JUDGMENT M. N. Shukla, J.
2. The plaintiff respondent made an application on 24th May, 1972 for leave to file a suit in forma pauperis for recovery of Rs. 23,202.10P. from the defendant. It is significant that the defendant appeared at this stage and contested the said application. It is also necessary to mention that the plaintiff applied under Order 38 Rule 5, C. P. C. for attachment before judgment. This again was contested by the defendant. The leave to sue in forma pauperis was granted on 24th Jan. 1974. The application for attachment, we have been informed, was dismissed. Thereafter fresh summons was issued to the defendant company and the court by its order dated 22nd Dec. 1975 held that the summons has been sufficiently served on the defendant. In these circumstances, an ex parte decree was passed against the defendant on 4th March, 1976. On 11th March, 1976 an application supported by an affidavit was moved by one Sri Rama Shankar Upa-dhya claiming to be the attorney of the appellant. The application was dismissed by the impugned order dated 4th March, 1976.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The appellant's counsel strenuously contended that the affidavit filed by the attorney of the Company was not countered by any affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff and, therefore, the application under Order 9 Rule 13, C. P. C. should have been allowed. In the first place, an objection was filed on behalf of the plaintiff opposing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. Secondly, there is no rule of law or equity which prevents a court from not accepting an affidavit if it is intrinsically worthy of acceptance merely because no counter affidavit has been filed. As we shall presently point out, the allegation made in the defendant's affidavit is wholly inadequate for making out a case for setting aside the ex parte decree.
4. In fact, the case has some very serious features. Firstly, the application under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC itself was not made by the Company or an officer properly authorised, presumably company must have been managed by more than one person. There is absolutely no explanation on behalf of the appellant as to why it was not possible for the company to take steps in the case at the proper stage through one of its officers or persons properly authorised in this behalf. Sri R. S., Upadhyaya, has never actually filed the alleged power of attorney in the court below, had no locus standi to move such application which was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
5. We have not the least doubt that the defendant was completely disentitled from asking for the setting aside of the ex parte decree when it was admitted in para 8 of the affidavit filed by the aforesaid attorney that he had been informed on phone by the clerk of the Calcutta Head Office that a registered letter containing the summons without plaint was received at the Head Office on 30-10-1975 and the same had been forwarded to him at Kanpur on 3-11-1975 for proper steps to be taken. In view of such unambiguous admission it is not open to the defendant to contend that it had no knowledge of the institution of the suit against it. It appears to be merely an invented excuse that the summons was not accompanied by a copy of the plaint. When the summons was received, the plaint too would have been most probably sent along with it. Even if it was not so, the appellant could have approached the court and then asked for a copy of the plaint The affidavit of the attorney, to which I have already referred, says that the summons received at the Calcutta Head Office was forwarded to the appellant at Kanpur by a letter dated 3.11.1975. No particulars of such letter have been given. There is no allegation in the affidavit that the letter had been sent by registered post. The appellant did not even care to file the affidavit of the person who may have posted such letter. In these circumstances this allegation appears to be wholly false. Moreover, as we said at the very outset, there was no point in indulging in this alleged charge of the attorney of the Company. The Company must be having at its disposal other officer and responsible persons who could have been entrusted with the duty of taking proper steps in the case. There was absolutely no point in forwarding summons with the alleged letter dated 3-11-1975 to Kanpur. The only explanation for this strange conduct offered on behalf of the defendant is that since the attorney was travelling from station to station and he was at that time expected to be at Kanpur, the letter was forwarded to Kanpur. All this appears to be absolutely false and no ground has been made out for setting aside the ex parte decree. The explanation offered for not being present on the date of hearing is wholly insufficient. This appeal is devoid of merit.
6. For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal with costs.