ORDER Harries, J.
1. These are applications in revision by Sipahi Lal and Ram Narain praying that an order passed by the learned District Judge of Moradabad dated February 27, 1936, directing that a complaint be made against them to the District Magistrate for their prosecution under Section 193, Indian Penal Code, be set aside.
2. The opposite party has taken a preliminary objection and has contended that no revision lies from such an order. The matter arose in this way:
Proceedings were first taken before a learned Munsif under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code. A. preliminary enquiry was held but the learned Munsif was of opinion that the facts did not disclose any ground for ordering a complaint to be made against Sipahi Lal and Ram Narain. The present opposite party being dissatisfied with that decision appealed as he was entitled to do under Section 476 B, Criminal Procedure Code, to the learned District Judge. The learned Judge considered the whole of the evidence which had been placed before the learned Munsif and came to the conclusion that this was a case which required a full enquiry in a Criminal Court and directed that a prosecution of these two persons should be commenced. Against that order Sipahi Lal and Ram Narain have applied in revision to this Court alleging that the learned Judge acted in this case illegally and with material irregularity.
3. The jurisdiction of Court in revision is governed by Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. This present case cannot possibly fall within Sub-section (a) or (b) of this section, but it is contended that it falls within Sub-section (c). It is said that the Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity but, it must be remembered, that in itself is not a ground for interfering in revision. The illegality or material irregularity mu9t have occurred in the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court. In short, before I can interfere I must be satisfied that the learned District Judge acted in the exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
4. There can be no doubt that the learned Judge had full jurisdiction to deal with this matter and all that is urged against the order is that it is wrong in law. No argument has been addressed to me suggesting that the learned Judge did anything in the course of this enquiry which was in any way contrary to the rules of law or procedure affecting the matter. He had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, he conducted the appeal properly and after so conducting it decided the case. He may have decided it wrongly, but that is very different from an illegal exercise of jurisdiction or material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. In my judgment it is quite impossible to say in this case that the learned Judge did anything which can possibly bring this case within Section 115, Civil Procedure Code and that being so, I am bound to hold that I have no jurisdiction to entertain this application.
5. However, in the event of my being wrong upon this point I have heard arguments upon the merits, and, even if I had power to interfere, I am perfectly satisfied that this is a case where this Court should not interfere. The learned District Judge has directed a prosecution of the applicants under' Section 193, Penal Code, for fabricating false evidence. The basis of the prosecution is that these two persons signed an endorsement on the back of a duplicate copy of a notice to the effect that the opposite party Suraj Sahai was found at about 5 30 p M. on December 13, 1934, and that he refused to accept a copy of the notice handed to him by the Court Amin and consequently that such notice was affixed to the door of his house which was open. It was the opposite party's case that he was at this time in Bombay and that, therefore, this endorsement on the back of the notice was a deliberate false statement. The learned Munsif was not satisfied that the statement was false and in any event held that the statement was not material because of certain events which bad happened. The learned District Judge was of opinion that the opposite party's statement, that, he was in Bombay at the time, was in all probability true and, therefore, that the endorsement was false. He further was of opinion that nothing which had happened could make the statement immaterial in the proceedings which were then taking place. I am wholly unable to say that, there was no sound material upon which the learned District Judge could arrive at the conclusion that this was a case which should be investigated in the Criminal Court. I express no opinion whatsoever upon the merits and all I need say is that the material before the learned District Judge does suggest that this is a serious matter which should be thoroughly investigated. It is a case where a complaint should be made and that being so, I hold that on the merits this application--even if I can entertain it--has no force.
6. The result, therefore, is that the applications of both Sipahi Lal and Ram Narain are dismissed with costs.