, in favour of the applicability of Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Act of 1963. The reason is that in Yidyacharan Shukla's case (supra), the Apex Court ruled by majority, that even where there was no provision in the First Schedule for an appeal or application is a situation identical with that for which special law provides, the test of the prescription of a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by First Schedule is satisfied. It is never the contention of Sri Srivastava. that the above view does not hold good, after coming into force of the Act of 1963.
21. The only question that requires consideration is as to whether or not, the provisions contained under the Act of 1947 or the rules framed thereunder, exclude application of Sections 5 and 14 of the Act of 1963. According to the view taken by the Apex Court in H.N. Yadav's case (supra) and by this Court in Ansar Ahmad's case (supra) such exclusion may. also be inferred from the provisions of special or local law. For holding exclusion of Section 5, to the filing of election petition under Section 12C of the Act of 1947. his Lordship referred to certain rules framed under the Act and observed that the same were like provisions contained under Sections 81 and 86 of the Act of 1951. But as found in the preceding paras, no similar provisions are found in the rules, in the context of revision under Section 12C (6). So it is difficult to say that the Act of 1947 or the rules framed thereunder, exclude the applicability of Sections 5 and 14 of the Act of 1963, to the filing of revisions under Sub-section (6) of Section 12C of the Act of 1947.
22. I, therefore, conclude that delay in filing application under Section 12C (6) of the Act of 1947, can be condoned under Section 5 read with Section 14 of the Act of 1963.
23. Sri Srivastava has contended that there were no sufficient grounds for condoning the delay, in filing the revision. He submits that there was no reason not to file the same, soon after dismissal of writ petition and in any case, if the opposite party No. 2, wanted to go in special leave petition, he should not have wasted time till 17.6.2001 (when the same was filed). He goes on to argue that even after dismissal of special leave petition on 27.7.2001, there was delay of 21 days. On the other hand, Sri Shukla has referred to the contents of affidavits, filed in support of application for condonation of delay. He submits that the opposite party No. 2 was advised to go to Apex Court and so much so, he filed the special leave petition in summer vacation and so it cannot be said that he was not honest and vigilant. He contends that the opposite party No. 2 cannot be punished, for knocking the doors of the Apex Court. It is also said that the opposite party No. 2 was prompt enough after dismissal of special leave petition, so much so he filed the revision, on the next date of the receipt of the certified copy of order dated 27.7.2001. His last submission is that this Court should not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the District Judge, unless the same is contrary to law or unless it causes or tends to cause miscarriage of justice. He says in case the order of the District Judge is allowed to stand, the petitioner will have an opportunity to contest the revision and show that the order dated 12.3.2001 of the prescribed authority is perfectly justified, but in case this order dated 22.9.2001 is reversed, a great injustice will be caused to the opposite party No. 2, so much so he will not be able to show that the order dated 12.3.2001, by which he has been unseated, is unjust and improper.
24. The Court is of the view that there is considerable force, in the contention of Sri Shukla. Firstly, the law on the condonation of delay, is liberal enough and unless culpable carelessness or malafides are shown, on the part of the applicant, the delay is normally condoned, to advance the cause of justice. (See Brij Inder Singh v. Kanshi Ram, AIR 1917 PC (sic) ; Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumar, AIR 1969 SC 575, Concord of India Insurance Co. v. Nirmala Devi, 1979 SCC (Cr) 996, O.P. Kathpalla v. Laxmi Singh. (1984) 4 SCC 66, Collector. Land Acquisition v. Kaitizi, 1987 (1) AWC 675 (SC) : (1987) 2 SCC 107 : 1988 All CJ 114). Secondly, the superior courts, will be reluctant enough, to interfere with the exercise of discretion, by lower court or authority, in favour of condoning the delay, unless such exercise is contrary to law or unless the same causes miscarriage of justice. Thirdly, the law favours decision on merits, after opportunity to the parties concerned to have their say. Fourthly, there was sufficient cause to condone the delay and the learned District Judge, committed no error, whatsoever, in condoning the delay in filing the revision, under Section 12C (6) of the Act of 1947. There was no reason for the opposite party No. 2, to be slack or careless or non-vigilant, as it was he, who had been unseated by order dated 12.3.2001. No mala fides can be imputed to him.
25. In the result, the writ petition is found devoid of merits and is hereby dismissed, but with no costs. The interim stay is vacated. The learned District Judge is directed to dispose of the application under subsection (6) of Section 12C, as early as possible. Parties concerned to appear before him on 10.9.2002 to receive further orders in the revision.