This revision is directed against an order imposing penalty upon the revisionist-assessee in terms of the provisions of Section 4-B (5) of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 19481. Admittedly, the revisionist-assessee held a recognition certificate under Section 4B of the 1948 Act for manufacture of "iron and steel". The penalty has come to be imposed upon the assessee for the Assessment Years 1978-79 and 1979-80 consequent to iron and steel being used by it for manufacture of "two-way cages". It is submitted by the learned counsel for the revisionist that "iron and steel" was a generic entry which found mention in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 19562 and therefore use of iron and steel for the purposes of manufacture of two-way cages could not have visited the revisionist with penalty under sub section (5) of Section 4-B. It is further submitted that the recognition certificate held by the assessee had not been cancelled and therefore also the imposition of penalty was unjustified.
Learned Standing Counsel, on the other hand, has drawn the attention of the Court to the language of Section 14 and more particularly to the entry of "iron and steel" as carried in clause (iv) and submits that such an entry was not and could not have been accorded amplification and would have to be necessarily restricted to the specific articles which found mention in the various sub clauses appended to clause (iv).
Insofar as the second submission of the learned counsel for the revisionist is concerned, this Court finds that the levy of penalty under sub section (5) of Section 4-B would stand attracted upon a finding being returned that goods were being used for purposes other than for which the recognition certificate had been granted. Learned counsel for the revisionist does not dispute that the recognition certificate was granted for the purposes of manufacture of "iron and steel". The mere fact that the recognition certificate had not been cancelled would not, in the opinion of this Court, relieve the revisionist from the levy of a penalty. This simply because the provision does not mandate the cancellation of the recognition certificate as a sin qua non or condition precedent to the imposition of penalty.
Insofar as the question of manufacture of two-way cages and they being covered under the entry of "iron and steel" goes, the Court finds that Clause (iv) of Section 14 employs the words "that is, to say". Following the well settled principles and rules of statutory interpretation especially when the words "that is, to say" are employed by the legislative author, it is obvious that articles in order to fall under clause (iv) would have to stand encompassed under the various sub clauses which stand appended thereto. Admittedly, two-ways cages do not find mention in any of the sub clauses appended to Clause (iv). The use of the words "that is, to say" forbids and clearly restricts the Court from conferring an expansive meaning upon the phrase "iron and steel".
One may in this connection usefully refer to what was held by the Supreme Court in Bansal Wire Industries Limited and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh.3 Reiterating what was held by the Court in Pyare Lal Mehrotra [(1976) 1 SCC 834], the Court held: -
"20. In the aforesaid decision in Pyare Lal Malhotra [(1976) 1 SCC 834 : 1976 SCC (Tax) 102] the very word "that is to say", as per Section 14 of the Central Act was considered and it was held that originally expression "that is to say" is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined and that such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word "includes" is generally employed. In the context of Section 14 of the Central Act, this Court in the said decision held that the expression "that is to say" is used in Section 14 apparently to mean to exhaustively enumerate the kinds of goods in a given list. It was also held in the said decision that the purpose of an enumeration in a statute dealing with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales."
Consequently, this Court finds no merit in the challenge laid to the order imposing penalty under Section 4-B (5) of the 1948 Act.
The revision shall consequently stand dismissed.
(Yashwant Varma, J.) Order Date: - 4.7.2016 Arun K. Singh