JUDGMENT Tarun Agarwala, J.
1. The petitioner is the landlord and has filed this writ petition against the judgment of the appellate court, whereby the appeal of the tenant was allowed and the order of the prescribed authority was set aside and the release application of the petitioner-landlord was rejected.
2. The petitioner filed an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the release of the first floor of the premises in question on the ground of bona fide and genuine need of additional accommodation for her family members. The petitioner in her application alleged that she along with her husband, two daughters and six sons are living in the premises in question and on account of the growing need of her family members, she requires the additional accommodation in occupation of the tenant. The petitioner contended that the eldest son had got married and has a wife and one child and that they require their own privacy and space. The other sons are also of marriageable age and would also require their own space and privacy. One daughter had got married but keeps visiting the petitioner. In his way, the petitioner contended, that her need was bona fide and genuine and that the accommodation in question should be released in her favour. The petitioner also contended that the tenant was not residing in the premises in question and that he keeps the accommodation in question locked most of the time. The petitioner contended that the tenant was staying with his mother in the ancestral house. In addition to this ancestral house, the tenant's mother has her own house and therefore the tenant has sufficient accommodation of his own where he can always shift. The petitioner thus contended that the tenant would not suffer any hardship in case he had to vacate the premises in question. On the other hand, the petitioner would suffer greater hardship in case the release application is not allowed.
3. The tenant contested the release application and denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and contended that the petitioner was neither the landlord nor the owner. The tenant further submitted that the release application was mala fide and not bona fide and that the petitioner does not require any additional accommodation. The tenant admitted that he had a share in the family house, but submitted that the accommodation was insufficient and therefore, was living in this single room tenanted accommodation. The tenant further denied that he was living with his mother in the family house and further denied that he was keeping the premises in question locked.
4. The prescribed authority after considering the rival submissions of the parties and upon perusing the affidavits filed by the parties on record, allowed the application of the petitioner and released the accommodation in question. The prescribed authority held that the petitioner's need was bona fide and genuine and that the petitioner required the additional accommodation for her family members. On the other hand, the prescribed authority found that the tenant was a single person and had a share in the family property and that he could easily shift to another place, since he was a single person and therefore, would not suffer any hardship in comparison to the hardship that could be caused to the landlord in the event the release application was not allowed. Accordingly, the prescribed authority held that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant.
5. Aggrieved by the order of the prescribed authority, the tenant filed an appeal. The appellate court made a spot inspection of the premises in question as well as the premises in occupation of the petitioner. The appellate court held that even though the petitioner had not shown the entire accommodation in his occupation, nonetheless, the petitioner's need was bona fide and genuine and that the petitioner required additional accommodation for the growing need of the family members and therefore, the petitioner's application for release of the accommodation on the ground of personal need was genuine and bona fide and was not mala fide. The appellate court, however, allowed the appeal of the tenant on the ground of comparative hardship and held that the tenant would suffer greater hardship in case he was evicted. The appellate court accordingly, allowed the appeal of the tenant, set aside the judgment of the prescribed authority and rejected the release application of the landlord.
6. The petitioner has now filed the present writ petition.
7. Heard Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, the learned counsel holding the brief of Sri R. B. D. Mishra, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. K. Pandey, the learned counsel for the opposite parties.
8. In my view, the writ petition is liable to be allowed. Admittedly, both the courts below have held that the petitioner's need for additional accommodation is bona fide and genuine and is not mala fide. The petitioner requires the additional accommodation for her family members. On comparative hardship the prescribed authority held that the tenant has an alternative accommodation in his ancestral house and therefore, he would suffer less hardship than the landlord. The trial court found that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant and this finding has been arrived at by the prescribed authority after appreciating the evidence. The appellate court has reversed this finding on the sole ground that the alternative accommodation in the ancestral house of the tenant is insufficient and that the tenant had not been able to find an alternative accommodation and therefore, the tenant would suffer greater hardship than the landlord. In my view, this finding of the appellate court is wholly erroneous and against the provisions of Rule 16 (1) (a), (b) and (c). On one hand the petitioner has nine family members and one grandchild and has to look and cater to their requirements. It is a large family and therefore, the additional accommodation is bona fidely required. On the other hand it has been alleged in para 4 of the release application that the tenant was unmarried, which has not been denied. Therefore, the comparative hardship has to be considered between nine family members of the landlord as compared to one tenant. Thus, under Rule 16 (1) (a) the need of the landlord is far greater than the need of the tenant. At the time when the accommodation was let out to the tenant the children of the landlord were minors and as they grew older and got married, the need for additional accommodation got acute. Thus, the additional requirement of additional accommodation has to be given due consideration and weightage under Rule 16 (1) (b) of the Act, in favour of the petitioner and her need is greater in comparison with the need of the tenant. It has also come on record that the tenant has an alternative accommodation and being a single person, the finding that the accommodation is insufficient is unbelievable. The reliance placed by the appellate court that the tenant could not find an accommodation is neither reasonable nor based on any evidence. The tenant must show as to what efforts he has made in trying to procure an alternative accommodation. Merely alleging that he could not find an alternative accommodation is insufficient. In view of the aforesaid, the comparative hardship under Rule 16 (1) (c) is also greater and in favour of the petitioner.
9. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. The Judgment and order of the appellate court dated 17.4.1989, is quashed and the order of the prescribed authority is restored and the petitioner's release application is allowed. In the circumstances of the case, the tenant is granted three months time to vacate and hand over the peaceful possession of the premises in question to the petitioner. However, there shall be no order as to costs.