JUDGMENT Parmeshwar Dayal, J.
1. A notification under Section 15(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 was issued on Jan. 30, 1985 calling upon all the Assembly Constituencies in the State of Uttar Pradesh to elect Members of the Legislative Assembly. The last date of filing nominations was 6-2-1985 and the last date of withdrawal was 9-2-1985. The polling was to take place on 2-3-1985. The petitioner Shyam Lal Rawat and the respondents Ram Lal and 10 others contested the election which was held on 2-3-1985. After counting, the respondent 1 Ram Lal son of Laltu was declared elected on 5-3-1985 from the reserved seat of Assembly Constitutency 77 Sidhauli, district Sitapur. The respondent 1 Ram Lal secured 22,467 votes followed by the petitioner Shyam Lal Rawat who secured 20,999 votes, thus with a margin of 1468 votes.
2. The petitioner challenges the election of the respondent 1 Ram Lal son of Laltu by means of this Election Petition on the grounds that the general election was formerly held in the month of May, 1980 when the respondent 1 was elected and he continued to be a Member of the Legislative Assembly as well as an Assistant Teacher of Junior Vidyalaya against the provisions of Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution of India read with Article 100(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act. There has been an improper reception of votes in favour of the respondent 1 while the valid votes cast in favour of the petitioner were illegally rejected. Some valid votes were improperly rejected. The respondent 1 got printed dummy ballot papers against the mandate contained in para 13 of chapter 11 of Arrangement for Poll of Hand Book of Returning officers. The respondent 1 comitted corrupt practices in distributing the pamphlets with a view to create hatred against the petitioner, as contemplated by Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. He paid a sum of Rs. 3000/- to the respondent 10 Ram Lal son of Chandrika and a sum of Rs. 3000/-to respondent 6 Muneshwar son of Delia for contesting the election. The nomination papers of the respondent 1 have been improperly accepted as he was holding an office of profit under the State Government. The nomination papers of the respondent 10 Ram Lal son of Chandrika also were improperly accepted as he was also holding an office of profit under the State Government, being a Bus Conductor in the U.P.S.R.T.C. The counting was done against the mandate contained in the Hand Book for Returning Officers.
3. The petitioner prayed for setting aside the election of respondent 1 and for declaring the petitioner as duly elected member from 77 Sidhauli Assembly Constituency, Sitapur.
4. The respondent 1 Ram Lal son of Laltu moved a CM Application No. 107(E) of 1985 for dismissing summarily the election petition under Order VI, Rule 16, C.P.C., Order VII Rule 16 and Section 151, C.P.C read with Sections 86 and 87 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter to be called as Act). An affidavit has been filed in support of this application, and it has been averred that the copy of the election petition, annexures and schedules etc. which were supplied to the petitioner are not the correct and true copy of the original election petition; true and correct copy of the petition has not been filed for service on the respondent 1 as contemplated by Ss. 81 and 83 of the Act; clear and full particulars of the material facts have not been given in the petition; bald, vague, ambiguous and misleading allegations were made in the petition; the respondent 1 submitted his resignation on 6-2-85 without depositing the salary of 3 months with the State Government when it was the last date for filing the nomination papers; the respondent 1 has never been an employee of the U.P.S.R.T.C., the verification of the petition, annexures and affidavit has been defective, and that the petition is bad for non-compliance of Ss. 81 and 83 of the Act.
5. The petitioner filed objections vide CM. Application No. 112(E) of 1985, supported with a counter-affidavit, denying the correctness of the allegations made in the C.M. Application No. 107(E) of 1985 and the accompanying affidavit.
6. The only point that arises for decision is that whether this election petition is liable to be dismissed in view of the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 17, C.P.C. and the provisions of the Act.
7. Section 87 of the Act lays down that subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Civil P.C. 1908 to the trial of suits.
8. Section 83 reads as follows : --
"Contents of petition --(1) An election petition --
(a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b) Shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Civil P.C. 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings;
Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegations of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition." The word "shall" used in the aforesaid two Ss. 83 and 87 emphasises on the fact that the provisions of these sections have to be strictly followed.
9. It was held in the case of Harish Chandra Bajpai v. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444 that a petition should contain a concise statement of the material facts which would include the facts relating to the election, the result thereof, the grounds on which it was sought to be set aside, the right of the petitioner to present the petition and the like. The proceedings of an election petition are of quasi criminal nature. So, the pleadings of an election petition should make out such a case that a charge or charges may be framed on the basis of each pleading. It was held in the case of Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh, AIR 1985 SC 89 that a proof of a corrupt practice must be beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.
10. It was held in the case of Samant N. Balakrishna v. George Fernandez, AIR 1969 SC 1201 that Section 83 is mandatory and requires first a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and then requires the full particulars. The difference between 'material facts' and 'particulars' has also been classified. The word "material" shows that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an imcomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in detail as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. Since a single corrupt practice committed by the candidate, by his election agent or by another person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent is fatal to the election, the case must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. If it has not been pleaded as -part of the material facts, particulars of such corrupt practice cannot be supplied later on. In order to make out a complete charge, the facts necessary must be included in relation to a "ground". The charge of corrupt practice is in the nature of quasi criminal charge, the trial of an election petition follows the procedure for the trial of a civil suit. The charge must, therefore, specify the material facts of which the truth must be established. The kind of corrupt practice which was perpetrated together with material facts on which a charge can be made out must be stated. Merely repeating the words of the statute does not amount to a proper statement of facts.
11. It was held in the case of Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh AIR 1972 SC 515 that general expressions like "fraudulently", "negligently" or "maliciously" in pleadings do not amount to any allegation of fact. Happening of a fact as well as a fact itself is material. Judged by that test, there was no allegation which would amount to any averment of any assistance as a fact in the absence of the kind of assistance being set out as a fact. The material fact or facts which, if established, would give the petitioner the relief asked for.
12. It was held in the case of Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia, AIR 1976 SC 744 that all the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are "material facts". In the context of a charge of corrupt practice, material facts would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practices alleged. All those facts that are essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action are "material facts" which must be pleaded, and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate to Section 83(1)(a) of the Act.
13. It was held in the case of Sultan Saluddin Owasi v. Mohd. Osman Shaweed, AIR 1980 SC 1347 that so far as the elected candidate is concerned, he is merely to rebut the allegations made by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as far as practicable.
14. It was held in the case of Daulat Ram Chauhan v. Anand Sharma AIR 1984 SC 621 that the allegation of corrupt practice must be so clear and specific that the inference of corrupt practice will irresistibly admit if no doubt or qualm. It cannot be left to time, chance or conjecture for the court to draw an inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning. As a logical consequence, it follows that where the allegation of fraudulent practice is open to two equal possible inferences, the pleadings of corrupt practice must fail.
15. Now, it has to be seen in view of the aforesaid established law that how far this election petition is up to the requisite standard.
16. Paras 1 to 10 are general and the correctness of the same is not disputed. Paras 11 to 14 refer to improper reception of votes. The points raised in these paragraphs are that the counting staff was appointed in disregard of mandate as contained in chapter XIV of Hand Book for Returning Officers and the counting did not start on the scheduled time. It has not been pleaded that what provisions of the mandate were violated and who violated them and how it affected the counting. The names of the persons who were appointed as counting supervisors and counting assistants have not been given. The size of the tables have been mentioned and that the process of counting could not be properly watched. It was alleged that the counting was done in an atmosphere which was not conducive to the job of scrutinising and counting the votes cast in favour of the candidates in the election, the agents had to remain standing; serious irregularities and illegalities were committed; votes of dead persons were cast and a large number of persons were dead on the poll whose votes were cast; and that a large number of persons were not present on the date of polling of which the schedules were given. These allegations do not make out the material facts which are required by law. The schedules have been prepared on the basis of imagination and surmises. It was a secret ballot and the figures could not be available to the petitioner. He has not mentioned that the persons whose names have been given in the schedules had informed him about the casting of votes by them or about the votes having been cast in their names or that the petitioner had looked into the ballot papers of the persons who were dead or that they had voted for a particular candidate.
17. In para 15, it has been pleaded that a majority of ballot papers were rejected and that they were wrongly rejected. This refers to the act of the officials and it is no allegation against the winning candidate. Further, it has not been specified that after all how the petitioner claimed that those ballot papers were rejected. So, this allegation is vague.
18. In the Schedules imaginary figures have been given which were based on speculation. Any number of ballot papers is not given. The petitioner claimed that he raised objections at the time of counting but he has not furnished any proof of the same. Had he raised any objection, he would have filed the copy of that application by which he might have raised objections.
19. In para 16, he referred to a dummy ballot paper and filed a specimen in Schedule 34. This Schedule 34 shows that the symbols of other candidates were also printed in it but their names were not mentioned against their symbols. The name of respondent 1 alone was printed against his symbol. It is not disputed that the symbol of other candidates should not have been mentioned in this dummy ballot paper vide Schedule 34. But more pleading on this point does not show that it was got printed by the respondent 1 or by his agent with his consent. It has also not been pleaded, much less established that it was circulated by the respondent 1 or by his agents nor it is believable that how it coud materially affect the result of the election. In view of the provision of Section 100(l)(d)(iv), he has to plead that by non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, the result of the election was materially affected, this pleading in para 16 is not covered by Section 100(2) also. The allegations made in this paragraph are obviously vague.
20. In paras 17 and 18, the petitioner pleaded that the respondent 1 distributed a pamphlet which was got printed by him for creating hatred against the petitioner and that he committed corrupt practice. This refers to Section 123(3) of the Act which lays down that the corrupt practice is the promotion of, or attempt to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens, on grounds of religion, race, caste, community, or language, by a candidate or his agent or any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent for the furtherance of the prospects of the election of that candidate or for prejudicially affecting the election of any candidate. A pamphlet vide Schedule 35 has been filed which is printed in Urdu. This pamphlet Schedule 35 appears to be issued by some Murlim gentleman and it referred to an election of some candidate of the year 1972 that he was not a proper person. In para 17, the exact wordings of Section 123(3A) of the Act were almost reproduced. It has not been pleaded that what were the grounds of creating caste discrimination or religious hatred etc. Any criminal charge cannot be framed on its basis. So, these paragraphs are not concise and precise, and are vague.
21. In para 10, it has been alleged that bribe was given to Nirmal Chand Jain and Shital Prasad Awasthi for contesting the election. It refers to Section 123(l)(A)(a)(b) of the Act which lays down that bribery shall be deemed to be a corrupt practice if any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, or any gratification, to any persons whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing a person to stand or not to stand, to withdraw or not withdraw from being a candidate at an election or an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as to reward to a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his candidature, and so on. The petitioner did not claim that he himself was present when any such amount was given to aforesaid candidates. He alleged that the amount was paid in presence of Nirmal Chand Jain and Shital Prasad Awasthi whose affidavits on this point have not been filed. It is not shown that how the respondent 1 was to be benefited by this alleged bribery. It has not been pleaded that how it could be a bargain for the respondent 1 or a motive for defeating the petitioner. The nexus itself is missing in the pleading.
22. It was held in the case of Jagannath v. Kamlapati Tripathi, 1981 All LJ 912 that bribery has been defined as any gift with the object to vote or refrain from voting or as a reward for having voted or refrained from voting. In the instant case, it is alleged that two candidates were bribed for contesting the election. Then, it was held in the cited case that when there was no allegation in the petition that tea etc. were offered as a reward for having voted for respondent 1 or for not voting for the petitioner, it could not be called as giving material fact of giving bribery. So, this paragraph is also vague and general.
23. In paras 20 to 34, it has been pleaded that the respondent 1 held the office of profit, he being a teacher in a sernior basic school. In para 21 of the petition, he is alleged to have been a teacher in a senior basic school. In para 7 of the affidavit of the respondent 1, he denied to have been an employee of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation but in the counter-affidavit of the petitioner in para 7, he has not denied to have been an employee of the U.P.S.R.T.C. and it was only averred that he was holding an office of profit under the State Government. In para 31, it is alleged that he was a member of Legislative Assembly on 5-2-1985 and he manufactured a fictitious document with the connivance of the Manager, Nehru Vidyalaya, Sidhauli, Sitapur and with the connivance of the Principal of that Institution and of the District Basic Education Officer, Sitapur as the resignation submitted by him purported to have been written by him on 1-12-1984, and the same was treated to be a resignation from 1-1-1985 and was accepted by the Manager on 12-12-1984. This partly referred to his previous tenure of a Member of the Legislative Assembly. The respondent 1 claimed that he had submitted his resignation much before the filing of the nomination papers. The dates have been given by the petitioner in his election petition on the basis of imagination only. Unnecessary arguments were advanced on the point that if a teacher of a senior basic school held an office of profit or not or that it was a privately managed school. This point is not to be decided in this case. The correctness of the pleadings has to be seen that how far they are in conformity with the statute. There is nothing to show on record that the date on the resignation was made ante timed. Since his resignation was of a early date than the date of his filing nomination papers, he could not be deemed to have been holding the office of profit on the date of filing his nomination papers. So, these paragraphs have been unnecessarily introduced in this case. The respondent 1 relied on the case of Bhagwati Prasad Dixit v. Rajeev Gandhi. 1985 All WC 682.
24. In paras 35 to 41, the petitioner pleaded about the respondent 10 that he was holding an office of profit in the Transport Department and he had not deposited three months' salary at the time of his resignation and that his nomination paper was wrongly accepted. The respondent 10 was not declared successful. He is alleged to have resigned on 1-2-85 i.e. on the date of filing the nomination paper. It is not shown that if he had resigned before or after the filing of the nomination papers. The acceptance of his nomination papers did not affect the election of the petitioner and it could have no effect on the merits of the case of the petitioner as against the respondent 1, the winning candidate. It was held in the case of Ashok Kumar v. Ajay Biswas, AIR 1985 SC 211 that an Accountant Incharge of Agartalla did not hold office of profit under the government of Tripura and was not disqualified for being a Member of Parliament. So, these paragraphs have not only been vague but have been unnecessarily introduced in the election petition.
25. In para 42, it has been repeated that the counting tables were not properly arranged. Even if it is supposed that the tables were not properly arranged, the election cannot be held void on that ground. So, this paragraph is also vague and unnecessary.
26. It is not correctly worded. Perhaps the word "made out" was to be used and the word "made" is missing. Any way, this reflects on the real intention and motive of the petitioner for filing this petition. He now wants the reopening of inspection and recounting of which the stage has already passed. It is a secret voting and recounting is permitted very sparingly when a fool proof case is made out for the same. The petitioner ought to have given grounds for inspection and recounting at this stage. So, this paragraph is also vague.
27. Para 44 relates to the deposit of the amount of security.
28. Strangely enough, there is no paragraph in this petition where in the cause of action might have been mentioned in a concise form.
29. The prayer (a) is to the effect "to set aside the election of respondent 1 to be void." It is not happily worded. Either a declaration ought to have been sought or a prayer for setting aside the election should have been made.
30. The copy filed by the respondent 1 shows that a complete and true copy was not supplied to him in as much as at page 5 in para 10 of the original petition, a reference of Article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution and of Section 100(l)(c) of the Act has been made in the original, while in the copy reference of Article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution and of Section 100(l)(a) has been made. In para 13 at page 8 of the original election petition, in the third line, the words are "such persons (voters) in favour of respondent 1," but the same line reads in the copy as "such by some boy persons (voters) in favour of respondent 1." All this shows that the petitioner did not compare the copy with the original and attested the same to be correct. Even though, it can be called a minor technical defect, but its attestation to be true copy by the petitioner cannot be called to be proper and justified. It was held in the case of A. Madan Mohan v. Kalavakunta Chandrasekhara, AIR 1984 SC . 871 that it is a well settled principle of interpretation of statute that wherever a statute contains stringent provisions, they must be liberally and strictly construed so as to promote the object of the Act.
31. On the other hand, the petitioner contended that the proceedings of election started when the first Notification for election to Parliament was made on 15-10-1984. But the Notification regarding the election to the State Assembly was made on 30-1-1985. He then referred to the various definitions under the Act and to the appointment of the Returning Officers and other Staff etc. But all this has nothing to do with the pleadings which have to be scrutinised in view of the objections raised by the respondent 1.
32. He claimed that an endorsement was made on the election petition that there has been a compliance of all the provisions of the Act. He relied on the case of Jugal Kishore v. Ratnakar, AIR 1976 SC 2130. But the endorsement of the Additional Registrar was an official formal act which could not mean to certify that the pleadings were made in accordance with law.
33. He also referred to the case of Madan Mohan v. Kalavakunta Chandrasekhara, AIR 1984 SC 871, in which case it was held that copies of all the annexures need not be served on the respondent. But it was held in the cited case that where the election petition filed was accompanied by as many copies as were the respondents, the petition was duly verified and the copies thereof were accompanied by the necessary Schedule containing the details of corrupt practice, and the Schedule or the annexures to the petition were also signed by the election petitioner, application for throwing out the election petition would not be maintainable on the ground that copies of the documents and Schedules were not supplied to the respondent. It does not lay down that no correct copy should be given or else the result would not be affected even if wrong copies were supplied. The petitioner relied on the case of Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 and on the case cited in AIR 1985 SC 1133 in which case it was held that the Tribunal could not go far away from the provisions of Act, 1951. This proposition of law is not to be disputed. In view of the provisions of the Act itself the provisions of C.P.C. have to be considered.
34. The petitioner contended that the petition could not be dismissed at a preliminary stage as under Section 86 of the Act, it can be dismissed for non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 81, 82 and 117 only. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of Bhagwati Prasad Dixit (Ghorewala v. Rajeev Gandhi, 1985 All WC 682 and to the case of Jagannath Prasad Singh v. Kamlapati Tripathi, 1981 All LJ 912.
35. He referred to the case of Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Birjilal Nandlal Biyani, AIR 1955 SC 610 in which case, there were some items which were not vague and it was held that all the paragraphs of the petition could not be deleted and the petitioner should be called upon to amend the pleadings at an early stage. But this cited case does not lay down that vague paragraphs also should not be deleted. In case, the entire election petition consists of vague paragraphs except a few general paragraphs which referred to the established facts, and those vague paragraphs are deleted, there remains nothing in the petition itself to keep it alive and the only consequence that would follow is the dismissal of the petition for want of a cause of action, as contemplated by Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C
36. The petitioner claimed that every charge arising out of the election petition has to be considered, as held in the case of Arun Kumar Bose v. Mohd. Furkan Ansari, (1984) 1 SCC 91 : (AIR 1983 SC 1311). Of course, each allegation has to be scrutinised and it has to be seen that if a specific charge can be framed on the basis of the allegations made in the election petition.
37. He relied on the case of Roop Lal Sethi v. Nachhattar Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1559 in which case it was held that paras 4 to 18 of the election petition should not have been struck off under Order VI, Rule 16, C.P.C. as there was no finding that the averments in the said paras were either unnecessary, frivolous or vexatious or that they were such as might tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit nor was there any finding that the averments therein were such as constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. But in the instant case, each and every relevant para has been examined and the cited case does not affect the merits of this case. He further referred to the case of S. Har Charan Singh v. Khazan Singh, (1985) 1 SCC 370 : (AIR 1985 SC 236) and contended that each charge is independent of other charges. This proposition of law is not to be disputed but it has to be seen that how far a charge or charges could be made out on the basis of the allegations made in the petition.
38. He relied on the case of Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal, AIR 1983 SC 303 which is a case covered by the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
39. He referred to the case of Baldeo Singh v. Teja Singh Swatantra, AIR 1975 SC 693 in which case the stage when a recounting has to be ordered has been detailed and it has been held that a ballot paper should not be rejected while the election personal has to be fair. All this has nothing to do with the present election petition.
40. He referred to the case of Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484 in which case it was held that procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice, and it referred to an inter-locutory order. The facts of this case are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. He further relied on the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR 1978 SC 851 which refers to the powers of an Election Commission, and this has nothing to do with the election petition.
41. He referred to the case of Om Prabha Jain v. Gian Chand, AIR 1959 SC 837 in which case the treasury receipt did not accompany the election petition and, therefore, it has no bearing to the present case.
42. The petitioner argued on the mathematical proposition and claimed that there was a margin of 1468 votes only against the winning candidate and if wrongly rejected votes or the votes of the dead persons etc. are to be calculated, he would certainly win. But any case for recounting is not made out by his pleadings themselves and these calculations are based on conjecture, speculation and imagination.
43. The petitioner submitted written arguments to supplement his oral arguments. The same has been placed on record and all the material points contained therein also have been discussed. It is not necessary to set out each and every point referred to in the arguments because the leading decisions of the Supreme Court as well as of the High Courts on the relevant questions have been considered and discussed.
43A. The conclusion is that the material facts in relation to a corrupt practice would include the groun'd, the charge, the facts constituting the charge, the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action, the manner and nature of the pleadings and the ingredients of the corrupt practices alleged. The pleadings of material facts should be precise, specific and full, particularly complete, not nebulous, beyond doubt and exact; and they should not contain bald, vague and twilight allegations. The allegations must be strictlyand concisely constructed to the spirit of law.
44. If the pleadings of paras 10 to 43 of the election petition including the clause of prayer are judged in the light of standards, laid down by law, these pleadings do not come within the ambit of the required standard. Order VI, Rule 16, C.P.C. empowers a Court to strike out a pleading which is found unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice or delay the fair trial of the suit or which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. So, all these paras 10 to 43 are liable to be struck out, as argued by Sri S. C. Maheshwari, learned counsel of the respondent 1. The remaining paras 1 to 9 and 44 are general and the election petition cannot be continued on their basis.
44A. Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. lays down that a plaint shall be rejected where it does not disclose a cause of action. It was held in the case of Madan Lal v. Zargham Haider, AIR 1958 All 596 that after striking out all the pleadings in the election petition, the petition itself was liable to be dismissed on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of action, and the dismissal would be one on merits under Section 98 of the Act. It was held in the case of Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, AIR 1957 SC 444 that the expression "trial" meant the entire proceedings before the Tribunal from the time when the petition is transferred to the Tribunal and until the pronouncement of the award and that when the petition does not contain a cause of action, there is nothing more in the case to be done and the case is liable to be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act. It was observed in the case of Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, AIR 1972 SC 515 that since an election petition has to be tried in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, in view of Section 87 of the Act, it is liable to be dismissed like a suit which does not furnish a cause of action. This election petition, therefore, must be dismissed.
45. Accordingly, this Election Petition No. 17 of 1985 is dismissed with costs to the respondent 1 which costs are assessed at Rs. 2000/-. The costs shall be paid out of the security money. The costs of the other respondents shall remain easy.
46. The Civil Misc. Application No. 107(E) of 1985 is allowed and the Civil Misc. Application (Objections) No. 112 (E) of 1985 is dismissed.
47. Substance of the judgment shall be sent forthwith to the Election Commission and the Hon'ble Speaker of the U.P. Legislative Assembly, Certified copies of the judgment shall be expeditiously sent to the Election Commission in duplicate.