JUDGMENT J.C. Gupta, J.
1. This is tenant's petition for quashing the orders dated 13.11.1997 and dated 21.4.1998 passed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 1 respectively whereby the release application moved by the landlord-respondent No. 3 under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') has been allowed.
2. The dispute relates to a shop situate in Gandhi Bazar. Kasba Baghpat (now a separate District), whose boundaries were given in the release application. The landlord applied for the release of the disputed shop with the allegations that in order to extend his business and to augment his income for meeting out the requirements of his family and his children, the necessity of setting up business of ready-made garments has arisen because the Ice Factory owned by him was not yielding sufficient income on account of the same being a seasonal business in summer season only and since he has no other suitable accommodation with him, his need for the disputed shop was most genuine, bona fide and pressing. It was further pleaded that the tenant-petitioner was in no need of the shop in question. The landlord's claim was contested by the petitioner, inter alia, on the grounds that Naresh Chand Jain, the elder brother of the landlord was a bachelor and living jointly with the landlord and they were having huge income to the tune of Rs. 5,000 per day from a Cinema Hall known as "Monica Theatre' ; that from the Ice Factory the earning of the landlord was about Rs. 9,00,000 per annum : that he has also established "Mayur Oil Mill" near the bus stand which was being run in the names of Smt. Rekha Jain the wife of the landlord, Smt. Manju Jain wife of the brother of the landlord and Sanjay Kumar Jain and the share of landlord's wife from the said business comes to about Rs. 12.00,000 per annum. According to the petitioner, the total income of the landlord was about Rs. 28.00.000 per annum. The petitioner further pleaded that the landlord has available with him a vacant shop at Meerut Baghpat Road which he could use if in fact he wanted to set up the desired business of readymade garments. Petitioner's further case was that he has been running the business of grocery in the disputed shop for the last 25 years in the name of M/s. Shankar Lal Shri Chand and he did not have any other shop to shift the said business. The landlord refuted the tenant's allegations and it was stated by him that he was having no share in the income from 'Monica Theatre' as the same had fallen in the exclusive share of Naresh Chand Jain in a family partition and the said brother was living separately ; that his total income including his wife's income is Rs. 1.25 lacs per annum only whereas the expenses which he was incurring on the education of his children were move than Rs, 1 lac per annum. With regard to the availability of shop near Baghpat Meerut Road, it was stated by the landlord that it was not a shop but only a godown and being situated far away from the market area and township was not suitable to the landlord for the proposed business.
3. The Prescribed Authority by the order dated 13.11.1997 allowed the landlord's release application holding that the landlord's need for the disputed shop was genuine and bona fide and that he would suffer greater hardship than the tenant in case his application for release was rejected. The appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 22 of the Act has also been dismissed by respondent No. 1 by the order dated 21.4.1998 and the findings of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority, on both the relevant issues have been affirmed.
4. Since counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged, with the consent of the parties' counsel, this writ petition is disposed of finally.
5. Sri. S. K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the concurrent findings of fact of the authorities below as perverse, arbitrary and based on non-consideration of important aspects of the case. It was urged by him that when the landlord based his claim that he needed the shop in question to augment his income the burden to establish that his income was not sufficient to meet out the expenses of his family laid heavily upon the landlord, yet in the present case the landlord withheld the account books of the businesses run by him and his wife. It was submitted that the landlord possessed extensive properties and was having huge income and the alleged need as set up by the landlord in his application for establishing the busine'ss of readymade garments in the shop in question was only imaginary and illusory. Learned counsel for the respondents-landlord Sri. K. K. Dwivedi, on the other hand submitted that this Court in its writ jurisdiction has a limited scope and the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the authorities below are not liable to be interfered with.
6. In the case of Munni Devi v. Additional District Judge and others, AIR 1997 SC 29, it was held that this Court in its writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and it is not for the High Court to reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion different from that reached by the District Judge or the Prescribed Authority.
7. In Jai Bhagwan Goyal v. XVlth Additional District Judge. Muzqffarnagar and others. 1998 (3) AWC 1601, it was held as under :
"No authority is required for the proposition that findings recorded on the question of bona fide need as well as on the question of comparison of hardship are findings of fact and if they are supported by the evidence on record, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution would not reappreciate the evidence. It is not for the High Court to reappraise the evidence and to form its own opinion whether in the circumstances of the case. It considers the need of the landlord to be more pressing and genuine than that of the tenant. The duty, to appreciate the evidence is exclusively assigned by law to the Prescribed Authority and the appellate authority under the Act and findings of fact recorded by, the Court below will not be vitiated if there is legal evidence to support them, notwithstanding that some of the reasons given in support thereof are not very, convincing. It is also well-established that while exercising powers in writ proceedings a finding of fact recorded by the Courts below cannot be substituted by the High Court by its own finding of fact even on the ground that another more convincing view is possible from the evidence on record. It has to be shown that such findings suffer from a manifest error of law before this Court is called upon to make interference in those findings."
8. In the case of Smt. Nirmata Tandon v. Xth Additional District Judge and others, 1996 (2) ARC 411, it was held that the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in rent control matters is supervisory in nature and this Court does not sit as a Court of appeal. The Court would not embark upon the reappraisal of the evidence or substitute its own findings of fact in place of the findings reached by the fact finding authorities. It is clearly outside the Court and ambit of judicial review when this Court exercises its powers under Article 226. However, a finding of fact may be interfered with when it is based on wrong application of principles of law relevant thereto or material evidence has not been taken into consideration or a finding is otherwise arbitrary and perverse.
9. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal when the Legislature has not chosen to confer such a right. The jurisdiction of the High Court is limited to see that the subordinate Court or Tribunal or Authority functions within the limits of its powers. The High Court cannot correct an error of fact by examining the evidence afresh. The power of superintendence under Article 227 is to be exercised cautiously and only in appropriate cases of gross injustice. The power to issue writ of certiorari cannot be invoked simply to correct an error of fact which a superior court can only do in exercise of its statutory powers as a Court of appeal. Similarly, judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness of decision but it is a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Where the findings of fact arrived at by the fact finding authority are found to be rational and reasonable based on relevant material and the view taken is not such which no reasonable minded person would have ever reached, the finding should not be interfered with even if the same was not to the liking of the Court.
10. It is now well-settled that the powers of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are of judicial superintendence which cannot be exercised to upset the conclusions of fact, reached concurrently by the two Courts below. Whether the requirement of the landlord is bona fide and reasonable, the question has to be left for examination objectively by the fact-finding authorities and when this exercise has been made in a proper and legal manner this Court will not interfere even if it is of the opinion that another view on the evidence was possible. Appreciation of evidence is the domain of the fact-finding authorities.
11. After examining the material and facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not find sufficient grounds to make interference in the concurrent orders passed by respondent Nos. I and 2.
12. In the case in hand, a perusal of the judgment of the Courts below will indicate that both the authorities below have concurrently found that the children of the landlord are getting education in residential Schools at Mussoorle and the fee deposited in the year 1997 was more than Rs. 1 lakh ; that the total income of the landlord Including his wife was not more than Rs. 1.25 lakhs per annum ; that the Ice Factory of the landlord practically remains closed during winter season ; that as per the terms of the decree passed in Civil Suit No. 178 of 1985 and in the family settlement 'Monica Theatre' fell exclusively in the share of Naresh Chand Jain, the elder brother of the landlord and Naresh Chand Jain lived separately and his income was not being shared by the landlord ; that the total Income of the landlord was not sufficient to meet out the present expenses of the landlord and his family and having regard to the income and expenses.
the need for the shop in question for establishing the business of readymade garments was bona fide. Both the Courts below have aiso recorded concurrent findings of fact in favour of the landlord-respondent on the question of comparative hardship. It would further appear that both the Courts below have duly examined and considered each and every assertion made by the tenant petitioncr in opposition to the landlord's claim for the release of the shop. In the family partition only the lee Factory, the disputed shop and a godown situated at Baghpat-Meerut Road fell into the share of landlord. The mere fact that a landlord is already having a business will not be conclusive to hold that such a landlord cannot establish a new venture to have additional income. Every landlord, like any other ordinary citizen, has a right to set-up additional business and/or to augment his income in order to lead a peaceful and comfortable life. The relief contemplated under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act can be granted for setting up an additional business and for augmenting his income as every person is entitled to work for his own independent existence and is also entitled to choose his own trade, business or vocation suiting to his individual status, aptitude, education, qualification, experience, etc. Therefore, there can be no manner of doubt that tenanted accommodation can be released in favour of the landlord to provide him a source to augment his income so that he may lead a decent and comfortable life and to cater to the needs of his own growing family. Every parent tikes to give best education to his children and if with that object, the landlord has got admitted his two children in residential Schools at Mussoorie, it cannot be said that they were got admitted simply to create a ground for getting the shop in question released. The tenant-petitioner could not dispute the fact that the landlord's children are getting education in Mussoorie nor anything could be brought on record to falsify the landlord's assertion that he was incurring an expenditure of over Rs. 1 lac per annum on the education of his children. The very fact that the landlord thought of augmenting his income only after when his children were admitted in Mussoorie Schools speaks of his bona fides. The finding of the Courts below regarding the income of the landlord is based on a consideration of oral evidence as well as documentary evidence including the Income-tax Assessment orders which the landlord had filed before the Courts below. These assessment orders were public documents and the Courts below have committed no error in law in placing reliance over them. Since the landlord had brought on record assessment orders of the Income-tax Department in proof of his income, non-production of account books was of no consequence and the finding of fact on the question of bona fide need recorded by the authorities below is not vitiated on that ground.
13. As regards the petitioner's allegation that the landlord was having a vacant shop near the landlord's Ice Factory on Baghpat Meerut Road, the finding recorded is that the said accommodation was being used by the landlord as godown of his ice Factory and was not lying vacant and in any view of the matter, the same being situated far away from the city area was not suitable to the landlord for establishing the proposed business of readymade garments. It is well-established principle that the landlord's need could only be doubted if he is possessed of an alternative accommodation and the same is suitable for the purpose for which the tenanted accommodation is asked for. Therefore, the Courts below were perfeclly justified in taking the view that the said premises could not be regarded as an alternative accommodation available to the landlord for setting up the business of readymade garments because first of all, the same was not vacant as the same was in the use of the landlord as a godown of his Ice Factory and In any view of the matter, the same was not at all appropriate and well-fitted for the purpose for which the landlord has asked for the release of the disputed premises because the same was situated far away from the market in an inchoate area and no person would like to waste his investments in a business by setting up the same at such an unsullied place knowing and perceiving fully well that the business would bring only losses and no gains. As against this, the disputed premises is most ideally situated to subserve the purpose and object of the landlord. I am, thus, in line with the view taken by the two Courts below for excluding that premises as available to the landlord while judging the questions of his bona fide need and comparative hardships of the parties.
14. From the material placed on record, it could not be shown from the petitioner's side that the conclusions arrived at by the authorities below on both the relevant issues of bona fide need and comparative hardship are perverse or so grossly wrong or unjust or shocking that no reasonable minded person would have reached to such conclusions. In this view of the matter, interference is not required to be made by this Court in the concurrent findings 'of fact recorded by the authorities below and the need of the landlord for starting readymade garments business in the shop in question to have additional business in order to augment his Income cannot be said to be whimsical or frivolous and as the landlord does not have any other suitable accommodation available with him in the market area to meet his requirements, the claim of the landlord for the disputed shop has rightly been held to be bona fide and genuine.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner then next urged that since the elder brother of the landlord N. C. Jain has died during the pendency of the present writ petition and as he was a bachelor, after his death the landlord-respondent has acquired a share in the properties left by the deceased including Monica Theatre and these facts have been stated by the petitioner in the supplementary affidavit filed before this Court. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent-landlord, the fact of the death of N. C. Jain has not been disputed. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the earnings from the Monica Theatre must have increased the landlord's income substantially, and, therefore, the very need of the landlord of setting up a new business to augment his income has extinguished, and this subsequent event of the death of Naresh Chand has the effect of disentitling the landlord in getting the disputed premises released in his favour. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord argued that under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, the order of Appellate Authority attained finality and no event subsequent to the date of decision of the Appellate Authority can be looked into by this Court in writ jurisdiction. In support of his submission learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in M/s. Pnarma Traders and another v. VIIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and others, 1992 (2) ARC 592. In the aforesaid decision, the question which arose for consideration was, as to whether, while deciding the writ petition exercising supervisory Jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, any additional evidence concerning facts relating to developments taking place subsequent to the filing of the writ petition could be allowed to be brought on record and considered. Relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Rameshwar and others v. Jot Ram and others, AIR 1976 SC 49 and Hasmat Rai and another u. Raghunath Prasad. AIR 1981 SC 1711. it was held that where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. The learned single Judge deciding the aforesaid case after referring to the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Udai Bhan Singh alias Babbart Singh and others v. Board of Revenue, U. P. and others, 1974 RD 107 and the Division Bench case of Gopinath Gael v. 1st Additional District Judge, 1977 AWC 192, further held that proceeding in the will petition is independent proceeding and not a continuation of the suit or proceeding giving rise to it and this principle applies with greater force in the case of subsequent developments of facts. After referring to the relevant provisions of the Act, the learned Judge authoritatively laid down as under :
"It is therefore, obvious that under the Scheme of the Act, not only the matter relating to release of an accommodation is expected to be decided with most expediency, a finality has been attached to the order passed by the Appellate Authority in the proceedings for the grant of the release."
16. Paragraphs 21 and 22 of the said report are worth consideration and they are reproduced as under :
"21. From the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, to which a reference has already been made above, there can be no manner of doubt that a supervening fact having a fundamental impact can be taken notice of in a proceeding whether it be of an appeal or revision, wherein the appellate or revisory authority exercises the same jurisdiction as is exercisable by the original authority or Court, to mould the relief only. The basis for this appears to be that an appeal or revision, in that case, would be nothing else but a continuation of the suit or the original proceedings and the appellate or revisory authority can correct any mistake in the decree or order passed by the original authority or the trial court and further can substitute its own decree or order in place of the one passed by the trial court or the original authority.
22. The proceedings contemplated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be put at par with, such appellate or revisory proceedings where such authority is entitled under the relevant statute to correct any error in the impugned order or decree or could substitute its own order. The three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hasmat Rai and another (supra), was very emphatic when it laid down that the tenant can be precluded from inviting the Court to take into consideration subsequent events when the decree or order for eviction has become final."
17. In the case of Smt. Rajkumari Padma Sirtgh v. Vth Additional District Judge. Allahabad and others. 1994 (2) ARC 386, another learned single Judge of this Court also took the view that while dealing with Rent Control matters in writ jurisdiction, subsequent events occurring during the pendency of writ petition cannot be taken note of as a finality is attached to an order passed in appeal. Similar view has been taken in the case of Ganesh Lal Agarwal v. Radhey Shyam Bagaria and others. 1995 (J) ARC 361.
18. The Apex Court in a recent case of Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agrawal and others. 1997 SC & FB RC 274, has also taken the view that under the U. P. Rent Control Act, the order of the Appellate Authority is final and the said order is a decree of the civil court and decree of a competent court having become final cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by taking into account any subsequent event which might have happened after the decision in the appeal. In that case, the landlord for whose requirement the tenanted accommodation was asked for had died during the pendency of the writ petition.
19. In view of the aforesaid decisions, it would not be just and proper to permit the petitioner to bring on record events which developed after the decision of the appeal filed under Section 22 of the Act which under the provisions of the Act attained finality. In any view of the matter, even if the fact of the death of Naresh Chand Jatn which occurred after the order of release had reached finality with the dismissal of appeal of the tenant, is taken into consideration, that would not have any material effect on the concurrent Judgments of the Courts below.
20. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that even if a new look is given to the matter on account of the death of N. C. Jain, the same will not in any way have an adverse effect on the bona fide need of the landlord inasmuch as late N. C. Jain has left as many as seven heirs who have inherited the Monica Theatre and licence for running the Theatre has been issued by the District Magistrate in the name of Harish Chand Jain. Even if for argument sake, it is assumed that there has been an addition to the income of the landlord, it would be only to the extent of l/7th share of the total income earned from the said Theatre but still the same will not be sufficient to meet the incurring expenses of the landlord and his family as has been stated by the respondent in his counter-affidavit. Moreover, the landlord has a bona fide need to keep himseif engaged in a full lime independent business for augmenting his income and for that purpose, the shop in question is genuinely required by him. The death of Sri N. C. Jain has thus not affected the bona fide need of the landlord materially and the findings of the Courts, below regarding bona fide need of the landlord are not liable to be quashed on the basis of this subsequent development which occurred after the order of the appellate court had reached finality.
21. For the foregoing reasons and discussion, this writ petition, which is concluded by concurrent findings of fact, is dismissed with no order as to costs. Stay order shall stand vacated.
22. After the disposal of writ petition by this Court by the order dated 14.12.1998, the petitioner has moved this application for granting him 18 months time to vacate the premises in question on the terms and condition which this Court may impose. Respondent counsel Shri V. K. Dwivedl opposes this prayer. Shri S. K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner makes a statement at the Bar that the petitioner is prepared to give an undertaking that he shall vacate the premises in question within the time granted by this Court and hand over vacant possession of the same to the landlord peacefully and shall not induct any third person therein nor shall lay any claim to remain in occupation of the premises in question after the expiry of the period allowed by this Court.
23. In the circumstances, the petitioner is allowed time up to 30.6.1999 to vacate the premises in question and hand over its possession peacefully to the landlord respondent No. 3 on or before the expiry of the said period and shall not induct any third person therein subject to his filing an undertaking to this effect before the prescribed authority within three weeks from today. For a period of three weeks, the execution of the order of release made in favour of respondent No. 3 shall remain suspended and if the required undertaking is filed within the aforesaid period, the execution of the said order shall remain in obeyance till 30.6.1999. In the event of no such undertaking is filed within the aforesaid period of three weeks, it shall be open for the landlord to get the order of release enforced forthwith.
24. The application is accordingly disposed of.