S.Jayapal vs I.Periyasamy

PRAYER Criminal revision case has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the order dated 18.01.2007 in Crl.M.P.No.1471 of 2006 in Special Case No.6 of 2003 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul.

!For Petitioner .. Mr.K.Chellapandian Senior counsel for Mr.P.Jothi ^For Respondent No.1 .. Mr.S.Ashok Kumar Senior counsel for Mr.K.Jeganathan For Respondent No.2 .. Mr.L.Murugan Government Advocate (Criminal Side) * * * * * :COMMON ORDER Crl.R.C.(MD)Sr.22374 of 2008 is against the order of discharge passed against the respondents 2 and 3 viz., P.Kulanthai @ Kulanthaivelu and K.Dhanalakshmi by the learned Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai in Crl.M.P.No.176 of 2008 in Special Case No.6 of 2003 dated 30.04.2008.

2. Crl.R.C(MD)SR.1366 of 2008 is against the order of acquittal of Mr.Ko.Si.Mani, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kumbakonam in Special Case No.14 of 2004 dated 24.07.2007.

3. Crl.R.C(MD)No.325 of 2008 is against the order of discharge of the first respondent viz., I.Periyasamy, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul passed in Crl.M.P.No.1471 of 2006 in Special Case No.6 of 2003 dated 18.01.2007.

4. Crl.R.C(MD)No.961 of 2008 is against the order of discharge of S.M.T.Jaganathan, by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul passed in Crl.M.P.No.1473 of 2006 in Special Case No.6 of 2003 dated 18.01.2007.

5. Crl.R.C(MD)No.962 of 2008 is against the order of discharge of P.Nagrajan by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul passed in Crl.M.P.No.1472 of 2006 in Special Case No.6 of 2003 dated 18.01.2007.

6. Crl.R.C(MD)No.300 of 2008 is against the order of discharge of K.Vijayan, V.Prema and A.Ravi by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul passed in Crl.M.P.Nos.1333, 1334 and 1335 of 2007 in Special Case No.3 of 2005 dated 27.11.2007.

7. Crl.R.C(MD)No.647 of 2007 is against the order of discharge of S.Ragupathy by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai passed in Crl.M.P.No.1219 of 2006 in Special Case No.3 of 2006 dated 11.04.2007.

8. Crl.R.C(MD)No.753 of 2008 is against the order of discharge of the first respondent viz., Thirumathi Valli @ Kavitha by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai passed in Crl.M.P.No.1218 of 2006 in Special Case No.3 of 2006 dated 11.04.2007.

9. Crl.R.C(MD)No.754 of 2007 is against the order of discharge of the first respondent viz., R.Annamalai by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai passed in Crl.M.P.No.1217 of 2006 in Special Case No.3 of 2006 dated 11.04.2007.

10. Crl.R.C(MD)No.755 of 2007 is against the order of discharge of the first respondent viz., Thirumathi Saroja Ragupathy by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai passed in Crl.M.P.No.1216 of 2006 in Special Case No.3 of 2006 dated 11.04.2007.

11. Crl.R.C(MD)No.167 of 2007 is against the order of discharge of the respondents 1 to 8 viz., K.N.Nehru and seven others by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trichy passed in Crl.M.P.No.2757 of 2006 in Special Case No.4 of 2004 dated 13.11.2006.

12. Since, Crl.R.C(MD)SR.22374 and 1366 of 2008 are connected matters, the same are also taken up for disposal along with other matters at the Stamp Register (SR) stage.

13. The question before this Court is whether the matter before it by way of these revisions are such that call for the exercise of revisional powers by this Court.

14. Mr.V.Chellapandian, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of all the petitioners, impresses upon this Court that revisional powers of this Court could be invoked by any citizen and there was no bar to any person doing so. He lays stress on the words 'any person' used in Sub clause (iii) of Section 397 of Cr.P.C. to contend that the very use of the word any person would make clear that revisional powers of the Court could be exercised at anybody's instance. Having made such submission, the learned senior counsel took this Court through various decisions. It would be best to inform each of these decisions and the portions relevant to the issue on hand.

(i) Nadir Khan v. The State, (Delhi Administration) [(1975) 2 Supreme Court Cases 406].

"4. It is well known and has been ever recognised that the High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law. The character of the offence and the nature of disposal of a particular case by the subordinate court prompt remedial action on the part of the High Court for the ultimate social good of the community, even though the State may be slow or silent in preferring an appeal provided for under the new Code. The High Court in a given case of public importance e.g. in now too familiar cases of food adulteration, reacts to public concern over the problem and may act suo motu on perusal of newspaper reports disclosing imposition of grossly inadequate sentence upon such offenders. This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections. It is true the new Code has expressly given a right to the State under Section 377 CrPC to appeal against inadequacy of sentence which was not there under the old Code. That however does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to act suo motu for enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases. What is an appropriate case has to be left to the discretion of the High Court. This Court will be slow to interfere with exercise of such discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution.

5. Section 401 expressly preserves the power of the High Court, by itself, to call for the records without the intervention of another agency and has kept alive the ancient exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to the knowledge of the High Court. The provisions under Section 401 read with Section 386(c)(iii) CrPC are clearly supplemental to those under Section 377 whereby appeals are provided for against inadequacy of sentence at the instance of the State Government or Central Government, as the case may be. There is therefore absolutely no merit in the contention of the learned counsel that the High Court acted without jurisdiction in exercising the power of revision suo motu, for enhancement of the sentence in this case. The application stands rejected".

(ii) A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, [(1984)2 Supreme Court Cases 500].

"It is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary".

(iii) Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, [AIR 1987 Supreme Court 877].

"14. The learned counsel on behalf of Dr Jagannath Mishra also raised another contention of a preliminary nature with a view to displacing the locus standi of Sheonandan Paswan to prefer the present appeal. It was urged that when Shri Lallan Prasad Sinha applied for permission to withdraw the prosecution against Dr Jagannath Mishra and others, Sheonandan Paswan had no locus to oppose the withdrawal since it was a matter entirely between the Public Prosecutor and the Chief Judicial Magistrate and no other person had a right to intervene and oppose the withdrawal and since Sheonandan Paswan had no standing to oppose the withdrawal, he was not entitled to prefer an appeal against the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court granting permission for withdrawal. We do not think there is any force in this contention. It is now settled law that a criminal proceeding is not a proceeding for vindication of a private grievance but it is a proceeding initiated for the purpose of punishment to the offender in the interest of the society. It is for maintaining stability and orderliness in the society that certain acts are constituted offences and the right is given to any citizen to set the machinery of the criminal law in motion for the purpose of bringing the offender to book. It is for this reason that in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak this Court pointed out that (SCC p. 509, para

6) "punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait jacket formula of locus standi .?" This Court observed that locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Now if any citizen can lodge a first information report or file a complaint and set the machinery of the criminal law in motion and his locus standi to do so cannot be questioned, we do not see why a citizen who finds that a prosecution for an offence against the society is being wrongly withdrawn, cannot oppose such withdrawal. If he can be a complainant or initiator of criminal prosecution, he should equally be entitled to oppose withdrawal of the criminal prosecution which has already been initiated at his instance. If the offence for which a prosecution is being launched is an offence against the society and not merely an individual wrong, any member of the society must have locus to initiate a prosecution as also to resist withdrawal of such prosecution, if initiated. Here in the present case, the offences charged against Dr Jagannath Mishra and others are offences of corruption, criminal breach of trust etc. and therefore any person who is interested in cleanliness of public administration and public morality would be entitled to file a complaint, as held by this Court in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and equally he would be entitled to oppose the withdrawal of such prosecution if it is already instituted. We must therefore reject the contention urged on behalf of Dr Jagannath Mishra that Sheonandan Paswan had no locus standi to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution. If he was entitled to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution, it must follow a fortiorari that on the turning down of his opposition by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate he was entitled to prefer a revision application to the High Court and on the High Court rejecting his revision application he had standing to prefer an appeal to this Court. We must therefore reject this contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Dr Jagannath Mishra".

(iv) Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (Delhi) v. Central Bureau of Investigation and others, [1997 Crl.L.J. 3242].

"24.In the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to hereinabove and the aforegoing discussion, this Court can examine if there exists a cause for it to interfere with the impugned order suo motu. It would, of course, be open to this Court to act suo motu if any information comes to its notice from any source which would show that there is a palpable error of law or wrong view of law is taken or the Lower Court has misapprehended evidence and it has resulted in failure of justice and not otherwise".

(v) N.Natarajan v. B.K.Subba Rao, [(2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 76] in paragraph 8 again informs that any person can set the law in motion.

(vi) Jagannath Choudhary and others v. Ramayan Singh and Another, [2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1181].

"11.The High Court possesses a general power of superintendence over the actions of courts subordinate to it. On its administrative side, the power is known as the power of superintendence. On the judicial side, it is known as the duty of revision. The High Court can at any stage even on its own motion, if it so desires, and certainly when illegalities or irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. This right of the High Court is as much a part of the administration of justice as its duty to hear appeals and revisions and interlocutory applications - so also its right to exercise its powers of administrative superintendence. Though however, the jurisdictional sweep of the process of the High Court, however, under the provisions of Section 401 is very much circumscribed, as noticed hereinbefore".

(vii) K.Pandurangan v. S.S.R.Velusamy and Another, [(2003)8 Supreme Court Cases 625].

"6.So far as the first question as to the maintainability of the revision at the instance of the complainant is concerned, we think the said argument has only to be noted to be rejected. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court has suo motu power of revision, if that be so, the question of the same being invoked at the instance of an outsider would not make any difference because ultimately it is the power of revision which is already vested with the High Court statutorily that is being exercised by the High Court. Therefore, whether the same is done by itself or at the instance of a third party will affect such power of the High Court. In this regard, we may note the following judgment of this Court in the case of Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.)".

(viii) K.Anbazhagan v. Superintendent of Police and others [2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 882].

"12. The second leg of argument, what appears to be an argument of despair, is of locus standi of the petitioner. In point of fact this question need not detain us any longer because on 28-2-2003 this Court had already granted permission to the petitioner to file the petition. No application has been taken out to revoke the permission so granted. Therefore, this question becomes mere academic. However, since the question involved is of public importance, we proceed to answer the question. Mr V.A. Bobde, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents 3 and 4 in CC No. 7 of 1997 and Respondent 3 in CC No. 2 of 2001 contended that in view of the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 406 CrPC the petition is maintainable only when motion is moved by the Attorney General or by the "party interested". According to the counsel, it is the "party interested" and not a "person interested" and, therefore, only the Attorney General or the "party interested" has locus standi to file application and the petitioner not being a party to the proceeding is not a "party interested", and has no locus standi to file the present petition. We are unable to accept this submission for more than one reason. It will be noticed that the "party interested" has not been defined under CrPC. The words "party interested" are of a wide import and, therefore, they have to be given a wider meaning. If it was the intendment of the legislature to give restricted meaning then it would have used words to the effect "party to the proceedings". In this behalf the wording of Article 139-A of the Constitution of India may be looked at. Under Article 139-A the transfer can be if "the Supreme Court is satisfied on its own motion or on an application made by the Attorney General of India or by a party to any such case". (emphasis supplied) Also if the provisions of Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code are looked at, it is seen that when the legislature intended a "party to the proceedings" to have a right of appeal it specifically so stated. The legislature, therefore, keeping in view the larger public interest involved in a criminal justice system, purposely used words of a wider import in Section 406. Also, it is a well-settled principle of law that statutes must be interpreted to advance the cause of statute and not to defeat it. The petitioner being a political opponent, is vitally interested in the administration of justice in the State and is a "party interested" within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 406 CrPC. Even otherwise, Mr Subramanian Swamy was the original complainant. He supports these transfer petitions.

13. It has also been urged that the petitioner being a political opponent of Respondent 2, these petitions have been launched against Respondent 2 on ground of political vendetta. This submission also has no force. In a democracy, the political opponents play an important role both inside and outside the House. They are the watchdogs of the Government in power. It will be their effective weapon to counter the misdeeds and mischiefs of the Government in power. They are the mouthpiece to ventilate the grievances of the public at large, if genuinely and unbiasedly projected. In that view of the matter, being a political opponent, the petitioner is a vitally interested party in the running of the Government or in the administration of criminal justice in the State. The petition lodged by such persons cannot be brushed aside on the allegation of a political vendetta, if otherwise, it is genuine and raises a reasonable apprehension of likelihood of bias in the dispensation of criminal justice system. This question has been set at rest by this Court in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (SCC p.318, para 16), where it is said: "It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant."

This decision was reiterated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal".

(ix) P.Ravindran v. State rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Wing, Cuddalore and Others, [(2008) 3 MLJ (Crl) 535], where following K.Anbazhagan v. Superintendent of Police and others, [2003 AIR SCW 6468 : (2004) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 89] observed as follows: "14. This Court holds that the petitioner herein is entitled to file a revision against the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, discharging the accused/ respondents 2 and 3. If the revision petitioner is entitled to file a revision, then he may require the copies of the records of the case".

15. Relying on the above citations, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that when the law is that anybody can set the criminal law in motion and this Court has suo motu powers of revision then it would not matter at whose instance, the revisional power is sought to be invoked and the status or role of the person, who moves this Court by way of revision, in the proceedings before the lower Court is of absolutely no consequence. The learned senior counsel also impresses that while Section 406 Cr.P.C. dealing with the powers of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to transfer proceedings speaks of any 'interested party', such wording is not to be found in Section 397 or 401 Cr.P.C. On the other hand Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. specifically speaks of 'any person' and according to him the word 'any person' literally would mean only that viz., any person may move any proceeding by way of revision before this Court.

16. Mr.R.Shanmugasundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents in Crl.R.C(MD)SR.1366 of 2008 would submit as follows: In A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, [(1984)2 Supreme Court Cases 500], the Hon'ble Apex Court was seized of the question of who could set the criminal law in motion. In K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made clear the need to exercise restraint in exercising powers of revision. As regards Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, [AIR 1987 Supreme Court 877], the learned senior counsel submitted that what was stated in paragraph 14 (supra) on locus standi was the minority view. The learned senior counsel submitted that the decision on a case of withdrawal would have no application in a case concerning discharge. Withdrawal and discharge are two different propositions altogether. In exercising power of discharge, the Court has to consider the record of the case, documents submitted therewith and hear either side and then come to the conclusion on whether or not there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. There is no such requirement in the case of withdrawal. Withdrawal was at the instance of the Public Prosecutor, while discharge was upon merits on the case.

17. The learned senior counsel also impresses upon this Court that Crl.R.C(MD)No No.167 of 2007 filed against the order of discharge of the respondents 1 to 8 viz., K.N.Nehru and seven others by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trichy in Crl.M.P.No.2757 of 2006 in Special Case No.4 of 2004 dated 13.11.2006, was not a case which arose from the complaint of Malarvizhi, but which came to be filed only on source information. This is distinguishable from the case where Shri Anbhazhagan [K.Anbazhagan v. Superintendent of Police and others [(2004) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 89] moved the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as he had participated at the stage of trial. In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (Delhi) v. Central Bureau of Investigation and others, [1997 Crl.L.J. 3242], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled the issue at paragraph 21 stating as follows:

"Irrespective of the reference to aforesaid commentaries cited by Mr.Bhatia I find that in addition to the above discussion a reference to various ruling including AIR 1966 SC 911 : (1966 Cri LJ 700) ; (1992) 4 SCC 653 : (1992 AIR SCW 3133); (1991) 3 SCC 756; 1996(8) SCale 383; 1934 Cri LJ 320; 1980 Cri LJ (NOC) Delhi 82; 1990 Raj LR 131 ; 1990 Cri LJ 2184 and para 90 of (1987) 1 SCC 288 : (1987 Cri LJ 793) would lead to the conclusion that the State is the master of prosecutions and that it would be extremely unsafe to accord locus standi to a third party to file a Criminal Revision Petition against judicial orders. It will be unwise and unsafe to entertain Criminal Revision Petition by third parties. The petitioner is neither the complainant nor aggrieved party. As such, I hold that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the present Criminal Revision Petition".

18. The learned senior counsel also relies upon paragraphs 11 and 15 in the decision in P.Muthupandi and Another v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Ramnad "Q" Branch, Ramanathapuram District and Another, [(2009)1 MLJ (Crl) 741], wherein a challenge to grant of bail was refused by this Court on the ground of lack of locus standi.

19. The learned senior counsel next contended that Advocates cannot appear, act, plead or practice for and on behalf of any person either when such person is related or when the Advocate is peculiarly interested. In the matters presently before this Court, it is Advocates belonging to a political party, who are seeking relief at the hands of this Court. Being political opponents, the petitioners are persons peculiarly interested and their action in approaching this Court amounts to their actually substituting themselves for their clients and indulging in fomenting litigation. Hence, these revision petitions deserve to be dismissed on the ground that their actions are opposed to the Advocates Act, 1961 and also to Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India Rules. The learned senior counsel placed heavy reliance on Judgment of this Court in S.Sengkodi v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, Chennai - 600 009 and others, [2009(3) CTC 6] wherein it was found that: "12. Even by assuming, without accepting, that a practicing Advocate can be permitted to enter into the shoes of his client, we have to keep in mind the consequences that will follow the suit if such acts are permitted to be performed by a practicing Advocate. If such a situation is permitted, then, there may not be any client-Advocate relation but only a client and de facto client relationship between the party and his counsel, resulting in adversely affecting the dignity and decorum of the noble profession and further running contrary to the Standards of Professional conduct and etiquette, prescribed under the Bar Council of India Rules, ....

13. In arriving at this decision, we garner support from a judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, 2001(2) CTC 504 (SC) : 2001 SCC (Cri) 806. In the said case, aggrieved by the orders by the District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, dated 13.02.2001, transferring a number of criminal cases for disposal to the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge, the petitioner, Advocate, representing the accused persons in three of such transferred cases, filed a Writ Petition in the High Court praying for quashing of the said order. It was contended that by the transfer of the cases, the speedy trial of the accused has been hampered and that the order has been passed in a casual manner. The said Writ Petition was dismissed by the High Court, holding that the petitioner being an Advocate had no locus standi to challenge the legality of the order by way of a Writ Petition. Aggrieved, the said petitioner/Advocate approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court has held as follows:

"Generally speaking, a person shall have no locus standi to file a Writ Petition if he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially invaded nor is there any imminent danger of such rights being invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring the applicable rules. The relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is based on the existence of a right in favour of the person invoking the jurisdiction. The exception to the general rule is only in cases where the Writ applied for is a Writ of Habeas Corpus or quo warranto or filed in public interest. It is a matter of prudence, that the Court confines the exercise of Writ jurisdiction to cases where legal wrong or legal injuries are caused to a particular person or his fundamental rights are violated, and not to entertain cases of individual wrong or injury at the instance of third party where there is an effective legal aid organisation which can take care of such cases. Even in cases filed in public interest, the Court can exercise the Writ jurisdiction at the instance of a third party only when it is shown that the legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is threatened and such person or determined class of persons is, by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for relief. In the instant case the petitioner had not filed the Petition in public interest and did not disclose the circumstances which prevented the affected persons from approaching the Court. In the discharge of his professional obligations, the petitioner Advocate is not obliged to file the Writ Petition on behalf of his clients. No circumstance was mentioned in the Petition which allegedly incapacitated the affected persons from filing the Writ Petition. Section 30 of the Advocates Act only entitles an advocate to practice the profession of law and not to substitute himself for his client. The filing of the Writ Petition in his own name, being not a part of the professional obligation of the Advocate, the High Court was justified in dismissing the Writ Petition holding that the petitioner had no locus standi".

20. Mr.R.Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent in Crl.R.C(MD)No.325 of 2008, primarily submits that in revision cases there was no right of audience and once the Court was seized of the matter, there would hardly be any room for any interloper to interfere with the Court proceedings. The learned senior counsel terms the reliance by the petitioner on the decision in Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others reported in 1987 Crl.L.J. 793 as totally misplaced and informs that the powers under Section 321 Cr.P.C. dealing with the withdrawal of the case and Section 239 Cr.P.C. dealing with discharge are totally different. An order under Section 239 Cr.P.C. is a reasoned order on merits and such cannot be interfered with at the instance of an interloper. The petitioner had absolutely no locus standi. He was neither the complainant or witness in the case and an order under Section 239 Cr.P.C. being as it was a judicial order, could not be challenged in the manner sought to be done.

21. The learned senior counsel relies on the following decisions:

(i) Sheo Nandan Paswan V. State of Bihar, [1987 Crl.L.J. 1993]. "30. The second qualification which we must introduce relates to a situation where a charge-sheet has been filed but charge has not been framed in a warrant case instituted on police report. Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides:

"If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under Section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing."

Now when a warrant case instituted on a police report comes before the court, the court is required to consider only the police report and the documents sent along with it and the court may make such examination, if any, of the accused as it thinks necessary and on the basis of such material if the court, after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, the court is bound to discharge the accused. What the court, therefore, does while exercising its function under Section 239 is to consider the police report and the document sent along with it as also any statement made by the accused if the court chooses to examine him. And if the court finds that there is no prima facie case against the accused the court discharges him. But that is precisely what the court is called upon to do when an application for withdrawal from the prosecution is made by the Public Prosecutor on the ground that there is insufficient or no evidence to support the prosecution. There also the court would have to consider the material placed before it on behalf of the prosecution for the purpose of deciding whether the ground urged by the Public Prosecutor for withdrawal of the prosecution is justified or not and this material would be the same as the material before the court while discharging its function under Section 239. If the court while considering an application for withdrawal on the ground of insufficiency or absence of evidence to support the prosecution has to scrutinise the material for the purpose of deciding whether there is in fact insufficient evidence or no evidence at all in support of the prosecution, the court might as well engage itself in this exercise while considering under Section 239 whether the accused shall be discharged or a charge shall be framed against him. It is an identical exercise which the court will be performing whether the court acts under Section 239 or under Section

321. If that be so, we do not think that in a warrant case instituted on a police report the Public Prosecutor should be entitled to make an application for withdrawal from the prosecution on the ground that there is insufficient or no evidence in support of the prosecution. The court will have to consider the same issue under Section 239 and it will most certainly further or advance the cause of public justice if the court examines the issue under Section 239 and gives its reasons for discharging the accused after a judicial consideration of the material before it, rather than allow the prosecution to be withdrawn by the Public Prosecutor. When the prosecution is allowed to be withdrawn there is always an uneasy feeling in the public mind that the case has not been allowed to be agitated before the court and the court has not given a judicial verdict. But, if on the other hand, the court examines the material and discharges the accused under Section 239, it will always carry greater conviction with the people because instead of the prosecution being withdrawn and taken out of the ken of judicial scrutiny the judicial verdict based on assessment and evaluation of the material before the court will always inspire greater confidence. Since the guiding consideration in all these cases is the imperative of public justice and it is absolutely essential that justice must not only be done but also appear to be done, we would hold that in a warrant case instituted on a police report - which the present case against Dr Jagannath Mishra and others admittedly is - it should not be a legitimate ground for the Public Prosecutor to urge in support of the application for withdrawal that there is insufficient or no evidence in support of the prosecution. The court in such a case should be left to decide under Section 239 whether the accused should be discharged or a charge should be framed against him". (emphasis supplied)

(ii) Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'Lalan" (VIII) and Another v. Union of India and others, [(2006)3 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 125].

"21. The learned counsel for Respondents 4 and 5 submitted that the original petition is a politically motivated move to malign Respondents 4 and 5 and this sort of public interest litigation should not be entertained by the court and placed reliance on a series of decisions passed by this Court. It may be noticed that Special Case No. 5 of 1998 has been filed against Respondents 4 and 5 alleging that they had amassed wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income while holding the post of Chief Minister of the State of Bihar. Both the petitioners are not in any way connected with this case. They are not de facto complainants in this case. It is for the prosecution to prove its case and Respondents 4 and 5 to deny that the allegations are not true and they did not have the disproportionate income as alleged by the prosecution. It is a criminal litigation exclusively between Respondents 4 and 5 and the State. It is also important to note that in a case of this nature, nobody else has got any right to interfere especially by way of public interest litigation or else such public interest litigation would only hamper the course of justice and may cause prejudice to the accused by denying them a fair trial. In this case, as early as 2004, 132 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution and 93 witnesses were examined on the defence side. Arguments of the prosecution were over as early as on 14-7-2004 and the defence arguments continued up to 19-7- 2004. Because of the present public interest litigation, the trial could not be conducted. It is equally important to note that though the petitioners have alleged a series of irregularities, but they are not supported by basic facts having solid foundation.

... ... ...

25. In the instant case, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing this public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution at the time when the recording of the prosecution evidence was almost over and the trial of the case reached a final stage. If at all the petitioners had any grievance regarding the removal of the Public Prosecutor, they should have submitted their grievance before the Special Judge or before the High Court. It is already noticed that the petitioners had no direct connection with this case. They were absolutely strangers as regards the criminal cases against Respondents 4 and 5 which were pending before the Special Judge. This unnecessary interference in the criminal case may cause, sometimes, damage to the prosecution case and at times may cause serious prejudice to the accused also. In any view of the matter, this sort of interference in the criminal prosecution would only deny a fair trial to the accused". (emphasis supplied)

22. Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent in Crl.R.C(MD)No.647, 753, 754, 755 of 2007 states that what is in issue is not the suo motu powers exercisable by this Court. He submits that it is not the contention of the any of the counsel for the respondents that such suo motu power does not exist. The issue is that when a person approaches this Court with a request for this Court to exercise the suo motu powers, then the Court initially will find out what his role or interest in the litigation is, was he a person who was the original complainant or was a witness or is a person genuinely interested in seeing a particular proceeding to a particular end OR was he merely a interloper or wayfarer, interfering with the system of justice towards achieving personal ends or towards publicity and such other objects. If a person fell in the first category, a revision certainly then would lie at his instance. According to the learned senior counsel, the petitioners herein fell within the second category and hence their presence should not be countenanced. The learned senior counsel relies on the following in paragraph 9 of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thakur Ram and others v. The State of Bihar, [AIR 1966 Supreme Court 911]:

"9. The provisions of Section 437, however, do not make it obligatory upon a Sessions Judge or a District Magistrate to order commitment in every case where an offence is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. The law gives a discretion to the revising authority and that discretion has to be exercised judicially.

... ... ...

In a case which has proceeded on a police report a private party has really no locus standi. No doubt, the terms of Section 435, under which the jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Judge was invoked are very wide and he could even have taken up the matter suo motu. It would, however, not be irrelevant to bear in mind the fact that the court's jurisdiction was invoked by a private party. The criminal law is not to be used as an instrument of wreaking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against the person who, according to that party, had caused injury to it. Barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for bringing the person who has acted against the social interests of the community to book. (emphasis supplied)

23. The learned senior counsel also relies on paragraph 2 of the decision of the Delhi High Court in Shashi Kumar Goyal v. State & Ors., [2002(1) Crimes 501].

"2. A preliminary objection was raised by Sh.K.B.Andley appearing for respondents 2 to 6 that petitioner has no locus standi to file this petition as he is not the maker of FIR and M.Kavita, complainant who has since remarried, presumably is not willing to challenge the impugned order, while controverting the objection, it was contended by Sh.B.K., Sharma for petitioner that petitioner is the brother of complainant and if he could file a complaint for the offence under Section 498-A IPC on her behalf under Section 198A Cr.P.C. he can also file this petition. As part of submission, it was further contended that even a private party has locus standi to file revision petition. Reliance was placed particularly on the decisions in Kavita v. State and Ors., Pratap v. State of U.P., Girdhari Lal v. Sita Ram & Ors., Rajendra Prasad Singh v. The State of Bihar and Ors. and S.P.Dubey v. Narsingh Bahadur. To be noted that State has not filed revision petition against the said order dated 3rd June, 2000. Aforesaid Section 198-A Cr.P.C. which is material, reads thus:- "No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code except upon a police report of facts which constitute such offence or upon a complaint made by the person aggrieved by the offence or by her father, mother, brother, sister of by her father's or mother's, brother or sister or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption".

Above Sections falls in Chapter XIII while Sections 397/401, Cr.P.C. under which present petition has been filed, in Chapter XXX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is true that certain categories of relatives of the person aggrieved by the offence under Section 498-A IPC have also been empowered under Section 198-A Cr.P.C. to file complaint but in my view, after the charge-sheet based on complaint lodged by the person aggrieved is submitted in Court by the police, the relatives cannot bank upon the provision of said Section 198-A to support their right to have revision petition filed under Sections 397/401 Cr.P.C. against an order made in the case by the trial Court. First limb of submission advanced on behalf of petitioner, thus, deserves to be repelled being without any merit". (emphasis supplied)

24. Relying on the above, learned senior counsel submits that when the right to move revisional jurisdiction against an order of Court after filing of the Charge sheet by the police, was curtailed even as regards persons to whom the right to prefer complaints was reserved, the petitioners herein who merely were interlopers would have no right to invoke revisional powers.

25. The learned senior counsel submits that Section 397(iii) Cr.P.C. could not be read in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Section 397(iii) Cr.P.C. should be read in tandem with Section 397(i) Cr.P.C. and if so read it would be clear that the word 'such person' used in Section 397(iii) Cr.P.C. only refers to a person who earlier had moved revision as contemplated under Section 397(i) Cr.P.C. According to the learned senior counsel, the decisions on locus standi to initiate proceedings cannot be applicable to cases of filing of revision against discharge and the decisions relied upon to show that this Court had suo motu powers would not be applicable to the facts of this case. To move revisions or to require this Court to exercise the suo motu powers of revision, petitioners must be persons, who have a genuine interest in the litigation and not be merely interlopers driven by ulterior motives as the petitioners herein are.

26. The learned senior counsel also draws the distinction between Section 406 and 397 Cr.P.C. and further submits that while exercising decision under Section 406 Cr.P.C. the question of the Hon'ble Supreme Court exercising its powers under Article 139(A) of the Constitution of India also is explicit in the decision of this Court referred to in K.Anbazhagan v. Superintendent of Police and Others, [(2004) 1 MLJ (Crl.) 89]. Again the contention is that a case of withdrawal cannot be equated with a case of discharge. The learned senior counsel impresses upon this Court that the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a particular case cannot be relied upon out of context and unless the factual situation in the case decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would permit application in a case before this Court, the same would have no bearing whatsoever. The learned senior counsel impresses upon this Court that the reliance by the petitioners on decision in P.Ravindran v. State rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Wing Cuddalore and Others, [(2008)3 MLJ (Crl) 535] was misplaced. In that case, the Court was dealing with an application for issuance of certified copies. The portion of the Judgment which are relied upon by the petitioners are found in paragraph 14 (extracted herein above) Clearly the decisions in that particular case would have been arrived at even if these paragraphs were not part of the Judgment. Thus what was not essential in arriving at a decision was merely obiter and would have no persuasive force.

27. The learned senior counsel also submits that the petitioners have not made out any case for grant of leave. Grant of leave was at the discretion of this Court. The check period for the present cases was 1992-96. First Information Report was registered in the year 2002 and the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed in the year 2006. All along the petitioners herein were nowhere in the picture. Thus, their suddenly cropping up by way of this revision petition would only show that they were fomenting litigation, which practice had been deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again.

28. Mr.K.Jegannathan, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent in Crl.R.C(MD)No.325 of 2008 informs that the petitioners are people holding political and party affiliations, that they had nothing to show any personal knowledge of the state of affairs pertaining to the cases nor had stated any purpose for which they had approached this Court. They were merely interlopers and had no locus standi.

29. In reply, Mr.V.Chellapandian, learned senior counsel submits that the petitioners herein had no personal enmity towards any of the respondents and that when the State has not championed the cause of justice, it was open to persons such as the petitioners to do so.

30. He submits that in the case in Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, [AIR 1987 Supreme Court 877] the finding in paragraph 14 that one, who had locus standi to oppose the withdrawal of the prosecution would on his opposition being turned down have a right to prefer a revision before the High court was not unsettled by the majority. As against the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents in Peoples Union for Civil Liberties (Delhi) v. Central Bureau of Investigation and others, [1997 Crl.L.J. 3242] that the State was the master of prosecutions and that it would be unsafe to accord locus standi to a third party to file criminal revision against orders, learned counsel in answer there to lay stress upon paragraph 24 of the said Judgment, which reads as follows:

"24.In the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to hereinabove and the aforegoing discussion, this Court can examine if there exists a cause for it to interfere with the impugned order suo motu. It would, of course, be open to this Court to act suo motu if any information comes to its notice from any source which would show that there is a palpable error of law or wrong view of law is taken or the Lower Court has misapprehended evidence and it has resulted in failure of justice and not otherwise".

31. Answering the contention that Advocates should not take on the rule of litigants, the learned counsel relied upon the decision in P.Muthupandi and Another v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, Ramnad "Q" Branch, Ramanathapuram District and Another, [2009)1 MLJ (Crl) 741], wherein a learned Judge of this Court dealing with a case for cancellation of bail, after discussing the law, found that the third party had no locus standi, but at the same time found it necessary that the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court enjoins a duty upon this Court to exercise its suo motu power.

32. I will consider the merits of the revision petitions filed against discharge and separately deal with the revision filed against acquittal in Crl.R.C(MD)SR.1366 of 2008.

33. On a careful consideration of the various authorities placed before me and the arguments of the respected counsel, I find that the following propositions emerge:

There is no impediment to the exercise of suo motu powers of revision by this Court in a case thought fit by it. However the vastness of the power in itself enjoins the duty to use the same sparingly. This Court must first be satisfied that persons who call upon it to exercise such power are not in the nature of wayfarers, interlopers or persons interested in fomenting litigation. As submitted by Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned senior counsel, it is only when the petitioners are seen to have crossed this bridge, i.e., this test of persons who are genuinely interested in seeing matters to a lawful end, that the Court could embark upon an enquiry of whether it would be a fit case to exercise its revisional powers. In the instant case, it must be held that the petitioners, who earlier had nothing to do with the matter are indulging in fomenting litigation. Their actions are such as would offend the provisions of Advocates Act as found by a Division Bench of this Court in the decision in S.Sengkodi v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by its Chief Secretary to Government, Fort St. George, Chennai - 600 009 and others, [2009 (3) CTC 6].

34. The cases in A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, [(1984)2 Supreme Court Cases 500] and K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788] as rightly contended by Mr.R.Shanmugasundaram, learned senior counsel, respectively deal with the question of who could set the criminal law in motion and the power of the High Court in revision against the order of acquittal. While on this, it may not be out of place to notice the Bar Council of India Rules. Rule 9 in Section I - Duty to the Court in Chapter II - Standards of Professional Conduct and Etiquette in Part VI, Rules Governing Advocates:

"9.An advocate should not act or plead in any manner in which he is himself peculiarly interested.

Illustration:

I. He should not act in a bankruptcy petition when he himself is also a creditor of the bankrupt.

II. He should not accept a brief from a company of which he is Director". From a reading of the illustration, I am inclined to think that the words intended in Rule 9 would be "pecuniarily interested" and not "peculiarly interested". However, for the purposes of this case, the matter may be left there, since there can be no doubt that the conduct of the petitioners is one of fomenting litigation and of stepping into the shoes of the litigants thereby blurring the distinction between counsel and client.

35. The various decisions relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners do not really apply to the question before us. In K.Chinnachamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788], the Court primarily was seized with the powers of the High Court in a revision against acquittal. In Nadhir Khan v. The State (Delhi Administration), [(1975) 2 Supreme Court Cases 406], what the Hon'ble Apex Court holds in effect that it is left to the discretion of the High Court as to what is an appropriate case for exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The cases of A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, [(1984)2 Supreme Court Cases 500] and N.Natarajan v. B.K.Subba Rao, [(2003) 2 Supreme Court Cases 76] are basically on the now accepted norm that any one can set the criminal law in motion. The case of Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and others, [AIR 1987 Supreme Court 877] also follows the decision in A.R.Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak and Another, [(1984)2 Supreme Court Cases 500] on the aspect of setting the criminal law in motion and passes on to hold that one, who set the criminal law in motion has the right to prefer revision against withdrawal of such case which had been initiated on his instance. The case of K.Pandurangan v. S.S.R.Velusamy and Another, [(2003)8 Supreme Court Cases 625] relates to the exercise of powers of revision at the instance of the complainant in the case. In K.Anbhazhagan v. Superintendent of Police and others, [2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 882] as rightly contended by Mr.R.Shanmugasundaram, learned senior counsel, the person involved from the stage of trial was the one who was before the Hon'ble Apex Court and what was really discussed therein was the powers of transfer exercisable by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Section 406 Cr.P.C. and also the power of transfer in the Hon'ble Apex Court under Article 139-A, which speaks of the power of transfer by the Hon'ble Apex Court, when such Court is satisfied on its motion or in application by the Attorney General or by a party to any such case. Thus in all the above cases, it is seen that none of them addressed the question of the exercise of powers of revision at the instance of private parties and against orders of discharge. It is not anybody's case that this Court has no powers of revision against the orders of discharge. The dispute is only as regards the exercise of such power in the circumstances of the cases before us. A close scrutiny of the decisions reported in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788] and Jagannath Choudhary and others v. Ramayan Singh and another, [2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1181] relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners would show that such decisions, really dealt with the restriction on exercise of the powers of revision by this Court. Even in dealing with the powers of revision in setting aside the orders of acquittal, what the Hon'ble Apex Court says in K.Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, [AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788] is:

"7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of Section 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method of ordering retrial, when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. It is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may however indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; and in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of Section 439(4). We have therefore to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles". (emphasis supplied) and what the Hon'ble Apex Court says in Jagannath Choudhary and others v. Ramayan Singh and another, [2002 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1181] is: "10. While it is true and now well settled in a long catena of cases that exercise of power under Section 401 cannot but be ascribed to be discretionary - this discretion, however, as is popularly informed has to be a judicious exercise of discretion and not an arbitrary one. Judicial discretion cannot but be a discretion which stands "informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system" - resultantly only in the event of a glaring defect in the procedural aspect or there being a manifest error on a point of law and thus a flagrant miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction under this statute ought not to be called for. It is not to be lightly exercised but only in exceptional situations where the justice delivery system requires interference for correction of a manifest illegality or prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In Nosibolla2, Logendranath Jha3 and Chinnaswamy Reddy1 as also in Thakur Das v. State of M.P. this Court with utmost clarity and in no uncertain terms recorded the same. It is not an appellate forum wherein scrutiny of evidence is possible; neither the revisional jurisdiction is open for being exercised simply by reason of the factum of another view being otherwise possible. It is restrictive in its application though in the event of there being a failure of justice there can be said to be no limitation as regards the applicability of the revisional power".

36. It cannot be forgotten that in K.Pandurangan v. S.S.R.Velusamy and Another, [(2003)8 SCC 625], the Hon'ble Supreme Court was concerned with a revision, which was filed at the instance of the complainant in the case. The challenge was to the action of the Appellate Court in granting remission of sentence purportedly acting under Orders issued by the Government. As regards decision in P.Ravindran v. State rep. by Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-corruption Wing, Cuddalore and Others, [(2008)3 MLJ (Crl) 535], it is to be stated that the proposition of a third party being entitled to file a revision petition against an order of discharge is too widely stated and as rightly contended by Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned senior counsel, the decision in such case would have been the same even without such observations, which are relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. Thus the same only can be treated as obiter as they were not essential in arriving at a decision in the case. On the other hand, this Court is unable to ignore the distinctions drawn, as pointed out above, between the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the facts pertaining to the cases before us. As rightly contended by Mr.R.Shanmugasundaram and Mr.R.Ashok Kumar, learned senior counsel, the distinction between a case of revision against withdrawal and revision against discharge are easily discernible. An order of discharge necessarily is a most reasoned one, which is arrived after total appreciation of the merits or otherwise of the case, which is not necessarily so in the case of withdrawal of prosecution. Reliance placed by Mr.R.Ashok Kumar in the case of Rajiv Ranjan Singh 'Lalan' (VIII) and Another v. Union of India and others, [(2006) 3 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 125] calls for acceptance and is reproduced here under:

"21. The learned counsel for Respondents 4 and 5 submitted that the original petition is a politically motivated move to malign Respondents 4 and 5 and this sort of public interest litigation should not be entertained by the court and placed reliance on a series of decisions passed by this Court. It may be noticed that Special Case No. 5 of 1998 has been filed against Respondents 4 and 5 alleging that they had amassed wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income while holding the post of Chief Minister of the State of Bihar. Both the petitioners are not in any way connected with this case. They are not de facto complainants in this case. It is for the prosecution to prove its case and Respondents 4 and 5 to deny that the allegations are not true and they did not have the disproportionate income as alleged by the prosecution. It is a criminal litigation exclusively between Respondents 4 and 5 and the State. It is also important to note that in a case of this nature, nobody else has got any right to interfere especially by way of public interest litigation or else such public interest litigation would only hamper the course of justice and may cause prejudice to the accused by denying them a fair trial. In this case, as early as 2004, 132 witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution and 93 witnesses were examined on the defence side. Arguments of the prosecution were over as early as on 14-7-2004 and the defence arguments continued up to 19-7- 2004. Because of the present public interest litigation, the trial could not be conducted. It is equally important to note that though the petitioners have alleged a series of irregularities, but they are not supported by basic facts having solid foundation.

22. This Court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary held that in a criminal case, a person who has no interest shall not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court by intervening in the proceedings and a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding alone has locus standi to file a public interest litigation and a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive, or any oblique consideration has no such right to file public interest litigation.

23. Respondents 4 and 5 relied on Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. That is a case where petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution purportedly in public interest but the prayer was to the effect that the death sentence imposed on one 'D' by the Sessions Court, affirmed by the Calcutta High Court and the Supreme Court, needed to be converted to a life sentence because there had been no execution of the death sentence for a long time. Therein, this Court said that a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding alone can initiate public interest litigation and that the court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations.

24. In Union of India v. Sushil Kumar Modi a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that: (SCC p. 661) "Once a charge-sheet is filed in the competent court after completion of the investigation, the process of monitoring by the monitoring court for the purpose of making CBI and other investigative agencies concerned perform their function of investigating into the offences concerned comes to an end; and thereafter it is only the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused, including matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

25. In the instant case, the petitioners have approached this Court by filing this public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution at the time when the recording of the prosecution evidence was almost over and the trial of the case reached a final stage. If at all the petitioners had any grievance regarding the removal of the Public Prosecutor, they should have submitted their grievance before the Special Judge or before the High Court. It is already noticed that the petitioners had no direct connection with this case. They were absolutely strangers as regards the criminal cases against Respondents 4 and 5 which were pending before the Special Judge. This unnecessary interference in the criminal case may cause, sometimes, damage to the prosecution case and at times may cause serious prejudice to the accused also. In any view of the matter, this sort of interference in the criminal prosecution would only deny a fair trial to the accused".

37. What is above reproduced leads the Court to accept the contention of the other learned senior counsel Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, when he submits that this Court will look into, who the parties before it are or what their purpose is i.e., whether the persons before it are merely seeking to achieve political ends and not merely interested in upholding the rule of law. It is in this context that the contention of such counsel that this Court should not grant leave to the petitioners becomes relevant. The check period for the cases in which revisions are sought was between the years 1992 to 1996. The First Information Report was registered in the year 2002 and the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was filed in the year 2006. As rightly contended all along the petitioners before this Court were nowhere in the picture. Thus, this Court would have to agree with the submission that their suddenly being before this Court through these revisions would only show that they were fomenting litigation and were not persons genuinely interested therein. This Court also finds itself in agreement with the contention of the learned senior counsel that the wording 'such person' in Section 397(3) Cr.P.C. would only relate to the person, who earlier had moved a revision as contemplated in Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. Again this Court in agreement with the submissions of Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, learned senior counsel, when he submits that section 397 Cr.P.C. on the one hand and Section 406 Cr.P.C. and Article 139-A of the Constitution of India on the other are totally distinct provisions.

38. Thus, it is seen that while the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again is that the powers of revision and particularly at the instance of private parties, sparingly is to be exercised. The factual aspects also do not call for leaning in favour of exercise of such power. It will not be out of place to mention that in the case of J.M.Arumugam and another [2009(2) MWN (Cr.) 95], a learned single Judge of this Court has found that revision petitions against discharge are not maintainable at the instance of private parties.

39. In view of the reasoning above stated, this Court finds that the revision petitions filed against discharge in Crl.R.C(MD)Nos.325, 961, 962, 300 of 2008, 647, 754, 755, 167 of 2007 and Crl.R.C(MD)SR.22374 of 2008 deserve to be dismissed.

40. This takes us to the question of revision at the instance of private party against acquittal, which is the question which arises for consideration in Crl.R.C(MD)SR.1366 of 2008. In Satyendra Nath Dutta and Another v. Ram Narain, [(1975)3 SCC 398], the Hon'ble Apex Court had this to say regards the exercise of revisional powers under Section 439(4) Cr.P.C. of the old code, which corresponds to Section 401(4) of the present Code.

"4. In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla it was held by this Court that the revisional jurisdiction conferred by Section 439 of the Code ought not to be exercised lightly when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal which could have been appealed against by the Government under Section 417. "It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice". In other words, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or misappreciated the evidence on record. In Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas the High Court, at the instance of a private complainant, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court and directed that the accused be retried. This Court held that the provision contained in Section 439(4) of the Code cannot be construed to mean that in dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal the High Court could, in the absence of any error on a point of law, re-appraise the evidence and reverse the findings of facts, provided only it stops short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him. The order of re-trial based on a re-appraisal of evidence was characterised by this Court as a formal compliance with the requirements of Section 439(4). In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. the Court while emphasising that the revisional jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court in exceptional cases only when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice observed that it was not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. The Court, however, indicated, in order to illustrate, a few of the cases in which the revisional jurisdiction could properly be used. An acquittal by a court lacking jurisdiction or excluding evidence which was admissible or relying on inadmissible evidence or where material evidence has been overlooked are some of the cases indicated by this Court as justifying the exercise of revisional powers. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh where the High Court in exercise of its revisional powers had, at the instance of a private party, directed re-trial of the accused, this Court on a review of the previous decisions reaffirmed that the High Court was wrong in entering into minute details of evidence, while examining the decision of the Sessions Court under Section 439(4) of the Code. The last decision to which reference may be made is Khetrabasi Samal v. State of Orissa. The High Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction had set aside the order of acquittal on the ground that the Magistrate should not have disbelieved the three eyewitnesses. The High Court sought justification for the course it adopted by observing that the Magistrate had not taken the trouble of sifting the grain from the chaff. The order of the High Court was set aside by this Court".

41. The said decision has been followed in case of Pakalapati Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others v. Bonapalli Peda Appadu and another, [AIR 1975 Supreme Court 854].

42. Again in case of Akalu Ahir and Ors. v. Ram Deo Ram, [1975 LW(Crl.)235], the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the proposition as can be seen from the following:

"9. In the present case also we feel that the High Court has re-weighed the evidence from its own point of view and though at the outset it noticed the correct legal position and expressly acknowledged the limits within which it was called upon to decide whether or not to interfere with the order of acquittal, in actual practice, it does not seem to have attended to the rules laid down by this Court in the four decisions noticed by it. As observed in D. Stephen case the revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC is not to be lightly exercised when invoked by a private party against an order of acquittal against which the Government has a right of appeal under Section 417. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. Again, as pointed out in Logendranath Jha case when Section 439(4) specifically excludes the power to "convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction", the High Court cannot, when dealing with a revision petition by a private party against an order of acquittal, in the absence of any error on a point of law, re- appraise the evidence and reverse the findings of fact on which the acquittal was based by resorting to the device of stopping short of finding the accused guilty and passing sentence on him. This would be a subterfuge impermissible in out judicial process".

43. It is interesting to note that all the decisions discussed in Satyendra Nath Dutta's case had been touched upon in the decision in K.Ramachandran v. V.N.Rajan & Anr. [2009(5) Supreme 751], a case dealing with the revision against acquittal and to the same effect.

44. The manner in which a revision against the acquittal is to be dealt with is uniform and also finds reflection in decisions of this Court, among other Judgments in Mohamed Nagoor Meeran v. The State and others reported in 1995 Crl.L.J. 857 and Janarthanam v. Ananda Naidu and 17 others and State rep. by the Inspector of Police Ponneri, [(1999)1 LW(Crl.) 262]. In revision against acquittal, the restraint in exercise of power is more demanding than in a case of revision against discharge. There is no material and muchless argument towards meeting the requisites which when met alone would call for exercise of powers by this Court in revision against acquittal.

45. In the result, all the Criminal Revisions fail and are dismissed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are dismissed.

smn To

1.The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dindigul.

2.The Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption Act cum Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai.

3.The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kumbakonam.

4.The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pudukottai.

5.The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trichy.

6.The Inspector of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Dindigul.

7.The Additional Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.