By this application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the applicants seek quashing of the first information report registered vide C. R. No. I - 5 of 2006 filed before the ATS (Operation), Unit-II, State of Gujarat, Ahmedabad.
The respondent No.2 - Bipinbhai Dayabhai Soni, Chairman, Sumatinath (Shahibag) Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. lodged the above referred first information report against the applicants and others alleging commission of the offences punishable under sections 384, 120 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code, wherein it is inter alia alleged that the applicants herein demanded a sum of Rs.15 lakhs from him for the purpose of withdrawing the civil suit instituted by them against the first informant.
Today, Mr. Y. S. Lakhani, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the applicants and Mr. P. R. Nanavati, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent No.2 - first informant have jointly placed on record a consent purshish filed in Appeal from Order No.31 of 2007 between Sumatinath (Shahibag) Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and others v. Karimaben Hanifbhai Malani and others. It was submitted that under the said consent purshish, the parties have amicably settled the dispute between them pursuant to which, it has been agreed that the appellant No.2.1 i.e. respondent No.2 herein has agreed not to pursue the above referred first information report and has agreed to get the complaint filed by him against the respondent No.1.1 and others quashed by consent. Both the learned advocates have jointly submitted that in the light of the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties, the first information report in question is required to be quashed in the interest of justice.
In Madan Mohan Abbot v. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case whereby the High Court had declined the prayer for quashing of the prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 379, 406, 409, 418, 506/34 IPC despite a compromise entered into between the complainant and the accused. The High Court had taken the view that since the offence punishable under section 406 was not compoundable, the settlement between the parties could not be recognized nor the pending proceedings quashed. The court summed up the approach to be adopted in such cases in the following words:
"6.
We need to emphasise that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilised in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law.
7. We see from the impugned order that the learned Judge has confused compounding of an offence with the quashing of proceedings. The outer limit of Rs.250 which has led to the dismissal of the application is an irrelevant factor in the latter case. We, accordingly, allow the appeal and in the peculiar facts of the case direct that FIR No. 155 dated 17-11-2001 PS Kotwali, Amritsar and all proceedings connected therewith shall be deemed to be quashed."
To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 where relying upon the decision in B.S. Joshi, the Supreme Court took note of the settlement arrived at between the parties and quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with section 120-B IPC and held that since the criminal proceedings had the overtone of a civil dispute which had been amicably settled between the parties, it was a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of quashing of the criminal proceedings since the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise.
In Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1 the Supreme Court observed thus:
"8.
In our view, the High Court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the criminal proceedings cannot be supported. The first information report, which had been lodged by the complainant indicates a dispute between the complainant and the accused which is of a private nature. It is no doubt true that the first information report was the basis of the investigation by the police authorities, but the dispute between the parties remained one of a personal nature. Once the complainant decided not to pursue the matter further, the High Court could have taken a more pragmatic view of the matter. ...
9. As we have indicated hereinbefore, the exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC of Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary to be exercised in the facts of each case. In the facts of this case we are of the view that continuing with the criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility."
In Shiji v. Radhika,(2011) 10 SCC 705, the Supreme Court after referring to its earlier decisions as well as the above referred decisions held thus:
"17.
It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 CrPC on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 CrPC."
Examining the facts of the present case in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, on a plain reading of the first information report, it is apparent that the dispute involved is more in the nature of a civil dispute and is personal in nature. The parties have amicably settled the dispute between them pursuant to which, the first informant is no longer interested in prosecuting the applicants. Under the circumstances, there are hardly any chances of an ultimate conviction. Continuance of the proceedings would, therefore, be an exercise in futility. Under the circumstances, no useful purpose would be served if the prosecution is permitted to continue. This is, therefore, a fit case for exercise of powers under section 482 of the Code.
For the foregoing reasons, the application succeeds and is, accordingly, allowed. The first information report registered vide C. R. No. I - 5 of 2006 filed before the ATS (Operation), Unit-II, State of Gujarat, Ahmedabad, is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute accordingly.
[HARSHA DEVANI, J.] parmar* Top