1. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of original case.
2. It is admitted case between the parties that Sri Laturi Singh was son of Smt. Javitri Devi and Late Jagan Singh. Laturi Singh was employed in Border Security Force. At the time of joining service he was not married and in service record he nominated his mother Javitri Devi (defendant-appellant) as nominee of his service emoluments etc. to be earned during service period. It is also admitted that after about two years of joining of his services, Laturi Singh died on 18.02.1987.
3. After the death of Laturi Singh, Original Suit No. 236/1997 was filed by plaintiff Meera Devi, alleging herself to be wife of Laturi Singh. In beginning the sole defendant of the case was Smt. Javitri Devi, mother of the Laturi Singh. Later on Union of India and officers of Border Security Force were also impleaded as parties. In original suit it was pleaded that since plaintiff Meera Devi is wife of Laturi Singh, therefore, she is entitled for service emoluments, pension and other amenities, entitled to the wife of deceased from the employer/ department. For declaration of such retiral benefits, she had filed original suit.
4. Defendant Javitri Devi (mother of Laturi Singh) contested the suit and pleaded that since she was only nominee of the deceased son Laturi Devi, therefore she is entitled for departmental amenities and emoluments after the death of Laturi Singh. She also pleaded that Meera Devi was not wife of Laturi Singh and in any case the plaintiff is not entitled for any emoluments and other retiral benefits because she was not nominee.
5. After affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, original suit was decreed in favour of plaintiff Meera Devi. Then Civil Appeal No. 36/2009 (Smt. Javitri Devi v. Smt. Meera Devi & Ors.) was filed by the defendant, which was heard and dismissed on 08.04.2010, by the Court of Additional District Judge, Chandausi, Moradabad.
6. Aggrieved by the judgments of trial court as well as first appellate Court, the present appeal was preferred by the defendant no.-1 of the original suit.
7. At the time of admission of Second Appeal, following substantial questions of law were framed:-
"1. Whether the amount of pension and retiral benefits can be paid only to the nominee and not to other legal heirs and representative of the deceased ? If so, it's effect.
2. Whether the courts below have overlooked the evidence in deciding the case between the parties ? If so, it's effect.
8. Although, the appellant had challenged the status of respondent-plaintiff Meera Devi as wife of Laturi Singh, but the trial court had appreciated the evidences in that regard and gave specific finding that plaintiff Meera Devi is legally wedded wife of Laturi Singh and her status is that of she is successor and legal heir of Laturi Singh. This finding of trial court is based on oral and documentary evidences including admitted photographs etc., and is apparently not infirm or erroneous. The first appellate court had also independently appreciated the evidences and held that plaintiff-respondent Meera Devi is legally wedded wife and legal heir of late Laturi Singh. The concurrent finding of fact on this point is apparently based on appreciation of evidences. Such concurrent and apparently acceptable findings are not perverse. Therefore, such findings should not be interfered in second appeal.
9. Admittedly the appellant-defendant Javitri Devi was nominee in service record of Laturi Singh. When he entered in service, he was unmarried. Later he married with plaintiff-respondent Meera Devi, and thereafter died. The dispute between the parties relates to entitlement of pension and retiral benefits etc. of said late Laturi Singh. In this regard the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vishin N. Khanchandani v. Vidya Lachmandas Khanchandani, (2000) 6 SCC 724, has held as under:
10. "The nomination only indicated the hand which was authorised to receive the amount on the payment of which the insurer got a valid discharge of its liability under the policy. The policy-holder continued to have an interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquired no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy-holder. On the death of the policy-holder, the amount payable under the policy became part of his estate which was governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. Section 39 did not operate as a third kind of succession which could be styled as a statutory testament. A nominee could not be treated as being equivalent to an heir or legatee. The amount of interest under the policy could, therefore, be claimed by the heirs of the assured in accordance with the law of succession governing them."
11. In another judgment the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi, (1984) 1 SCC 424, at page 425 has decided the rights of leagal heirs viz-a-viz nominee and gave judgment. The relevant portion of which are as under: -
"1. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether a nominee of a life insurance policy under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938 (Act 4 of 1938) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the assured dying intestate would become entitled to the beneficial interest in the amount received under the policy to the exclusion of the heirs of the assured.
5. We shall now proceed to analyse the provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The said section provides that a holder of a policy of life insurance on his own life may when effecting the policy or at any time before the policy matures for payment nominate the person or persons to whom the money secured by the policy shall be paid in the event of his death. If the nominee is a minor, the policy-holder may appoint any person to receive the money in the event of his death during the minority of the nominee. That means that if the policy-holder is alive when the policy matures for payment he alone will receive payment of the money due under the policy and not the nominee. Any such nomination may at any time before the policy matures for payment be cancelled or changed, but before such cancellation or change is notified to the insurer if he makes the payment bona fide to the nominee already registered with him, the insurer gets a valid discharge. Such power of cancellation of or effecting a change in the nomination implies that the nominee has no right to the amount during the lifetime of the assured. If the policy is transferred or assigned under Section 38 of the Act, the nomination automatically lapses. If the nominee or where there are nominees more than one all the nominees die before the policy matures for payment the money due under the policy is payable to the heirs or legal representatives or the holder of a succession certificate. It is not necessary to refer to sub-section (7) of Section 39 of the Act here. But the summary of the relevant provisions of Section 39 given above establishes clearly that the policy-holder continues to hold interest in the policy during his lifetime and the nominee acquires no sort of interest in the policy during the lifetime of the policy-holder. If that is so, on the death of the policy-holder the amount payable under the policy becomes part of his estate which is governed by the law of succession applicable to him. Such succession may be testamentary or intestate. There is no warrant for the position that Section 39 of the Act operates as a third kind of succession which is styled as a ''statutory testament' in para 16 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Uma Sehgal case. If Section 39 of the Act is contrasted with Section 38 of the Act which provides for transfer or assignment of the rights under a policy, the tenuous character of the right of a nominee would become more pronounced. It is difficult to hold that Section 39 of the Act was intended to act as a third mode of succession provided by the statute. The provision in sub-section (6) of Section 39 which says that the amount shall be payable to the nominee or nominees does not mean that the amount shall belong to the nominee or nominees. We have to bear in mind here the special care which law and judicial precedents take in the matter of execution and proof of wills which have the effect of diverting the estate from the ordinary course of intestate succession and that the rigour of the rules governing the testamentary succession is not relaxed even where wills are registered.
8. We find it difficult to treat a nominee as being equivalent to an heir or legatee having regard to the clear provisions of Section 39 of the Act. The exemption of the moneys payable under a life insurance policy under the amended Section 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure instead of ''devaluing' the earlier decisions which upheld the right of a creditor of the estate of the assured to attach the amount payable under the life insurance policy recognises such a right in such creditor which he could have exercised but for the amendment. It is because it was attached the Code of Civil Procedure exempted it from attachment in furtherance of the policy of Parliament in making the amendment.
10. It is obvious from the above passage that the above case has no bearing on the meaning of Section 39 of the Act. The fact of nomination was treated in that case as a piece of evidence in support of the finding that the policy was not a joint family asset but the separate property of the coparcener concerned. No right based on the ground that one party was entitled to succeed to the estate of the deceased in preference to the other or along with the other under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act was asserted in that case. - - -
13. In view of the above conclusion, the judgments and decrees of the High Court, the first appellate court and the trial court are liable to be set aside. They are accordingly set aside. Since it is not disputed that the plaintiffs are under the law of succession governing them each entitled to one-third share in the estate of the deceased, it is hereby declared that each of the plaintiffs is entitled to one-third share in the amount received under the insurance policies in question and the interest which may have been earned by its investment. The suit stands decreed accordingly."
12. In Sarbati Devi case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that mere act of nomination does not confer the nominee with any beneficial interest in the amount payable under the terms of nomination on the death of person nominating. Nomination only indicates the hand of authorized nominee to receive the amount of payment. This principle laid down in the said judgment, has been adopted in subsequent judgments.
13. It is settled legal position that if a person under insurance of any employee nominates any nominee to receive benefits or insurance or service or retiral benefits after his death, then in such case legal heirs of person insured or employee nominating, will also have legal rights to receive those benefits; and the act of nomination does not confer or clothe the nominee with any beneficial interest in the amount payable in such a case. If insurer or employer (as the case may be)has paid such amount to the nominee, then he will be absolved from his legal obligation of payment. But if the dispute arises between nominee and legal heir/ successor in interest of the deceased, then only such legal heir/ successor will have right to receive such amount of pension or retiral benefits or the amount ensured. In such a case the claim of nominee, having no other legal right, will not prevail over the rights of legal heirs. In light of discussion as above, the first substantial question of law is decided in favour of plaintiff-respondent and against the defendant-appellant.
14. The other disputes between the parties was as to whether the plaintiff-respondent Meera Devi was legally wedded wife of late Laturi Singh or not ? On this point both the contesting parties have led the evidences in lower courts. Trial court had framed issue no.-2 as to whether plaintiff Meera Devi was married with Laturi Singh, and issue no.-4 was as to whether plaintiff and Laturi Singh lived as husband and wife or not ? Both the contesting parties have led evidences on these issues, which were appreciated by the trial court, thereafter learned Civil Judge had given finding of fact that Meera Devi and Laturi Singh was legally wedded as husband and wife. The trial court had also given finding that after the marriage they have lived together as husband and wife. The trial court has held that plaintiff had discharged the burden to prove these issues. The first appellate court had also appreciated the facts and evidences separately and thereafter gave finding of facts that they were legally wedded husband and wife. After the death of Laturi Singh his wife plaintiff Meera Devi is entitled to receive the amount accrued from service including other retiral benefits. The concurrent finding of fact of the two lower courts are based on acceptable reasons. On these points their judgments are apparently correct and acceptable. Such findings cannot be treated as infirm or perverse. So it cannot be interfered by this Court through re-appreciation of evidences. Therefore this contention of learned counsel for the appellant is found unacceptable that courts below had overlooked the evidences in deciding the case between the parties. None of the contentions of learned counsel for the appellant are sustainable. Accordingly the second substantial question of law is also decided against the appellant and in favour of plaintiff-respondent.
15. On examination of reasonings recorded by trial court, which are affirmed by the first appellate court, I am of the view that the judgment of both the lower courts are well reasoned and are based on proper appreciation of entire evidences on record. No legal or factual infirmity is found in concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the lower courts.
16. In view of the above, this Second Appeal is dismissed.
Order Date :- 12.02.2016.
Vinod.