JUDGMENT V.M. Sahai and Sabhajeet Yadav, JJ.
1. These three writ petitions have been filed by same petitioner. First Writ Petition No. 19760 of 2000 was filed seeking for relief in the nature of writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 11.04.2000 passed by Respondent No. 1 i.e. Inspector General Registration, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, contained in Annexure 8 of the writ petition where by the petitioner was awarded punishment of (i) withholding the payment of salary for the period during the suspension, (ii) withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect, (iii) awarding censure entry and withholding integrity for the year 1997-98 of the petitioner.
2. The relief sought in the writ petitions rests on facts that while working on the post of Sub-Registrar in the Registration Department of Government of Uttar Pradesh vide order dated 28.10.1999 the petitioner was placed under suspension. On the same day a charge sheet was served upon the petitioner containing as many as four charges against him. Vide aforesaid order dated 28.10.1999 Assistant Inspector General Registration, Mathura was also appointed as Inquiry Officer and petitioner was directed to submit his reply of the charges within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the charge sheet. A true copy of the charge sheet dated 28.10.1999 is on record as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. On receipt of the aforesaid charge sheet, the petitioner has submitted his reply before the Inquiry Officer on 15.11.1999. Along with the aforesaid reply, the petitioner has filed as many as 18 documents i.e. seven documents in support of reply of charge No. 1. three documents in support of reply to the charge No. 2, two documents in support of reply to the charge No. 3 and six documents in support of reply to the charge No. 4. A true copy of reply dated 15.11.1999 is on record as Annexure 3 to the writ petition. On receipt of the aforesaid reply, the Inquiry Officer has conducted disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner and vide his report dated 24.12.1999 submitted to the respondent No. 1, the Inquiry Officer has held that the charge Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were not proved against the petitioner, whereas the charge No. 3 was partially proved against him. The copy of the inquiry report supplied to the petitioner along with the show cause notice dated 18.02.2000 is on record as Annexure 4 of the writ petition. It appears that respondent No. 1/Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the findings of Inquiry Officer contained in inquiry report and issued a show cause notice on 18.2.2000 indicating that the charge Nos. 1, 2 and 4 are proved against the petitioner, whereas charge No. 3 remained partially proved against him. It was also indicated in the show cause notice that any major penalty under Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules 1999 can be awarded against the petitioner. A copy of show cause notice dated 18.2.2000 is on record as Annexure 5 of the writ petition.
3. It is further stated in the writ petition that the copy of aforesaid show cause notice dated 18.2.2000 was received by the petitioner through District Registrar on 7.3.2000 and a copy of the aforesaid show cause notice was also served upon him through Assistant Inspector General Registration on 13.3.2000 accompanying with inquiry report dated 24.12.1999. On receipt of the aforesaid show cause notice, the petitioner has submitted his detailed reply through registered post on 24.3.2000, which was received in the Office of respondent No. 1 on 28.3.2000 and has been recorded on 29.3.2000 in the receipt register at serial No. 2107. It is also stated that after submitting the reply through registered post on 24.3.2000 to the respondent No. 1 the petitioner came to know that respondent No. 1 at a relevant time was holding camp office at Lucknow and as such the petitioner has again submitted his reply to the said show cause notice to the respondent No. 1 at his Lucknow Camp Office through speed post on 29.3.2000. A true copy of postal receipt issued by the post office concerned for the said registered letter which contains reply submitted by the petitioner at Lucknow Camp Office of respondent No. 1 is on record as Annexure 6 of the writ petition. The copy of reply is also on record as Annexure 7 of the writ petition. Thereafter the petitioner did not receive any information whatsoever from the respondents asking him to appear either before respondent No. 1 or before respondent No. 2 and abruptly all of a sudden he has received the impugned order dated 11.4.2000 passed by respondent No. 1 whereby he has been punished simultaneously by aforesaid three penalties. Hence this petition.
4. While assailing the impugned order, learned Counsel for the petitioner in nut-shell has contended that the impugned order is vitiated under law on account of fact that while holding the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer has exonerated the petitioner form three charges out of four charges levelled against him, whereas the third charge was found partially proved against him but while disagreeing with the findings of Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority did not give any cogent reason on the basis of materials inasmuch as the reply submitted by the petitioner against show cause notice has not been considered at all. Elaborating his submission learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the copy of show cause notice dated 18.02.2000 was admittedly received to the petitioner through District Registrar on 7.3. 2000 and through Assistant Inspector General Registration on 13.3.2000 accompanying with inquiry report dated 24.12.1999 submitted by the Inquiry Officer asking the petitioner to submit his reply within fifteen days. On receipt of which the petitioner has submitted his reply through registered post on 24.3.2000 within eleven days from the date of receipt of notice, which was received in the office of respondent No. 1 on 28.3.2000 and was incorporated at serial No. 2107 of Dak Receipt Register dated 29.3.2000. Besides this, the petitioner has also sent a reply of aforesaid show cause notice through speed post on 29.3.2000 at Lucknow Camp Office of respondent No. 1. Thus, in any view of the matter the reply of show cause notice submitted by the petitioner has already been received in the Office of respondent No. 1 and was available with him prior to the date of impugned order passed against him but while taking decision in the matter, the respondent No. 1 did not consider the aforesaid reply submitted by the petitioner, thus committed gross illegality in coming to the conclusion arrived at by him while passing the impugned order against the petitioner. Such action of respondent No. 1 is contrary to the provisions of Rules of Disciplinary Inquiry applicable to the petitioner and violates the principles of natural justice and fair play. Contrary to it, while justifying the impugned action/impugned order on behalf State-respondents one Sri Harpal Singh posted as Assistant I.G. Registration, Mathura has filed a detail counter affidavit in writ petition on behalf of State Government.
5. We have heard Sri H.R. Mishra, Advocate for the petitioner, and Wasim Alam, learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of Respondents-State authorities and also perused the records produced by the Standing Counsel.
6. From bare reading of the counter affidavit it indicates that general vague averments have been made to the effect that the Disciplinary Inquiry was conducted against the petitioner by affording him adequate opportunity of hearing but there is no specific denial of the facts that the reply to the show cause notice dated 18.2.2000 submitted by the petitioner was received in the office of respondent No. 1 on 28.3.2000 within stipulated time and same was available to the respondent No. 1 prior to the impugned order dated 11.4.2000 was passed by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner, which have been specifically asserted in para 26 of the writ petition.
7. Besides, we have also summoned the record from the office of respondents and perused the same through learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of State Government. From perusal of register of Dak Receipt of the office of respondent No. 1, it is clear that in the Dak Receipt Register dated 29.3.2000 the petitioner's reply of show cause notice has been received in the office of respondent No. 1 at serial No. 2107. Even assuming that the petitioner was required to submit his reply within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the show cause notice, even then since the petitioner has received show cause notice on 7.3.2000 and 13.3.2000, therefore, fifteen days time shall be computed by excluding the date of receipt of notice lastly on 13.3.2000, thus so computing the period of fifteen days would expire on 29.03.2000. In that event of the matter it cannot be said that the reply could not be received within stipulated period of time provided under show cause notice. That apart, since the impugned order has been passed on 11.4.2000 against the petitioner, therefore, there can be no scope for doubt to hold that prior to the decision taken in the matter of Disciplinary Inquiry, the reply of show cause notice has already been received by the respondent No. 1 and was available with him but while deciding the matter he did not consider the reply of show cause notice submitted by the petitioner. In such facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that while taking the decision in the matter, the petitioner has been denied of reasonable/adequate opportunity of hearing prior to the impugned action taken against him. Thus, the action taken by the respondent No. 1 is in utter violation of Principles of Natural Justice and fair play inasmuch in violation of Rule 9(4) of U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1999 applicable to the petitioner. As such the action taken by the respondent No. 1 in this regard is vitiated under the aforesaid provisions of law inasmuch as violative of the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and cannot be sustained. Accordingly the impugned order dated 11.4.2000 passed by respondent No. 1 is hereby quashed.
8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that since the Inquiry Officer has exonerated the petitioner almost from all the charges i.e. from three charges out of four charges levelled in the charge sheet and only one charge i.e. charge No. 3 was found partially proved against him as such in such factual backdrop of the case having regard to the nature of charges levelled and found proved against the petitioner, the penalty imposed against him is so harsh and disproportionate to the gravity of the charges found proved against him as such treated to be arbitrary and cannot be sustained. He, further submitted that in any view of the matter it was not open for the Disciplinary Authority to impose three penalties simultaneously in a single disciplinary inquiry in view of recent pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and Anr. v. S.C. Parasar 2006, Vol. II, U.P.L.B.E.C., 1429. We have considered the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner and also examined the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court but the order which we propose to pass in the writ petition, we need not to go into the merit of the said submission and applicability of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in aforesaid decision in the case in question.
9. Since we have already held that the impugned order has been passed by Disciplinary Authority without considering the reply of show cause notice submitted by the petitioner and cannot be sustained in the eye of law and quashed the same, therefore, further question arises for our consideration is what relief would be appropriate in given facts and circumstances of the case. In this connection it is significant to point out that in the process of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this court normally does not take a decision on the controversial factual issue by appreciating the materials and evidence on record as a court of first instance or appellate authority, particularly, where the decision has yet to be taken by Disciplinary Authority on such an issue, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that since a fresh decision is required to be taken by Disciplinary authority in the matter, therefore, we need not to express our opinion on the merits of the case vis-a-vis, submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner, accordingly the respondent No. 1 is directed to take fresh decision in the matter after considering the reply of show cause notice submitted by the petitioner inasmuch as aforesaid submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner within a month from the date of production of certified copy of this order before the Disciplinary authority, by passing a reasoned and speaking order on merits.
10. By another Writ Petition No. 32758 of 2003, the petitioner has challenged a portion of the judgment and order dated 07.03.2003 passed by State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow in claim petition No. 1227 of 2000 filed by the petitioner, whereby while partly allowing the claim petition filed by the petitioner, the Tribunal has quashed a portion of order dated 18.11.1996 whereby three increments of petitioner had been withheld permanently and on that basis his integrity for the year 1995-96 was held to be doubtful and vide order dated 4.12.1999 the representation/appeal of the petitioner against the aforesaid punishment was rejected by the State Government. In operative part of the impugned order although the Tribunal has quashed the punishment of withholding three annual increments of the petitioner on permanent basis but left the integrity of the petitioner for the year 1995-96 to be remained doubtful leaving it open to State authorities to hold fresh disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the procedure as laid down under relevant Rules. A further relief in the nature of mandamus was sought for, commanding the respondents to consider the case of petitioner for his promotion to the post of Assistant Inspector General of Registration and to give all the benefits to the petitioner of the said post including seniority from the same date the juniors to the petitioner have been so promoted.
11. The relief sought in writ petition rests on the facts that the District Registrar. Agra had inspected the Office of Sub Registrar, Agra, Sadar in December 1995 and in respect of certain power of Attornies registered had raised some objections, thereafter, notice dated 07.03.1996 and 16.03.1996 calling for the petitioner's explanation in the matter were issued. In response to the aforesaid notice, the petitioner submitted his reply to the District Registrar vide his letter dated 09.04.1996 refuting the charges levelled in the aforesaid notice. Before the reply of petitioner reached to the Distinct Registrar, the Officer who had occupied the post at relevant time recommended to the Inspector General of Registration to initiate disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner vide his letter dated 03.04.1996. Thereupon a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by respondent No. 2 on 20.05.1996. In response to the said notice the petitioner has submitted his reply on 30.05.1996. Thereafter the petitioner was asked by the respondent No. 2 to appear before him on 05.07.1996, in compliance of which the petitioner appeared before the respondent No. 2 on the date fixed and his statement was recorded in respect of the matter of show cause notice given to him. Thereafter without holding any further inquity in the matter the respondent No. 2 has passed an order on 18.11.1996 inflicting upon the petitioner the punishments to the effect that the integrity of petitioner for the period 1995-96 to be held doubtful and his three increments were also stopped permanently. A copy of the order dated 18.11.1996 is on record as Annexure 2 of the writ petition.
12. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order, the petitioner preferred representation through proper channel to the State Government but his representation has also been rejected vide non-speaking order dated 04.12.1999, a copy of which is on record as Annexure 4 to the writ petition. The petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders before U.P. Public Service Tribunal by filing aforesaid claim petition inter-alia on the ground that the punishments inflicted upon the petitioner are major penalties but no full-fledged disciplinary inquiry has been held against him under Rule 55 of Civil Services Classification Control and Appeal Rules as applicable at relevant point of time, rather the procedure has been adopted by the respondents for imposing minor penalties against him. As such the punishments awarded against the petitioner is without authority of law and violative of relevant provisions of Rule 55 of CCA. Rules. A counter affidavit has been filed in the claim petition and after hearing the parties on merit the Tribunal has passed the impugned order dated 7th March 2003 whereby penalty of withholding three increments permanently of petitioner has been quashed but the integrity of the petitioner for the year 1995-96 left remained to be doubtful with liberty to the Disciplinary authority to hold fresh disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of law hence this petition.
13. We have carefully examined the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioner and also perused the record. From perusal of order dated 18.11.1996 passed by I.G. Registration, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition it appears that while holding inquiiy against the petitioner only notice dated 7.3.1996. 16.3.1996 and 20.5.1996 have been given to the petitioner asking him to submit his reply on the same but after considering the reply submitted by him on 9.4.1996 and 30.5.1996 and recording his statements, the penalties of stoppage of three increments on permanent basis and withholding of integrity for the year 1995-96 have been inflicted upon him by the I.G. Registration without holding any full-fledged disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. The representation of the petitioner against the aforesaid punishments has also been rejected by the State Government.
14. From the perusal of impugned order dated 7.3.2003 passed by the Tribunal it appears that Tribunal was of the opinion that penalty of stoppage of three increments permanently could not be inflicted upon the petitioner on the basis of show cause notice issued under provisions of Rule 55-B of CCA. Rules as the stoppage of increments permanently is a major punishment tantamount to reduction to a lower stage in a time scale and as such said punishment could not be inflicted without holding full-fledged disciplinary inquiry as contemplated under Rule 55 of C.C.A. Rules. The Tribunal has held that admittedly the proceedings were initiated under Rule 55-B of C.C.A. Rules and no full-fledged disciplinary inquiry as contemplated by Rule 55 of Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules was held against the petitioner before imposing the aforesaid penalties upon him accordingly quashed the order dated 18.11.1996 and order dated 4.12.1999 to that extent leaving it open for the disciplinary authority to hold fresh inquiry in accordance of with the provisions of law but so far as the order regarding withholding of integrity of petitioner for the year 1995-96 is concerned, the Tribunal has held that no interference is called for and held that integrity of the petitioner for the aforesaid year shall remain doubtful. To arrive at the aforesaid conclusion, the Tribunal has further held that since the withholding of integrity of petitioner is not a punishment under relevant rules of C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules 1930, and it is discretionary matter of Superior authority inasmuch as the penalty of holding the integrity of the petitioner to be remained doubtful has been awarded against him after considering his reply of show cause notice issued against him, therefore, no interference is called for and same shall remain intact.
15. Challenging the offending part of the conclusion drawn by Tribunal with regard to the doubtful integrity of petitioner for the year 1995-96, learned Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that once the Tribunal has reached a conclusion that punishments of withholding three increments of the petitioner on permanent basis is major punishment, which could not be inflicted upon him without holding full-fledged disciplinary inquiry, and procedure adopted in holding disciplinary inquiry was not proper and according to the relevant rules applicable for such inquiry and left the disciplinary authority to hold fresh inquiry if so desired, in such a circumstances of the case, there was no legal basis to sustain the punishment of withholding integrity of petitioner for the year 1995-96 which was outcome of the same disciplinary inquiry in connection of the same charge, which was admittedly found faulty by the Tribunal itself. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner appears to have some substance and deserves to be accepted.
16. To appreciate the submission of learned Counsel for petitioner and question in controversy involved in the case, it is necessary to point out that prior to commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant Discipline and Appeal Rules 1999 (for short 1999 Rules) the provisions of Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules 1930, (for short 1930 Rules) were applicable to the petitioner. Therefore, to arrive at correct conclusion it is necessary to examine the relevant Rule 14 classifying the services and Rule 49 describing the punishments to be awarded against the Government employee in the Disciplinary inquiry and the procedure for holding such Disciplinary inquiry pertaining to the said punishments under Rule 55 and Rule 55-B of 1930 Rules as under:
Rule 14- The Public Services in India shall be classified as follows:
(1) the All India Services;
(2) the Central Services Class I;
(3) the Central Services, Class II;
(4) the Provincial Service;
(5) the Specialist Service;
(6) the Subordinate Services.
Rule 49. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reason and as hereinafter provided, be imposed upon members of the services comprised in any of the classes (1) to (5) specified in Rule 14, namely
(i) Censure,
(ii) Withholding of increments including stoppage at an efficiency bar.
(iii) Reduction to a lower post or time-scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale,
(iv) Recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders,
(v) Suspension.
(vi) Removal from the Civil Service of the State which does not disqualify from future employment.
(vii) Dismissal from the Civil Service of the State which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment.
Rule 55. (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1850, no order (other than an order based on facts which had led to his conviction in a criminal Court or by a Court Martial) of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank (which includes reduction to a lower post or, time-scale or to a lower stage in time-scale but excludes the reversion to a lower post of a person who is officiating in a higher post) shall be passed on a person who is member of a Civil Service or holds a civil post under the State unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced in the form of definite charge or charges which shall be communicated to the person charged and which shall be so clear and precise as to give sufficient indication to the charged government servant of the facts and circumstances against him. He shall be required, within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted. At that inquiry such oral evidence will be heard as the inquiring officer considers necessary. The person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish, provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof. The officer conducting the inquiry may also separately from these proceedings, make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the charged Government servant.
(2) Where the punishing authority itself inquires into any charge or appoints an inquiring officer for holding an inquiry into such charge, the punishing authority, if it considers it necessary to do so, may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as 'Presiding Officer' to present the case on its behalf in support of the charge.
(3) The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case on his behalf, but not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer appointed by the punishing authority is a legal practitioner or the punishing authority having regard to the circumstance of the case, so permits.
(4) This rule shall not apply where the person concerned has absconded, or where it is for other reasons impracticable to communicate with him. All or any of the provisions of the rule may, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, be waived, where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements can in the opinion of the inquiring officer be waived without injustice to person charged.
(5) This rule shall also not apply where it is proposed to terminate the employment of either temporary Government servant or of a probationer whether during or at the end of the period of probation. In such cases a simple notice of termination, which in the case of a temporary Government servant, must conform to the conditions of his service, will be sufficient.
This was substituted by Notification No. 17/3/68-Appointment (3) CCA Rules, dated 22.3.1975.
Rule 55-B (a) Whenever the punishing authority is satisfied that good and sufficient reasons exist for adopting such a course it may impose the penalty of-
(i) Censure, or
(ii) Stoppage at an efficiency bar.
Provided that it shall not be necessary to frame formal charges against the Government servant concerned or to call for his explanation.
(b) In all cases where a punishing authority imposes the penalty of-
(i) withholding increments in the time-scale or stages where there is no efficiency bar, or
(ii) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders, formal proceedings embodying a statement of the offence or fault, the explanation of the person concerned, and the reasons for the punishment shall be recorded: Provided that it shall not be necessary to record such proceedings in cases where a Government servant's increment in the time-scale of his pay, at any stage other than an efficiency bar, is stopped due to his integrity remaining uncertified.
17. Before analysing the rules in question and examining the import of the penalties inflicted upon the petitioner, vis-a-vis submissions of learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it would be useful to refer a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab and Ors. 1990 Vol.61, F.L.R 635 (S.C) : 1991 SCC (L&S) 998, wherein while considering the import and effect of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect, in context of somewhat similar set of rules, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect is major penalty under the rule under consideration in aforesaid case as under:
5. Penalties:- The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government employee, namely:
Minor Penalties
(i) Censure;
(ii) withholding of his promotions;
(iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence or breach of orders;
(iv) withholding of increments of pay;
Major Penalties
(v) reduction to a lower state in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the Government employee will earn increments of pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period, the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay;
(vi) reduction to a lower time-scale of pay, grade, post or service which shall ordinarily be a bar to the promotion of the Government employee to the time-scale of pay, grade, post or service from which he was reduced, with or without further directions regarding conditions of restoration to the grade or post or service from which the Government employee was reduced and his seniority and pay on such restoration that grade, post or service;
(vii) compulsory retirement;
(viii) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the Government;
(ix) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for future employment under the Government.
Clauses VI to IX are not relevant to the facts of the case.
Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter undoubtedly is a minor penalty within the meaning of Rule 5(iv). But Sub-rule (v) postulates reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period with further directions as to whether or not the Government employee shall earn increments of pay during the period of such reductions and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay. It is an independent head of penalty and it could be imposed as punishment in an appropriate case. It is one of the major penalties. The impugned order of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect whether could fall within the meaning of Rule 5(v)? If it so falls Rules 8 and 9 of the Rules require conducting of regular enquiry. The contention of Shri Nayar, learned Counsel for the State is that withholding two increments with cumulative effect is only a minor penalty as it does not amount to reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay. We find it extremely difficult to countenance the contention. Withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule 5(iv) of the Rules. But when penalty was imposed withholding two increments, i.e., for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably means that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time-scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years' increments would not be counted in his time-scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words are the skin to the language which if pealed off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent. When we broach the problem from this perspective the effect is as envisaged under Rule 5 (v) of the Rules. It is undoubted that the Division Bench in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. (1). speaking for the division bench, while considering similar question in paragraph 8 held that the stoppage of increments with cumulative effect, by no stretch of imagination falls within Clause (v) of Rule 5 or in Rule 5 or in Rule 412 of Punjab Civil Services Rules. It was further held that under Clause (v) of Rule 5 there has to be a reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay by the competent authority as a measure of penalty and the period for which such a reduction is to be effective has to be stated and on restoration it has further to be specified whether the reduction shall operate to postpone the future increments of his pay. In such cases withholding of the increments without cumulative effect does not at all arise. In case where the increments are withhold with or without cumulative effect the Government employee is never reduced to a lower stage of time scale of pay. Accordingly it was held that Clause (iv) of Rule 5 is applicable to the facts of that case. With respect we are unable to agree with the High Court. If the literal interpretation is adopted the learned Judges may be right to arrive at that conclusion. But if the effect is kept at the back of the mind, it would always be so, the result will be the conclusion as we have arrived at. If the reasoning of the High Court is give acceptance, it would empower the disciplinary authority to impose, under the garb of stoppage of increments, of earning future increments in the time scale of pay even permanently with expressly stating so. This preposterous consequences cannot be permitted to be permeated. Rule 5(IV) does not empower the disciplinary authority to impose penalty of withholding increments of pay with cumulative effect except after holding inquiry and following the prescribed procedure. Then the order would be without jurisdiction or authority of law, and it would be per se void. Considering from this angle we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the Rules; it is a major penalty and imposition of the impugned penalty without enquiry is per se illegal.
18. A Division Bench of this Court had also considered the similar controversy in case of Sadanand Pandey v. Chief Secretary to the Government of U.P. and Ors. (1993) 1 U.P.L.B.E.C., 83. The pertinent observations made by this Court in para 6 and 7 of the decision is as under:
6. So far as the first argument is concerned, learned Counsel in support of his contention relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 1990 FLR 635. There is no dispute that Rule 14 of the Rules deals with penalties which may be awarded to the delinquent officer. It is, therefore, necessary to extracts Rule 14 of the Rules:
Rule 14.- The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on any member of the Staff;
(i) Censure.
(ii) Withholding of increments or promotion.
(iii) Recovery of the whole or part of the pecuniary loss caused to the College by negligence; or breach of orders;
(iv) Reduction to a lower service, grade or post or to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale;
(v) Compulsory retirement;
(vi) Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under the College;
(vii) Dismissal from service which shall be a disqualification for the future employment under the College; provided that no order imposing on any member of the staff of the penalties specified at (i), (ii), and (iii) above shall be passed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and unless the member of the staff concerned has been given an opportunity to make representation to the appointing authority;
Provided further that no order imposing on any member of the staff, penalties specified at (iv) to (vii) above shall be passed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and except after an enquiry has been held and the member of the staff has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him.
7. A perusal of the rule would show withholding of increments of pay has been treated as minor punishment but if the penalty is reduction to a lower service, grade or post or to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale it is treated as major penalty under Clause (iv) of Rule 14 of the Rules. In view of this the question which requires consideration is as to whether withholding of one increment permanently is a minor penalty or tantamount to a major penalty. If it is held that it is major penalty, admittedly, the procedure required for awarding major penalties has not been complied with, with the result such punishment would be liable to be set-aside. Under Rule 14 the penalties under Clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) can be given which are the minor penalties, by giving opportunity to the delinquent officer to make representation to the appointing authority, whereas penalties under Clause (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) can only be given after delinquent officer has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. No doubt withholding of increments of pay simpliciter is minor penalty within the meaning of Clause (ii) of Rule 14 of the Rules. But Sub-clause (iv) provides for reduction to a lower service, grade or post or to a lower time scale or in lower stage in a time scale, case where one increment of delinquent officer is permanently withheld. It means one increment earned by the petitioner which has been permanently withheld as minor punishment, is lost for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. The result will be that, the petitioner has been reduced to lower stage in time scale of pay. If the effect of loss of one increment is to reduce the petitioner in lower stage in the time scale, it would amount a major punishment within the meaning of Clause (iv) of Rule 14 of the Rules. We are, therefore, of opinion that withholding one increment of the petitioner permanently amounts to reduction to a lower stage in the time scale, which is major punishment. Admittedly the procedure prescribed for awarding major punishment having not under gone, the order of punishment withholding the petitioner's increment permanently deserves to be quashed.
19. From close analysis of the observation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (supra), it is clear that Hon'ble Apex Court has held that withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly comes within the meaning of Rule 5(iv) of the Rules, which is a minor penalty but when penalty was imposed withholding two increments, i.e., for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably means that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty for ever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put tack to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time-scale by two paces and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years' increments would not be counted in his time-scale of pay as a measure of penalty and held that impugned order would come within the meaning of Rule 5(v) of the Rules. It is major penalty and imposition of impugned penalty without inquiry is per se illegal. Similarly, Division Bench of this Court in Sadanand Pandey's case by placing reliance upon the aforesaid decision of Apex Court has held that withholding of increments of pay simpliciter is minor penalty within the meaning of Clause (ii) of Rule 14 of the Rules. But Sub-clause (iv) provides for reduction to a lower service, grade or post or to a lower time scale or in lower stage in a time scale, where one increment of delinquent officer is permanently withheld, it means one increment earned by the petitioner which has been permanently withheld as minor punishment, is lost for ever in his up-ward march of earning higher scale of pay. The result will be that, the petitioner has been reduced to a lower stage in a time scale of pay. If the effect of loss of one increment is to reduce the petitioner in a lower stage in a time scale, it would amount a major punishment within the meaning of Clause (iv) of Rule 14 of the Rules. Thus this Court has held that withholding of one increment of petitioner permanently is tantamount to reduction to a lower stage in a time scale, which is a major penalty. In our considered opinion, the view taken by Division Bench of this Court in Sadanand Pandey's case (Supra) is in complete consonance with the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Kulwant Singh Gill's case (Supra), which is binding upon us, and we are also in full agreement with the view taken by Division Bench of this Court. Learned Standing Counsel could not point out any ruling of Hon'ble Apex Court, contrary to the said proposition or at variance thereof.
20. Now applying the law enunciated hereinbefore, it is to be seen that under Rule 49 of 1930 Rules although, the penalties, which could be imposed upon the members of the service have been enumerated but without any headwise description thereof as to which of the said penalties would be minor penalties and which one would be major penalties. However, Rule 55(1), which prescribed the procedure for holding full-fledged disciplinary inquiry, prior to imposition of such penalties upon a Government employee has specifically stipulated the penalties of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank which includes reduction to a lower post or time scale or to a lower stage in a time scale. Thus, it leaves no scope for doubt to hold that, where the disciplinary authority intends to impose such penalties upon a Government employee, the same is under legal obligation to hold full-fledged disciplinary inquiry against Government employee, before inflicting such penalties upon the Government employee. Since withholding of one or two or three or more increments of Government employee on permanent basis has been held to be tantamount to reduction in rank as reduction to a lower stage in time scale as one of the major penalties, therefore, we are of the considered opinion that such penalties could not be imposed upon the Government servants governed by said Rules without holding full-fledged disciplinary inquiry as contemplated by Rule 55 of 1930 Rules against such Government servants. Since in the instant case, the petitioner's three increments have been stopped permanently without holding full-fledged disciplinary inquiry against him as contemplated under Rule 55 of 1930 Rules rather admittedly aforesaid punishments have been awarded to him merely by following the procedure prescribed under Rule 55-B of 1930 Rules, therefore, the impugned order is per-se illegal and cannot be sustained. The approach of Tribunal to that extent seems to be correct and we are in full agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal in this regard.
21. However, so far as the offending portion of the impugned judgment and order of Tribunal is concerned, in this connection the Tribunal has held that since the administrative authorities have passed the order after considering the materials and explanation submitted by the petitioner and further that declaring the integrity of petitioner doubtful for the year 1995-96 is an administrative order and dependent upon the discretion of authority who is entrusted with the appraisal of work and conduct of the petitioner and it is not a penalty enumerated under relevant rules of the 1930 Rules, therefore, no interference is called for and held to be remained intact. In this connection it is significant to mention that it is no doubt true that withholding of integrity certificate or holding the integrity of an employee doubtful is discretionary jurisdiction of superior administrative authority and has not been enumerated among the penalties or punishments under Rule 49 of the 1930 Rules, but in Gurdial Singh Fiji v. State of Punjab and Ors. , in somewhat different context in para 12 of the decision Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the circumstances that the Chief Secretary has to record a certificate does not confer upon unguided or unfettered discretion to assess the integrity of the officers by granting or refusing the integrity certificate at sweet will. The State Government has to certify the integrity of the eligible candidate with reference to the entries in his annual confidential report. It was further held in para 15 of the decision that in so far as the non issuance of the integrity certificate is concerned, it is undisputed that its only justification is the adverse report in confidential roll of the appellant for the year 1966-67. The circumstances surrounding the adverse entry may, therefore, bear examination for seeing whether such preponderating importance could on the facts, to which we will immediately advert, be given to the particular entry and Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that since the Government has failed to consider the explanation of the appellant and decide whether the adverse report was justified in that factual backdrop, it was held that non-issuance of integrity certificate was without any lawful justification.
22. Thus in view of such legal position, it is very difficult for us to subscribe the view taken by the Tribunal that since the non-issuance or withholding of integrity of employee has not been enumerated as one of the penalties mentioned under relevant rules i.e. Rule 49 of the 1930 Rules, and it is discretion of the Superior authority to certify or not, or to keep it to be remained doubtful and same has been awarded against the petitioner by the disciplinary authority after considering the reply of show cause notice given by the petitioner, in our considered opinion cannot be countenanced, for simple reason that firstly the impugned order dated 18.11.1996, clearly indicates that the petitioner's integrity has been held to be doubtful as measure of penalties, inflicted upon him along with the other penalties as a consequence of said disciplinary inquiry held against him, secondly, if it was not inflicted as a measure of punishment in that eventuality, there was no occasion to mention it in the same impugned order dated 18.11.1996 along with other punishments awarded to the petitioner and thirdly, if it was not mentioned as punishment under the relevant rules in that eventuality it was not open for the disciplinary authority to award such punishment, beyond the scope of the statutory rules, as such action of disciplinary authority on that count alone would be per-se illegal. Thus, in such facts and circumstances of the case it is very difficult for us to conceive that the withholding of integrity of petitioner for the year 1995-96, was somehow unconnected with the said disciplinary inquiry and could be justified independently besides, the said inquiry, therefore, in our considered opinion, there is hardly any scope for doubt to hold that said punishment was inflicted upon the petitioner as a result of the aforesaid disciplinary inquiry which was admittedly found faulty by the Tribunal itself.
23. Besides this, it is necessary to make it clear that integrity of public servant is backbone of the public service and public administration. To ensure efficiency in the public administration it is necessary that public servants must have absolute integrity. It plays very significant role in service career of public servants withholding integrity or holding the integrity doubtful or non-issuance of integrity certificate have penal consequence and is very fatal in service career of a government servant particularly in the matter of promotion as well as in according the benefits of higher pay scales depending upon the service rules or executive orders issued in this regard and also used in cases of compulsory retirement as well known in service jurisprudence. It is no doubt true that withholding of integrity certificate or holding the integrity doubtful of a Government servant has not been enumerated in any heads of penalties to be imposed upon Government servants under Rule 49 of 1930 Rules in our considered opinion not because of the reason that it has no penal consequence and adverse effect upon the service career of the Government employee, rather because of the reason that it is used to be recorded in the annual confidential roll of the employee, by superior officer, who is entrusted to keep superintendence upon such Government employee on the basis of appraisal and assessment of his annual work and conduct, and before recording such an adverse entry in the annual confidential report, the Superior authority is not required to hold any disciplinary inquiry against such employee whereas before imposing a punishment enumerated under Rule 49 of 1930 Rules or under such other service rules, the Disciplinary Authority is under legal obligation to hold disciplinary inquiry according to the procedure prescribed under such rules but once such adverse entry is recorded in the confidential report, the same is required to be communicated to the Government employee according to the rules or executive orders issued in this regard, asking the employee to submit his explanation. In our opinion, that is why withholding of integrity or holding the integrity of employee doubtful for particular year was not enumerated in head of penalties under relevant service rules, which require conducting the disciplinary inquiry before inflicting such penalties, therefore, one should not be confused with the situations under which such adverse remarks can be recorded in the annual confidential report of the employee and situation under which the same is awarded as punishment. In our considered opinion since in the case in hand, in the wake of aforesaid situation the integrity of the petitioner has been held to be doubtful as a result of disciplinary inquiry held against him, therefore, the reasons given by the Tribunal in this regard cannot be countenanced. In such facts and situation of the case we are unable to subscribe the views taken by Tribunal and in our considered opinion, the Tribunal ought to have quashed the entire order dated 18.11.1996 passed by I.G. Registration, inasmuch as subsequent order dated 4th December 1999 passed by the Government whereby the petitioner's appeal/representation against the aforesaid penalties has been rejected by the Government. Thus in given facts and circumstances of the case for the foregoing reasons the impugned orders dated 18.11.1996 and 4th December 1999 contained in Annexure 2 and 3 respectively to the writ petition and offending portion of impugned order dated 7.3.2000 passed by Tribunal whereby the petitioner's integrity for year 1995-96 left remained to be doubtful cannot be sustained and accordingly the same are hereby quashed with liberty to the respondent-authorities to hold fresh disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of law.
24. However, it is made clear that since we have not examined the charges on the basis of which show cause notices dated 7.3.1996, 16.3.1996 and 20.5.1996 were issued to the petitioner and reply of petitioner dated 9.4.1996 and 30.5.1996 to the said notices issued to him inasmuch as impugned orders dated 18.11.1996 and 4.12.1999 on merits and left it open to the disciplinary authority to hold a fresh disciplinary inquiry in accordance with the rules. The charges pertains to the year 1995 coupled with the facts that the Tribunal has left it open to the disciplinary authority to hold fresh inquiry, but even in absence of any interim order staying the operation of order passed by Tribunal, no inquiry has been held as yet by disciplinary authority to our notice. Therefore, in such a factual backdrop of the case, the respondent-State authorities are directed to consider the feasibility of fresh disciplinary inquiry de-novo, having regard to staleness and gravity of the charges, and availability of materials in proof of such charges and take a decision within a month. If the authorities come to the conclusion that a fresh disciplinary inquiry is still feasible, the same shall be concluded within further period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before the I.G. Registration, U.P. Allahabad.
25. The petitioner has filed another writ petition being Writ Petition No. 226 of 2006 which is third writ petition of the petitioner. By this petition the petitioner has challenged the order dated 16.9.2005 contained in Annexure 4 of the writ petition passed by I.G. Registration, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad whereby the petitioner has been retired compulsorily from service while working on the post of Sub-Registrar by seeking writ in the nature of certiorari, and further relief in the nature of mandamus has been sought for directing the respondents to take the petitioner in service with continuity of service till he attained the age of 60 years and also pay regular payment of salary including the arrears and increments.
26. The relief sought in the writ petition rests on the facts that the petitioner was duly appointed as Sub-Registrar in the year 1980 after due selection made by U.P. Public Service Commission. The date of birth of petitioner is 1.7.1953. If he would have been permitted to continue in service, he would have retired on 30th June 2013. It is stated that before compulsory retirement of petitioner, a Screening Committee was constituted which has recommended his retirement while taking into consideration his last 10 years' service records. It is stated that a tabular chart was prepared by Screening Committee based on annual confidential reports for the year 1994-95 to 2003-04, wherein the petitioner's remarks in annual confidential report in column 6 of the chart have been shown as good, very good and excellent from 1994-95 to 2002-2003 whereas no remark has been mentioned in respect of annual confidential report of year 2003-04. In column 7 of the aforesaid chart no reference has been made in regard to legal proceedings pending between the petitioner and department, whereas in fact such proceedings were pending before this Court and State Public Service Tribunal as well. In column 8 of tabular chart some the remarks have been mentioned. In this remarks' column four points have been mentioned. The correct fact is that the remarks mentioned at serial No. 2 has been omitted by the Department vide order dated 4.12.1999 and with regard to point No. 4 it is stated that it has been stayed by State Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 717 of 2005 vide order dated 19.7.2005 and with regard to the points mentioned at serial Nos. 1 and 3 two writ petitions namely Writ Petition No. 19760 of 2000 and Writ Petition No. 32758 of 2003 are pending before this Court. The order passed by State Government dated 4.12.1999, which has been referred hereinabove has been filed as Annexure 6 of the writ petition. The stay order granted by the Tribunal on 19.7.2005 is on record as Annexure 7 of the writ petition. The aforesaid stay order dated 19.7.2005 passed by Public Service Tribunal was tendered for receiving in the Office of I.G. Registration U.P. Allahabad by way of a letter dated 20.7.2005, a copy of letter dated 20.7.2005 is on record as Annexure 8 of the writ petition.
27. The petitioner has also asserted in writ petition that the constitution of Screening Committee was not according to the Government orders, inasmuch as the third member of Screening Committee which had held its meeting on 25.7.2005 namely Sri V.K. Pandey was junior to the petitioner and it was also not constituted according to Government order dated 23.9.2000 whereby the Special Secretary of Department concerned was required to be nominated as member of Screening Committee, where the appointing authority was Governor of Uttar Pradesh. It is further stated that the petitioner's appointing authority is Governor of State of Uttar Pradesh, however, the power of appointment was delegated to the I.G. Registration by Governor but such delegation of power of appointment does not embrace in it the power to make compulsory retirement of the petitioner. It is also stated that at serial No. 4 in the remarks column of Annexure 5 of writ petition in the tabular chart the fact of stay order granted by Tribunal has not been mentioned against the punishment awarded to the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner has filed contempt petition No. 245 of 2005 against the I.G. Registration, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad in which 6th January 2006 was fixed for reply before the State Public Service Tribunal. It is also stated that not mentioning the matter subjudiced before Hon'ble Court in remarks column in the tabular chart showed that action of respondent was arbitrary and by by concealing the various material facts from the screening committee, the impugned order has been passed against the petitioner. In give facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order is vitiated under law and cannot be sustained.
28. Contrary to it, in justification of the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the petitioner, a detailed counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-State authorities sworn by Sri Sita Ram Meena, I.G. Registration, U.P., Allahabad in the writ petition. The pertinent averments made in para 8 of the counter affidavit are reproduced as under:
8. That the petitioner during his tenure of working as Sub Registrar was awarded the following punishment:
1. By the order dated 18.11.1996 the integrity of the petitioner was withhold and the petitioner's three annual increments with cumulative effect were also stopped. However, the same, by a subsequent order dated 31.1.2005 of the I.G. Registration, was further amended in view of the order of the tribunal The claim petition filed by the petitioner was partly allowed and the portion in the impugned order dated 18.11.1996 and order dated 4.12.1999 whereby three increments of the claimant have been withheld permanently was quashed. Rest of the order contained in the impugned order aforesaid, relating to claimant integrity being doubtful, remained intact. A copy of the said order dated 7.3.2003 of the tribunal is being annexed as Annexure C.A.-1.
2. The petitioner was given adverse entry by the order dated 20.9.1996 for not achieving the target of income given by the department. However, the same was expunged by an order of the Govt. dated 4.12.1999 on the representation of the petitioner. A copy of the said order dated 4.12.1999 of the Government is being annexed as Annexure C.A.-2.
3. The petitioner's integrity of the year 1997-98 was again declared doubtful by the order dated 11.4.2000 withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect. A copy of the order dated 11.4.2000 is being annexed as Annexure C.A.-3.
4. The integrity of the petitioner of the year 1998-1999 was declared doubtful along with adverse entry by the order dated 19.9.2001 of the I.G. Registration. The representation filed by the petitioner against that was dismissed by the Government. A copy of the order of the Government dated 29.01.02 dismissing the representation of the petitioner is being annexed as Annexure-C.A.-4. However, the petitioner got an interim order dated 19.7.2005 in the Claim Petition No. 717/2005 filed in the U.P. Public Service Tribunal against the order dated 29.1.2002 of the Government dismissing the representation of the petitioner and subsequently I.G. Registration has passed an order dated 12/29 August 2005 in regard and compliance of the same which is being annexed as Annexure C.A.-5.
29. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case the order, which we propose to pass in the writ petition, we need not to examine the rival submissions of learned Counsel for the parties on question of validity of constitution and composition of screening committee inasmuch as the question of appointing authority of the petitioner and we leave it open to be decided in appropriate case. However, we would like to examine the validity of impugned order from other angles. From the perusal of reports of screening committee and tabular chart prepared by it and averments contained in the counter affidavit, it is clear, that screening committee has considered last 10 years service records, by fixing 31.3.2005 as a cut off date for the purpose of screening the service record of the candidates coming under zone of consideration.
30. From perusal of Annexure 5 of the writ petition which is a tabular chart prepared by Screening Committee, it is clear that in column 6 of the tabular chart the concise remarks pertaining to entries made in confidential report of the petitioner from year 1994-1995 to 2003-2004 have been given. In respect of year 1994-1995 the remark has been made as good (Uttam), for the same year w.e.f. 1.4.1995 to 26 9.1995 the remark has been made excellent. For the year 1995-1996 the remark has been made excellent. For the year 1996-97 the remark has been made excellent (Utkrist), for the year 1997-98 the remark has been made very good (Ati uttam) and for the year 1998-99 the remark was good (uttam). Again for the year 1999-2000 the remark has been made very good (Ati uttam), same remark has been made in respect of year 2000-01, 2001-02, 2002-03 and no remark has been made in respect of year 2003-04. Thus from the perusal of remarks made in respect of annual confidential report of the petitioner for last nine years, there is nothing to indicate that any adverse remark has been made in respect of annual confidential report of the petitioner.
31. However, in column 8 of the aforesaid tabular chart, four other remarks have been mentioned. At point No. 1 it has been stated that vide order dated 18.11.1996 the petitioner's integrity for the year 1995-96 has been held to be doubtful with further penalty of stoppage of three increments on permanent basis with cumulative effect. The penalty of stoppage of three increments has been set aside vide order dated 31.1.2005 but the integrity of aforesaid year remained intact doubtful. In this connection it is also necessary to point out that against the aforesaid penalties initially the petitioner has filed claim petition before U.P. Public Service Tribunal and against the offending part of the decision of U.P. Public Service Tribunal dated 7.3.2003 filed a writ petition before this Court namely Writ Petition No. 32758 of 2003 which we have disposed of with a direction to hold fresh disciplinary inquiry by quashing the offending part of the decision of U.P. Public Service Tribunal dated 7.3.2003, as a consequence of which there remains nothing against the petitioner so far as point No. 1 is concerned. So far as point No. 2 is concerned that petitioner was given adverse censure entry vide order dated 20.9.1996, but in para 8 (2) of the counter affidavit it is stated that the same was expunged by an order of Government dated 4.12.1999 on the representation of the petitioner. A copy of the said order dated 4.12.1999 is on record as Annexure CA-2 to this affidavit. Therefore, the statement of fact made at point No. 2 has also become non-existent fact.
32. In the aforesaid chart, at point No. 3 it has been stated that vide order dated 11.4.2000 the petitioner's integrity for year 1997-98 was declared doubtful and penalty of withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect was also inflicted upon him. In this connection it is pointed out that while challenging the order dated 11.4.2000 the petitioner has filed another writ petition namely Writ Petition No. 19760 of 2000. While deciding the aforesaid writ petition we have quashed the order dated 11.4.2000, as such the statement of fact made at point No. 3 has also become non-existent fact. Besides this at point No. 4 it has been stated that vide order dated 19.9.2001 the petitioner's integrity for the year 1998-99 has been withheld and against the aforesaid order the petitioner's representation has also been rejected by the Government. In this connection it is to be pointed out that the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid orders dated 19.9.2001 and 29.1.2002 whereby the representation against the aforesaid punishment has been rejected by the State Government in Claim Petition No. 717 of 2005. While entertaining the aforesaid claim petition vide order dated 19.7.2005 the Tribunal has stayed the effect and operation of the aforesaid order under challenge and there is nothing on record to indicate that the aforesaid claim petition has been decided by U.P. Public Service Tribunal or the interim order dated 19.7.2005 has ever been vacated or modified by the Tribunal itself. Although the order under challenge would not be wiped off on account of aforesaid interim order but at moment the effect of interim order would be that the orders dated 19.9.2001 and 29.1.2002 could not be given effect to. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances of the case the facts stated at point No. 4 would also stand modified in the manner indicated hereinabove.
33. Thus in view of these facts and circumstances of the case there remains nothing adverse against the petitioner on the basis of which Screening Committee could have based its decision to recommend compulsory retirement of the petitioner and we are of the opinion that in such facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order dated 16.9.2005 contained in Annexure 4 of the writ petition passed by I.G. Registration, retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the same is hereby quashed. In the result the petitioner would be reinstated in service for the limited purpose of completion of disciplinary inquiries as directed by us in preceding paragraphs of our judgment.
34. However, so far as the matter pertaining to punishment of petitioner vide order dated 19.9.2001 and order of State Government dated 29.11.2002 the petitioner's claim petition No. 717 of 2005 appears to be still pending before the U.P. Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow, therefore, we are of the opinion that the parties should exchange and complete their affidavits before Tribunal within one month if not completed earlier and Tribunal shall take final decision in the claim petition within a period of two months.
35. In view of our observations and directions made in the earlier part of the judgment we further direct that the Authorities shall complete their exercise within the stipulated period of time and after completion of such exercise as indicated in the body of judgment, the matter of the petitioner shall be re-examined and reviewed by Screening Committee to be constituted in accordance with the provisions of law having regard to cut off date mentioned in the earlier meeting of Screening Committee and the appropriate authority shall take a decision in accordance with law within a further period of one month. In case the petitioner succeeds in the disciplinary inquiries as indicated in earlier part of the judgment and petitioner is actually reinstated in service, the authority while reinstating the petitioner in service shall also take decision on the question of quantum of arrears of salary to be paid to the petitioner during the period interregnum i.e. from the date of compulsory retirement of the petitioner till his actual reinstatement in service and pass appropriate order regarding other service benefits to be given to the petitioner including the promotion within a further period of one month from the date of production of certified copy of this order before I.G. Registration, U.P. Allahabad.
36. In view of foregoing observations and directions, all the three writ petitions stand allowed to the extent indicated hereinbefore in the body of judgment.
37. There shall be no order as to costs.