ORDER S.N. Srivastava, J.
1. Present second appeal has its genesis in appellate judgment dated 8.12.2003 passed in Civil Appeal No. 70 of 2000, which stemmed from judgment and decree dated 17.3.2001 rendered in Original Suit No. 276 of 1982.
2. From a perusal of the record it would transpire that the* appellant In the instant appeal who had his sweetmeat shop in Camperganj locality on the basis of licence issued on 31.10.1965 pursuant to resolution No. 137 passed by the then Nagar Palika Parishad Rai Bareilly, had instituted a suit for the relief of permanent injunction against notice issued to the appellant thereby notifying recession of licence. The suit having been dismissed, the petitioner preferred appeal which also ended up in dismissal and consequently the appellant has preferred the instant second appeal impugning the decisions of the aforesaid courts below.
3. The learned counsel representing the appellants pressed into service certain points ostensibly of legal niceties and urged that after dissolution of Nagar Palika Parishad, Rai Bareilly, the District Magistrate who took over charge as Administrator came to acquire power invested in the Board temporarily and therefore, the order passed by the District Magistrate exercising power of Administrator for revoking the licence granted to the appellant by resolution of the Board was non-est. In connection with this proposition learned counsel further submitted that the order of revocation could only be made by the Board by a resolution and by this reckoning the suit of the plaintiff was apt to be decreed attended with grant of permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the land on which she had erected temporary construction for running of her sweetmeat shop. The learned counsel also referred to Sections 31A (c) and 10AA (1) and (a) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, in vindication of his stand.
4. Before elaborating on contentions made across the bar, it would be appropriate to scan the relevant provisions of Municipalities Act referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. Sections 10AA (1) (a) and 31 of the Municipalities Act envisage that all powers, functions and duties of the Board, its President and Committees shall be vested in and be exercised, performed and discharged by an officer appointed in that behalf of the State Government (hereinafter referred to as the Administrator) and the Administrator shall be deemed in law to be the Board, the President or the Committee as the occasion may require. The cumulative effect of the above provisions is that the Administrator shall be deemed to be Board for all purposes. It would thus be quite obvious that the aforesaid provisions leave no manner of doubt that the Administrator would be vested with all requisite powers as vested in the Board, its President and Committees and therefore, exercise of power by the Administrator in rescinding the licence cannot be said to be detracting from lawful exercise of power vested in the Board.
5. From a perusal of the record, it would appear that the sweetmeat shop of the appellant was situated at a place which interfered with smooth flow of traffic and removal of shop was warranted in the larger public interest. No doubt, the licence was granted in the year 1965 by the Board pursuant to resolution but nothing has been pressed into service by the learned counsel to bring home the point that licence could not be revoked by the Administrator. The appellants do not stake claim to the land on the basis of any right or title and admitted position is that it was a public land for use of which they were granted licence by the Board in the fact situation as was then prevalent. Both the courts below have rendered concurrent findings fringed with well- knit reasoning and no error apparent on the face has been fished out by the learned counsel for the appellants to warrant a contrary view.
6. In the above conspectus, the questions 1, 3 and 4 raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in appeal aforestated are answered accordingly in terms of the above. As regards question No. 2, I have traversed upon the discussion made in the decisions of the courts below and I concur with the concurrent finding of the courts below that action initiated pursuant to fresh notice by the Administrator would not be rendered otiose in the light of the earlier decision rendered in Suit No. 58 of 1972. The question is therefore, accordingly answered. No other, substantial question of law has been placed into service nor any such question of law arises.
7. In the perspective of the above discussion, the appeal falls and is accordingly dismissed.